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I would also like to thank Professor James Gibson for ~greeing to 
become my supervisor in place of Professor Molteno at a very. late 
stage when the thesis had actually been completed and was in the 
course of preparation. 
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SUMMARY. 
This thesis deals with the international law position of those 
entities which may be said to have status in relation to the territory 
known as Rhodesia (or Southern Rhodesia, if one is to give it its 
original name). These entities are the State of Rhodesia, the 
Government of Rhodesia, the People of Rhodesia and the United Kingdom 
which claims to exercise sovereignty over the territory of Rhodesia. 
Since the ambit of the thesis concerns the international law position 
of these entities it follows that other international law problems 
relating to Rhodesia, which concern third states and international 
organizations, fall outside its scope. These latter problems 
relate to obligations of third states and competences of inter-
national organizations to take action in the Rhodesian situation and 
do not relate to the status of Rhodesia itself. This thesis 
therefore does not deal with such matters as the imposition of 
sanctions by the United Nations and the obligations of member 
states to participate in them. However, where obligations of third 
states are inextricably connected with the status of the territory 
itself, it is necessary to treat them. Thus the "duty not to 
recognize" Rhodesia owed by third states received full treatment 
in all its various facets for recognition is a concept which is 
of cardinal importance in considering status. 
For the pur~oses of exposition the thesis is divided into two main 
parts, a historical part and a contemporary part. It must be 
stressed that the historical part is of an introductory nature 
only. The purpose is merely to provide background information 
for the treatment of the relevant contemporary legal problems. 
It does not in any way claim to be an exhaustive exposition of the 
matters/ .. 
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matters with which it deal s but is more in the nature of a summary. 
The historical part comprises the first two chapters of the thesis. 
Chapter I is entitled "Summary of the Constitutional Position of 
Southern Rhodesia up to 11th November, 1965." This outlines the 
constitutional structure of the Protectorate of Southern Rhodesia, 
1894-1923 and the Colony of Southern Rhodesia, 1923-1965. It 
deac~ibes specifically the legislative, executive and Judicial 
powers, the franchise and human rights pertaining at different times. 
The effect of the creation and dissolution of the Federation of 
Rhodesia and Nyasaland, 1953-1963, on the constitutional structure 
of the Colony is also described. Finally a review of the abortive 
negotiations between the United Kingdom and Southern Rhodesia 
Governments, 1963-1965, on the question of independence for Southern 
Rhodesia is given. This latter review attempts to highlight the 
important points of difference between the parties which constituted 
obstacles in the path of a grant of independence to Rhodesia. 
Chapter II is entitled "The International Status and Personality 
of Southern Rhodesia before 11th November, 1965." This Chapter 
considers the international status of the territory under Lobengula, 
its status as a British sphere of influence, as a Protectorate 
and as a Colony. The effect of the creation and dissolution of 
the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland on the status of the 
territory, the international status of the Federation and of the 
former British South Africa Company are also considered. The 
question whether Southern Rhodesia could be regarded as a non-
self-governing territory within the meaning of Article 73 of the 
United Nations Charter between 1945 and 1965 is then discussed. 
Finally the extent of Southern Rhodesian international personality 
before 1965 is considered. Here its personality as a member of 
various/ ..... 
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various international organizations, as a party to treaties, as the 
possessor of diplomatic rights and a right of protection and as a 
bearer of international responsibility are described. 
The second main part of the work, dealing with contemporary problems 
encountered, is entitled "Rhodesia since the Unilateral Declaration 
of Independence." This part deals with the international law 
position of the entities which may be said to have status in relation 
to the territory known as Rhodesia. It comprises four Chapters. 
Chapter III is entitled "The State of Rhodesia". This chapter 
commences with an analysis of the nature, effect and legality of 
the Unilateral Declaration of Independence. The act is ssen as 
one which attempts to make certain constitutional and international 
law changes in the status guo. In the international law sphere it 
is seen as the employment of the device of notification and as a 
result affording an opportunity for the employment of the devices of 
protest and recognition by other states. The constitutionality of 
the act naturally receives considerable attention and the inter-
national law significances of the unconstitutional act are discussed. 
The legality of the declaration from the point of view of international 
law is considered as also are various allegations that the declaration 
constituted an act of aggression, an infringement of the principle 
of self-determination, an act of irresponsibility and a violation of 
the basic policies of the Charter of the United Nations. 
The question whether Rhodesia fulfils the criteria of independent 
statehood is next examined and the answer found to be in the 
affirmative. In considering this question it has been necessary 
to examine in some depth the newly proposed requirements of inde-
pendent statehood, viz. the requirement that a state should not only 
-viii-
be effective in the traditional sense of exacting habitual obedience 
but should also be effective in making and executing all those 
decisions that a good government should make and the requirement 
that a state should not be a "manipulated" state. 
The next topic brings us to the heart of the thesis, the question 
being whether recognition of a state is a prerequisite for the enjoyment 
of international personality. This involved an examination of the 
doctrinal dispute concerning the Constitutive and Declaratory 
theories of recognition. The two theories are outlined and the 
impossibility of avoiding a preference for one or the other is dis-
cussed. Attention is also drawn to the fact that juristic writings, 
state practice and court decisions are completely at variance 04 
the matter. The arguments in favour of each of the theories and 
the compromise approacheE are analysed and discussed. A~er 
considering these, conclusions are then expressed on the nature of 
the act of recognition as being essentially unilateral, discretionary , 
constitutive and a matter of intention in relation to its existence, 
scope, retrospectivity and prospectivity. Views are then expressed 
on the nature of international personality and of international 
society. Since the controversy concerning the constitutive or 
declaratory role of recognition is vital to the status of Rhodesia, 
and as many other views expressed in other parts of this thesis 
depend on the answer to this question, it was felt that the matter 
should be examined in depth and that is why the writer has devoted 
over 9ne hundred pages to the topic. 
Lauterpacht's controversial theory that there is a duty to recognize 
a state which meets the test of independent statehood is next 
examined in the light of state practice and conceptual and 
Juristic problems. The theory is rejected and the conclusion is 
Preferred / .... 
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preferred that there is no duty to recognize Rhodesia. 
The duty not to recognize prematurely is then considered and found 
not to be applicable to Rhodesia. Possible treaty duties not to 
recognize arising under Article 2 (5) of the Charter of the United 
Nations and under various resolutions of the United Nations, in 
particular S. Res. 277 (1970) are discussed. It is asserted that 
under the latter resolution there is a duty not to recognize 
Rhodesia. The scope and extent of that duty are considered. It 
is also argued that there is no duty not to recognize a state 
which is constitutionally based on the denial of the right of self-
determination. Finally the validity of an act of recognition 
which contravences a "duty not to recognize" is discussed and the 
sutmission is made that the act, though unlawful, can be valid. 
The question whether recognition has been accorded to Rhodesia is 
next considered. In this context attention is drawn to the 
competing international law claims to complete sovereignty over 
Rhodesia ..c the Rhodesfa!l claim and the British claim. The Rhodesian 
claim is not expressly recognized by any other state. Whether 
implied recognition of the Rhodesian claim can be inferred from 
various factors is next considered. These are the conduct of 
negotiations, maintenance of official,trade, consular and diplomatic 
relations, conclusion of bilateral treaties, United Nations action 
under both Chapters VI and VII of the Charter and United Kingdom 
invocation of United Nations assistance. The conclusion is 
expressed that there has been no implied recognition of Rhodesian 
claims to independence by any other state. It is then found that 
the competing British claim to exercise complete sovereignty over 
Rhodesia has been recognized by all states except South Africa. 
The South African attitude is then analysed and a compromise solution 
is/ ..... . 
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is offered in which it is submitted that South Africa still 
continues to recognize the status quo ante U.D.I . 
Conclusions are then expressed on the extent of Rhodesian personality. 
These are based upon the views previously advocated on the constit-
utive nature of recognition and on the extent to which there can 
be said to be recognition of Rhodesia. Rhodesia is found to 
have a limited international personality in three spheres; in its 
relationship wlth South Africa; as a member of certain international 
organizations ; in its relationship with member states of the 
Organization of American States. 
The implications of limited Rhodesian personality are then discussed. 
In the limited spheres where its personality is operative, it is 
capable of having rights and duties. Outside these spheres, it 
has no rights and duties. Thus it may make no claims on other 
states but is in turn not subject to claims by other states. In 
the light of this, various allegations that Rhodesia has violated 
international law are examined and rejected. 
Chapter IV is entitled "The Government of Rhodesia". It commences 
by distinguishing the concept of government from that of state, 
the former being merely an element of the latter. Rhodesia is 
. found to have an effective government which is unconstitutional in 
origin. The question whether recognition is necessary to give 
international status t o that effective government is then discussed 
and a preference for the C.Onstitutive theory is also expressed 
here. Just as in the case of states a duty to recognize govern-
ments is rejected so that no state has a duty to recognize the 
Government of Rhodesia. Possible duties not to recognize a 
government are then discussed. The duty not to recognize a govern-
ment prematurely is found to be inapplicable to the Government of 
Rhodesia/ .... 
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Rhodesia, The doctrine of legitimacy, the doctrine of subsequent 
legitimation and unwillingness to observe international law are 
all discussed and found not to impose a duty not to recognize a 
government. A treaty duty not to recognize the Government of 
Rhodesia is found to exist by virtue of S . Res. 277 (1970). 
The extent of recognition which has been accorded to the Government 
of Rhodesia is next considered. This matter is simplified by the 
rule that non-recognition of state, of necessity involves non-
recognition of government. Thus the Government of Rhodesia is only 
capable of being recognized in the three spheres in which the State 
of Rhodesia has a limited personality. These three spheres are 
then examined and the Government of Rhodesia is found only to have 
international status in one of these spheres, viz. the relationship 
with South Africa. The consequences both in international law and 
in municipal law of the limited status of the Rhodesian Government 
are then discussed in relation to the giving of cognizance to its 
acts in other states, its locus standi before the courts of other 
states, jurisdictional immunities and diplomatic imnumities in other 
states, recovering property situated in other states, money-
is9uing capacity and postage stamp issuing capacity. The effect of 
S Res. 277 (1970) on these matters and on the general question of 
giving effect to the legal system of Rhodesia in the courts of other 
states is also considered. 
Finally the individual responsibility of the members of the Rhodesian 
Government is considered. Their conduct is found not to fall within 
any of the established categories of individual responsibility in 
international law. 
Chapter Vis entitled "The People of Rhodesia". It commences by 
discussing/ ..... . 
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discussing the concept of "people" and the capacity of individuals 
to be the bearers of rights and duties in international law. 
The question whether a right of self-determination exists is next 
considi-red and the question is answered in the negative . The view 
is also expressed that even if the right of self-determination 
did exist and inhere in the people of Rhodesia, it would not be 
available against Rhodesia but it might be available against the 
United Kingdom. 
The question whether any human rights under international law 
inhere in the people of Rhodesia is next considered. The 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Charter of the Unitd 
Nations and the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundam-
atal Freedoms are considered as possible sources of such rishts 
but are rejected for differing reasons. It has been alleged that 
Rhodesia has violated traditional human rights such as would have 
justified humanitarian intervention. The traditional human rights 
in question are examined and found to be non-existent. An important 
matter which receives attention here is whether a customary norm 
of non-discrimination on the basis of race can be said to have 
evolved. An affirmative answer is given to this question but for 
reasons which concern its lack of international personality, the 
norm is found not to bind Rhodesia in its relationship with its 
own citizens. 
The rights of para-military forces operating in Rhodesia agai nst 
Rhodesian and South African forces is next discussed. The laws 
of war are found to be inapplicable to the contest in question. 
For various reasons, the rights bestowed by the Geneva Conventions, 
1949 are also found to be inapplicable and the conclusion is ex-
pressed that the conflict in Rhodesia is not governed by 
international/ 
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international law. 
The right to protect the people of Rhodesia diplomatically is next 
treated. The general rules vf diplomatic protection and the role 
of recognition in relation to the same are discussed. It is 
found that Rhodesia may exercise a right of diplomatic protection 
against South Africa while the relevant right resides in the United 
Kingdom in relation to other states. Finally the rather complicated 
position in relation to protection in cases of dual and multiple 
nationality and the protection of corporations is outlined. 
Chapter VI is entitled "The United Kingdom". The latter claims 
complete sovereignity over the territory of Rhodesia and claims 
to be its government. Hence, in considering the status of the 
territory, it is imperative to describe the special position of the 
United Kingdom in relation to it. However, this chapter deals 
only with the special position of the United Kingdom and embraces 
only those legal situations which are peculiar to the United 
Kingdom itself. The chapter does not deal with general legal 
situations which concern other states Just as much as the United 
Kingdom. Thus obligations to participate in various United Nations 
sanctions directed against Rhodesiaar'e not considered because in this 
respect the United Kingdom is in precisely the same position as 
other merrber states of the United Nations. Such obligations have 
nothing to do with the special relationship between the United 
Kingdom and the territory. 
The very substantial degree of United Kingdom personality in 
relation to the territory flowing from near-universal recognition 
is first described. The consequences of this for other states are 
then outlined. 
The / ....•. 
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The responsibility of the United Kingdom for acts committed in 
Rhodesia is next considered. The general principles of state 
responsibility are discussed. A distinction is drawn between 
responsibility for the acts of 'authorized'officials, i.e. those 
instructed by the United Kingdom to carry on functioning a~er 
U.D .I., and responsibility for acts of the 'rebel• officials in 
Rhodesia. United Kingdom responsibility in relation to negligence 
in preventing and suppressing the Rhodesian rebellion and negligence 
in protecting the rights of aliens in Rhodesia, responsibility 
for the ommission of the Rhodesian Government to pay interest on 
Rhodesian loans, for acts of para-military forces and of South 
African forces operating in Rhodesia are all discussed. In most 
of these cases the United Kingdom is found to bear little or no 
responsibility. 
The special competences of the United Kingdom in relation to 
Rhodesia are next considered. The United Kingdom may naturally 
take such measures as are objectively legal in international law. 
A variety of such measures have been taken and the principal 
examples here are grouped into a classification comprising economic, 
financial, political and constitutional measures. The United 
Kingdom may also take action against Rhodesia which is prima. 
facie a breach of international law, because of lack of Rhodesian 
personality against it. Not only may the United Kingdom take action 
against Rhodesia but it also has some special competences to take 
action against third states which would normally be a breach of 
international law. The special competences have been conferred 
on it by resolutions of the Security Council of the United 
Nations. The United Kingdom has the competence to conduct the 
Beira "Blockade". The general characteristics and Charter basis 
of I ..... . 
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of this competence are discussed. The United Kingdom had the 
competence to detain the tanker Joanna V. It has the competence 
to rescind certain binding treaties relating to Rhodesia. Finally 
it has the competence to grant independence to Rhodesia. 
The special obligations of the United Kingdom are next considered. 
Its obligations in relation to Rhodesian loans and public debt in 
its capacity as the recognized government of Rhodesia are examined 
and found to exist. Next its sgecial obligations as a member state 
of the United Nations are considered. These include its obligations 
as an administering power under Articles 73(e) and 74 of the Charter 
of the United Nations , its obligation to end repressive measures in 
Rhodesia under S . Res. 253 (1968), its obligations to consider 
in good faith various recommendations ma.de to it by organs of the 
United Nations and finally its obligations relating to the grant 
of independence to Rhodesia. In the latter connection several 
important obligations are examined in some detail. The customary 
norm of non-discrimination on racial grounds is found to be relevant. 
Thus the United Kingdom should ensure that the constitution of an 
independent Rhodesia granted by it should be in conformity with the 
norm. Independence on the basis of the 1965 Constitution, the 
1969 Constitution, the Tiger Proposals, the Fearless Proposals 
and the Anglo-Rhodesian Proposals for a Settlement,1971 is examined 
critically in the light of the nor m of non-discriminat i on. 
The obligation to develop self-government under Article 73 of 
Charter is also considered. The "six principles", insisted on by 
the United Kingdom in negotiations with Rhodesia, are construed 
as an attempt to grant a genuine self-government to Rhodesia 
which would be in accordance with the obligations of the United 
Kingdom under Article 73. Independence on the basis of the 1965 
Constitution/, ... 
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Constitution, the 1969 Constitution, the Tiger Proposals, the 
Fearless Proposals and the Anglo-Rhodesian Proposals for a 
Settlement, 1971, is again examined critically, and in detail, 
in the light of each of the six principles individually. 
Obligations incumbent on the United Kingdom in relation to a 
grant of independence to Rhodesia under binding United Nations 
resolutions are next considered and analysed. These are found 
to add somewhat to the obligations already subsisting under the 
norm of non-discrimination and Article 73 of the Charter. 
Whether the United Kingdom can be expected to use force in 
implementing its obligations under these resolutions is also 
discussed and the question answered in the negative. 
The question of the effect of the impossibility of fulfilling the 
above obligations is then considered. A distinction is drawn 
betwern the possibility of granting an "appropriate" independence to 
Rhodesia, on the one hand, and the possibility of denying an 
"inappropriate" independence to Rhodesia on the other hand. The 
latter, from its very nature, is found to be possible while the 
former is, for the moment at any rate, impossible f or the United 
Kingdom. Because of this, it is stibmitted that relative i m-
possibility temporarily suspends Uni ted Kingdom obligations here. 
Obligations which the United Kingdom may possibly owe as a member 
state of the British Commonwealth of Nations are next examined. 
The various undertakings given by the United Kingdom in the 
Commonwealth context are described. The inter se doctrine is 
discussed and the conclusion is preferred that none of these 
undertakings embody international obligations for the United 
Kingdom. 
The/ ..... . 
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The last subject discussed in the the thesis is the effect of a 
hypothetical grant of independence by the United Kingdom to 
Rhodesia. The effect of this on the international personality 
of Rhodesia and the obligations and international responsibility 
of the United Kingdom in respect of the territory are outlined. 
The question of state succession to treaties by Rhodesia on such 
a grant is considered. The general rules of state succession are 
discussed, and the possibility of the doctrine of reversion to 
sovereignty applying in the case of Rhodesia is considered and 
rejected. Finally the question of the continuance of United 
Nations sanctions in the event of a grant of independence to 
Rhodesia is discussed. In this regard the rebus sic stantibus 
doctrine is considered and the answer to the question is found 
to depend on whether the independence granted is an "appropriate" 
independence, i.e. one which is in accordance with the international 
law obligations of the United Kingdom, or an "inappropriate" 
independence, i.e. one which contravenes the international law 
obligations of the United Kingdom. 
In compiling the bibliography, I have omitted references to standard 
general work on public international law as these would, in any event, 
be consulted in a work of t~s nature. The bibliography consists 
of a select academic reading list containing monographs and articles 
appearing in Journals. 
Finally my opinions on the various problems encountered are statcj 
in the light of materials available to me on 31st March, 1973. 
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PART I 
HISTORICAL SUMMARY 
CHAPrER I 
SUMMARY OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL POSITION OF SOUTHERN RHODESIA UP 
TO 11TH NOVEMBER, l!e5 
SECTION I 
INTI10DUCTION 
In this introductory section the constitutional development of 
Southern Rhodesia up to 11th November, 1965, is outlined. More 
details of such development are furnished in the remaining sections 
of the Chapter. In the second section, the development of the con-
stitution of the Protectorate of Southern Rhodesia is described. 
The third section portrays the history of constitutional development 
in the Colony of Southern Rhodesia and pays attention, where necess-
ary, to the effect of the creation and dissolution of the Federation 
of Rhodesia and Nyasaland on this. This is followed in the fourth 
section by a review of the negotiations between the Southern 
Rhodesian and United Kingdom authorities concerning the grant of 
independence to Southern Rhodesia. It is hoped that the review will 
isolate the issues which lay between Southern Rhodesia and the 
United Kingdom, most of which turned out to be obstacles in the path 
of a grant of independence to Southern Rhodesia. 
It must be stressed, however, that this Chapter is merely of an 
introductory nature. Its main purpose is to provide background 
material for the discussion of problems relating to the status of 
Rhodesia in the post-U.D.I. era. It does not attempt to be a de-
tailed exposition of the constitutional law of Southern Rhodesia 
in the pre-U.D.I. era. 
In/••. 
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In 1889 the British South Africa Company was chartered •1 ) It exer-
cised a form of administration in Mashonaland for a year. 2 ) This 
administration had, however, no constitutional basis because in terms 
of the Charter of the Company, it only obtained permission to exer-
cise such governmental powers as it might acquire by concession, 
grant, agreement or treaty subject to the approval of the Secretary 
of State •3 ) These powers had not been so acquired. 
In 1891 an Order in Council was promulgated in terms of which the 
territory was to be a British protectorate. 4 ) Th1.f3 vested general 
powers of administration and legislation in the High Commissioner for 
South Africa.5) Such administration as Lobengula acquiesced in was 
not, however, performed by the High Commissioner but by the British 
South Africa Company under permission from the Crown6 ) and subject to 
a measure of supervision by the High Commissioner.7) 
1) For text of Charter see c.5918, No. 128, Encl., pp.227-232. 
2) Palley, pp. 40-41. 
3 ) Charter of the Company, Art. 2. See Palley, pp. 34-36; Foreign 
Jurisdiction Act (53 & 54 Viet. c.37). 
4) South Africa Order in Council, 9th May, 1891. Strictly speaking 
a protectorate is not a British possession but foreign territory. See J.E.S. Fawcett, "Treaty Relations of British Overseas Territ-
ories", (26) B.Y .I.L., 1949., p.86 at p.88. See too Foreign 
Jurisdiction Act (53 & 54 Viet. c.37). 
5) Order in Council, note 4) supra, S.2. 
6) Order in Council, note 4) supra, S .8. 
7' Order in Council, note 4) supra, S .4. See Palley, pp .~-94 
who shows that in fact the High Commissioner proposed virtually 
to take over the government of the country but that the Colonial Office was not agreeable and ordered him only to exercise his legislative and administrative powers in except ional cases. Georges Fischer, "Le Probleme Rhodesien", (11) Annuaire Francais de Droit International, 19:>5, p.41 says that: "ce regime 
represente une survivance tardive dfune methode d'administration 
coloniale disparue bien plus tSt partout ailleurs." 
-3-
In 1893-94 Company forces overcame Lobengula and by this conquest 
the Crown acquired jurisdiction over Southern Rhodesia .8 ) Jurisdict-
ion may be acquired over a protectorate by conquest coupled with an 
omission to annex the territory. 9) On 18th July. 1894 an Order in 
Council was promulgated providing for the administration of the 
terr! tory. lO) The Protectorate so established continued till 1923 
when by Order in Council Southern Rhodesia was annexed •11 ) Letters 
Patent issued in the same year provided a constitution establishing 
responsible government . 12 ) Thus from 1923 to 1~5 Southern Rhodesia 
was a self-governing Bt'itish Colony.13 ) It is now necessary to out-
line briefly the constitutional structures of the Protectorate of 
Southern Rhodesia and the Colony of Southern Rhodesia respectively. 
_______________________ Section II/ ••• 
8) In re Southern Rhodesia [1919] A.C. ~11 at 221; Palley, p. 110. 
Sir Arnold McNair K.c •• "Aspects of State Sovereignty" (26) 
B.Y.I.L., 1949, p.6 at p.30. 
9) Palley, pp. 110-111; ftbeysekera v. Jayatilake [1932] A.C. 
260 at 264. 
16) Matabeleland Order in Council, 18th July, 1894. Palley, p .114 
points out that despite its misleading title it was to apply to 
all territories which were to comprise the future Southern 
Rhodesia. 
11) Southern Rhodesia (Annexation) Order in Council, 1923, 
30th July, 1923. 
12) Letters Patent, 1st September, 1923. 
13) Palley, p.215 points out that it is a myth that Southern 
Rhodesia enjoyed~ self-government for a period of some 
forty years, that at first it enjoyed partial self-government 
and that even as late as 1959 it was described as being not 
fully self-governing. 
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SECTION II 
CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE PRarECTORATE. 
In a British protectorate the control of external affairs is vested 
in the Parent State but the latter may also have varying degrees of 
control in relation to the internal affairs of the protectorate.1 ) 
In fact the Crown is deemed to have absolute powers over such a protect-
orate because strictly speaking the protectorate is foreign territory.2 ) 
The acts of the Crown, whether by way of legislation or administration , 
are regarded as being performed against foreigners abroad. Such acts 
are therefore acts of State and are not challengeable in the courts.3 ) 
It is possible, of course, for these powers of the Crown, derived from 
prerogative to be restricted or regulated by Act of Parliament.4 ) It 
is also possible for such powers to be extended by Act of Parliament.5) 
Under the Order in Council of 1894 the legislative power was vested 
in the Board of Directors of the Company.6 ) Enactments, however, 
would/ ... 
---------------------------
1) Sobhuza II v. Miller [1926] A.C. 518 at 522-523. 
2) R. v. Crewe : Ex. Parte Sekgome [1910] 2 K.B. 576 at 611; 
Palley, p. 45. 
3) R. v. Crewe: ·Ex parte Sekgome (1910] 2 K.B. 576 at 6CX5, 628; 
Sobhuza II v. Miller [1926] Ac. 518 at 525; Palley, pp. 61-62. 
4) Foreign Jurisdiction Act (53 and 54 Viet., C. 37) S .I ; Nyali Ltd. 
v. Attorney-General [1956] 1. Q.B.l at 14; Attorney-General 
v. de Keyser's Royal Hotel Ltd. [1920] A.C. 508, at 539; 554, 561; 
Sabally and N' ,lie v. H.M. Attorney-General [1964] 3 W.L.R. 732 
at 749; Palley, pp. 62-63. 
5) Foreign Jurisdiction Act (53 and 54 Viet., c.37) S .2. 
6) s .17. 
-5"'.' 
would be void if repugnant to an Order in Council or to a proclamation 
issued by the High Commissioner for South Africa.7) 
An Order in Council of 1898 transferred legislative power to a legis-
lative Council.8 ) This was composed of elected members and members 
nominated by the Company, the latter being in the majority . 9) The 
1898 Order also provided that the High Commissioner would have the 
power to alter the proportion of elected to nominated members in 
favour of the former. lO) In 1903 equality as between elected and 
nominated members was introduced. 11 ) In 1911 an Order in Council pro-
vided for a majority of elected members •12 ) The power under the 1898 
Order was exercised and the number of elected members was increased by 
further Orders in Council in 1913 and 1914. 13 ) There were of course 
restrictions on the Council's power to legislate. Enactments repug-
nant to an Order in Council were void and certain other specified 
types of enactments were void unless the prior consent of the 
Secretary of State was obtained . 14 ) 
As/ ••• 
-----------------------------
7) S .20. For details of further controls on such legislation see 
Palley, pp. 114-115. 
8) Southern Rhodesia Order in Council, 1898. See Palley, p.133; 
R. v. McChlery,1912 A.D. 19:) at 219-220. 
9) Palley, pp. 133, 195-197. 
10) s.17 (A) (ii). 
11) Southern Rhodesia Order in Council, 16th February, 19()3; 
Palley, p.197. 
12) Southern Rhodesia Order in Council, 4th May, 1911, S .3; 
Molteno, p.259. 
13) High Commissioner's Proclamation 17 of 23rd August, 1913; 
Proclamation 47 of 31st July, 1914. See Palley, pp.202-203. 
14) S. 47 ,49,81. For full details of restriction on the legislat-
ive power see Palley, pp. 133-134, 156-172. 
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As far as administration was concerned the Order in Council of 1894 
~rovided that it should be vested in ari administrator and a Council 
consisting of four persons appointed by the Company subject to the 
approval of the Secretary of State •15 ) Under the Order in Council of 
1898 this body became the Executive Council and further minor changes 
were made • 16 ) 
The 1894 Order in Council established a High Court. Judicial appoint-
ment was by the Company subject to the approval of ~he Secretary of 
State. Until 1910 appeals lay to the Cape Supreme Court. From 1910-
1923 appeals lay to the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of 
South Africa with a further appeal to the Privy Council.l7) 
The 1898 Order in Council also provided for franchise qualifications 
for elections to the Legislative Council. It provided that the High 
Commissioner could determine these by Proclamation. He prescribed 
the franchise qualifications then in force in the Cape Colony. 18 ) 
In the case In re Southern Rhodesial9) it was held that unallotted 
lands in the Protectorate were vested in the Crown and not in the 
Company. This eventually led to the demise of the Protectorate and 
the annexation of the territory as the Company was then unwilling to 
continue to have responsibilities relating to the territory.20) 
SECTION III/ .. ~ 
--------------------------
15) S.8, 14; Palley, pp.116-117. 
16) s.13(1); Palley, p.133. 
17) s.49 to 78; Palley, p.152. 
18) High Commissioner's Proclamation 17 of 25th November, 1898. 
S. 3,4.5; Palley, pp. 133, 135-136. 
19) [1919] A.C. 211. 
20) Palley, pp. 206-207. 
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SECTION III 
CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE COIDNY. 
As we have seen the Colony was created by annexation in terms of an 
Order in Council in 1923 •1 ) A constitution was provided in the same 
year by Letters Patent. 2 ) In the period under examination the cons tit-
utional structure of the Colony was somewhat complicated by the creat-
3) ion of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland in 1953, its 
dissolution in 19534 ) and the introduction of a new constitution f or 
Southern Rhodesia in 1951.5 ) In considering the constitutional 
structure the legislature, executive and judiciary will be treated 
separately. The franchise and human rights provisions will then be 
described. 
(1) The Legislative Power. 
This power was exercised by the Crown and an elected Legislative 
Assembly •6 ) fut the legislative power7) was subject to several 
limitations which were as follows: 
(a) The Colonial Laws Validity Act, 1865, S .2 applied and this 
prohibited the legislature from passing laws with extra-
t erritorial effect. 8 ) 
___________________ (b)/ .•. 
1) Southern Rhodesia (Annexation) Order in Council, 1923, 
30th July, 1923 • 
2) Letters Patent, 1st September, 1923. 
3) Rhodesia and Nyasaland (Federation) Act, 1953, 1 & 2. Eliz .II, 
C.30; Rhodesia and Nyasaland Order in Council, 1953, S.l. 
1953, No .1200. 
4) Rhodesia and Nyasaland Act, 1953 11 & 12 Eliz. II C .34; Federat-
ion of Rhodesia and Nyasaland Order in Council, S.l. 1953 No, 1635 ; 
Federation of Rhodesia a."ld Nyasaland (Dissolution) Order in 
Council, S.l. 1953 No. 2085. 
5) Southern Rhodesia (Constitution) Order in Council, S .1. 19)1, 
No. 2314. 
6) On the composition of the legislature see Palley, pp. 217-218. 
7) Contained in S .26 (1) of the Letters Patent, 1923. 
8) Palley, p.220. 
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(b) The Cr own retained the power to reserve bills, disallow 
b1lls and to instruct the Governor to withhold assent to 
(c) 
' 
bills or to reserve bills.9 ) 
10) Certain bills had to be reserved by the Government, 
one of the principal examples being the requirement of 
reservation in relation to certain bills discriminating 
11) 
against Africans. 
(d) Certain sections of the Constitution could not be amended 
by the Legislature but only by the Crown or the United 
Kingdom Parliament. Two of the main examples here were the 
provisions defining the legislative power and the section 
containing the prohibitions.12 ) 
( e ) The remainder of the Constitution could only be amended by 
two thirds of the members of the Legislative Assembly.l3) 
(f) Certain matters relating to Native Affairs were vested in 
the High Commissioner for South Africa. 14 ) 
These then were the initial legislative powers of the Colony in 
1923 and the limitations thereon. Changes in these powers over 
the years will now be described. 
--------------------------In/.•. 
9) s.31; Palley, pp.216, 226-227; Chayes, II p. 1319. The power 
of disallowance has never in fact been used. Ibid., p.1326. 
10) S.28; Palley, pp. 225, 236. 
11) S.28; Chayes,II,p. 1319. For a full analysis of these provis-
ions see Palley, Chapter 12. 
12) S .26 (2 ); Chayes, II, p. 1319. Other like prohibitions are 
contained in S.25(1), 28, 39-41, 54(1), 55, 56, 57(1)(2). See 
Palley, pp. 220-221. 
13) s.26(2). 
14 ) s .39-4 7 • 
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In 1930 a further compulsory reservation in relation to bills 
providing for exclusive African or European land tenure was 
introduced by Letters Patent &~ending the Constitution. 15) 
In 1937 the control of the High Commissioner for South Africa 
16) 
over certain aspects of Native administration terminated. 
In 1953, as we have seen, the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland 
was formed and the Federal Constitution was embodied in an Order 
in Council of that year. 17) The Federal Legislature was given 
exclusive powers to legislate on certain matters18 ) but until 
the Governor-General published a notice to this effect in relation 
to a particular subject, the individual territorial legislatures 
were to continue to be competent to legislate.19 ) Notices were 
in fact published only in relation to external affairs, customs 
20) 
and excise and income tax. It is therefore only in these 
particular fields that the Legislative Assembly of Southern 
Hhodesia lost its powers to legislate as a result of federation. 
It may be added that in certain fields both the Federal and the 
Territorial Legislatures were competent to legislate . 21 ) The 
residue of legislative powers remained with the Territorial 
Legislature, in the case of Southern Rhodesia subject to the 
limitations which we have already described. 
--------------------------In/ .. • 
15) Letters Patent, 26th March, 1930; Palley, p.266. 
16) Letters Patent, 25th March, 1937; Palley, p.294. 
17) Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland (Constitution) Order in 
Council, 1953 S.l. 1953, No. 1199. 
18) Second Schedule, Part I of the Constitution. 
19) Art. 29(2) of the Constitution. 
20) S.R.G.N. 903/53, 345/61 . 
21) Second Schedule, Part II of the Constitution. 
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In l~l the Southern Hhodesia (Constitution) Act,1~122 ) author-
ized the Crown to repeal the Constitution granted by the Letters 
Patent of 1923 and to grant a new Constitution to the Colony by 
Order in Council. These aims were achieved by the Southern 
Rhodesia (Constitution) Order in Council, l~l. 23) Under this 
new Constitution the legislative power was vested in the Queen 
and a Legislative Assembly of 65 members. 24 ) This Legislature 
was authorized to make laws which might operate extra-territorial~ 
ly.25) It is now merely necessary to describe the limitations 
which existed on the right of the Legislative Assembly to pass 
laws •26 ) 
(a) The United Kingdom Parliament retained an inherent power to 
legislate for the Colony. zr ) However, there was a cons tit-
utional convention that it would only do so on matters 
__________________
______ within/ ... 
22) 10 Eliz. II, C. 2; Palley, p. 318. 
23) S .1. l~l, No. 2314. 
24) S .20 (1). 
25) S.20(2); Molteno, p.260. 
26 ) For a concise summary of these see Mol teno, p .260. 
27 ) H. v. McChler:y, 1912 A. D. 199. See too 8. 111 proviso; Palley, 
p.702; Molteno, p.261; Madzimbamuto v. Lardner :Blrke N.O., 
1~8 (3) All E.R. 561 (P.C.) at 572; J ·.M. Eekelaar "Splitting 
the Grund.norm" (30) M.L.R., 1~7, p .156 at p .157; B.A. Hepple, 
P. 0 1 Higgins & C .C. Turpin "Hhodesian Cri8is - Criminal Liabili ty11 , 
19)6, Criminal Law Heview, p.5 at p.9. 
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(a) continued: 
within the competence of the Southern Rhodesian Legislature 
with the agreement of the Southern Rhodesian Government.28 ) 
-----------------------------
(b )/ ••. 
28) Cmnd. 1399, p.3; Palley, p.103; Molteno, p.261. According to 
Eekelaar, note 27) supra, p. 157 and de Smith, The New Common-
wealth and its Constitutions, London, 1954 quoted by G.N.Barrie, 
":V1odesian U.D.I. - an unruly horse" (1) C.I.L.S.A., 1958 p.110 
at pp. 110-111 the Government of the United Kingdom publicly 
recognized the existence of a convention that Parliament could 
not legislate on any matter within the competence of the Southern 
Rhodesian Legislature and could not amend the Constitution with-
out the consent of the Southern Rhodesian Government. Chayes,II, 
p. 1327 says that the convention was of such strength that by 
virtue of it the British Government could not resume its former 
powers in Southern Rhodesia. Eekelaar, note 27) supra, pp.157-
158 discusses the great extensiveness of the convention. But 
in strict theory the convention had no legal effect in limiting 
the legal powers of the United Kingdom Parliament. Madzimbamutois 
case, note 27) supra, at 572; MoCnlery's case, note 27) supra, 
at 218. For the convention canno~ have had the effect of divid-
ing municipal law sovereignty between Parliament and the Colonial 
Legislature. Campbell v. Hall, 1558-1774 All E.R., 252 at 257 
quoted by Molteno, p.280. Molteno, pp. 282-283 also points out 
that the 1951 Constitution left the Colonial Laws Validity Act 
applicable without qualification to Rhodesia which would be 
inconsistent with a division of Municipal law sovereignty. See 
too Mol teno, p .285. J .E .S. Fawcett, l'Securi ty Council Resolutions 
on Rhodesia" (41) B.Y.I.L., 1565/66, p.103 points out at pp. 
lo4-5 that in a joint declaration of 27th April, 1957 the British 
and Federal Governments recognized that the convention was applic-
able to the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. This was the 
position of Southern Rhodesia prior to Federation too but it is 
not clear whether the principle emerged in 1923 or at an inter-
mediate time. In 1953 Britain affirmed the convention before 
the Security Council. The convention can hardly have applied t o 
legislation which was designed to alter the structure of the 
Colony itself but only to ordinary internal legislation. Thus 
the British dissolved the Federation in the face of strenuous 
opposition from the Federal Government. 
By way of comment on these views expressed by J.E.S. Fawcett, the 
convention in question was in essence that the Government of the 
United Kingdom should not propose legislation falling within the 
powers of a self-governing colonial legislature. This convent-
ion pre-dated 1923. Thus when Southern Rhodesia became a self-
governing colony in 1923, the convention applied to it. The 
words underlined above would seem to dispose of any objections 
to United Kingdom legislation dissolving the Federation. In 
any event from the time of the establishment of the Federation, 
the United Kingdom Government expressly reserved the right to 
review the Federal experience after the lapse of ten years. 
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(b) The power of disallowance could be exercised in relation 
to legislation which the United Kingdom Government regarded 
as being contrary to a treaty obligation which it had con-
tracted in relation to the Colony. It could also be exer-
cised in relation to certain legislation dealing with the 
rights of holders of Colonial Stock.29 ) Otherwise the 
power of disallowance disappeared. 
(c) The power of reservation applied to legislation introduced 
to amend certain parts of the constitution. The amendment 
of these particular parts of the Constitution was reserved 
to the Crown •30 ) 0th i th f ti di erw se e power o reserva on s-
appeared •31 ) 
(d) Certain other parts of the Constitution were specially 
32) 
entrenched. These could only be amended in one or other 
of two ways: (1) by the Legislature with a two-thirds 
majority and the approval of a majority of each of the tour 
racial groups in a separate referendum for each group; 
(11) by the Legislature with a two-thirds majority, the 
relevant bill obtaining the assent of Her Majesty acting on 
the advice of the United Kingdom ministers .33) 
___________________ (e)/ ..• 
~9:) S.32(1 ); Palley, pp. 716-717; Molteno, pp.263-264. 
30) s.30(1), 105, 111; 
42, 49. 105, 111; 
The particular sections are S.1-6, 29, 32, 
Palley, pp.432-433; Molteno , p.263. 
31) S.32(1); Palley, p.717 ; Eekelaar, note 2:7) supra, p.157. 
32) These are the matters enumerated in the Third Schedule; Palley, 
P . 435. 
33) S.107-110; Palley, p.435; Molteno, p. 262. 
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( e) The remaining parts of the Constitution could only be amended 
by the Legislature w1 th a two-thirds majority •34 ) 
(f) The exercise of the Governor's powers were subject to Royal 
Instructions •35 ) However, convention excluded interference 
in this way .36) 
(g) As before 1961 the spheres of exclusive federal competence 
would have been outside the legislative competence of the 
Southern Rhodesian Legislature, viz. external affairs, 
customs and excise and income tax.37) 
Finally, with the dissolution of Fe:deration in 1963 under the 
Rhodesia and Nyasaland Act, 1963, the latter restriction was re-
moved as the l egislative powers of the Federation were distributed 
among the territories.38 ) 
(2) The Executive Power. 
Under Letters Patent the executive power was vested in the 
Governor and an Executive Council which was appointed by him. 
The Constitution provided for the appointment of Ministers by 
the Governor .39 ) The Governor acted on the usual advices except 
where otherwise provided.40 ) 
Under/.~·. 
---------------------------
34) S.lo6; Palley, p.436 ; Molteno, p.262. The Constitution then 
could only be changed in accordance with the manner and form laid 
down therein. Attorney-General for New South Wales v. Tretrowan 
[1932] A.C. 526 quoted by Eekelaar, note 27) supra, at p.157. 
35) S.2; Palley, p.719. 
36) See Palley, pp. 720-721 f or the circumstances in which instruct-
ions might be issued in practice. 
37) Palley, p.433; s.117(1). 
38) For a contrary view see Palley, pp. 433, 695. 
39) Palley, p. 274. 
40) Palley, pp. 274-276. 
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Under the Constitution of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland 
the Executive power of the Federation was exercised by the Gover-
nor-General on behalf of the Crown acting on the advice of the 
Federal Ministers or Federal Executive Council.41 ) The Executive 
power was subject to the following limitations. (1) The exercise 
of the power of the Governor-General was subject to Royal Instruct-
ions as to assent, withholding of assent a...~d reservation .42 ) 
(ii) The Executive power only related to the subjects in respect 
of which the Federal Legislature was competent.43) Further, in 
relation to Southern Rhodesia, the fields of exclusive Federal 
competence would have been removed from the ambit of the executive 
authority of Southern Rhodesia . 
Under the 1961 Constitution executive power was vested in the 
Governor acting on behalf of the Queen. 44 ) and on the advice of 
the Pr ime Minister or Executive Council, as the case might be, 
except where the constitution otherwise provided .45) 
Finally; with the dissolution of Federation in 1963, the executive 
powers of the Federation were again distributed among the territ-
ories •46 ) 
_____________________ (3)/ .•• 
41) Palley, pp. 353, 355, 
42) Palley, p.353. 
43) Palley, p.346. There was,however, a provision exhorting consult-
ation on matters of common interest and concern - Art.·41(2), For 
a discuss:fon of the operation of this arrangement in practice see 
Palley, pp. 357-360, 
44) 19:,1 Constitution, S.42; Palley, p.453, 
45) Palley, p . 454. 
46) Palley, p. 680. 
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(3 ) The J'.Udiciar-y. 
The High Court which existed before 1923 continued to exist . As 
before 1923 appeals were to the Appellate Division of the Supreme 
Court of South Africa with a further appeal to the Privy Councii.47 ) 
48) This position continued until 1955. From 1955 to 1963 appeal 
lay to the Supreme Court of the Federation of 11hodesia and 
Nyasaland49) with further appeal to the Privy Council •50 ) The 
Supreme Court of the Federation also possessed some original 
jurisdiction .51 ) 
As from 1961 the constitution and jurisdiction of the High Court 
of Southern Rhodesia was provided for by the 1961 Constitution.52 ) 
Finally, on dissolution of the Federation, a Constitutional amend-
ment was enacted providing for a new appeal tribunal to replace 
the Supreme Court of the Federation. The High Court was divided · 
into two divisions: (i) A General Division. This succeeded to 
the jurisdiction of the High Court as formerly constituted; 
____________________ (ii)/ ... 
47) Palley, p.329. 
48) Palley, p.400. By Act No . 33 of 1938, a Rhodesian Court of 
Appeal was created to hear criminal appeals. See Palley, p.329. 
49) Constitution of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, 1953, 
Arts . 55, 62; Federal Supreme Court Act No . 11 of 1955; Palley, 
pp. 400-401. 
50) Palley, p.402. 
51) Constitution of the Federation of rthodesia and Nyasaland 1953, 
Articles 53, 54; Palley, pp. 401-402. 
52) Palley, p. 521. 
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(ii) An Appellate Division. This was primarily to hear appeals 
from the General Division.53 ) A further appeal lay to the Privy 
Councn. 54 ) 
(4) Human Rights 
Certain human rights were .embodied in a Declaration of Rights in 
the 1961 Constitution.55) These provisions were specially entrencha:l 
d ld 1 b lt d · th 1 d descri·bed. 56 ) an cou on y ea ere 1.n e manner area y 
Legislation alleged to infringe these rights was subject to· Judic-
ial review.57 ) A Constitutional Council was also established 
which had certain functions in relation to the observance of the 
Declaration of Rights.58 ) 
The human rights specifically entrenched in the Declaration were, 
however, subject to a number of qualifications.59 ) 
___________________ (5)/ ... 
53) Palley, p.522. 
54) There was an appeal of right in relation to a claim by any person 
that the provisions of the Declaration of Rights contained in the 
Southern Rhodesia Constitution 1961 had been contravened in relat-
ion to him. Constitution Amendment Act, No. 13 of 1964, s.8; 
Palley, p.403. There was a similar right of appeal between 1961 
and 1964 from the Federal Supreme Court on appeal from the High 
Court of Southern Rhodesia. Southern Rhodesia Constitution, 1961, 
S. 71; Federal Supreme Court (Amendment) Act, No. 46 of 1962; 
Palley, p.403. 
55) Palley, p.573. 
56) Supra, P·l2· 
57) Constitution of Southern Rhodesia 1961, S.71, 115; Palley, p.573 . 
58.) Palley, pp. 436-437. For a detailed exposition of the Council's 
functions see Palley, pp. 443-452, 
59) For details see Palley, pp. 577-585. In fact Palley regards the 
right that no criminal offences be retrospectively created and 
that no penalty more severe than that competent at the time when 
the offence was committed be imposed as the only examples of 
"absolute" rights in the Declaration (p.577). 
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(5) The Franchise. 
The origi nal Legislative Assembly in the Colony was elected by the 
same f r anchise as that pertaining in the Protectorate.60 ) The 
1961 Constitution provided for a Legislative Assembly of 65 
members.61 ) This was to be elected by voters on two voters' rolls, 
viz. an "A" roll and a "B" r o11.62 ) There were f r anchise quali-
fications for enrolment as a voter on either roll but the quali -
fications for enrolment on the "A" roll were more stringent. 63 ) 
The country was divided into fi~y single member constituencies 
and also into fifteen single member electoral districts.64 ) 
In elections in the former constit uencies the tot al "B" roll 
votes cast could not be treated as exceeding one quarter of the 
total number of "A" votes cast. In the latter constituencies the 
reverse was the position.65) 
The franchise qualifications were specially entrenched in the 
1961 Constitution in that amendments raising these qualifications 
could only be enacted in the manner already described.66 ) 
------------------------I.t/ ... 
60) The qualifications are contained in the Voters' Qualification 
and Registration Amendment Ordinance, No. 14 of 1912 and the 
Women's Enfranchisement Ordinance, No. 9 of 1919. Palley, p.203. 
Some changes were introduced in a series of Electoral Acts and 
Amendment Acts from 1928 to 1957. For details see Palley, 
pp. 217, 308-312. 
61) S,7, 37; Palley, .p.414. 
62) Electoral Amendment Act, No. 62 of 1961. Palley, p.416. 
63) For details see Palley, pp. 418-419. Electoral Amendment Act, 
No. 62 of 1961 s.8-11, 15. 
64) Constitution of Southern Rhodesia 1961, S .7, 37; Palley, 
pp. 414-415. 
65) Palley, p.415; Electoral Act, Chapter 2, s.81(2). 
66) Supra, p.12. 
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It will be seen from the above that there were two types of limit-
ation on Southern Rhodesian competences before 11th November, 
1965. {i) There were certain constitutional restrictions and 
restrictions relating to the protection of the people of Rhodesia 
which were not concerned with the competences of the United 
Kingdom as such. This type of restriction in no way derogates 
from the independence of a state. In the United States of America 
we find such "internal" constitutional limitations. 67 ) (ii) There 
were restrictions on competences which were aimed at preserving 
the competences of the United Kingdom in relation to Southern 
Rhodesia. This species of restriction does mean that the entity 
which is so restricted is not independent because it is in certain 
ways subject to the control of another State. In the case of 
Southern Rhodesia the following restrictions existed as we have 
seen. 
The power of disallowance existed in an extremely limited field 
and the amendment of particular parts of the Constitution was 
reserved to the Crown. 68 ) Molteno considers these restrictions 
as being of a formal nature and not detracting greatly from inde-
pendence.69) In addition to these restrictions there was the 
inherent right of the United Kingdom Parliament to l egislate for 
Southern Rhodesia, and the fact that the exercise of the Governor's 
powers were subject to Royal instructions. However, in both of 
-----------------------------these/ ... 
67) Molteno, p.260. 
68) Supra, p.12. 
69) Pp. 260-261. Eekelaar, note 27 supra, p. 157 considers that 
the 1961 Constitution gave Southern Rhodesia almost complete 
autonomy over her internal affairs. 
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these cases Convention precluded unilateral interference by the 
United Kingdom in Southern Rhodesian affairs. Because of this 
Molteno concludes that these restrictions were not real restrict-
70) 
ions on Southern Rhodesian independence. 
In fact,therefore, Southern Rhodesia was all but independent 
before 11th November, 1965. Despite this the Southern Rhodesian 
Government wished to secure formal independence from Britain. 
The pressure for independence was no doubt to a considerable 
extent due to the fact that the other two ex-members of the 
Pederation, Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland were granted independ-
ence by Britain in 1964 as Zambia and Malawi respectively. For 
the purposes of securing independence negotiations between the 
authorities in Southern Rhodesia and Britain commenced. These 
were fated to be fruitless and they culminated in the Unilateral 
Declaration of Independence by Southern Rhodesia on 11th November, 
1965. A brief resume of the negotiations will now be given. 
-------------------------SECTION IV/ ... 
70) P.261. Hepple, Higgins and Turpin, note 27 supra, p.9 say that 
the only limitations on Southern Rhodesia prior to U.D.I. were 
(a) the Legislature could not legislate repugnantly to United 
Kingdom Acts of Parliament (b) only the United Kingdom Parliament 
could grant sovereign independence to Rhodesia (c) Southern 
Rhodesia was not recognized by the international community as a 
sovereign state for international law purposes and the United 
Kingdom Government has retained ultimate responsibility for its 
external relations - a constitutional position not significantly 
different from the position in 1918 of those self-governing 
territories which were later to become the independent Dominions. 
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SECTION IV 
INDEPENDENCE NEGOTIATIONS 1963-1965.l) 
(1) Requests for Independence. 
In a letter dated 27th November, 1963 from the Prime Minister of 
Rhodesia , Mr. Winston Field, to the Secretary of State for 
Commonwealth Relations regret is expressed that the independence 
question had not been advanced. The matter was regarded as one 
of urgency and importance in view of the fact that Nyasaland's 
right to independence had been acknowledged. A precedent had 
thus been created for treating Northern Rhodesia in the same 
manner but an opposite attitude had been adopted in relation to 
Southern Rhodesia 1 s request for independence. In the result 
S th Rh d i h db 1 d . 1 t . "bl ·t· 2 ) ou ern o es a a een pace in an a mos impossi e posi ion. 
In a letter dated 3rd March, 1964, f rom the Prime Minister of 
Southern Rhodesia to the Secretary of State the issue is stated 
to be, not the impact on the Commonwealth which the grant of 
independence is likely to have, but the preservation of the 
Southern Rhodesia Constitution against international and Common-
wealth forces to circumvent and suppress it.3 ) 
Demands for full independence continued to be pressed, e.g. in a 
letter dated 13th January, 1965 the Prime Minister of Southern 
----------------------------Rhodesia/ ... 
1) The source of the information contained in thi s resume is Cmnd. 
28:)7 - Southern Rhodesia - Documents relating to the negotiations 
between the United Kingdom and Southern Rhodesian Governments, 
November 1963 - November 1965. 
2) Cmnd. 2807, pp. 5-6. 
3) Ibid., p.13 . 
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Rhodesia, Mr. Ian Smith, tells the British Prime Minister, Mr. 
Harold Wilson, that it is now imperative that immediate independ-
ence be granted to Rhodesia because attractive financial facilitie s 
for development purposes had been offered to Rhodesia upon attain-
ing independence. 4 ) In a letter dated 11th September, 1965, 
Ian Smith expresses disappointment at the lack of progress to the 
Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, Arthur Bottomley,5) 
while in a letter dated 15th September, 1965, Ian Smith says that 
he must make it clear that if Arthur Bottomley visits Rhodesia 
for discussions the discussions must reach final decisions on 
the position.6 ) Again, in a letter dated 20th October, 1965, 
Ian Smith informs Harold Wilson that the statesmanlike thing for 
him to do is to grant independence. 7 ) 
(2) Reasons advanced for claim to Independence by Rhodesia. 
Southern Rhodesia advanced the following reasons to support a 
grant of independence to it by the United Kingdom. 
Prior to the dissolution of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasa-
land the Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia was informed that 
"Her Majesty's Government accept in principle that Southern 
Rhodesia like other territories will proceed through normal 
processes to independence. 118 ) 
--------------------------'The/ ... 
4) 
5) 
6) 
7) 
8) 
Ibid, 
Cmnd. 
Ibid., 
Ibid., 
Ibid., 
p.55. 
28o7. p.64. 
p.65. 
pp. 99-100. 
pp. 5, 60. 
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The acknowledgment of the rights of Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia 
respectively to independence made Southern Rhodesia's position 
impossible. 9) 
The 1961 Constitution was an "independence" Constitution. It was 
a compromise which satisfied no section of the community but this 
compromise was accepted on assurance from Sir Edgar Whitehead, the 
Prime Minister of the time, that when his Government had negotiated 
the new Constitution they had done so in the belief that if the 
Federation were to break up, Southern Rhodesia would have complete 
independence. If this belief was unfounded, it was strange that 
no formal steps were taken at the time to inform the Government 
of Southern Rhodesia that the view held by the British Government 
was in direct conflict.lo) No statement was made contradicting 
Sir Edgar Whitehead's utterances and this supported the contention 
that there was an implicit understanding that Southern Rhodesia, 
by accepting the new Constitution, would be ensuring her own 
sovereign independence in the event of the Federation being 
dissolved .11 ) 
The British Prime Minister, Sir Alec Douglas-Home, at a meeting 
with Mr. Smith in London on 7th September, 1964, pointed out that 
there had been no such contract in 1961 and that Sir Edgi.r Whitehead 
had explicitly confirmed this in a recent public speech. 
Mr. Duncan Sandys said that as the United Kingdom Minister 
-------------------------------chiefly/ . 
9) Ibid., p.6. 
10) Crnnd. 2&J7, p.15. 
11) Ibid., p.18. 
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chiefly responsible for the 1961 Constitution ·he could confirm 
that he had given no such pledge in 1961. Mr. Smith said that he 
accepted these statements without reservation but pointed out that 
Sir Roy Welensky and Sir Edge~ Whitehead must then have continued 
to deceive the electorate in Southern Rhodesia. The British Prime 
Minister said he could not comment on what Sir Roy or Sir Edgar 
might or might not have said during political meetings in South-
ern Rhodesia. 12 ) At a subsequent meeting on 10th September, 
1964, he affirmed that he would be prepared to confirm to 
Mr. Smith in writing that no ~uch undertaking as was alleged to 
13) have been given in 1961 was, in fact, either given or requested. 
This he did in a message dated 16th September, 1964, in which he 
also referred to a speech by Sir Edgar in the Southern Rhodesia 
14) Legislative Assembly on 25th August. 
(3) Principles Governing Negotiations. 
From the start the British Government were anxious that Common-
wealth nations should participate in the solution of the Rhodesian 
probleml5) though conceding that final settlement was a matter for 
16) the British and Southern Rhodesian Governments alone. Southern 
Rhodesia, on the other hand, did not see the usefulness of 
Commonwealth participation and would only negotiate with the 
British Government. 17 ) Thus Southern Rhodesia indicated that it 
was not prepared to attend a conference convened between Sir 
Robert Menzies, Mr. Lester Pearson and President Nyerere to 
----------------------------discuss/ .•. 
12) Ibid., p.22. 
13) Ibid., p.38 
14) Cmnd. 28£;7, p.39. 
15) Ibid., pp. 6, 7-8, 43, 61, 95. 
16) IE.!!!•, pp. 10, 61. 
17) Ibid., pp. 5, 6, 8-9, 38, 62, 96, 
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discuss the independence quest i on. 18) It also regarded the idea 
of a constitutional confer~nce which had the unanimous approval 
of the Commonwealth Prime Minister's Meeting as "absolutely 
unnecessary and out of the question", that if such a conference 
were to be called it would not attend and if any attempt were 
made by Britain to promote such a conference it would be inter-
19) preted as interference in their internal affairs. In a joint 
Communique issued a~er talks between the Prime Minister (Sir 
Alec Douglas-Home) and Mr. Ian Smith it was made clear that the 
Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia did not feel bound by any of 
the statements made at the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Meeting 
20) to which he had not been invited. 
The Southern Rhodesian view was that any consultations and 
21' negotiations concerning independence would be at Govet~,unent level. 1 
In this regard it would therefore be unwise to make any proposals 
to African Nationalists without first ensuring that they were 
acceptable to the Rhodesian Government. 22 ) The British Govern-
ment was of the view that the granting of independence was a 
matter to be settled by negotiation between the respective Govern-
ments~3) In this regard Mr. Wilson at a meeting in Salisbury on 
26th October, 1965, said that he would bear in mind Mr. Smith's 
wish that he should not, during his visit, put forward any con-
crete proposals to African representatives without first ascertain-
ing whether they would be likely to be acceptable to the 
----------------------------------------------------------------....;Rhodesian/ ... 
18) Ibid., p.6. 
19) Ibid., p.62. 
20) Ibid . , p.38. 
21) Cmnd. 28o7, pp. 45, 53, 56. 
22) .Il?l£., p.103. 
23) Ibid., p.57. 
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Rhodesian Government. But he would try to discover what kind of 
a compromise, in general terms, the Africans might be prepared 
t o entertain. He would then wish to have a further discussion 
with Mr. Smith.24 ) 
(4) Procedures utilized in negotiations. 
The independence negotiations were conducted by correspondence 
and at meetings between members of the Governments concerned. 
A chajn of correspondence was conducted from 27th November, 1963 
to 10th November, 1965.25) Meetings were held between the Prime 
Ministers at London on 7th September, 1964,26 ) 8th September, 
27) 28) · 29) 1964, 9th September, 1964, · 10th September, 1964, 30th 
January, 1965,30 ) 7th October, 1965,31 ) 8th October, 1965,32 ) 
11th October, 1965,33 ) at Salisbury on 26th October, 1965,34 ) 
and 29th October, 1965.35 ) In addition the Commonwealth Sec-
retary and the Lord Chancellor visited Rhodesia in February -
March 196536) and the Minister of State for Commonwealth 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~_.;Relations/ •.. 
24) IQ.!.g_., pp. 110-111. 
25) This is reproduced .!.!21.g_. 
26) The records · of these meetings will be found .!.!21.g_., pp.21-26, 
26-30. 
27) The record is reproduced ibid., pp.30-34. 
28) The record is reproduced ibid., 0 ,pp,34-.?~. 
29) The record is reproduced .!.!21.g_., pp.37-38. 
30) This was an informal meeting due to the presence of Mr. Smith 
in London to attend the State Funeral of Sir Winston Churchill. 
See Cmnd. 2&:)7, p.56. 
31) The record is reproduced .!.!21.g_., pp.69-79, 
32) The record is reproduced .!.!21.g_., pp.&:)-90. 
33) The record is reproduced ibid., pp.90-95. 
34) The record is reproduced ibid., pp.90-95. 
35) The records of these two meetings are reproduced ibid., 
pp. 111-116, 117-132. 
36) IQ.!.g_., p.58. 
37) 
38) 
39) 
40) 
41) 
42) 
43) 
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Relations in July, 1965.37 ) Finally, there was a series of meet-
ings on 30th and 31st October, 1965, between the Commonwealth 
Secretary and the Attorney General and Rhodesian Ministers.38 ) 
In addition, other meetings were proposed by each side but these 
did not materialize. The Secretary of State for Commonwealth 
Relations offered on 19th October, 1964, to come to Salisbury to 
discuss matters with Mr. Smith but as the latter would not agree 
to his meeting Mr. Nkomo and the Rev. Sithole he found it imposs-
ible to visit Rhodesia.39 ) Mr. Harold Wilson invited Mr, Smith 
on 23rd October, 1964, to visit London for talks. 40 ) Mr. Smith 
indicated a willingness to go41 ) but the proposed meeting did not 
take place because Mr. Smith would not go without first receiving 
an assurance that it was not British Government policy th1t 
Rhodesia should only be given independence when under African 
contro142 ) whereas Mr. Wilson considered that this was laying 
down prior conditions for the talks. 43 ) On 29th March, 1965, 
Mr. Harold Wilson invited Mr. Smith t o London for private dis-
cussions. He was willing, as a first step, to ask the High 
Commissioner in Salisbury to explore matters with Mr. Smith to 
see if they could formulate points of agreement and points which 
might require further negotiation. Alternatively, he suggested 
that/ ... 
Ibid., p.63. 
Ibid., p.132. 
Ibid., pp.42, 44-45. 
Ibid., p.42. 
Ibid., p.43. 
Ibid., p.47. 
·Cmnd. 26)7, pp. 47-48. 
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that Mr. Smith should send an emissary for discussions in London 
or that he should send one to talk to Mr. Smith in Salisbury.44 ) 
Nothing came of the suggestion. Mr. Smith does not even allude to 
it in subsequent correspondence. The Commonwealth Secretary on 
13th September, 1965 proposed a visit to Salisbury,45) but this 
did not materialize because Mr. Smith wished the visit to take 
place before the end of September, 46 ) whereas the Commonwealth 
Secretary could not come at such an early date. 47 ) 
(5) General proposals made during negotiations. 
These will be discussed before specific issues arising between 
the parties are considered. 
Private proposals, the terms of which were not fully disclosed, 
were put forward by Mr. Winston Field in February 1964~8) but 
these were unacceptable to the British Government. 49 ) The same 
happened in March, 1964.50) 
The Rhodesian Government alleged that proposals had been put 
forward by them at the time of Mr. Hughes' departure from 
Rhodesia on 27th July, 1965 but the British Government denied 
tnat any concrete proposals had been put forward by either side 
during Mr. Hughes' visit.5l) 
On/ ... 
-----------------------------44) 
45) 
lJ6) 
47) 
48) 
Ibid., 
Ibid., 
Ibid., 
Th.!£., 
Ibid., 
p.58. 
pp. 64-65. 
p.65. 
p.66. 
pp. 9-10. 
49) Ibid., pp. 10-11. 
50) Ibid., pp. 13-14. 
51) Cmnd. 28o7, p.64. 
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On 21st December, 1964, Mr. Wilson suggested that a small but 
high-level all-party mission composed of senior and experienced 
members of the British Parliament such as Privy Counsellors 
might visit Rhodesia in the fairly near future. They would ac-
quaint themselves with the $ltuation at first hand.52 ) Mr. Smith 
rejected this pointing out that as approximately 100 British 
Members of Parliament of all parties had visited Rhodesia over 
the past eight years no useful purpose would be served by the 
suggested visit.53 ) 
When Mr. Bottomley in a message dated 13th September, 1965 proposed 
visiting Salisbury, Mr. Smith suggested that he should come with 
concrete proposals to present and that they should be able to 
reach final decisions. No good purpose would be served by Mr. 
Bottomley's coming to Salisbury without a mandate.54 ) 
The British Government also proposed five principles upon which 
they would need to be satisfied before granting independence.55~ 
These principles are discussed in detail at a later stage as 
specific issues arising between the negotiating parties.56 ) At 
this stage it is only intended to comment briefly on the principles 
in general as a basis for discussion and the relationship of the 
1961 Constitution to them. The original Rhodesian claim was that 
independence should be given on the basis of the 1961 Constitution.57) 
--------------------------...;However/ ... 
52) Ibid., p.51. 
53) Ibid., p.53. 
54) Ibid., p.65. 
55) These are outlined ibid., p.66. 
56) Infra, pp. 34-58. 
57) Cmnd. 28o7, pp. 19, 100. 
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However, the British attitude was that the grant of independence 
on the basis of the 1961 Constitution did not satisfy the five 
principles.58) The 1961 Constitution was not sacrosanct, it was 
not a Constitution for independence and changes would have to be 
made in it.59) The 1961 Constitution could, however, serve as a 
basis upon which work could proceed in arranging a Constitution 
60) for independence and certain improvements could be ma.de in it. 
The position may therefore be said to be that the 1961 Constitut-
ion was a basis upon which to work but it would have to be 
adapted to conform to the five principles before it was acceptable 
as an independerceConstitution. The Rhodesian view on the other 
hand was that the 1961 Constitution covered the five principles.61 ) 
The five principles nevertheless were accepted by each side as a 
basis for discussion and negotiations.62 ) 
As we have seen there was disagreement on the question whether 
the 1961 Constitution satisfied the five principles but it can 
be said that the parties were indeed very far apart on all the 
five principles and the gap seemed to grow.63 ) The agreed 
communique issued during the meetings in London in October, 1965 
highlights the differences separating the parties.64 ) 
----------------------------
(6)/ ... 
58) Crnnd. 2Eb7, p.100. 
59) Ibid., p. 110. 
60) 
61) 
62) 
63) 
64) 
Ibid., 
Ibid., 
Ibid., 
Ibid., 
Ibid., 
p. 112. 
p. 99. 
pp. 66, 
pp. 79, 
p.90. 
99. 
82. 
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(6) Specific matters and issues arising between the parties. 
Generally speaking, the points of difference between the parties 
arose out of the so-called "five principles", which are herein-
a~er described, but it must be stated that controversy was not 
confined to this sphere. In dealing with the issues the five 
principles will be treated separately from other miscellaneous 
issues and the latter will be dealt with first. 
(a) Miscellaneous Matters and Issues. 
{i) The Question of Membership of the Commonwealth. 
It would seem as if this was not a matter of great 
importance. Southern Rhodesia was indeed willing to 
take, and indeed asked for independence outside the 
Commonwealth.65) The British Government, however, 
maintained that whether independence was granted in-
side or outside the Commonwealth was immaterial and 
that the real difficulty lay in the restricted nature 
of the franchise.66 ) Even if a constitution could be 
devised which was acceptable to the people as a whole, 
Southern Rhodesia might still have to remain outside 
the Commonwealth because the arrangement might not be 
accepted by other members of the Commonwealth.67 ) In 
reply to this Mr. Smith stated that independence was 
more important than membership of the Commonwealth.68) 
_________
_________
_ (ii)/ ... 
65) Cmnd. 28J7, pp. 11, 33, 55, 67-68. 
66) Ibid., pp. 11, 67-68. 
67) Ibid., p. 33, 
68) Ibid. 
69) 
70) 
71) 
72) 
73) 
74) 
75) 
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(ii) 'fhe possibility of U.D.I. 
Ibid., 
Ibid., 
Ibid., 
This was at all times in the minds of the negotiating 
parties and reference is made to it several times. 
Mr. Duncan Sandys stated that the press had been report-
ing that Southern Rhodesia might be contemplating a uni-
lateral declaration of independence.69 ) Mr. Smith 
admitted that the Government of Southern Rhodesia had 
given considerable thought to U.D.I. as one way of 
attaining independence. 70 ) The economic consequences of 
U.D.I, were described by Mr. Duncan Sandys?l) and were 
later confirmed by Sir Alec Douglas-Home who also 
pointed out that there could be no question of recognit-
ion, Rhodesia would be regarded as being in revolt and 
there could be no question of the Queen being regarded 
as Head of State of an independent Southern Rhodesia 
in revolt. 72 ) Mr, Harold Wilson again confirmed the 
consequences of U.D I. 73 ) and because he regarded them 
in a serious light he suggested at one stage a Constit-
utional Conference to avert them. 74 ) He did, however, 
affirm that there would be no British military intervent -
ion in the event of U.D.I. and that he had brought this 
point home forcefully to the African Nationalists Mr. 
Nkomo and the Rev. Sithole. 75) He also asked Mr.Smith 
for/ ... 
p.11. 
pp. 23, 35. 
pp. 11-12. 
Cmnd. 2&)7, p.29. 
Ibid., pp. 50, 87. 
Ibid., p.87. 
Ibid., p. 111. 
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for a categorical assurance that no U.D.I. would be 
madeT6 ) an assurance which Mr. Smith apparently felt 
unable to give. 77 ) He begged Mr. Smith again: 
"even at the eleventh hour (18th October, 1965) 
for the sake of your country, for the sake of 
Africa and for the sake of future generations 
of all races, to pause before bringing hardship 
and misery, perhaps even worse, to your own 
people and to countless others far beyond your 
borders, who have no power to influence your 
decision but whose lives may be gravely affected 
by it." 78) 
Mr. Smith replied that no hardship and misery would 
flow from any action taken by the Rhodesian Government 
but directly from actions taken by the British Govern-
ment and those whom it had induced to support it.79) 
(iii) Political Prisoners. 
Thi s question was raised once only. Sir Alec Douglas-
Home referred to the proposal made at the Meeting of 
Commonwealth Prime Mi nisters that a Constitutional 
Conference should be called and that the I.,@li ti cal 
prisoners in Rhodesia should be released. Mr. Smith 
stated that no individuals were in prison for purely 
political reasons and Africans who were confined t o 
certain areas of the country could secure their re-
lease, provided that they behaved in a law-abiding and 
constitutional manner.&:>) 
----------------------------
76) Ibid., p.43. 
77) Ibid., p.50 . 
78) Ibid., p.98. 
79) Cmnd. 2&:>7, p.100. 
&:>) Ibid. , p. 33 . 
(iv)/ ... 
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(iv) The question of the grant of independence upon 
approval by the people alone. 
The argument was advanced that if the people as a 
whole approved the terms of a settlement then, regard-
less of the content of the settlement so approved, 
independence should be granted. Approval by the 
people as a whole was but~ of the British Govern-
ment's five principles so that insistence that it alone 
was a sufficient basis for independence was in fact 
tantamount to saying that the other four principles 
insisted upon by the British were in fact superfluous 
and could be disregarded if only this condition were 
seen to be met. Mr. Harold Wilson in fact saw the 
position in this light. 81 ) Thus Mr. Smith wanted the 
United Kingdom Government to accept in principle that 
he was entitled to independence if he could demonstrate 
that he had African support82 ) and when making concrete 
proposals relating to the composition of the Legislature 
asked why if these proposals were found to be acceptable 
to the people should the United Kingdom Government feel 
entitled to object.83) At one stage Mr. Harold Wilson 
seemed to accept the proposition that independence 
would be granted on any basis which the British Govern-
ment were satisfied was acceptable to the people as a 
whole. 84 ) Subsequently, however, he made it clear that 
fulfilment of this one condition was not enough. 85) 
-------------------------.....:Mr.Smith/ ... 
81) Ibid., p. 122. 
82) To!£., p.27. 
83) Ibid., pp. 122-123. 
84) Ibid., p. 49. 
85) Ibid., pp. 122, 136. 
-34-
Mr. Smith alleged in correspondence with Mr. Wilson 
that he had agreed with Sir Alec Douglas-Home that 
Rhodesia could have independence on the basis of the 
1961 Constitution, if it could be proved that this was 
acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole.e6) 
Mr. Wilson denied that such an agreement had been ma.de. 87 ) 
It would appear that no such agreement was made. Sir 
Alec pointed out that even i f a basis acceptable to the 
people as a whole could be devised (1) there could be 
no guarantee that this would necessarily be accepted by 
some other members of the Commonwealth, 88) and (2) a 
new situation would arise which the British Government 
would have to consider on its merits. They would still 
not be committed to grant independence.89) Mr. Smith 
should be under no illusion that they might have to say, 
when the time came, that it was not to their satisfact-
ion.90) 
(b) The Five Principles. 
(i) Unimpeded progress towards majority rule. 
Although the African Nationalists were not prepared to 
accept an independence which was not preceded by majorit~-
African rule,9l) it is quite clear that it was not the 
_____________
_____________
 .intention/ ... 
e6) Cmnd. 28o7, pp. 135, 138. 
87) Ibid., p.136. 
88) 
89) 
90) 
91) 
~-, 
Ibid., 
Ibid., 
Ibid., 
pp. 32-33. 
p. 34, 
p. 35. 
p. 111. 
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intention of the British Government to insist on major-
ity rule prior to the grant of 1ndependence92 ) and 
indeed the African Nationalists were informed that they 
could not expect it in the future. 93 ) What the British 
Government insisted upon was unimpeded progress towards 
majority rule even though the attainment of the latter 
might be in the post-independence phase. Mr. Wilson 
indicated that he had an open mind on the timing of 
majority rule94 ) and indeed it would not be possible to 
prescribe a fixed period of time because the period 
95) could only be measured in functional terms. However 
the principle and intention of unimpeded progress to 
majority rule, already enshrined in the 1961 Constitut-
ion, would have to be maintained and guaranteed.96) The 
Rhodesian Government added provisos to this in that 
they would have to be satisfied that the majority rule 
which would in time result from the Constitution would 
have to be a reasonable and responsible one and they 
were not prepared to increase the rate of progress to 
majority rule. 97 ) 
In estimating the time within which majority rule might 
be attained Mr. Wilson was of the view that there was 
clearly no early prospect of it as there was no intent-
ion on the part of the Rhodesian Government to do 
________________________ .anything/ ... 
92) Ibid., pp. 48, 59, 111. Sir Alec Douglas-Home however seems to 
have taken a contrary view at one stage of the negotiations. 
See Cmnd. 28'.)7, p.35. 
93) Cmnd. 28'.)7, p.111. 
94) Ibid., pp. 48, 50. 
95) Ibid., p. 111. 
96) Ibid., p. 66. 
97) Ibid., p. 68. 
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anything to accelerate the education of Africans for 
this purpose.98) Mr. Smith considered that the achieve-
ment of majority rule would be a lengthly process espec-
ially in view of the African boycott of the Constitution 
but the Rhodesian Government would not detract from the 
principle. 99 ) When Mr. Wilson ultimately proposed the 
establishment of a Royal CommissionlOO) he suggested 
that it would need to undertake a certain amount of 
basic factual research to forecast how long it would be 
101) before suggested schemes resulted in majority rule. 
Another difficulty arose here because the Rhodesian 
Legislature had the power to virtually eliminate the 
"B" roll.l02) Mr. Wilson could not consider a settle-
ment which would allow the Rhodesian Parliament such 
powers though Mr. Smith pointed out that the 1961 
Constitution did not empower the Legislature to prevent 
ultimate majority rule but only enabled it to delay it. 103 ) 
(ii) Guarantees against retrogressive amendment of the 
Constitution. 
Here it is necessary to deal separately with the question 
of guarantees against the ret rogressive amendment of the 
specially entrenched provisions of the 1961 Constitution 
and the ordinary provisions of the Constitution, both of 
which, subject to certain adaptions, wer e likely t o be 
incorporated in an independence constitution. 
---------------------
------...:Amendment/ . . . 
98) Ibid., p.81. 
99) Ibid., pp. 71-72. 
100) See Infra, p. 55. 
101) C!'lll'ld. 28o7, p. 121. 
102) Cl'lll'ld. 28o7, p.105. 
103) Ibid., pp. 105, 124. 
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Amendment of the specially entrenched clauses. 
It would appear that in principle the Rhodesian Govern-
ment were unable to accept any form of constitutional 
safeguard which would prevent the Europeans in Rhodesia 
from altering the Constitution if they deemed it necess-
ary to prevent the premature emergence of an African 
Government . 104 ) 
The existing procedures for the amendment of the special-
ly entrenched clauses were (1) by referenda of all four 
races and (2) by Her Majesty on the advice of the 
United Kingdom Government.l05) The former was a clumsy 
procedure and invidious in that it involved assigning 
individuals to different race groups. Also the Asian 
group (constituting one percent of the population) could 
block desirable amendments. The latter method would havo 
1~) to disappear on independence. The problem there-
fore was to devise alternative methods of entrenchment 
to replace these two procedures. The replacement, how-
ever, had to be something as "strong" a s the referent.!um io7) 
The following alternatives were preferred in the negot-
iations: 
(A) A Senate with the power to block constitutional 
108) amendments was suggested by the Rhodesians. 
The question of the composition of the Senate 
resulted in acute disagreement and deadlock.l09) 
--------------------------At/ ... 
lo4 ) Ibid., pp. 67, 68. 
105) Palley, p. 435; Cmnd. 2&)7, p. 73. 
1~) Cmnd. 2&)7, pp. 73, 110. 
107) Ibid., p. 75. 
108) Ibid., pp. 65, 123. 
109) Ibid., p. 123. 
-38-
At first the Rhodesians proposed a Senate comprised 
of Europeans only,llO) later they suggested a min-
ority of Africans in the proposed Senate111 ) and 
finally they were prepared to concede that it 
should be entirely composed of Africans. 112 ) 
They insisted however that the Senate should be 
composed of twelve chiefs only. 113 ) The chiefs 
were unacceptable to the United Kingdom because 
there could not then be said to be a democratically 
elected block as the chiefs were paid servants of 
the Rhodesian Government.114 ) 
Another suggestion here was the "panel" suggestion 
put forward by Mr. Lardner-Burke. There should be 
twelve seats in the Senate. A panel of candidates 
for six of the twelve seats might be nominated by 
the chiefs while a panel of candidates for the 
remaining six seats might be put forward by the 
Electoral College for the Constitutional Council. 
The actual elections might then be made by the 
electorate on the "B" Roll or, perhaps, by the 
combined electorate on the "A" and "B" Rolls. 
This would ensure that candidates for the Senate 
would be responsible individuals. 115) Mr. Wilson 
-----------------------------was/ ... 
110) Ibid., p.70. 
111) Ibid., p.66. 
112) Ibid., p.70, 
113) Ibid •. pp .66, 133. 
114) Ibid., pp. 73, 74, 75. 
115) Cmnd. 2807, p.93. 
116) Ibid., 
117) Ibid., 
118) Ibid., 
119) Ibid., 
120) Ibid., 
121) Ibid. , 
122) Ibid., 
123) Ibid., 
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was prepared to examine this proposa1116 ) and thought 
that it should receive further consideration117)but 
nothing came of it. 
(B) A blocking quarter of Africans in the Legislative 
Assembly was suggested by the Rhodesians on several 
118) 
occasions. Originally this was not acceptable 
to the United Kingdom because it did not provide 
for a sufficient increase in African Representat-
i 119) on 
it.120) 
but later they were prepared to consider 
Again, however, disagreement over the 
composition of the blocking quarter resulted in 
121) deadlock. Again the issue was nomination 
versus election of members. The Rhodesians felt 
that two additional seats should be given to the 
Africans in the House of Representatives, thus 
giving them a blocking quarter, but that the two 
additional members should be chiefs as they felt 
strongly that the chiefs should have some represent-
ation in Parliament.122 ) The United Kingdom did not 
object in principle to some representation of the 
chiefs in Parliament but 
an integral element in a 
could not accept them as 
blocking quarter. 123 ) 
--------------------They/ ... 
p. 93. 
p, 123. 
pp. 66, 109. 
p. 74. 
p. 123. 
p. 123. 
pp. 66, 109. 
p. 110. 
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They suggested that two additional "B" Roll seats 
should be filled by election thus giving the 
124) Africans a blocking elective quarter. 
(C) A blocking third of Africans in the egislative 
125) Assembly was suggested by the United Kingdom. 
Again, however, disagreement over the composition 
126) of the blocking third resulted in deadlock. 
The Rhodesians suggested a blocking third consist-
127) ing of the 15 "B" Roll seats plus twelve chiefs . 
The chiefs were not acceptable to the United King-
dom128) which also considered that the margin of 
two votes was not a sufficient constitutional safe -
guarct.129) They suggested a "B" Roll consisting 
of twenty -six seats for constitutional purposes.l30 ) 
(D) A variation of (C) above qr rather a combination 
of (A) and (C) above was also tentatively suggested, 
viz. that a Senate of twelve should be constituted, 
t hat i t shoul d vote with the House and that two-
thirds :naJori ty should ".)e required f or amendment. l3l) 
T'.1is suggestion was subject to the same defect as 
the fo r mer proposals in t hat the~e was disagreement 
over composition. 
----------------------(E)/ . .. 
124) Ibid., pp. 66, 134. 
125) Crnnd. 2&)7, pp. 74, 123, 133. 
126) Ibid., p. 123. 
127) Ibid., pp. 70, 133. 
128) Ibid., pp. 73, 74. 
129) Ibid., p. 133. 
130) Ibid . , pp. 74, 75. 
131) Ibid., p. 73. 
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(E) The United Kingdom also suggested that amendment 
should be ma.de by a two-thirds majority of the 
Legislative Assembly (as at present constituted 
and in which therefore the Africans with fi~een 
"B" Roll seats did not have a blocking third), but 
thereafter the Bill should be submitted to the 
entire electorate for approval and in this connect-"· 
ion the "B" Roll electorate should be increased to 
include all adult taxpayers. 132 ) There was no 
agreement on this. 
(F) Mr. Wilson also suggested a referen 1m of adult 
taxpayers as a suitable means of amendment133 ) but 
nothing came of this suggestion either. 
(G) The last suggestion was the conclusion of a Solemn 
Treaty between the United Kingdom and Rhodesia134) 
at the time of granting of independence. 135) Accord-
ing to the Rhodesians it would not be acceptable 
to them if it incorporated reservations going be-
yond the Constitution. 
the Constitution. 136 ) 
It would simply reinforce 
The British were anxious 
_________________________ that/ ... 
132) Ibid., p. 133. 
133) Cmnd. 28o7, p. 110. 
134) Ibid., p. 92. 
135) Ibid., p. lo4 .. 
1.36) Ibid., pp. 92, 127. 
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that the Treaty should comprise all five princip-
137) les. Further points arose concerning registrat-
ion, construction and sanctions for breaches of the 
proposed treaty. The United Kingdom suggested that 
the treaty should be registered at the United 
Nations138) but Rhodesia would not agree to the 
United Nations being involved.139) On the con-
struction of the Treaty, suggestion wss made that 
the Privy Council, the International Court of 
Justice or the proposed Commonwealth Court of Appeal 
should adjudicate on disputes arising out of the 
140) Treaty. The Privy Council was most favoured 
by the Rhodesians. 141 ) 
On the question of sanctions for breach of the Treaty 
Rhodesia suggested the measures outlined before by the 
United Kingdom as consequences of a Unilateral Declarat-
ion of Independence. The British view was that the 
action contemplated in those statements was appropriate 
as the immediate response to an illegal act but it would 
not necessarily be appropriate as a sanction for a 
142) treaty. On the whole Mr. Wilson was not very 
enthusiastic about the treaty proposals. 143) He re-
ferred t o the not entirely happy precedent of the 
-----------------------------------------------------treaty/ •.. 
137) Ibid., p. 104. 
138) Ibid., p. 92. 
139) Ibid., p. 104. 
140) Ibid., pp. 92, 104. 
141) .1!2.14., p. 104. 
142) Cmnd. 2fb7, p.92. 
143) .1!2.14., pp . 103-104. 
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144) treaty of guarantee with Cyprus and he added that 
his colleagues in the Cabinet might not be easily con-
vinced that a treaty would satisfy the criteria they 
had in mind. 145) 
Ultimately it was agreed that a Treaty would not pro-
vide any real help in solving the problem because the 
United Kingdom envisaged a much more comprehensive type 
of Treaty than would be acceptable to the Rhodesian 
146) Government. 
As agreement could not be reached on any of the above 
propositions it follows that it was not possible to 
devise an acceptable method of entrenchment for the 
specially entrenched provisions of the 1961 Constitution. 
During the negotiations on this matter two further 
points arose between the parties. It was suggested 
that there should be a permanent and irreversible right 
of recourse to the Privy Council in anyone who alleged 
that his rights had been infringed by legislation. 147 ) 
The United Kingdom also suggested a new special entrench-
ment of Chapter III of the existing Constitution relat-
ing to the delimitation and number 'of constituencies 
and electoral districts but no agreement could be 
reached on this. 148) 
-----------------------------------------------------Ordinary/ •. . 
144) Ibid., pp. 92-93 . 
145) Ibid., p. 104. 
146) Ibid., p. 127. 
147) Ibid., pp. 127-128, 134. 
148) Cmnd. 28o7, p.134. 
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Ordinary Constitutional Amendments. 
The United Kingdom considered that there were defects 
in the 1961 Constitution in that there were no adequate 
safeguards for the unentrenched provisions and that 
this was the time to rectify the matter. 149) In 
particular the Rhodesian Legislature under the 1961 
Constitution had power to reduce the "B" Roll and thus 
delay, if not prevent, the achievement of ultimate 
African majority rule.l50) What was needed was a : 
guarantee against such reduction.l5l) In any event 
the proposed changes in the Constitution could not be 
152) confined to the entrenched clauses. This matter 
proved t o be a major stumbling block153 ) and was even 
described by the parties as the fundamental difficulty.154 ) 
On the one side the Rhodesian Government insisted that 
the existing machinery for amendment by a two-thirds 
majority should continue unaltered.155) On the other 
side the United Kingdom required the maintenance of the 
present two-thir ds provision and an increase in the "B" 
156) Roll seats to provide a blocking third for amendment. 
In brief the United Kingdom wished t o more or less 
equate the entrenched and ordinary provisions of the 
Constitution in so far as amendments ar e concerned 
-----------------------------whereas/ ... 
149) Th!£·, p. lo6. 
150 ) Ibid., p. 105. 
151) Ibid., p. 122. 
152) Ibid., pp. llO, 124. 
153 ) Ibid ., pp. 93, 103. 
154) Ibid., pp. 106, 128. 
155) filQ.•, pp. 93, 103 , 129, 133 . 
156) Ibid., pp. 74, 93, 133. 
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whereas the Rhodesians wished to draw a clear distinct-
ion between them. As we have seen too the measures 
which the United Kingdom proposed in relation to all 
constitutional amendments were unacceptable to the 
Rhodesians even in relation to the entrenched provisions. 
Thus disagreement was complete. 
(iii) Immediate improvement in the political status of the 
African population. 
This involved in essence two questions: (1) more repre-
sentative institutions and (2) an extension of the 
franchise. 
The British pressed for greater African Representation 
in the legislative institutions.157 ) They pointed out 
that if an elected blocking third was created this woul d 
at the same time give increased African Representation .158: 
They regarded the idea to extend the franchise on the 
"B" Roll as helpful and a significant advance but they 
drew attention to the fact that it would not give the 
Af ricans more seats, i.e. increased representation. 159) 
They proposed an elected Senate comprised of Africans 
and an increased number of African seats in the Legislat-
160) 
ure but this was unacceptable to the Rhodesians who 
161) 
would make no such concessions. One of the reasons 
given was the refusal of the Africans t o co-operate in 
taking advantage of t he present Constitution.162 ) The 
---------------------------__:Rhodesians/ . .. 
157) Cmnd. 2tXJ7, PP, 35, 122. 
158) Ibid., p. 74. 
159) Ibid., pp. 75, 81, 122. 
160) Ibid., p. 75. 
161) Ibid ., p. 75. 
162) ill!£.· ' P P 68 , 74. 
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Rhodesians were willing to enlarge the legislature but 
insisted that the existing ratio of "A" Roll to "B" Roll 
seats should be preserved in an enlarged legislature. 163) 
The other question was the extension of the franchise 
which was described by Sir Alec Douglas-Home and Mr. 
Duncan Sandys as incomparably more restrictive than that 
of any other British territory to which independence has 
hitherto been granted. 164 ) Originally . the Rhodesians 
pressed for the elimination of the system of cross-voting 
in return for the extension of the franchise165) but 
eventually they agreed to forego this. 166 ) In the 
result the sides succeeded in achieving agreement on 
the extension of the franchise on the "B" Roll to 
qualified indigenous adult taxpayers. 167 ) It was 
estimated that this would give a vote on the "B" Roll 
to approximately One million persons.168) 
(iv) Progress towards ending racial discrimination. 
In principle the British considered that what mattered 
was that the general impression of racial discrimination 
within Rhodesia must be removed by some signs that dis-
crimination was really being progressively reduced. 169) 
In this regard it was essential that there should be 
some dramatic forward move in relation t o e.g. the 
Land/. -
------------------------------
163) Ibid., p. 33. 
164) Cmnd. 28o7, p. 16. 
lt5) Ibid., pp. 34, 67. 
166) ~- , p. 75. 
167) 
168) 
169) 
Ibid., 
Ibid., 
ill£·, 
p. 135. 
pp. 70, 81 ~ 
p. 77. 
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Land Apportionment Act170 ) which should be repealed or 
amended. 171 ) 
The Rhodesian Government should at least admit publicly 
that its repeal was desirable in principle. 172 ) The 
United Kingdom also raised the question of opening 
Salisbury to Africans and that of education. 173) 
The Rhodesians said that they were considering modificat-
ions to the Land Apportionment Act which would have the 
effect of admitting Africans to non-racial areas for 
business and residential purposes and they would continue 
to study such modifications. 174 ) They would consider 
withdrawing certain parts of it when it seemed desirable 
to do so. Already five million acres of land formerly 
European had been made available to Africans. The Act 
was of value in protecting Africans from exploitation. 
As regards racial discrimination in the towns they were 
presently considering several multiracial areas. They 
were examining whether that part of the Salisbury trad-
ing area which was adjacent to the Kopje could be made 
a multi-racial area. On the question of integration of 
schools this type of change made for a worsening of racial 
relations rather than for their improvement. It was up to 
those who wanted multi-racial education to provide it. 
Nothing would be done to prevent them. It was unreason-
able that existing schools for one race should be turned 
into multi-racial schools without the consent of the 
-------~------------------- parents/ ... 
170) Ibid., p. 71, 
171) Ibid., p . . 67. 
1 72) Ibid. , p. 76 . 
1 73) Ibid. , p. 76 . 
174) C!Tll1d. 28o7, p. 68. 
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parents. The creation of a multi-racial teachers' 
training college had been allowed. 175) 
The United Kingdom considered, however, that sufficient 
steps had not been taken, 176 ) that the Rhodesian con-
cessions were not significant,177) and that the Rhodes -
ian attitude to education was indefensible in terms of 
progress towards a multi-racial society.178) Neverthe-
less they considered that the distance between the two 
sides was less on this principle than on the others179) 
and that the matter could perhaps be dealt with in the 
context of acceptability to the people . l8o) 
(v) The British Government must be satisfied that any basis 
proposed for independence was acceptable to the people 
of Rhodesia as a whole. 
The principle was insisted upon right throughout the 
181) 
negotiations by the United Kingdom and indeed the 
principle was accepted by both sides. 182 ) It was agreed 
that as far as European opinion was concerned, a refer-
endum on the present franchise on both sides would 
suffice.183 ) The problem however was the means by which 
the African acceptance should be demonstrated and on this 
both parties were uncommittedl84 ) and indeed in profound 
disagreement as will shortly appear. The following 
proposals were put f orward. 
---------------------(A)/ ... 
175) Ibid., p.76. 
176) ~ .. p.67. 
177) Ibid., p.7l. 
178) Ibid., p. 76. 
179) TI?.!£.' p.&) 
18o) Ibid., p.122. 
181) 
182) 
183) 
184) 
Cmnd. 28o7, pp.22, 23, 35, 49, 
59, 77. 
Ibid., pp. 39, 66. 
Ibid., p.30. Such a referendum 
was held on 5th November, 1964. 
Ibid., p.42. 
Ibid., pp. 37, 39, 
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(A) Rhodesia proposed that Africa.a opinion could be best 
ascertained through the established tribal system 
whereby two hundred tribal Chiefs and five hundred 
tribal Headmen could represent three million of 
the three and a half million African population 
and an indaba would be called for this purpose. 185) 
Mr. Smith asked the British Government to nominate 
observers to attend such an indaba186 ) but they 
refused as this might be interpreted as implying a 
commitment on their part to accepting this method 
of consultation as representing the opinion of the 
people as a whole. 187 ) The indctba took place at 
188) Domboshawa between 21st and 26th October, 1964. 
The British Government saw several problems in 
relation to the indaba procedure. In the first 
place they did not see that the Chiefs and Headmen 
were genuinely representative of African opinionl89) 
and thus that the opinion of the people as a whole 
would not be reflected at such an indaba~90) After 
the indaba was held they would not accept that 
acceptability had been demonstrated by it.l9l) In 
In the second place it was clear from Mr.Wilson's 
questioning of the Council of Chiefs that they had 
little comprehension of the terms of the existing 
Constitution which was not true of the African 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~Nationalist/ ... 
185) 
186) 
187) 
188) 
189) 
190) 
191) 
Ibid., p.23. 
Ibid., p.4o. 
Ibid., p.41. 
Ibid., p.42. 
1!21.£., p .24. 
Ibid., p.41. 
Cmnd. 28o7, pp. 48, 52, 59, 77, 
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Nationalist delegations. 192 ) In the third place 
the question of impartial supervision under the 
control of neutral observers was mentioned at one 
stage .193 ) 
(B) Mr. Smith suggested that there might be a main 
~daba preceded by a series of preliminary indabas 
which would enable each chief to ascertain the 
opinion of his own tribe.194 ) Nothing came of 
this suggestion. Presumably it was subject to the 
same objections as the previous proposal. 
(C) Mr. Smith suggested that Mr. Wilson might satisfy 
himself by taking the views of the principal 
African Nationalist leaders and of the Africans in 
the Constitutional Council and in the Parliamentary 
Opposition, the views of the chiefs and the Europ-
eans being more precisely known, and Mr. Wilson 
agreed that this was a possible way.l95) Nothing, 
however, came of the suggestion presumably because 
both parties saw the difficulty of probable non-
participation in such an arrangement by the African 
Nationalists. 195 ) 
(D) In principle the United Kingdom required something 
in the nature of a referendum or some method of 
democratic consultation. 196) At one stage it 
appeared that Rhodesia might be prepared to go 
------------------------------
some/ ... 
192) Ibid., p. 115, 
193) Ibid., pp. 28-29. 
194) Ibid., p. 28. 
195) Ibid., p. 109. 
196) Ibid., pp. 28, 31, 112. 
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some distance in this direction197 ), but in general 
it can be said that such procedures found no favour 
with it as will shortly appear. In relation to such 
democratic consultation the United Kingdom put for-
ward the following suggestions. 
1. 
2. 
A constitutional conference should be held. 198) 
This was not acceptable to Rhodesial99) which 
maintained that this would undermine the 
authority of the chiefs by implying that they 
were not sufficiently representative of their 
?80ple for these purposes and that local 
opinion would not simply stand another confer-
ence before Southern Rhodesia was granted 
200 ) independence. 
A referendum should be held. 20l) The Rhodes-
ians saw several problems in this particular 
suggestion. In the first place it was imprac-
tica1202) in that the Africans would not 
understand the questions put to them which 
were of a complex and sophisticated nature. 203) 
In the second place it would undermine the 
standing of the chiefs as spokesmen of their 
tribes.2o4) In the third place it was diffi-
cult to reconcile the principle of individual 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~consultation/ .. _ 
197) Ibid., p. 34. 
198) Cmnd. 28o7, pp. 23, 33, 61, 87. 
199) Ibid., pp. 23, 25, 62, 87. 
200) 
201) 
202) 
203) 
2o4) 
Ibid., 
Ibid., 
Ibid., 
Ibid., 
Ibid., 
p.25. 
p.24. 
p.24. 
pp. 23 , 
p. 24. 
24, 25, 28. 
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consultation (as in a referendum) with the 
traditional tribal system. It might indeed 
be impussible to do so.205) 
3. An indaba f ollowed by some method of popular 
consult ation.2o6) Here it was suggested that 
the Chiefs and Headmen might arrange some kind 
of referendum. 207 ) The Rhodesians indicated 
however, that they might be prepared to ask 
the Chiefs and Headmen to canvass opinion in 
their tribes and villages before attending the 
indaba but there should be no question of 
trying to turn this process into any kind of 
referen,dum. 208) A i th th t· = ga n ey saw e sugges ion 
of popular consultation as undermining the 
authority of the chiefs209) and as mere pander -
ing to African Nationalist leaders who had not 
even bothered t o register on the voters' rolls 
and who would now be getting a "double oppor-
tunity".210 ) 
4. The referendum procedure in the 1961 Constitut-
ion might be ut i lized.211 ) The Rhodesians 
saw difficulties here in that one percent of 
the population (the Asian Group) couJd nullify 
a referendum, the process was cumbrous and in 
addit ion the assignment of indivi duals to 
------------------------------:racial/ ... 
205) Ibid., p. 32. 210 ) Ibi d. , p.27. 
2o6 ) Ibid., p. 27. 211) Ibid., p .77. 
207) Ibid., p. 2 8. 
208) Cmnd . 28o7, p. 25. 
209) Ibid. , pp. 27, 28. 
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racial groups was an invidious process.212 ) 
The United Kingdom replied that it did not 
contemplate what might amount to four separate 
electoral colleges. On this point they would 
be inclined to support a single referendum. 
Mr. Smith pointed out however, that this would 
be virtually a referendum on "one man one vote" 
and would be unacceptable. 213) It might also 
be added that the African Nationalists rejected 
an acceptability test verified by reference to 
214) 
various groups of the population. 
5. A referendum which went beyond the confines of 
the existing electorate on the "A" and "B" 
Rolls should be held. Here various suggestions 
were made, viz. that some one million Africans 
should be added to the "B" Roll and that the 
"A" and "B" Rolls together might provide the 
basis of a referendum, 215) that a referendum 
216) 
of all adult taxpayers should be held -
this should also have the effect of adding 
one million Africans to the electorate for the 
purpose of the referendum. At an earlier 
stage it was even suggested that the addition 
of one million African taxpayers might not be 
sufficient. 217 ) All these suggestions were 
----------------------------....:rejected/ . . . 
212) Ibid., p. 78. 
213) Ibid., p. 91. 
214) Ibid., p. 112. 
215) Ibid., p. 78. 
216) Cmnd. 2&)7, p. 112. 
217) Ibid., p. 81. 
rejected by the Rhodesians on the grounds 
that the independence issue was too complex to 
be understood by the vast majority of Africans 
participating in such a wide referendum. 218) 
(E) As will shortly be seen, the United Kingdom proposed 
a Royal Commission to investigate the resolution of 
the differences between the sides. It was suggested 
that the separate issue of the method of testing 
acceptability should be le~ entirely to the 
Commission. 219) The Com.~ission should commence its 
work by discussing this issue.220 ) It was suggested 
that it should submit an interim report221 ) and 
that although considerable weight should be attached 
to the recommendations of the Commission, the two 
Governments must be entitled to examine the 
Commission's proposals before deciding whether they 
ld t th 222) cou accep em. 
In the ultimate no means of testing African opinion 
acceptable to both sides was found. As the British 
Government saw it, the Rhodesian Government was not 
prepared to contemplate any process of consultation 
which might be rejectea223) to which the Rhodesians 
countered that it would be invidious and embarrassing 
to both Governments if agreement was reached on a 
basis for independence and if this was subsequently 
rejected. 224 ) 
----------------------(F)/ ... 
218) Ibid., pp. '{8, 81, 115. 223) Ibid., p. 67. 
219) Ibid., pp. 119, 136. 224) Ibid., p. 68. 
220) J.!21£., p. 123. 
221) I!21£., p. 120. 
222) Ibid., p. 130. 
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(F) The Royal Commission. 
Towards the end of the negotiations when it appeared 
as if disagreement on nearly all important points 
was complete (as appears from the foregoing) 
Mr. Wilson proposed that he and Mr. Smith should 
jointly recommend to the Queen the appointment of a 
Royal Commission. 225) The Rhodesian Government were 
willing in principle to give it a try.226 ) There 
was also agreement over the composition of the 
Commission. It should be headed by Sir Hugh Beadle 
and consist of one Rhodesian and one British nominee 
in addition.227 ) The Commission· should have the 
normal power to take formal evidence and to move 
228) freely amongst the people. It would need to 
undertake a certain amount of basic factual resear~~9: 
On the above there was broad consensus, but on the 
terms of reference, the principle of unanimity and 
binding nature of the Commission's ultimate rec-
ommendations there was disagreement. 
On the terms of reference the British wanted wide 
terms. The Commission should be able to recommend 
the constitutional arrangements on the basis of 
which Rhodesia might proceed to independence. 230) 
The Rhodesians considered, however, that this 
~----------------------------------~--------------_;amounted/ ... 
225) 
226) 
227) 
228) 
229) 
230) 
Ibid., 
Ibid., 
Ibid., 
Ibid . , 
Ibid., 
Ibid., 
p. 
p . 
pp. 
p. 
p. 
pp. 
112. 
118. 
112, 116, 120 . 
113. 
121. 
112-113. 
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amounted to a blank cheque to the Commission and 
they wanted the terms of reference to be more 
specific.231 ) They had therefore tabled an altern-
ative proposal which suggested that the terms be: 
1. Independence on the 1961 Constitution -
creation of a House of Chiefs of twelve; 
2. Two-thirds majority of House of Chiefs voting 
with Parliament should have full power to alter 
any entrenched clauses. 232 ) Thus there was 
disagreement on the content of the basic docu-
ment to be put to the Commission and Mr. 
Lardner-Burke was of the view that the two 
Governments would never succeed in reaching 
agreement on it.233 ) Eventually Mr. Wilson 
was prepared to consider the proposal with 
the narrow terms of reference envisaged by the 
Rhodesians but could not accept the Rhodesian 
attitude on the unentrenched clauses of the 
1961 Constitution. 234 ) This he was only pre-
pared to do on the understanding that Mr.Smith 
had agreed that there shoald be 'tlllanimity on 
the part of the Commission in making its 
recommendations. 235) 
On the principle of unanimity there was dis-
agreement. The United Kingdom insisted on a 
-----------------------------'unanimous/ ... 
231) Ibid. , p . 118. 
232) Ibid., p. 116. 
233) Cmnd. 28o7, p. 123. 
234) Ibid., p. 140. 
235) Ibid., p. 140. 
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unamimous recommendation236) whereas the 
Rhodesians wanted provision made for majority 
recommendation. 237 ) The United Kingdom were 
under the impression that Mr. Smith had accepted 
the principle of unanimity238)but Mr. Smith 
agreed that this would be essential "if the 
report was to carry conviction.239) 
The United Kingdom would not agree to the 
recommendations of the Commission being bind-
ing. 240 ) The rights of the United Kingdom 
Parliament must be fully reserved. The Commiss-
ion's report would obviously carry the greatest 
weight and there would have to be compelling 
241) 
reasons for rejection. On the other hand 
the Rhodesians required the recommendations 
to be binding, 242 ) described this point as 
being fundamenta12~3 ) and requested Mr.Wilson 
to sign that he would grant independence if 
the Commission found that this was acceptable 
to the people of Rhodesia as a whole. 244 ) 
----------------------------Finally/ ... 
236) Ibid., p. 121. 
237) 
238) 
239) 
240) 
241) 
242) 
243) 
244) 
Ibid., pp. 139, 
Ibid., pp. 137, 
Ibid., p. 121. 
Cmnd. 28o7, pp. 
Ibid., pp. 141, 
Ibid., pp. 116, 
Ibid., p. 142. 
~-, p. 116. 
142. 
140 . 
113, 137. 
143. 
139, 142. 
245) Cmnd. 2&J7, p. 143, 
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Finally, on 10th November, 1965, Mr. Wilson 
asked Mr. Smith that if the United Kingdom 
Government undertook to commend to Parliament 
a unanimous report by the Royal Commission 
that the 1961 Constitution was acceptable to 
the people of Rhodesia as a whole would the 
Rhodesian Government give a corresponding 
undertaking that if the Commission submitted 
a unanimous report that the 1961 Constitution 
was not so acceptable they would abandon 
their claim in this respect and would agree 
that the Commission should then proceed to 
devise a new constitution as a basis for 
independence. If the Commission failed to 
produce a unanimous report, the position of 
the two Governments would be wholly reserved. 
If these proposals were not acceptable to 
the Rhodesian Government arrangements should 
be made for a personal discussion between 
the two Prime Ministers.245) The Unilateral 
Declaration of Independence was made on the 
following day. 
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CHAPTER II. 
THE INTERNATIONAL STATUS AND PERSONALITY OF 
SOUTHERN RHODESIA BEFORE 11TH NOvm.tBER, 1965. 
SECTION I. 
STATUS OF SOUTHERN RHODESIA IN GENERAL. 
In the present Section the general international status of Southern 
Rhodesia at various times before 11th November, 1965 will be described. 
Thus the development of the status of the territory from being one 
under Lobengula, through the process of being a British Sphere of 
Influence, a Protectorate and finally a self-governing Colony will be 
outlined. Attention will also be paid to the status of the British 
South Africa Company and the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, 
both of which were intimately connected with the territory. In the 
following Section the more specific question of the status of Southern 
Rhodesia in relation to the provisions of Article 73 of the Charter of 
the United N~tions between the years 1945 and 1965 will be discussed. 
In the third section of the Chapter, the extent of Southern Rhodesian 
personality will receive attention. This involves an examination of 
the extent of its treaty capacity, its personality as a member of 
international organization, its capacity to bear international respon-
sibility, diplomatic rights and protect its nationals . 
.•. 
As in the former Chapter, it must again be stressed that this 
Chapter is merely of an introductory nature. Its purpose is to provide 
background material on the international law status of the territory 
before U.D.I. for the discussion of problems relating to the status 
of Rhodesia in the post-U.D.I. era. It does not attempt to be a 
detailed and exhaust~ve exposition of the various matters discussed 
in it. Before/ .•. 
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Before 1888 the territory was subject to the rule of Lobengula, the 
Matabele King. 1 ) It often happened, in past centuries, that kings 
and rulers outside the ambit of Western Christian civilization were 
treated by European powers as possessing a degree of international 
personality while full personality, the capacity to enjoy all rights 
under international law, was reserved to western Christian states.2 ) 
As early as the middle ages the notion existed that sovereignty could 
be exercised by infidels3) and by the 15th Century by Non-Europeans, 4 ) 
pagans5) and backward peoples. 6 ) The territory of such peoples could 
not be regarded as being res nullius ~7 ) Thus it was not subject to 
occupation. 8 ) But it could be acquired by other means, e.g. cession 
-----------------
---,----------or/ ... 
1) Palley, p,7, 
2~ Sorensen, pp. 9, 37, 39, 41; Akehurst, pp. 23-24. 
3) Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Secunda Secundae, Venetiis, 1593, Q 10, 
Art. 10; Ernest Nys, Les origines du droit international, Paris 
& Brussels, 1894; Lindley, p.11. 
4) C.H.Alexandrowicz, "New and Original States - The Issue of Revers-
ion to Sovereignty" (45) International Affairs, 1969, p.465 at 
pp. 468-470 points out that the classic writers show that Non-
European States had international personality before the 19th 
Century and (at p.471) that part of the continent of Asia must be 
considered as having entered the Family of Nations before the 19th 
Century . See too Nabob of the Carnatie v. East India Company, 
2 Ves. Jun. 56; The Secretary of State in Council of India v. 
Kamachee Boye Sahaba, 13 Moo. P.C. 22; Secretary of State for 
India v. Sardar Rastam Khan and Others [1941] A.C. 356. 
5) Lindley, p. 12. 
6) T.A.Walker, A History of the Law of Nations, Cambridge, 1899, 1, 
§ 120 et seq; Lindley, p.12. 
7) Alberici Gentilis, De Iure Belli, (&i. T.E.Holland), Oxford 1877, 
1 , XIX; John Selden, Mare Clausum, London, 1652, Ch. XX; H. Grotius , 
Mare Liberum, Arr.sterdam, 1712,Ch. 11; S. Pufendorf , Of the Law of 
Nature and Nations (tr. Kenneth ) Oxford 1710, I I I, IV, VI; Lindley, 
pp. 17, 20, Gunther, Kluber, Blackstone, Heff'ter, Fiore, Woolsey, 
Pradier-Fodere, Salomon, Bonfils, J~ze, Despagnet and the Institute 
of International Law (Lausanne) 1888 are all quoted in support by 
Lindley,pp. 14-16. Vattel, Phillimore, De Martens, Pinheiro-Ferreira , 
and Bluntschli all give a limited recognition to the sovereignty of 
backward peoples - Lindley, p.17, Westlake, Hall (who is ambivalent ), 
Oppenheim, Laurence, Dudley Field, Martens-Ferrao,Heimburger and 
Schwarzenberger, 1, pp. 81-83 deny the sovereignty of backward 
peoples - Lindley, pp. 18-19. State practi ce supports the view that 
it was not res nullius. Lindley, p.26. 
8) Lindley, p. 26. 
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or conquest.9) In Africa too these ideas found expression in practice.lo) 
In the process of expansion into the newly opened regions of 19th 
Century Africa, where the established states found nothing which was 
recognizable as a state, they would annex the territory, but where 
communities with political institutions were found, these would normally 
be treated with.ll) This shows that these latter communities did 
possess some measure of personality even under the "European" system 
of international law.12 ) It was recognized by European Powers that 
sovereignty resided in local rulers 13 ) and their territories were not 
------------------------------
res nullius/ 
9) Lindley, pp. 26, 43. Where the people agreed to place themselves 
10) 
under the acquiring state it was regarded as cession - even if they 
were forced - for forced agreements were then part of international 
law. If it was taken from them by force against their will it was 
regarded as conquest. Lindley, p. 44. The principle that lands 
inhabited by backward peoples were open to acquisition by Christ-
ians by means other than occupation was recognized by State Practice 
over the centuries. Bull of Nicholas V, 1452, Bull of Alexander VI , 
Inter Caetara, Letters Patent of Henry VII, 1495, to John Cabot, 
Letters Patent of Fran9ois 1, 1540, Charter of Elizabeth 1, 1578, 
to Sir Humphrey Gilbert, Charter of the same to Raleigh, Charters 
of James I in respect of Virginia and New England, French Grants 
1635, 1642 to Compagnie des Isles de L'Am~rique, Grant of Charles II 
1670 tp the Hudson Bay Company. For details see Lindl ey, pp.24-2;. 
Lindl0y-., 
Africa. 
p.33. There was, however, a difference between Asia and 
In the countries of the East Indies there is room for a 
doctrine of reversion to sovereignty on the attainment of independ-
ence. But the scramble for Afri ca resulted in partition irrespective 
of ethnological and social tradi tion. Thus newly independent 
·African states (unlike some of their Asian counterparts) can hardly 
claim identity with the vast numbers of States and Chieftainships 
which had disappeared in the melting pot of colonial absorption. 
Most of them are new States and reversion to sovereignty has no 
application. See Alexandrowicz, note 4) supra.pp. 472-473, 
11) Lindley, p.17. 
12) Sobhuza II v. Miller & Others [1926] A.C. 518. At the Conference 
of Berlin, 1884-1885, it was recognized that there might be African 
Sovereigns on the East Coast other than the Sultan of Zanzibar and 
the then hypothetical quest i on of encountering sovereigns in the 
geographical basin of the Congo was discussed - Lindley, p.33, 
13) The Conference of Berlin, 1884-1885 recognized that the rights of 
native chiefs included rights of sovereignty although in fact most 
of the chiefs had alienated these rights. The idea that local 
rulers had sovereignty is further supported by the fact that pro-
tectorates were assumed over their territories and the assumption 
of a protectorate implies the existence of a etate to be protected -
Lindley, pp. 33-34, 
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1~) 
res nullius. The community governed by Lobengula was such a 
community,l5) Lobengula himself was regarded as a sovereign16 ) and 
treaties were concluded with him and his predecessors.17 ) 
(1) British "Sphere of Influence". 
There are a number of varieties of spheres of influence, only two 
of which are relevant in the present context: 
(a) A sphere of influence may be established over an area by 
agreement between colonizing powers. There is a promise 
by each of the powers to abstain from doing anything that 
might lead to the acquisition of sovereign rights within the 
sphere allotted to the other who is at liberty to acquire 
sovereign rights in the area by treaty or other appropriate 
method. 18) 
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
 by/ ... 
14) Lindley, p. 34 says it emerges very clearly that lands in Africa 
were not res nullius when one considers the procedure by which the 
Powers extended their sovereignty in Africa. In general, territor-
ial rights were obtained by cession from Native Chiefs - generally 
by making treaties with all the native chiefs in the area to be 
acquired. 
15) Lindley, p. 37; .In Re Southern Rhodesia [1919] A.C. 211. 
Lobengula's rule was that of a regular government in which the 
rule was his. He had a kind of Senate and popular assembly which 
he consulted. So there was no question of this being a case of 
whites settling where there is no recognizable form of sovereignty. 
Ibid., 214-215. 
16) A treaty of 1888 describes Lobengula as "ruler of the tribe known 
as Amandabele together with the Mashona and Makalaka, tributaries 
of the same". The relation between the Mashonas and Matabele inter 
se was ambiguous but did not matter because in 1888, Queen Victoria 
recognized Lobengula as sovereign of both peoples. The British 
Government stated to the Portuguese Government that Lobengula was 
an "independent king" and "undisputed ruler over Matabeland and 
Mashonaland 11 who had not parted with his sovereignty. In 1&1) the 
Colonial Secretary wrote to Lobengula saying that he was "King of 
the country" and no one can exercise jurisdiction in it without 
his permission. See In Re Southern Rhodesia, note 15) supra, at 
214. Lobengula also granted mining concessions in 188o, 1882,1888. 
Ibid., 216. 
17) In 1836, there was a Treaty of Friendship and Alliance between 
the Governor of the Cape Colony and Umsiligas described as "King 
of the Abaqua Zooloo or Qua Machoban". In addition, there was the 
Treaty of 1888 described in note 16) supra. 
18) Lindley, p. 2o6; Palley, p.4. 
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By treaties ~ted 12th May, 18&5 and 30th December, 18&5, 
France and Germany acknowledged Portuguese rights to exercise 
sovereignty between Angola and Mozambique without prejudice 
to any rights that may have been hitherto acquired by other 
powers and they would abstain from making acquisitions in the 
region so defined. 19) Portugal admitted that this recognit-
ion and engagement were not binding on other Powers but 
maintained they gave her a legal title which could be invoked 
before other nations.20 ) The United Kingdom refused to 
acknowledge such a title and eventually by Treaty dated 11th 
June, 1891, Portugal finally renounced her claim to much of 
the territory which France and Germany had recognized as 
being within her sphere of influence.21 ) 
(b) A sphere of interest may be created over the territory of a 
third state by agreement with that state. The latter might 
undertake not to dispose of its territory to any except the 
22) interested power. 
In 1888, a treaty, concluded by one J.S.Moffat, British Resident 
Commissioner in Bechuanaland with Lobengula, was ratified by the 
British Government. 23 ) Under it, the territory became a British 
"Sphere of Influence 11 • 24 ) A unilateral declaration to this effect 
was made by the High Commissioner for South Africa in April, 1888. 
In August 1888, the South African Republic was informed by telegram 
___________________________ that/ ... 
19) Lindley, p. 213; Palley, p.6. 
20) Lindley, pp. 213-214; Palley, pp. 5-6. 
21) Lindley, p. 214; Palley, pp. 6-7, 
22) Lindley, p. 2o6. 
23) Palley, p. 6. 
24) In Re Southern Rhodesia, note 15) supra, 214. 
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that 'the Lobengula country was regarded as being within the sphere 
of exclusively British interest' and in 1891, the High Commissioner 
issued a Proclamation declaring that any attempt to occupy the 
British sphere of influence would be deemed to be an unfriendly 
act. 25) The treaty provided for peace between British Subjects 
and Lobengula's people. Lobengula undertook not to conclude 
treaties or enter into relations with other powers. He also under-
took not to cede any of his territory to foreign powers except 
with the consent of Her Majesty's Commissioner in South Africa.26 ) 
27) Under this treaty of 188o, Britain did not acquire the territory 
but would merely be entitled to the individual rights ennumerated in 
. 28) the treaty the existence of the sum total of which made the 
territory a sphere of influence. From 1889 onwards, the status 
of the territory, as such a sphere, was further consolidated by 
recognition on the part of other powers. At first, the South 
African Republic was indisposed to recognize the British claim to 
a sphere of influence and attempted to appoint a consul to 
Lobengula. The dispute continued through 1888 and 1889 but event-
ually President Kruger capitulated. 29) By Convention in 1891, 
Portugal renounced her claim to the territory.30) Eventually, all 
the powers concerned had recognized the new sphere of influence. 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~Anglo/German/ . . . 
25) Palley, p.8. 
26) Palley, p.7. 
27) Lindley, pp. 227,236; Falley, p. 6; Oppenheim, 1, p. 514. 
28) Lindley, p . 235. 
29) Palley, pp. 8-9. 
30) (43) British Foreign and State Papers (1891) 27; Lindley, p.214; 
Palley, p. 5. By this Convention, Portugal and Britain agreed on 
a boundary with Mozambique, arrangements were made for the construct-
ion of a railway to the coast, the Zambezi and its tributary were 
recognized as international waterways and the duty on transit 
goods through Mozambique was limited. See Chayes, 11, p. 1317. 
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Anglo-German, Portuguese and South African Republic treaties 
acknowledge this.3l) I.obengula retained an international person-
ality. He was recognized as being a ruler and having sovereignty 
by the British.32 ) His territory within the sphere of influence 
was not territorium nullius and thus could not be acquired by 
occupation.33) Furthermore, there were duties in respect of the 
sphere of influence as the power cannot interfere (except by consent) 
with the autonomy of the local ruler and has no jurisdiction over 
his subjects.34 ) Cecil Rhodes and his associates secured a con-
cession from Lobengula vesting in them exclusive mineral rights 
in the territory ruled hy Lobengula.35) The British South Africa 
Company was chartered in 188c) and it acquired the rights under 
this Concession.36) This concession would, it is submitted, prim-
arily be a municipal law contract.37 ) Its international law sig-
nificance would only be that of any other concession, namely, that 
the state of nationality of the concession-holders (in this case 
the United Kingdom) would be entitled to exercise diplomatic pro-
tection in the event of a failure to honour the concession. 
38) 
31) Palley, p.9. 
32) In Re Southern Rhodesia, note 15) supra, 214. 
33) Lindley, p. 39. 
34) Lindley, p. 322. It was thought, however, that from the legal stand-
point these duties were owed to other members of the Family of Nations 
who had made reciprocal promises with regard to their activities (e.g. 
Art. 6 of the General Act of the Berlin Conference) and not to the 
natives themselves. See Lindley, pp. 327, 333. 
35) Palley, p.29. This was the Rudd Concession. 
36) Article 2 of the Charter of the British South Africa Company. Palley, 
p. 35. It also acquired the rights under the Lippert Concession 
granted in 18')1. In Re Southern Rhodesia, note 15) supra, 219. 
37) Serbian and Brazilian Loans case, P.C.I.J. 1929, Series A, 20/21, 
p.41; Schwarzenberger, 1, pp. 71,74; O'Connell, 1, p.382; Brownlie , 
p.444; Akehurst, pp. 119-120. Of course, if the concession contract 
itself provides that international law will govern then that is the 
case. Akehurst, pp. 96-97. 
38) Serbian and Brazilian Loans Case, note 37) supra ; Schwarzenberger,l . 
p.2o6; O'Connell, 11, p.764; Brownlie, p.444; Akehurst, p.120; 
Sorensen, pp. 48'), 573. That this was so in the instant case is 
clear from the fact that Rhodes sought Imperial recognition of the 
Concession and that Queen Victoria approved it despite the fact that 
Lobengula repudiated it and Lobengula was so informed of the approval. 
See Palley, pp. 31-32. In the latter role, the United Kingdom was in 
fact protecting the concession holders. 
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(2) The Protectorate. 
In 1891, an Order in Coun9il was promulgated in terms of which 
general powers of administration and legislation were vested in the 
British High Commissioner in South Africa.39 ) For the first time, 
the United Kingdom is claiming to exercise governmental powers in 
the territory. Lobengula did not resist this encroachment and 
this failure was interpreted as acquiescence in British claims.40 ) 
It is doubtful whether as a matter of international law these 
events were sufficient to establish a British Protectorate over 
Lobengula's territory. A treaty would, of course, establish the 
matter beyond doubt. 41 ) However, acquiescence in a claimed right in 
circumstances where protest against the exercise of the right might 
reasonably be expected would normally have the effect of raising 
an estoppel which would prevent the entity involved from subsequent-
ly disputing the claimed right.42 ) The position, however, appears 
to be that no protectorate was formally claimed by Great Britain 
at this time and that the rights exercised and acquiesced in and 
which were, therefore, it is submitted, quite lawful were somewhat 
less/ ... 
----------------------------
39) South Africa Order in Council 9th May, 1891; Palley, pp. 77-78. 
For text of the Order see In Re Southern Rhodesia, note 15) supra, 
219-220. 
40) In 1893, the Under Secretary for the Colonies explained that 
Lobengula had acquiesced in the exercise by the white authorities of 
Jurisdistion over the whites and over the natives immediately con-
nected with them. Palley, p.78. 
41) This would manifest the express consent of the state to be protected. 
See Palley, pp. 76-77; O'Connell, 1, pp. 342-343; Oppenheim, l, 
p. 178; Lindley, p.203, 
42) Island of Palmas case, 1928, 2 R.I.A A., ~9; Minguiers and 
Ecrehos case, I.C.J. Rep., 1953, 47 at lo6; Anglo-Norwegian 
Fisheries case, I.C.J. Rep. 1951, 116 at 138. The principle is 
qui tacet consentire videtur si logui debuisset ac potuisset. 
Temple of Preah Vihear case (Cambodia v. Thailand), I.CJ. Rep., 
1962, 5 at 22-23; O'Connell, 1, pp. 424-426;, Ma.cGibbon, "Some 
Observations on the Part of Protest in International Law" (30) 
B.Y.I.L., 1953, p. 293; Schwarzenberger, 1, pp. 3o6-308; Brownlie, 
p. 513. 
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less than the establishment of a protectorate. The submission, 
therefore, is that a Protectorate did not actually exist in 1&;1. 
In any event, the 1&;1 Order in Council applied only to Mashonaland 
and not to Matabeleland43)so that only the former would have been 
comprised in the Protectorate, assuming it to have existed. 
Whether or not the above submission is correct, a Protectorate 
certainly existed from 1&)4 as a result of conquest and proclamat-
ion. In 1&;3-1&)4 Company forces invaded Matabeleland and con-
quered it. An Order in Council of 18th July, 1&)4 provided for 
the administration of the territory by the Company, throui)h an 
administrator and a council of four appointed by the Company, 
subject to the approval of the Secretary of State.44 )Legislative 
power was vested in the Board of Directors of the Company, subject 
to the limitations already described. 45 ) On the above conquest, 
the Crown could, as a matter of international law, have annexed 
the territory for there had been a conquest for the Crown by the 
Company.46 ) Sovereignty was acquired by the United Kingdom as a 
. 4 ) 
result of such conquest. 7 The Native sovereignty of Lobengula 
had terminated. 48) On such conquest, it lay in the hands of the 
British/ ... 
-----------------------------
43) In Re Southern Rhodesia, note 15) supra, 225. 
44) Matabeleland Order in Council, 1&)4. Despite its title, the Order 
applied to Mashonaland and Manicaland as well, i.e. all territories 
which were to comprise the future Southern Rhodesia. Palley, p.114; 
In Re Southern Rhodesia, note 15) supra, 225. For text of the Order 
see ibid., 224. 
45) Formerly the Company would have had to seek the source of its 
administrative and legislative power in the sovereign - Lobengula -
but now the source was the Crown. In Re Southern Rhodesia, note 15) 
supra, 222. Palley, p. 111. 
46) The Company could not assert a conquest for its own benefit. In Re 
Southern Rhodesia, note 15) supra, 221, 238. Such Companies were 
not independent sovereigns so that when they acquired or exercised 
rights of sovereignty, at all events rights of external sovereignty, 
they were acting as agents for the state. Lindley, p.108; Palley, 
p.111. 
47) Lindley, p. 44; Palley, p.110. 
48) In Re Southern Rhodesia, note 15) supra, 241. 
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British Government to say what should be done. 49) It had the powers 
of a conqueror. It might fix such terms and conditions as it 
thought proper; it might yield or retain the conquest; it might 
change part or the whole of the law.56 ) It could have annexed the 
territory,5l)which it chose hot to do. The lesser measure of 
establishing a Protectorate instead, was also within its competence. 
It is true that colonial pr otector ates were normally established by 
agreement.52 ) 
It is sometimes asserted that such agreement is essential53)though 
it is conceded that the establishment of a protectorate could be 
implied from the provisions of certain agreements •54 ) Even if 
agreement was essential to establish a protectorate, it is sub-
mitted that the combined effect of the Order in Council of 1894 
and the agreement of 1888 with Lobengula were sufficient to estab-
lish a protectorate over the Dominions of the latter and satisfy the 
requirement of agreement. In fact, the agreement of 1888 hes been 
considered a.s suffic~ent to establish a protectorate by implication~5 ) 
It is now necessary to describe the characteristics of a colonial 
protectorate such as existed here. 
49) Ibid. , 221. 
50) Palley, p. 110. 
51) In Re Southern Rhodesia, note 15) ; supra, 239. Similarly, 
Swaziland was not annexed but jurisdiction extended in it. 
Sobhuza II v. Miller [1926] A.C. 518. 
52) C.H. Alexandrowicz, "New and Original States - The issue of 
Reversion to Sovereignty" (45) International Affairs, 1969, 
p. 465 at p. 472. 
53) Lindley, p. 203. 
54 ) Such provisions implied the supremacy of the contracting power 
in that chiefs would be prohibited from making treaties and 
arrangements with other powers and frc~ ceding their lands to 
foreign governments without the consent of the contracting power. 
See Lindley, p. 185. 
55 ) Lindley, p. 185. 
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In the first place there was a difference between protectorates of 
the older type and the colonial protectorates established in Africa, 
an essential feature of the latter being that the colonial power 
had the right in so far as other members of the family of nations 
were concerned to take steps to annex the protected territory,
56 ) 
though as we have seen this had to be by conquest or cession, 
both of which were liberally construed, or by prescription.5
7) 
In the second place, in all cases of colonial protectorates, ex-
ternal sovereignty is assumed by the protector.5
8 ) Tbus the pro-
tector may demand that the protectorate should have no direct 
dealings with third states and may exercise a consequential right 
of supervising and dictating policy in matters affecting foreigners~9) 
In the third place, the internal sovereignty of the local ruler 
is unimpaired. If this is to be acquired, it must be derived 
from the express or implied consent of the native authority, the 
acquiescence of the native authority,
60) or the powers of a 
61) 
conqueror. Thus, in practice, the internal sovereignty of 
the local ruler may be scarcely impaired or it may be superseded 
by the protector to any extent, even completely. Usually such 
62) 
supercession proceeded gradually. The degree of supercession 
------
------
------
------
---'in/ ... 
56) Lindley, p. 183. 
57) Lindley, pp. 44, 8o, 203; Alexandrowicz, note 52) supra, p. 472 
says that the European protector in fact received carte blanche 
from the other contracting parties to the Berlin Act to deal with 
the protected entity and it usually aimed at annexation. 
58) Lindley, p. 187; O'Connell, 1, p. 342. 
59) Lindley, p. 322. 
60) Lindley, pp. 187, 322. 
61) Palley, p. 110. 
62) Lindley, p. 187. 
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in many British Protectorates in Africa was so complete that they 
were administered like colonies.63) 
In the fourth place, the protectorate does not form part of the 
dominions of the protector. The inhabitants do not become 
nationals although they can be protected when in other countries 
and treaties between the protectorate and third powers remain in 
force. This is so as long as there has been no formal annexation 
and even though internal and external affairs are controlled 
64) 
entirely by the protector. 
In the fi~h place, though it is clear that an international 
protectorate has international personality,
65) the extent of 
which may vary from case to case depending on the degree to which 
third states are prepared to acquiesce in or recognize the agency 
of the protector,66 ) the colonial protectorate does not have 
international/ ... 
-------------
-------------
--
63) Lindley, p. 204. For instance, the Colony and Protectorate of 
Kenya was administered as a unit. On the assimilation of Protector-
ates to Colonies see Ex parte Mwenya (1960] I.Q.B. 241. 
64) Lindley, p. 203; O'Connell, 1, pp. 343-344; R. v. Crewe, .ix parte 
Segkome [1910] 2 K.B. 576 at 603. Secretary of State for India v. 
Sardar Rustam Khan and Others [1941] AC. 356. The inhabitants 
are aliens in municipal law but in international law they are 
British - Protected persons. Clive Parry, "Plural Nationality and 
Citizenship with Special Reference to the Commonwealth" (30) 
B.Y .I.L. 1953, p.244 at p. 252. 
65) Nationality Decrees issued in Tunis and Morocco (1923) P.C I.J. 
B.4, p. 27; Rights of United States Nationals in Morocco, 1952 
I.C.J. Rep. at 188; Troche! v. Tunisia, I.L.R., 1953, p.47. The 
~rotectorate is a distinct entity in international law with inter-
national responsibility. O'Connell, 1, p. 342; S0renseI1»pp.l82, 
262-263; Palley, p.44. 
66) Third states have a discretion in this respect. Schwarzenberger, 
l, pp. 93-94, However, relations between Protector and protector-
ate will be governed by international law (ibid . , p. 94) and to 
that extent at least the protectorate will have personality. The 
question of the extent of personality is relative and depends on 
function. "Mais on peut d'expliguer les complications diverses ... 
des pays proteges. par l'idee de relativite et de divisibilite 
possible de la souverainete... On est done arrive ace resultat 
practigue de s'attacher a l'autonomie non pas du groupe, mais de 
l'exercice d'une fonction, pour le tout ou pour partie, par le 
groupe". Le Normand, pp. 71-72, 74. 
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international personality.67 ) It is part of the mother state 
though its separate existence may be relevant for certain 
purposes. 68 ) The conclusion is that the protectorate had no inter-
national personality, but it is of course an entity which has an 
international law significance because the Jurisdiction of the 
protector over it has been established in international law to 
the exclusion of other powers.69) 
(3) The British South Africa Company. 
It is necessary here to see what the general position of Chartered 
Companies was in international law. 
None of the chartered companies of the earlier periods were con-
sidered to be subjects of international law whether British, French 
70) 
or Dutch. This was the position of the Compagnie des Cent-
Associes (1627), la Compagnie des Indes Occidentales, (1664),7l) 
the Dutch East India Company, 72 ) the Hudson Bay Company, the East 
African Company and the British East India Company .73) Although 
the latter has been at times referred to as a sovereign power, 74 ) 
-------------------------------
it/ ... 
67) Schwarzenberger, 1, p. 92; Brownlie, p. 108; Palley, p.45. It 
is submitted that this view is too rigid and dogmatic and that 
while in most cases colonial protectorates enjoyed no personality, 
there is no reason why in theory a limited entrustment of person-
ality by the mother state should not have been possible. Colonies 
were so entrusted. Akehurst, p.75. As Akehurst says at pp. 75-76, 
no general rules should be laid down in respect of protectorates. 
68) See Brownlie , p. 108. 
69) Palley, p. 44. 
70) Lindley, p. 99; Palley, pp. 22-23, 
71) Castel, p. 71 
72) Schwarzenberger, 1, p. 8o. 
73) Schwarzenberger, 1, p. 8o; Castel, p.71; Nabob of the Carnatie v. 
East India Company, 1 Ves. Jun., 371 at 390, 393; Nabob of the 
Carnatie v. East India Company, 2 Ves. Jun., 66 at 70. 
74) Lindley, p. 98; G.C W. Forester and Others v. The Secretary of State 
for India in Council (1872) L.R. Ind. app. Sup. Vol 10; Ex Ra,lah of 
Coorg v. East India Company, 1860 Beav., 300 at 309. 
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it would appear that none of the above companies were subjects of 
international law but instead were agents or organs of the states 
by whom their Charters were granted. 75) This connection is even 
more close in the case of the French and Dutch companies than in 
the case of the English, 76 ) which were le~ very much to them-
selves by the parent state. 77 ) That the Charter Companies were 
not international persons with rights or duties of their own in 
international law78 ) is clear from the fact that whatever they did 
or acquired e.g. territory, they did on behalf of their parent 
state79) and their Charters were ultimately re~0cable by the 
parent states.&)) As organs or agents of their parent states it 
is quite clear, however, that these companies had international 
capacity i.e. certain acts performed by them produced consequences 
in international law and they had a certain status in international 
law. 81 ) The extent of such capacity would naturally depend upon 
the/ ..• 
------------------------------
75) Schwarzenberger, 1, p. &); Castel, p. 71; Lindley, p. 52; 
Palley,p2); Salaman v. Secretary of State in Council for India 
[19o6] I.K.B. 613; Island of Palmas case,1928, 2 R.I. A.A., 829. 
In Nabob of the Carnatie v. East India Company, 1 Ves. Jun., 371 
at 393, it was held that not only was the Company not an independent 
sovereign but it did not even exercise a delegated sovereignty. In 
Nabob of the Carnatie v. East India Company, 2 Ves. Jun., 56 at 70, 
it was held that the Company was a mere subject. In Secretary of 
State in Council of India v. Kamachee Boye Sahaba, 13 Moo. P.C. 22 
at 86, the Company was held to be a delegate. 
76) Lindley, p. 99. 
77) Lindley, p. 98. 
78) Even where it was suggested that the British East India Company was 
a sovereign power, it was usually qualified by the statement that 
this was so in so far as the natives were concerned. See Lindley, 
p. 98; Ex RaJah of Coorg v. East India Company, 1860 Beav., 300 
at 309. 
79) Lindley, p. 99. 
Bo) Lindley, p. 99. In English law this could be done by Act of 
Parliament, Judicial process based on abuse of powers or consent 
of all concerned. 
81) For example, Article V of the Treaty of Munster and the Treaty of 
Utrecht clearly show that both the Dutch East and West India 
Companies were entitled to create situations recognized by internat-
ional law. The Acts of the Netherlands East India Company must be 
entirely assimilated to the acts of the Netherlands state itself. 
Island of Palmas case, 1928, 2 R.I.A.A . , 829. L.C . Green, Internat-
ional Law through the Cases, London 1959, 2nd Ed., p.359. 
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the powers of the individual company under consideration.
82 ) The 
following capacities did in fact reside in the earlier companies. 
(a) The power to commit the parent state in international law. In 
this respect, the company might commit the parent state to a 
state of peace or war with other powers,8.3) or might make 
treaties binding on parent states.84.) 
(b) The capacity to acquire on behalf of the parent state in 
international law. Thus when territory was acquired whether 
by agreement or otherwise, it was acquired for the parent 
state.85) The conclusion of contracts by the Netherlands 
Companies with natives was regarded as the exercise of 
sovereignty over the territory and might confer such powers 
as would Justify the sovereign in considering it as a part 
of his territory. 86 ) 
______
______
______
______
 (c)/ ... 
82) 
83) 
Island of Palmas case, 2 R.I.A A. 829; Nabob of the Carnatie v. 
East India Company, 1 Ves. Jun., 371 at 392. 
Thus the peace between Spain and the Netherlands extended to "tous 
Potentats, nations et peuples" with whom the East or West Indi_a_ 
Companies in the name of the State of the Netherlands "entre les 
limites de leurdits Octroys sont en Amitie et Alliance." Island of 
Palmas case, note 81) supra. Under their Charter the British East 
India Company had the power to make peace and war which would bind 
the sovereign - Great Britain. Nabob of the Carnatie v. East India 
Company, 1 Ves. Jun. 371 at 392; Ex Ra,lah of Coorg v. East India 
Company, 1860 Beav., 300, Lindley, p. 99 refers to it as ma.king 
war not only with native states but also with the Portuguese, Dutch 
and French - even when the respective sovereigns in Europe were at 
peace! 
e4) The Netherlands East India Company had the power to conclude 
Conventions even of a political character in accordance with 
Article 35 of its Charter of 1602. Island of Palmas case, note 
81) supra. The British East India Company could do likewise. Nabob 
of the Carnatie v. East India Company, 1 Ves. Jun., 371 at 392; 
Nabob of the Carnatie v. East India Company, 2 Ves. Jun., 56 at 60. 
85) Lindley, p. 99; G.C.W. Forester and Others v. The Secretary of State 
for India in Council, (1872) L.R . Ind. App. Sup. Vol. 10; The 
Secretary of State in Council of India v. Kamachee Boye Sahaba, 13 
Moo. P .c . , 22 at 86. 
86) Island of Palmas case, note 81) supra. 
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(c) The parent state was responsible in international law for the 
acts of the Chartered Companies, such responsibility being 
based on controi. 87 ) 
(d) Since the companies were in effect organs of the parent state 
they could claim in certain cases state immunity, relying on 
the doctrine of act of state. Here, however, it must be 
mentioned that the companies possessed a dual character 
being both trading merchants and organs of state exercising 
sovereign powers. 88) When they performed acts in the former 
capacity,89) they were in the position of private individuals 
and could not claim immunity from suit under the act of state 
doctrine.90) But when they exercised political powers they 
could claim such imrnunity.9l) 
For our purposes the position of the later chartered companies 
would not appear to be materially different from that of the earlier 
companies. The companies had no international personality.92 )This 
was vested in the parent state exclusively. In the case of the 
German and Portuguese Charters, the sovereignty of the respective 
93) governments appeared on the face of the Charters. In the case 
of the British Charters, the position was not so clear,94) but the 
view/ ... 
------------------------
---------
87) Palley, pp. 21-23, The problem arose particularly in relation to 
the British East Africa Company. 
88) Ex Ra.1ah of Coorg v. East India Company, 1e60 Beav., 300 at 308-309. 
89) As in Nabob of the Carnatie v. East India Company, 1 Ves. Jun., 
371 at 393 , 
90) Ex Ra.]ah of Coorg v. East India Company, 1e60 Beav., 300 at 309. 
91) Nabob of the Carnatie v. East India Company, 2 Ves. Jun., 56 at 60. 
The Secretary of State in Council of India v. Kamachee Boye Sahaba, 
13 Moo. P.C., 22 at e6; Ex Rajah of Coorg v. East India Company, 
1e60 Beav., 300. 
92) Lindley, p. 108. 
93) Lindley, p. 104. 
94) Lindley, p. lo4. 
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view is that sovereignty here resided with the United Kingdom -
which had the right to modify or withdraw the charter.95) In the 
case of the African companies, their charters placed them more 
completely under the control of the British Government especially 
in relation to foreign affairs.96) 
As with the earlier companies, these companies also had a similar 
international capacity. The company was an agent or organ of the 
parent state9?) with the consequent capacity to commit the state 
and to acquire for it.98) Again, the State was internationally 
responsible for the acts of the Compa.n~) and as an organ of 
state it would certainly have enjoyed irranunity in the courts of 
other states.lOO) 
We may now turn to the specific position of the British South 
Africa Company which was formed in 18e9. lOl) From what we have 
seen, ·it will be obvious that the British South Africa Company, 
like other chartered companies, lacked international personality. 
It will also be apparent from what we have said that the Company 
would be capable of enjoying international capacity, the extent of 
which will now be described. 
_________
_________
____ (a)/ ... 
95) 
96) 
97) 
98) 
99) 
Lindley, p. 
Lindley, p. 
Lindley, p. 
Lindley, p. 
Palley, pp. 
108. 
108. 
108. 
108. 
21-23. 
100) The extension of state immunity to organs of government at all levels 
is very liberal. For a recent example see South African Airways v , 
New York State Division of Human Rights, 315 N.Y.S. 2d. 651; (65) 
A.J.I.L., 1971, pp. 403-405. 
101) Palley, p. 33. The reasons for the formation of the Company were 
(1) financial - expansion was to take place at the expense of the 
Company Shareholders and not at that of the taxpayer; (2) the 
security of British interests in areas which Britain was not pre-
pared to administer directly; (3) to fulfil international require-
ments relating to the establishment and exercise of Jurisdiction in 
claimed areas. The same reasons prompted the formation of the 
British Ea.st Africa Company and the Royal Niger Company. See Palley, 
pp. 16-18. 
(a) The capacity to commit the United Kingdom. Earlier companies, 
as we have seen, had power to commit the pa~ent 3tate to a 
state of war or peace and by treaty, such powers being given 
by their charter. 102 ) The British South Africa Company had 
no such capacity. Its Charter provided that in any dealings 
with foreign powers, the Company was bound to act on the 
suggestions made to it by a Secretary of State while the 
Company was bound by all treaties and arrangements entered 
into by Britain at any time with other powers.l03) Thus 
even though the Company was the internal government of the 
Protectorate until 1923, it had no representative powers 
internationally.104 ) 
(b) The capacity to acquire for the United Kingdom. Here again 
we must look initially at the Company's Charter. In terms 
of Article 2, it was permitted to exercise such powers as it 
might in future acquire by concession, agreement, grant, or 
treaty, subject to the approval of a Secretary of State. Thus 
there were two conditions for acquisition and proper exercise 
of governmental power in the area - acquisition from the 
proper authority in the aforesaid manner and approval by a 
Secretary of State.105) 
--------
--------
--------
----In/ ... 
102) Supra, pp . 72-73. 
103) Arts. 8, 22. Palley, pp. 36-37, 
104) On the internal powers of the Company see its Charter, Arts. 3, 
4, 10, 14, 22 and Palley, p.33. 
105) Palley, p. 36, concludes that the Charter gave the Company no 
governmental powers - only the capacity to obtain the same. 
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In relation to the first condition, the Company acquired the Rudd 
Concession of 1888 which vested exclusive rights in them to all 
lo6) 107) 
minerals in the territory and the Lippert Concession of 1891 
which gave the exclusive right "to lay out, grant, leE.se, for such 
period or periods as he (Lippert) may think fit, farms, townships, 
building plots, 
purport to give 
or grazing areas". 108) 
governmental powers109 ) 
Neither of these even 
and it was understood 
that these powers could only be obtained from Lobengula who was 
the legal sovereign of the country and recognized as such by the 
British at the time.llO) 
Nevertheless, the Company did exercise a degree of administration 
in Mashonaland in 1890, appointing an administrator who issued 
regulations relating to various matters~ll) It must be concluded 
that in the absence of the fulfilment of the two conditions such 
administration was an usurpation. As such it was an encroachment 
on the sovereignty of Lobengula which existed at the time. Since 
it was also ultra vires the Charter of the Company, 112 ) it was 
-------------------
----------ineffectual/ ... 
lo6) In Re Southern Rhodesia [1919) A.C. 211 at 218. 
107) Ibid., 219. 
108) Ibid., 218. 
109) Ibid., 218; Palley, p.36, says that whereas the Rudd Concession 
might b~ extensive interpretation have permitted legislation in 
respect of mining and its control, it could not be construed as 
delegating any other powers. 
110) Palley, p. 36; In Re Southern Rhodesia (1919) AC. 211 at 218. 
111) Palley, pp. 40-41, tells us that on arrival in Salisbury, the 
Administrator set up a headquarters there, laid out a township, dealt 
with mining laws and regulations which were in draft, initiated 
surveys and the opening of roads to the various mining centres, 
established postal communications and despatched missions to native 
chiefs. Eventually, by the end of 1890, there was a three-fold 
division of authority - Colquhoun (the Administrator) dealing with 
administrative details: Dr. Jameson dealing with all political 
and important matters, and, Colonel Pennefather with police questions. 
112) See Palley, p. ,36. 
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ineffectual in acquiring any further international law rights for 
the United Kingdom in what was at the time its sphere of influence. 
From 1891 to 1894 the position changes, for with the acquiescence 
of Lobengula in company administration 113 ) and with the necessary 
114) permission of the Crown, it is submitted that there was no 
longer an encroachment on sovereignty or any question of the 
company acting ultra vires. A specific right in international law 
to administer in its sphere of influence may have been acquired for 
the United Kingdom by the company but as previously submitted this 
was probably not sufficient to establish a protectorate in inter-
national law.115) 
The 1893-1894 conquest of Matabeleland was a conquest by the 
company for the Crown and it had the effect of acquiring complete 
international law sovereignty in the territory for the United 
Ki d 116) ng om. 
(c) The international responsibility of the United Kingdom. It 
is clear that the United Kingdom would have borne ineernation-
al responsibility to other powers for the acts of the Company, 
as the latter was a "subordinate government" with no capacity 
. 117) for the conduct of foreign affairs. The question actually 
arose in practice when claims were pressed on the United Kingdom 
by the South African Republic as a result of ~he Jameson raid.
118) 
____
____
____
____
____
___ (d)/ ... 
113) See note 40) supra. 
114) South Africa Order in Council 9th May, 1891, s.8. 
115) Supra, pp. 66-67. 
116) See note 46) supra. 
117) Palley, pp. 21-23; O'Connell, 11, pp. 965-966. See too note 103) 
supra; Brownlie, p; 376. 
118) Palley, p. 22. 
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(d) The Company could probably have enjoyed immunity from 
suit in the courts of foreign countries in relation to 
its political activities .119) Being the government of 
a non-metropolitan territory without international person-
ality, it could be classified as an organ of the central 
120) 
government and thus identical with it. 
(4) The Colony. 
Southern Rhodesia became a colony of the United Kingdom upon annex-
ation by the latter in 1923.121 ) In such an annexed territory 
residual powers pass to the annexing state, the natives become 
nationals and fall fully under jurisdiction except in those cases 
where international agreements may have tempered or modified such 
122) powers to some extent. For the most part, the government of 
the Colony was autonomous in internal affairs.
123) 
There/ ... 
------------------
------------
119) Nabob of the Carnatie v. East India Company, 1 Ves. Jun., 371; 
Ex RaJah of Coorg v. East India Company, 1€60 Beav., 300; Nabob 
of the Carnatie v. East India Company, 2 Ves. Jun., 56; The 
Secretary of State in Council of India v. Kamachee Boye Sahaba, 
13 Moo . P . C . , 22 . 
120) O'Connell, 11, p. 878; Isbrantsen Co. v. Netherlands East Indies 
Government, 75 F. Supp. 48 (1947) ; Van Heyningen v. Netherlands 
Indies Government, Ann. Dig., 1948, case no. 43; Huttinger v. 
Upper Congo Great African Lakes Railway Co., Ann. Dig. 1933-34, 
Case No. 65. American, Australian and French courts have declined 
to assume Jurisdiction over the colonial dependencies of foreign 
states and British, French and American courts have granted immunity 
to their own dependencies. Brierly, p. 246. Mighell v. Sultan of 
Johore [1894] l.K B. 149; Duff Ievelopment Co. v. Government of 
Kelantan [1924] A.C. 797; Kahan v. Federation of Pakistan [1951] 
2 K.B. 1003; Sayce v. Bahawalpur [1952] 2 All E.R. 64. ~ 
121) Southern Rhodesia (Annexation) Order in Council, 1923, 30th July, 
1923. 
122) Lindley, p .323. Relevant undertakings here would be those contained 
in Article 6 of the General Act of the Berlin Conference but the 
view was that these were owed not to the natives but to the other 
members of the family of nations. See Lindley, pp. 327, 333. 
123) Pall ey, pp. 242-246; Chayes, II, p . 1319. 
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There is, however, nothing to prevent territorial entities other 
than independent states from enjoying a limited degree of internat-
124) ional personality. This limited international personality 
must naturally always coincide with the degree of personality 
which the mother-state retains, each, so to speak, supplementing 
the personality of the other. Thus international personality is 
divided in these cases and the content of the personality of each 
of the entities involved is different - the theory of differential 
personality.125) Personality is a shorthand term for the sum of 
faculties possessed by a legal actor, and those faculties may vary 
according to the acts performable. The result is a scale of legal 
competence, with the independent, fully sovereign state at the top 
126) 
but other entities occupying intermediate positions. To find 
out whether a given entity enjoys pErsonality, and, if so, how 
much, one simply looks at the facts. 
"The position of any entity is determined by political fact. 
If a territory is in certain respects, though not in other 
respects, a separate political actor it is clearly endowed by 
international law with the necessary faculties of legal action 
to give effect to this political reality". 127) 
--~------------------------~---------------
------------------------~---Naturally/ ..• 
124) M. Broderick, "Associated Statehood - a New Form of Decolonization" 
(17) I.C.L.Q., 1968, p. 368 at 396; Akehurst, p.75; Sorensen, 
p. 260. The traditional view was that only fully sovereign states 
had rights in international law. See Korowitlz, "Some present aspects 
of Sovereignty in International Law" (102) Hague Recueil, 1961 at 
p.86; L'Huiller, Elements de droit international public (1950) p.40; 
S. Bastid, Cours d'Institutions Internationales (1956) p. 244 et 
~.; O'Connell, 1, p. Bo. 
125) O'Connell, 1, pp. 82-83; Berezowski, "Les Sujets non souverains du 
droit international" (65) Hague Recueil (1938); Van Kleffens, 
"Sovereignty in international law" (82) Hague Recueil (1953) p.85. 
126) Broderick, note 124) supra, p.396. 
127) Ibid.JThus Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam, Egypt, Tunis and Morocco all 
had considerable autonomy in the conduct of external affairs before 
independence. Whiteman, 1, pp. 287, 289. In Tr~sor Public v. Cie. 
Air Laos, 1958, Annuaire fran9ais de droit international, p.725, the 
Court a quo decided that Laos in 1953 was a state in international 
law for the purposes of air carriage and that the provisions of the 
Warsaw Convention were applicable. The Netherlands Antilles and 
Surinam, though not independent, may accede to membership of certain 
international organizations. For their status see Van Panhuys, "The 
International aspects of the Reconstruction of the Kingdom of the 
Netherlands in 1954", Netherlands International Law Review, 1958,p.l, 
and "The Netherlands Constitution and International Law" (47) 
A.J.I.L.,1953. p. 537, 
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Naturally a colony like any other non-independent entity is capable 
128) 
of enjoying a limited international personality. The device 
by which limited personality devolves upon a colony or other non-
independent territorial entity is that of entrustment by the mother 
country.129) The subordinate entity receives a power to negotiate 
directly with foreign states and to enter into certain kinds of 
tr•eaty with them. l30) Such entrustment invariably took place to a 
greater or lesser extent in the case of all the self-governing 
coloniesl3l) and lasted for a considerable time in the case of 
those colonies which evol~ed to independence over a considerable 
period of time instead of being granted independence at a specific 
point in time. 132 ) 
As we have seen, Southern Rhodesia was a self-governing colony and 
in its case entrustment also took place, such entrustment increas-
ing as time proceeded. The period of entrustment was, however, 
broken during the existence of the Federation of Rhodesia and 
Nyasaland/ ... 
------------
------------
--
128) Akehurst, p.75. Sorensen, p.262. 
129) Broderick, note 124) supra, p.397. 
130) Ibid. Third states who thereafter enter into relations with the 
subordinate entity must be deemed to have impliedly recognized the 
limited personality of the latter. 
131) Akehurst, p.75; Sorensen, p.262; Broderick, note 124) supra,p.401 ; 
The 1887 Colonial Conference, Parliamentary Papers , Vol.56, Report 
of Proceedings, pp. 464, 476 recommended that self-governing coloni es 
should have permission to enter into direct negotiations with foreign 
governments with respect to commercial matters but even before this , 
Canada had negotiated several differential tariff agreements with 
the U.S.A. and France. The privilege of separate negotiation was 
granted to the Australian States and New Zealand at the lS:)4 Colonial 
Conference. In recent times, entrustment has also been granted in 
the case of the Caribbean Associated States. The powers granted by 
entrustment are deemed to be delegated executive authority in extern-
al affairs. See Broderick, note 124) supra, pp. 371, 376-377. 
132) This was the position in the case of the older Dominions, Austral i a, 
Canada, New Zealand and South Africa. But even in the case of the 
newly independent states, independence is usually preceded by a 
period of limited entrustment. See Akehurst, p.75. 
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Nyasaland and on the dissolution of the latter was again resumed 
by Southern Rhodesia. 
Because of entrustment, Southern Rhodesia was able to gain an 
133) increased voice in both Commonwealth and Inter.national affairs. 
Southern Rhodesia attended the Imperial Economic Conference at 
Ottawa in 1932 and concluded bilateral trade agreements with 
Canada and the United Kingdom. 134 ) It attended the Imperial Confer-
ence in 1937 as observers. 135) By 1939, Southern Rhodesia could be 
quite legitimately regarded as a separate member of the Commonwealth 
for some purposes and as a dependency of the United Kingdom for 
other purposes. 136 ) Thus it could communicate directly with 
other members of the Commonwealth but could not communicate withA 
foreign governments except through the ordinary channels of the 
British diplomatic service.137 ) By the time of the establish-
ment of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, it is clear 
that Southern Rhodesia could not only conclude agreements with 
Commonwealth countries138) but could also be a party to internat-
ional treaties139) and participate separately in international 
organizations, usually of a technical or administrative character, 
with the assent of other members and the diplomatic assistance of 
the United Kingdom. 140 ) 
__________________________ The/ ... 
133) Chayes, 11, P~3l9. Progressive entrustments were made from 1923 on. 
Palley, p. 724. 
134) R.B.Stewart, Treaty Relations of the British Commonwealth of Nations, 
New York, 1939,p.21. 
135) I£14., p.22. 
136) 1!2.!.£., p.21. 
137) Ibid., p.22. However, inter-commonwealth relations of the time were 
probably not governed by international law because of the inter se 
doctrine. Ibid., p.328. 
138) J.E.S. Fawcett, "Treaty Relations of British Overseas Territories" 
(26) B.Y.I,L.,1949, p.86 at p.105. 
139) Ibid. , p .102 . 
140) ~-, p.lo6; Palley, pp. 362-363. 
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141) The Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland was formed in 1953. 
The Constitution of the Federation provided that the United Kingdom 
might entrust the conduct of external affairs to the Federation.
142 ) 
The device of entrustment of external affairs powers was used in 
the case of the Federation which from time to time received a 
grant of power to negotiate directly with foreign states and to 
sign and ratify certain classes of treaties without the intervent-
ion of the United Kingdom. 143) A limited entrustment was made in 
1953144 ) and a much wider grant was made in 1957 •145 ) The entrust-
ment was made in a Joint Declaration of the United Kingdom and 
Southern Rhodesian Governments of 27th April, 1957, arrl the compet-
ence it bestowed was described by the Federal Pr ime Minister as 
follows: 
1 the right to conduct all relations and to exchange rep-
resentatives with Commonwealth countries without consult-
ation with the United Kingdom Government; 
'the right to appoint representatives to the diplomatic 
staffs of H.M. embassies; 
T°the right to conduct all negotiations and agreements with 
foreign countries subject to the need to safeguard the 
United Kingdom Government's international responsibilities; 
'the right to appoint its own diplomatic agents, who will 
have full diplomatic status and who will be in charge of 
Federal missions, in any foreign countries prepared to 
accept them, and to receive such agents from other countries; 
'the right on its own authority, to acquire the membership of 
international organizations for which it is eligible.' 146) 
_____________________
______ The/ ••• 
141) Rhodesia and Nysasaland (Federation) Act, 1953, 1 & 2 Eliz. 11, c.30. 
142) Federation of Rhodssia and Nyasaland {Constitution) Order-in-Council, 
1953,s.1. No. 1199 - art . 29; Palley, p. 363. 
143) Broderick, note 124) supra, p. 378. 
144) These were the powers previously entrusted to Southern Rhodesia. 
Palley, pp. 363-364. See too International Law Association, The 
Effect of Independence on Treaties, London, 1965, p.51. ~-
145) Ibid.; Palley, pp. 403, 407; J .E .S. Fawcett, "Security Council 
Resolutions on Rhodesia" (41) B.Y.I.L.,1965-1966, p.103 at p.105 
describes this as a conscious enlargement of the international 
competence of the Federation. 
146) See Fawcett, note 145) supra, pp. 105-1~. 
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The above meant that the Federation was an international person,
147 ) 
just as Southern Rhodesia was before it, and although it was not a 
full international person, i.e. an independent state,
148) the degree 
of personality which it enjoyed was very extensive. 149 ) In practice, 
however, the Federation did not exercise all the entrusted capacit-
ies to the fullest extent.150) 
It is now conveµient to describe the precise extent of Federal 
international personality. Federal personality emerges in a 
number of spheres which will now be mentioned. 
(a) Treaty capacity. 
The Federation had the capacity to conclude treaties.l5l) In 
pursuance of this capacity it concluded trade and customs 
agreements with the United Kingdom, Australia, South Africa, 
Canada, Bechuanaland, Israel, Japan and Portugal,
152 ) and it 
concluded an extradition treaty with South Africa.
153) 
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
 .(b)/ ... 
147) Broderick, note 124) supra, p.397; Fawcett, note 145) supra, p.lo6. 
148) Ibid,; Palley, p.365. 
149) Palhy, p.365; J .E S. Fawcett, The British Commonwealth in Inter-
national Law, London, 1963, p.114 says that as Commonwealth coun-
tries approach independence, the United Kingdom responsibility 
becomes attenuated almost to vanishing point. He then goes on to 
discuss the Federation. 
150) Fawcett, note 145) supra, p.lo6. 
151) Ibid.; Broderick, note 124) supra; Palley, pp. 350, 364; C.J.R. 
Dugard, "Succession to Federal Treaties on the Dissolution of a 
Federation" (82) S.A.L.J., 1965, p.430 at pp. 430, 436; C J .R. 
Dugard, "Succession to Federal Treaties Revisited" ( 84) S A L.J ., 
1967, p.250; S.v. Eliasov,1965 (2) S.A. 770 (T) Hiemstra, J. held 
at 773 that the Federation as a whole was a state with treaty-
making capacity. See too S. v. Bull, 1967 (2) SA . 636 (T). 
152) Fawcett, note 145) supra, p. lo6; D.P. O'Connell, State Succession 
in Municipal and International Law, Cambridge, 1967, 11, p.175. 
153) S. v. Eliasov, 1965 (2) S.A. 770 (T); S. v. Bull, 1967 (2) S .A. 
636 (T); O'Connell, note 152) supra, pp. 177-178. In addition, the 
Federation conclu~ed double taxation agreements with the United 
Kingdom, South Africa, East Africa and a visa abolition agreement 
with Portugal. See O I Connell, note 152) supra, pp. 1 76, l 77. 
(b) Capacity to be a member of international organizations. 
The Federation was a full member of the following international 
I.T.u.1,54) 155) 156) organizations: W.M o., the G.A.T.T., the 
African Postal Union;57 ) the African Telecommunications 
Union, 158 ) the Commission for Technical co-operation in 
Africa South of the Sahara,159 ) the Scientific Council for 
Africa South of the Sahara, 160 ) the Foundation for Mutual 
161) 
Assistance in Africa South of the Sahara, International 
Red Locust Control Service, 162 ) International Union for the 
Protection of Industrial Property, 163 ) International Wheat 
Councn.164 ) 
The Federation was an associate member of W.H.o.,
165) and 
F.A.0.166) 
-------
-------
-------
-------
-The/ ... 
154) Peaslee, 1. p.LVI; It acceded on 14th Dec., 1960. The Effect of 
Independence on Treaties, note 144) supra, p. 323; Fawcett, note 
145) supra, p.lo6. 
155) Peaslee, 1, p.LVII; It fell under article 3(e) of the W.M.O. Constit-
ution being a territory not listed in annex 11 maintaining its own 
meteorological service but not responsible for the conduct of its 
international relations. Fawcett, note 149) supra, p.230. 
156) Peaslee, 1, p. LVII; Broderick, note 124) supra, pp. 395-396; 
Fawcett, note 145) supra, p.lo6. 
157) Peaslee, 1, p.6; Broderick, note 124) supra, pp. 395-396, 
158) Peaslee, 1, p.14; Broderick, note 124) supra, pp. 395-396, 
159) Peaslee, 1, p.272; Broderick, note 124) supra, pp. 395-396, 
160) Peaslee, 1, p.279. 
161) Peaslee, 1, p.281. 
162) Peaslee, 11, p.1332. 
163) Peaslee 11, p. 1473; Broderick, note 124) supra, p.395. 
164) Peaslee, 11, pp. 1527, 1528. 
165) Peaslee, 1, p.LVI; Broderick, note 124) supra, p.396; Fawcett, 
note 149) supra, p.230. It became a member on 14th May, 1954. 
The Effect of Independence on Treaties, note 144) supra, p.329. 
166) Peaslee, 1, p. LVI; Broderick, note 124) supra, p.396; Fawcett, 
note 149) supra, p.230, 
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The Federation did not have separate membership of U.P.U., 
I.M.F. and I,B,R ,D. In U.P.U . it was but a member of th~ · 
British Colonies group and the British Overseas Territories as 
a whole was one member. 167 ) It was comprised in the United 
Kingdom membership of I.M.F. and I,B.R.D. 
The Federation also had membership of certain commonwealth 
organizations. It was a member of the Commonwealth Agricultural 
Bureau168) and the Inter-African Phyto-Sanitary Commissibn. 169 ) 
In fact, during its existence, the Federation was for the most 
part treated as a Member of the Commonwealth vis-a-vis other 
members.l70) Its Prime Minister took the place of the Southern 
Rhodesian Prime Minister at Commonwealth Prime Ministers' 
Conferences, at first obtaining an invitation ad hoc to 
attend but in 1956 a standing invitation.l7l) 
(c) Diplomatic capacity. 
From 1953, the Federation was allowed to exchange represent-
atives with Commonwealth countries subject to the agreement of 
the United Kingdom. 172 ) In 1957, this capacity was increased 
and the Federation could conduct all manner of representation 
with commonweal th cc,untries directly. 
1 73 ) Thus the Federat-
ion appointed High Commissioners in London and Pretoria.
174 ) 
-----
-----
-----
-----
-----
-At/ ... 
167) Peaslee, 1, p. LVII; Fawcett, note 145) supra, p. lo6. 
168) Peaslee, 1, p.289; Broderick, note 124) supra, p.396. 
169) Peaslee, 1, p. 768. 
170) Palley, p. 365. 
171) Palley, pp. 365, 403, 
172) Palley, p.364. 
173) Palley, p.364. 
174) Fawcett, note 145) supra, p.lo6. 
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At this time, High Commissioners had ambassadorial status175) 
with consequent international law diplomatic immunity. 176 ) In 
foreign countries there were representatives of the Federation 
attached to the British Embassies in Washington, Tokyo, Lisbon 
and Bonn. 177) In addition, the Federation received diplomatic 
representatives from both foreign and commonwealth countries 
and arrangements for the treatment of such representatives 
was entrusted to the Federal government. 178) 
(d) Capacity to bear international responsibility. 
This would, naturally, be co-extensive with the sphere of 
Federal personality. Thus when India complained to the United 
Kingdom about an incident in Northern Rhodesia, described 
as racial discrimination against Indian diplomatic rep~esent-
atives, the United Kingdom declined to intervene saying that 
the responsibility was that of the Federation as a result of 
its enhanced status.179) On the question of the use of 
Northern Rhodesian territory to introduce military equipment 
to/ ... 
------------------------------
175) The office of High Commissioner had gradually become that of a 
diplomatic representative. In 1948, the Commonwealth Prime 
Ministers agreed in conference that the status should be assimilated 
to that of foreign envoys. See Fawcett, note 149) supra, p.198. 
In this respect, the inter se doctrine had become obsolete. Ibid., 
p. 144 et segg. ---
176) For instance, the United Kingdom and New Zealand Legislation on 
diplomatic immunity extended to cover the representatives of the 
Federation. See Fawcett, note 149) supra, p.199. 
177) Fawcett, note 145) supra, p.lo6; Palley, p.364. 
178) Palley, pp. 364, 365. 
179) Fawcett, note 149) supra, p.114; Palley, p. 365. 
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to Katanga, the Federal Prime Minister declared that inter-
vention if necessary would be a matter to be decided solely 
by the Federal Government.l8J ) 
(e) Capacity to protect nationals. 
On 
The federation was permitted to enact its own citizenship 
181) legislation. 
the dissolution of the Federation182 ) the Government and 
Legislature of Southern Rhodesia assumed the powers previously 
183) 
exercised by the Federal government and legislature. Southern 
Rhodesia was promised a similar entrustment to that which the 
184) Federation had enjoyed. The Secretary of State for Common-
wealth relations stated that the powers entrusted to Southern 
Rhodesia in the conduct of external affairs would be the same as 
those entrusted to the Federation.185) Such an entrustment was not , 
however, specifically made. 186 ) Regardless of this, Southern 
Rhodesia regarded itself as continuing to enjoy the same competence 
as the Federation187 )and it negotiated a commer~ial agreement with 
Japan/ ... 
----------------
---------------
1 So) Fawcett, note 149) supra, p.114 who makes the apposite observation 
that if United Kingdom responsibility did not extend to this case, 
it is difficult to know what it did cover. See, however, O'Connell, 
note 152) supra, pp. 172-173 and the same writer 11 State succession 
and entry into a Composite Relationship" (39) B.Y.I .L., 1963, p.54 
at p.127 who says that constitutional responsibility for the 
implementation of international obligations rested with the Federal 
Government while international responsibility remained with the 
United Kingdom. 
181) Federal Citizenship Ac~ No. 12 of 1957; Palley, pp .350-351. 
182 ) S.l. 2085/1963. Fawcett, note 145) supra, p.107. 
183) Fawcett, note 145) supra, p.107. Palley , p.724. 
184) Broderick, note 124) supra, p.378. O'Connell, note 152) supra, 
p.174. 
185) Fawcett, note 145) supra, p.107; The International I.aw Association, 
The Effect of Independence on Treaties, London, 1965, p.51. 
186) Ibid.; Broderick, note 124) supra, p.378. O'Connell, note 152) sui;.rc __ 
p.174. 
187) The International Law Association, The Effect of Independence on 
Treaties, London, 1965, p.51; Broderick, note 124) supra, p.378; 
0 1Connell, note 152) supra, p.174. 
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188) 
Japan without making use of United Kingdom instrumentalities. 
The Southern Rhodesian argument was that by constitutional convent-
ion the entrustment had become an aspect of the international and 
constitutional status of the Federation and had devolved on its 
constituent members. 189) In practice, the Southern Rhodesian 
government continued to operate on the lines of the entrustment 
formerly made to the Federal government.
190 ) It largely obtained 
the international and Commonwealth memberships of international 
organizations possessed by the Federation and most of the treaties 
with the Federation continued to bind Southern Rhodesia.l9l) 
From all the above, it will be seen that in principle Southern 
Rhodesia, as a colony, possessed a very substantial degree of 
international personality prior to 11th November, 1965.
192). 
The/ ... 
--------
--------
--------
------
188) Broderick, note 124) supra, p. 378. 
189) Ibid. Miss Broderick also poses the question whether entrustment 
once made can be revoked. Ibid. 
190) Palley, p.724. 
191} Palley, pp. 724-725; O'Connell, note 152) supra, p.174, 
192) Palley, pp. 724, 730 states, however, that Southern Rhodesia 
possessed no such personality because its powers were delegated to 
it as a dependency by the United Kingdom. With respect, the writer 
disagrees. It is clear that a dependent territory may have inter-
national personality to the extent of its capacity to enter into 
international relations. See Fawcett, note 149) supra, p.143. The 
fact that such personality has been delegated i.e. entrusted does 
not make any difference. As we have seen, Broderick, note 124} supra., 
p. 378 even suggests that such entrustment (or delegation) may be 
irrevocable. This, however, it is submitted, goes too far. The 
correct position lies somewhere between Palley's assertion and 
Broderick's suggestion. Entrustment may probably be revoked for 
the future and personality thus accordingly arrested. This is 
probably what happened a~er the Unilateral Declaration of Independ-
ence when the United Kingdom passed the Southern Rhodesia Act, 1965. 
But it would be contrary to good faith for a mother country to 
revoke entrustment in such a way as to cancel rights which a 
third state had already acquired against the dependency relying 
on the entrustment which had been made to it by the mother country. 
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The exact extent of this personality is considered later.
193 ) But 
certainly Southern Rhodesia did not have the plenary personality 
of an independent state194 ) though it was near to this in mcnY re-
spects. The reason why it was not an independent state was the 
existence of constitutional limitations in the 1961 Constitution, 
freely accepted by Southern Rhodesia, and giving the United Kingdom 
certain powers over it, 195) in particular the power of disallowance 
of certain legislation.196) 
The United Kingdom would, of course, have had primary international 
personality in respect of the territory since Southern Rhodesia 
was a dependency. 197 ) But the actual content of this personality 
in the case of Southern Rhodesia was not great.
198) The reason 
was that as Commonwealth countries approach independence the re-
sponsibility of the United Kingdom becomes attenuated, sometimes 
almost to vanishing point. 199) 
------------
------------
·SECTION II/ . . . 
193) Infra, pp. 105-118. 
194) Fawcett, note 145) supra, p.107, 
195) Fawcett, note 145) supra, p.107. 
196) 1961 Constitut i on s.32 (1). 
197) Palley, p. ?JO. 
198) Though it was capable of expansion and revival at the expense of 
Southern Rhodesia by the device of revokation of entrustment in 
so far as this did not interfere with the rights of third states 
already acquired against the Colony. See footnote, 192) ~upra. 
199) Fawcett , note 149) supra, p. 114. 
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SECTION II 
STATUS OF SOUTHERN RHODESIA AS A NON-SELF GOVERNING TERRITORY WITHIN 
THE MEANING OF ARTICLE 73 OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER. 
We have just seen that Southern Rhodesia was not an independent state. 
It is now necessary to consider whether it was a self-governing territ-
ory. The reason is that if it was not a self-governing territory, the 
provisions of Chapter XI of the Charter of the United Nations would be 
applicable to it and the United Kingdom would have the obligations set 
out in Articles 73 and 74 of the Charter
1 ) including, in particular, the 
duty to transmit to the Secretary-General of the United Nations the 
information required by Article 73 (e). 
A territory which is not independent may nevertheless be self-governing. 
There is thus a distinction between the concepts of independence and 
self-governrnent.2 ) This is clear from two propositions: 
(1) A non-self-governing territory may achieve self-government in 
ways other than the achievement of independence. The General 
Assembly of the United Nations has accepted the following three 
ways:3 ) 
____
____
____
____
____
 (a)/ ... 
1) The extent of these obligations is discussed infra, pp.657-660. 
when the position of the United Kingdom int~ era a~er 11th 
November, 1965 is treated. 
2 ) Akehurst, p.282; This was conceded by the Secretary General of 
the United Nations in 1967 and by the Special Committee on the 
Granting of Independence to Colonial Peoples. See Broderick, 
"Associated Statehood - a )few Form of Decolonization" (17) 
I.C .L.Q,., 1968, p .368; Rupert Emerson, "Self-Determination" (65) 
A.J.I L.,1971, p.459 at p.470. In the same way, independence is 
not synonomous with self-determination and there may even be a 
conflict between these concepts. See A.H. Robertson, Human Rights 
in National and International Law, Manchester, 1968, p.290. 
3) A. Res. 1541 (XV). The three ways specified were confirmed in 
A. Res. 2625 (XXV) which added a fourth way - the emergence of 
any other iolitical status freely accepted by the people. See 
Emerson, note 2) supra , p.470, Akehurst, p. 282. Georges Fischer, 
"Le Probleme Rhodesien" (11) Annuaire Francais de Droit Internat-
ional, 1965, p.41 at p.62 ; J.A.C. Gutteridge, The United Nations 
in a Changing World , Manchester, 1969, pp. 64-65. 
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(a) Independence. 4 ) This need not be discussed. 
(b) Integration with an independent state. This occurred in the 
cases of Hawaii and Alaska. 5 ) 
(c) Free association with an independent state. This has 
happened in several instances. 
The United States placed Puerto Rico on the United Nations list of 
non-self-governing territories in 1946.6 ) Subsequently, however, 
Puerto Rico achieved self-government7 ) in association with the 
United States. 8 ) The United States reserves defence and external 
affairs.9) 
In/ ... 
-----------------
---------------
4) We might add that the basic standpoint of the Committee of 24 on 
decolonization would equate self-government with independence in 
principle but would approve exceptions to it. See Emerson, note 2) 
supra, p.470. 
5) J.A. de Yturriaga, "Non-Self-Governing Territories : The Law and 
Practice of the United Nations" (18) The Yearbook of World Affairs, 
1964, p. 178 at p.195. Akehurst, p.282. 
6) Chayes, 11, p.1331. 
7) De Yturriaga, note 5) supra, p.195. In 1952, a new Constitution 
was adopted by joint action of the Puerto Rico legislature and the 
United States Congress creating the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. The 
General Assembly in A. Res. 748 (VIII) accepted that it was no 
longer non-self-governing. See Chayes, 11, p.1331. Commonwealth 
Status was self-government and took the territory out of Chapter XI 
of the United Nations Charter. See Jose A. Cabranes, "The Status 
of Puerto Rico" (1..6) I.C.L.O., 1967, p. 531 at pp. 535, 537-538. 
8) Broderick, note 2) supra, pp. 398-399; Cabranes, note 7) supra, 
p. 533 points out that it is a form of free association, the name 
of the state being Estado Libre de Puerto Rico. 
9) Broderick, note 2) supra, pp. 398-399. On the status of Puerto 
Rico in general see Cabranes, note 7) supra, p , 531 et seqq.; 
E. Kraske, "Die stellung Puerto Rico im Verbande der Vereinigten 
Staaten von Amerika" (15) Zeitschrift filr Auslandisches Offentiliches 
Recht und V"cilkerrecht, 1953-54 p. 541 et seqq. 
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In the same way Surinam and the Antilles have achieved self-
10) 
government in association with the Netherlands, Greenland with 
ll' Denmark, 'the six Caribbean States of Antigua, St. Kitts-Nevis-
Anguilla, Dominica, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, Grenada with the United 
12) 13) Kingdom, the Cook Islands with New Zealand. 
(2) It was realized at the inception of the United Nations, and even 
before that, 14 ) that a territory might be self-governing and yet 
not independent. 
Our basic enquiry then is whether Southern Rhodesia, admittedly not 
an independent state, was nevertheless self-governing between the 
years 1945-1965, 
The Charter of the United Nations does not define non-self-governing 
territories. 15) The General Assembly therefore requested the var-
ious colonial powers to submit lists of their territories considered 
16) to be non-self-governing. Such lists were submitted and in the 
________
________
________
___ United/ ... 
10) De Yturriaga, note 5) supra, p.195; Broderick, note 2) supra, pp. 
399-400. For their status see Van Panhuys, "The International Aspect s 
of the Reconstruction of the Kingdom of the Netherlands in 195411 , 
Netherlands International Law Review, 1958, p.l; Van Panhuys, "The 
Netherlands Constitution and International Law" (47) A.J.I.L., 
1953, p.537, 
11) De Yturriaga, note 5) supra, p.195. 
12) West Indies Act, 196ic.4. These states have full self-government 
in internal affairs. Responsibility for external affairs and defence 
is reserved to the United Kingdom. The association is free and 
voluntary and is terminable at any time by either party but the 
United Kingdom has undertaken to give six months notice of intention 
to terminate. See Broderick, note 124) supra, p,371; Akehurst,p.282. 
13) Cook Islands Constitution Act, 19;54; Cook Islands Constitution 
(Amendment) Act, 1965. (New Zealand Statu~es Vol. 1, no. 69, 70). 
Emerson, note 2) supra, p.470. The association is a free one with 
external affairs and defence the res~onsibility of New Zealand, 
Broderick, note 2) supra, pp. 390, 391. 
14) See for instance the attitude to the Phillipines in 1938. J.E.S. 
Fawcett, "Security Council Resolutions on Rhodesia" (41) B.Y.I.L., 
1965-1966, p.103 at p.108. 
15) De Yturriaga, note 5) supra, p.191. 
16) Ibid. 
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United Kingdom lists the name of Southern Rhodesia was omitted. 17 ) 
The General Assembly noted the lists but did not query them.
18) In 
addi tion, the Colonial states sent these lists on the understanding 
that they reserved their rights to enlarge or reduce the lists in 
future. 19 ) The conclusion from the above is that in 1946, Southern 
Rhodesia was a self-governing territory in so far as Chapter XI of 
20) 
the United Nations Charter was concerned. 
As time progressed the United Nations organs purported to assume 
more competences in relation to non-self-governing territories in 
general and, as a consequence, in relation to Southern Rhodesia in 
particular. The following action may be isolated for discussion: 
(a) The General Assembly attempted to define the requisites of a 
self-governing territory. In 1953 it adopted a list of 
factors to be taken into account in deciding whether or not a 
21) 
territory had attained self-government. In 1960 further 
principles were expressed.22 ) 
-------------------------------
(b)/ ... 
17) Ibid. Chayes, 11, p. 1327; 
p. 728. 
Fawcett, note 14) supra, p.108; 
18) A.Res. 66(1); Palley, p.728; Chayes, 11, p.1327. 
19) De Yturriaga, note 5) supra, p,191, 
Palley , 
20) J.E.S. Fawcett, 11Treaty Relations of British Overseas Territories11 
(26) B.Y.I.L., 1949, p.86 at pp. 87, 88 couples Malta and Southern 
Rhodesia together, both of which he regards as being self-governing. 
21) A.Res. 742 (VIII). These included the ascertainment of the opinion 
of the population freely expressed by democratic process , effective 
participation of the population in the Government, universal and 
equal suffrage, free periodic elections, absence of coercion of voters 
and disabilities on political parties. See Chayes, 11, p.1329. 
22) A. Res. 1541 (XV); The free and voluntary choice of the people 
expressed through democratic process and based on universal adult 
suffrage was emphasized. See Chayes, 11, p. 1329. The people could 
choose which method of decolonization they wished to adopt. Akehurst , 
p. 282. 
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(b) The Assembly attempted to assume the power to interpret 
Article 73 of the Charter in genera123 ) and in particular to 
decide whether or not a territory was non-self-governing with-
in the meaning of that Article.24 ) 
(c) Relying on the above, the General Assembly declared for the 
first time in 1962 that Southern Rhodesia was a non-self-
governing territory within the meaning of Chapter XI of the 
Charter. 25) In further consequence of, and in reliance upon, 
this determination, various organs of the United Nations took 
action. Such action is now described. 
(d) The United Kingdom was treated as the administering power with 
obligations under Article 73.26 ) 
(e) The Assembly then made various recommendations to the United 
Kingdom as the "administering power" and to other bodies. It 
recommended that the United Kingdom convene a constitutional 
conference to ensure the adoption of universal adult suffrage 
in Southern Rhodesia; 27 remove racial discrimination in the 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-territory/ ... 
23) Thus A.Res. 1514 (XV) is an attempted interpretation of the obligat -
ions in this Article. See Akehurst, p.282. 
24) De Yturriaga, note 5) supra, p. 191; Chayes, 11, pp. 1325-1326. 
25) A. Res. 1747 (XVI). This was followed by A.Res. 1760 (XVII). The 
Assembly accepted the argument that since the great majority of the 
people did not have political rights, one could not regard the 
territory as being self-governing. See Fischer, note 3) supra, 
p.62. See too Chayes, 11, pp. 1331-1332. Here the Assembly followed 
the Report of the Sub-Committee on Southern Rhodesia of the Special 
Committee on the Situation with Regard to the Implementation of the 
Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries 
and Peoples. See Chayes, 11, pp. 1324-1325; De Yturriaga, note 5 ) 
supra , p.208. 
26) A.Res.1747 (XVI); A.Res. 2022 (XX). Fawcett, note 14) supra, 
p.108; Chayes, 11, pp. 1331-1332. 
27) A Res. 1747 (XVI); A.Res. 2022 (XX). 
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territory;28) secure the release of political prisoners; 29) 
allow African political activity;)O) use force to achieve all 
these ends.3l) I t requested the Special Committee on the 
Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independ-
ence to Colonial Countries and Peoples to consider whether 
Southern Rhodesia had attained a full measure of self-govern-
ment and to report32 ) and to continue with its constructive 
efforts.33) It drew the attention of the S~curity Council "to 
the threats made by the present authorities in Southern Rhodesia , 
including the threat of economic sabotage against the independent 
African States adjoining Southern Rhodesia".34 ) It declared 
Southern Rhodesia to be a threat to the peace and security of 
Africa.35 ) Finally, it called upon all States to refrain 
from rendering assistance to the minority r~gime in Southern 
Rhodesia, to use all their powers against a unilateral 
declaration of independence, not to recognize any government 
in Southern Rhodesia which was not representative of the 
majority of the people, and to render moral and material 
help to the people of Zimbabwe in their struggle for freedom 
and independence.36 ) 
_____
_____
_____
_____
__ (f)/ ... 
28) A. Res. 1747 (X\I); A Res. 2022 (XX). 
29) A. Res. 1747 (XVI) ; A.Res. 1755 (XVI); A. Res. 2022 (XX). 
30 ) 
31) 
32 ) 
33) 
34 ) 
35) 
36) 
Ibid. 
.!!2.!£. 
A. Res. 
A. Res. 
A. Res. 
A Res. 
A. Res. 
1745 (XVI). 
1747 (XVI). 
2022 (XX). 
1760 (XVI). 
2022 (XX) . 
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(f) The Special Committee Just referred to (hereina~er called the 
Colonial Committee) considered Southern Rhodesia at meetings 
on 15th March and 10th April, 1963.37 ) It sent a sub-committee 
to visit the British Government in April 1963. The British 
Government held discussions with the sub-committee.38) The 
sub-committee submitted a report. 39) The view of the committee 
was that Southern Rhodesia was in colonial status.
40 ) The 
Committee made various calls on the Uniteq Kingdom to convene 
a constitutional conference. 41 ) It also heard individual 
petitioners from Southern Rhodesia. 42 ) In 1963, it renewed its 
attacks on the British position which asserted that Southern 
Rhodesia was self-governing.43) 
(g) The Security Council also dealt with the Southern Rhodesian 
situation. On 14th September, 1963, the United Kingdom was 
invited by a motion not to transfer any power or attributes 
of sovereignty or any armed forces or aircraft to Southern 
Rhodesia until a fully representative government was established. 
Britain used her veto .44 ) On 6th May, 1965, the Security 
Council passed a resolution requesting United Nations members 
to refuse to accept a unilateral declaration of independence by 
the minority government, calling upon the United Kingdom not t o 
------------
------------
-----transfer/ . . . 
37) De Yturriaga, note 5) supra, p. 207 , 
38) Ibid. Chayes, 11, p.1324. 
39) De Yturriaga, note 5) supra, p.208. 
40) John Carey, "The United Nation's Double Standard on Human Rights 
Complaints" (60) A.J.I L. , 1966, p.792 at p.798. The Mauretanian 
view was that Southern Rhodesia, though not under the control of 
United Ki ngdom officials, was under the rule of settlers installed 
by the United Kingdom. Ibid. 
41) Chayes, 11, p.1325. De Yturriaga, note 5) supra, p.208. 
42) M.E.Zvolego, Rev. M.Scott, Joshua Nkomo. Ibid., p.203. 
43) Chayes, 11, pp. 1332 -1333. 
44) Palley, p.728; Cqayes , 11, p.1333. 
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transfer to Southern Rhodesia any of the attributes of sover -
eignty but to promote the attainment of independence with a 
democratic system of government and calling for a constitutional 
conference. 45) 
The first three activities above (a) - (c) are the important ones. 
For if these matters do not fall within the competence of the 
General Assembly then it follows that the remaining activities (d) -
(g) are outside the powers of the relevant organs of the United 
Nations since they are essentially based upon the existence of 
competence to perform activities (a) - (c). We may deal with the 
competence to define the requisites of a self-governing territory, 
i.e. (a) above and the power to interpret Article 73 of the Charter 
i.e. (b) above, together. These two "competences" have common 
features in that the Charter does not give the Assembly the power 
to do either and that initially the Assembly did not claim either 
power, being apparently content to allow the colonial powers to re-
serve these particular competences to themselves. 46 ) 
The basic question here is whether the General Assembly may authorit-
atively interpret the provisions of the Charter and, in particular, 
the provisions of Article 73, There is no such power given by the 
Charter itself but it has been argued that the General Assembly 
possesses such power.47 ) It can be argued that insofar as a 
--------------
--------------
-_..;resolution/ ... 
45) S.Res. 202 (1965); 
pp. 108-109. 
Chayes, 11, p. 1334; Fawcett, note 14) supra, 
46) De. Yturriaga, note 5) supra, pp. 191, 195. 
47) See, for example, McDougal and Reisman "Rhodesia and the United 
Nations; the Lawfulness of International Concern" (62) A.J .r.·L., 
1968, p.l. at pp. 11-12; Sorensen, p.162; Samuel A.Bleicher, 
"The Legal Significance of Re-citation of General Assembly Resolut-
ions" (63 ) A.J.I.L., 1969, p.444 at p.448 et seqq. 
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resolution deviates from the original meaning of the Charter it has 
48) 
no binding effects. But apart from this it has been argued that 
an interpretative resolution binds not only those states who vote 
for it and abstain from voting on it but also those who vote against 
it.49) The argument is that if the interpretation is a reasonable 
choice between various rational alternatives, a dissenting state is 
bound 
" it must be assumed that a state agreeing to be bound by 
the terms of a constitutive instrument necessarily accepts 
the possibility that some of the subsequent interpretations 
will not be those that the state would have preference •... " 50 ) 
Of course, a state must accept that adverse interpretations of its 
obligations may be made from time to time but that is not t o say 
that it accepts such interpretations as being authoritative, i.e. 
as finally settling such matters in a judicial manner. If it were 
to accept this further proposition, that interpretation was to be 
conclusively binding, the power of judicially interpreting the 
instrument would have to be specifically granted to the interpret-
ing organ by the constituent instrument. This is usually the 
position in constitutive instruments and so normally there can be 
authoritative interpretation of such instruments by the empowered 
organ.5l) But the Charter of the United Nations is a significant 
exception here.52 ) Nowhere does the Charter give interpretative 
powers to the General Assembly. From this excepti0nal omission 
of a power normally given, one is driven to the conclusion that 
----------------------------the/ ... 
48) Ibid., p. 448. 
49) Ibid., p. 449. 
50) Ibid. 
51) Sorensen, p.92. 
52) Ibid. 
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the Assembly was not meant to interpret the Charter authoritatively 
and indeed has no such power. This means that interpretation of 
the Charter (including, of course, Article 73) by the General 
Assembly cannot be accepted as finally binding on states. Inter-
pretations by the Assembly, therefore, are subject to evaluation 
and it always lies in the hands of a dissenting state to contest 
the accuracy of Assembly interpretation in any case - even if it 
appears reasonable.53) 
We have now eome to the conclusion that under the Charter, the 
General Assembly had no power of authoritative interpretation. If 
the General Assembly is to have such a power it could only possess 
it by reason of a de facto revision of the terms of the Charter 
under which such powers were assumed with the consent or acquiescence 
54) 
of the affected powers. In the case of the power to authoritat-
ively interpret the provisions of Article 73, the consent or 
~----------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------~a.cquiescence/ ... 
53) Reasonableness of course might indicate that an interpretation was 
correct - but not conclusively so. Rosalyn Higgins, The Develop-
ment of International Law through the Political Organs of the 
United Nations, Oxford, 1963, pp. 112-113 considers however, that 
through a series of resolutions the Assembly may have developed 
the power to interpret Article 73 by determining the territories 
to which it applies. Such a practice would, however, it is sub-
mitted, involve a Charter revision by practice and the possibility 
of such revision is now discussed. The question of the repetition 
of resolutions as evidence of the evolution of custom (apart from 
the question of Charter interpretation) is discussed infra, p. 482. 
in relation to the possible existence of a right of self-determinat-
ion. 
54) On de facto revision, or modification by practice, see Brownlie, 
p.502; Schwarzenberger, Manual, pp. 167-168; Akehurst, pp. 244-245. 
It is clear, of course, that such modifications cannot be unilater-
ally effected (i.e. by mere General Assembly assumption of power 
alone in this case) and hence the requirement of consent or acquies-
cence by the affected powers. See Sorensen, p. 222-223. 
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acquiescence of the colonial powers to such assumption would, there-
fore, be necessary as they are the affected powers. It would appear 
to be quite clear that the colonial powers never consented to or 
acquiesced in the Assembly exercising such authoritative interpret-
ative powers. Originally the colonial states sent lists of depend-
ent territories on the understanding that they would reserve their 
rights to enlarge or reduce the lists in future.55) The competence 
of the Assembly to determine when a territory should be removed 
from the list has at all times been challenged by the governing 
powers who asserted that the achievement of self-government was for 
each governing power to determine in any case. 56 ) When they con-
sider self-government to be attained they simply inform the General 
Assembly that reports will no longer be submitted in respect of the 
territory. 57 ) The competence of the Assembly to determine what is 
a self-governing territory has continually been challenged58) and 
a compromise was, at one time, achieved in the dispute under which 
it was acknowledged that both the Assembly and the state in question 
might make such a determination.59) This, of course, means that 
neither determination is in fact authoritative! 
In our enquiry we need, of course, only concern ourselves with the 
question whether such assumption of authoritative interpretative 
powers by the General Assembly is binding by consent or acquiescence 
on the United Kingdom as we are only concerned to enquire whether 
the United Nations was entitled to treat Southern Rhodesia as a 
non-self-governing territory vis-a-vis the United Kingdom. 
------------------------------:It/ ... 
55) De Yturriaga, note 5) supra, p,191, 
56) Ibid., p. 195, 
57) For examples, see ibid. 
58) Obed Y. Asamoah, The Legal Significance of the Declarations of the 
General Assembly, The Hague, 1966, p.175. 
59) A, Res. 648 (VII); Fawcett, The British Commonwealth in Internationai_ 
~' London, 196.3, p.140. 
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It would appear quite clear that the United Kingdom never 
acquiesced in the exercise of such functions by the General 
Assembly. On the contrary, the United Kingdom consistently protest-
ed at such assumption by the Assembly and at the various actions 
60) 
taken by the Assembly as a consequence. 
We must now consider the third question above - (c) - the specific 
interpretation of the General Assembly that Southern Rhodesia was 
61) 
a non-self-governing territory. The determination here must, 
of course, be dependent on a general power to interpret in the 
General Assembly and we have submitted that such a power does not 
exist and, more specifically, is not binding on the United Kingdom. 
However, there is here an additional factor to consider. It can be 
said that there was a specific determination of the status of 
Southern Rhodesia in 1946 by tacit agreement. In 1946 the United 
Kingdom submitted a list of non-self-governing territories to the 
United Nations and the list did not include Southern Rhodesia which, 
in the opinion of the United Kingdom, was self-governing.62 ) The 
General Assembly noted but did not query the omission of Southern 
Rhodesia from the list thereby tacitly accepting the position 
adopted by the United Kingdom on the status of Southern Rhodesia. 63 ) 
It can be argued from this that the General Assembly would be 
estopped from repudiating this determination even if it otherwise 
____________________
____ had/ ... 
60) See the speech of Sir Patrick Dean to the General Assembly in June , 
1962 which precisely describes the attitude of the United Kingdom. 
Chayes, 11 , pp. 1325-1326. 
61) A. Res. 1747 (XVI); A. Res. 1760 (XVII). 
62) Chayes, II, p. 1327; Palley, p.728; Fawcett, note 14 supra, p.108. 
63) A. Res. 66(1); Chayes, II, p.1327; Palley, p.728. 
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64) had the power to interpret generally. In other words, the 
determination made initially is binding, it has been· acted upon by 
the United Kingdom, 65) and it cannot be unilaterally rejected by 
the United Nations. The conduct of the United Nations over a 
period of some sixteen years further consolidates this original 
determination. For sixteen years it treated Southern Rhcrlesia as 
a self-governing territory by demanding no reports. Further, it 
is abundantly clear that the United Kingdom at all times regarded 
Southern Rhodesia as being self-governing, it did not accept that 
the United Nations had any interest in it, and it never accepted 
the specific determin~tions made by the General Assembly that 
Southern Rhodesia was non-self-governing, 66 ) just as it never 
accepted the principle that the Assembly could make a binding deter-
mination of this nature either in this case or generally. Thus, 
the United Kingdom list of non-self-governing territories did not 
include Southern Rhodesia. 67 ) It would not accept the resolutions 
which declared Southern Rhodesia to be non-self-governing.68 ) When 
the sub-committee of six visited Britain between 20th and 26th April, 
1963, the British Government informed it that it was incompetent 
to intervene in the affairs of Southern Rhodesia which was self-
governing but it nevertheless authorized the London visit and held 
discussions with the sub-committee. 69) It maintained at all times 
----------
----------
-------that/ ... 
64) On estoppel see Sorensen, p.148; Akehurst, pp. 189-191; O'Connell, 
1, p,13; Eastern Greenland case, P.C.I.J. 1933, Series A/B, no.53 
at 68; Temple of Preah Vihear case, I.C.J. Rep. 1962, 6 at 23, 31, 
32, 39-51; Arbitral Award of the King of Spain, I.C.J. Rep. 1960, 
192 at 209, 213; Argentina - Chile Boundary Award (61) A.J.I.L. , 
1967, p .1071, 
The United Kingdom never provided information in respect of Southern 
Rhodesia, Chayes, II, p.1327. 
A. Res. 1747 (XVI); A.Res. 1760 (XVII). 
Chayes, II, p.1327; Fawcett, note 14) supra, p.108. 
Fischer, note 3) supra, p. 62. 
De Yturriaga, note 5) supra, p.207; Chayes, II, p.1324. 
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that it was not an administering authority, 70) it did not provide 
information under Article 7371 ) and would not admit that the United 
Nations had any interest in the matter. 72 ) Thus it would not partic-
ipate in Assembly voting on A. Res. 1747 (XVI) and was recorded as 
"present and not voting".73) 
In the Security Council it was prepared to veto resolutions on 
Southern Rhodesia and did so veto a resolution in September, 1963. 74 ) 
Finally, it is clear that the United Kingdom treated Southern Rhodes-
ian affairs as being a matter of domestic jurisdiction with which the 
United Nations was incompetent to intervene. 75) We may therefore 
say that the United Kingdom has reiterated at every opportunity that 
Southern Rhodesia is self-governing and has denied United Nations 
competence in relation to the territory. From this we may conclude 
that the United Kingdom has never acquiesced in any changes purported 
to be made by the United Nations in relation to the status of the 
territory and thus the status of Southern Rhodesia remained right 
throughout the period 1946-1965 as it was initially in 1946 viz. 
the status of a self-governing colony to which Article 73 of the, 
Charter was inapplicable. This conclusion is further strengthened 
by the following argument . If the competence of the General Assembly 
to determine whether or not an admittedly non-self-governing territ-
ory i.e. one which appears in the lists, remains the same, is such 
a matter of contention, how much more so is that competence doubtful 
---------------------------
in/ ... 
70) Palley, p.729. 
71) Chayes, II, p. 1327. 
72) Palley , p.728; Chayes, II, pp. 1325, 1326. 
73) Chayes, II,pp.1331-1332. 
74) Chayes, II. p.1333; Palley, p.728; De Yturriaga,note 5) supra~ 
p. 208. 
75) Chayes, II ., p .1330; Palley, p.728; Fawcett, note 14) supra, 
p. 108. 
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in the matter of a positive determination that a territory, not 
previously in the lists, should be regarded as non-self-governing? 76 ) 
And how much more so is such competence in doubt in the case of a 
territory such as Southern Rhodesia whose omission from the lists 
was tacitly accepted by the General Assembly in 1946? 
SECTION III. 
T~ EXTENT OF SOUTHERN RHODESIAN INTERNATIONAL PERSONALITY. 
We have already seen that Just prior to 11th November, 1965, Southern 
Rhodesian personality was quite extensive. 1 ) We must now see the 
exact extent of such personality by considering the various headings 
under which such personality existed. 
(1) Membership of International Organizations. 
In practice, the international personality of the Federation of 
Rhodesia and Nyasaland devolved on Southern Rhodesia a~er the 
dissolution of the former. 2 ) Thus Southern Rhodesia succeeded in 
general to the membership, associate membership or participation 
in group membership, as the case might be, of those Commonwealth 
and international organizations of which the Federation had been a 
member.3 ) These organizations and the type of membership existing 
in each have already been described. 4 ) As far as membership of ~he 
~~~~~~~~~---~---~---~------~---~~------~~Commonwealth/ ... 
76) And yet the General Aseembly made such determinations in relation 
to the Portuguese overseas provinces in A.Res. 1542 (XV). 
1) Supra, p. 89. 
2 ) SuRra , pp. 88-89. 
3) Palley, p.725; S/9853, Annex IV, pp.7, 12, 14. Before the inception 
of the Federation Southern Rhodesia had been a member of some of these 
e.g. U.P.U., I.M.F., I.B.R.D. See J.E.s. Fawcett, "Security Council 
Resolutions on Rhodesia" (41) B.Y.I L., 1965-1966, p.103 at p.lo6. 
4) Supra, pp. 85-86. 
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Commonwealth itself was concerned, Southern Rhodesia could not be a 
full member as it was not an independent state and it did not have 
the status of a dominion.5) For some purposes it was regarded as 
being a member of the Commonwealth but for other purposes as a 
dependency of the United Kingdom. 6 ) Thus its Prime Minister had a 
standing invitation to attend Commonwealth Prime Ministers Confer-
ences not as a right but as a matter of courtesy. 7) 
(2) Participation in treaties. 
There are four types of treaty which must be discussed here : 
(a) British treaties applied to Southern Rhodesia; 
(b) British treaties which did not apply to Southern Rhodesia but 
to which Southern Rhodesia could accede and did accede; 
(c) Treaties concluded by Southern Rhodesia as such; 
(d) Treaties of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland to which 
Southern Rhodesia succeeded. 
(a) British treaties applied to Southern Rhodesia. 
Southern Rhodesia had no personality in respect of these 
particular treaties. The United Kingdom alone was responsible 
for their performance and had the sole international personal-
ity in relation to them. The question of Southern Rhodesia 
·-·· ·· ·· · -·· · · ·i:.,.rc"c;-eeding to these treaties and becoming a party to them in 
its own right would only arise in the event of its claim to 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~independence/ ... 
5) 
6) 
7) 
Chayes, II , p.1319; J.E S. Fawcett, The British Commonwealth in 
International Law, London, 1963, p.86. 
R.B.Stewart, Tr eaty Relations of the British Commonwealth of Nations, 
New York, 1939, pp. 21-22. 
Fischer, "Le Probl~m Rhodesien" (11) Annuaire Francais de Droit 
International, 1965, p.41 at p.51; J .D B. Miller, The Commonwealth 
in the World, London, 1965, p.62; Sir Ivor Jennings, Constitutional 
Laws of the Commbnwealth, Oxford, 1957,p.10; H.H.Marshall, "The 
Legal Effects of U .D.I." (17) I.C L.Q., 1968, p. 1022; Palley, 
p.365. Later no invitation was issued because of the attitude of 
emergent Af rican Commonwealth Countries. See Marshall, op.cit., 
p. 1023. On Southern Rhodesia (and the Federation) in relation to 
the Commonwealth see supra , p. 26 . 
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independence achieving validity in international law. 8) 
These treaties existing with many countries concern a great 
variety of subject matter.9) The remaining three categories 
of treaty do involve international personality on the part of 
Southern Rhodesia and by describing them we discover the 
extent of such personality. 
(b) British treaties to which Southern Rhodesia acceded. 
Originally, all treaties of the United Kingdom applied ipso 
facto to all Br itish territories and to all British subjects 
10) 
unless the treaty contained a provision to the contrary. 
By the eighteen sixties it was realized that such treaties 
did not necessarily have to be automatically applicable to 
overseas territories such as self-governing colonies. 11 ) By 
the eighteen eighties various devices were being utilized in 
practice to exclude such self-governing colonies and territories 
from/ ... 
-------------------------------8) The question of succession is discussed infra,pp.736-753 in relation 
to the effect of a grant of independence by the United Kingdom to 
Rhodesia. 
9) A list of the important treaties applied to Southern Rhodesia will 
be found in The International Law Association's ;,The Effect of 
Indep1ndence on Treaties", London, 1965, pp. 66-90. A list of the 
important boundary treaties concluded with Portugal will be found at 
ibid., p.84. Many of these treaties were directly applied by United 
Kingdom signature alone. Others were only applied subsequently to 
the territory and after consultation with it. In this category we 
find mainly treaties of Extradition, Commercial Treaties, Treaties 
on Economic co-operation and some other treaties of a miscellaneous 
character. This category of treaty applied to the territory only 
after consultation with it, must be distinguished from the t~pe of 
treaty to which the territory itself accedes. In the latter case, 
the territory itself becomes a separate and participating party (see 
infra,pp.107-1Q9)with relevant international personality whilst in 
the former case the mother state is the party to the treaty with 
international responsibility for the application of the treaty in 
the territory. Southern Rhodesia in effect produced a list of 
treaties which it claimed to have inherited. See D.P.O'Connell, 
International Law, 1, London, 1965, p.431. 
10) J .E.S. Fawcett, "Treaty Relations of British Overseas Territories" 
(26) B.Y.I.L., 1949, p.86 at p.93, 
11) Ibid. , p. 94 . 
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from the application of certain treaties, such as the practice 
of excluding certain territories by name but with provision 
12) 
of an opportunity for them to accede, the practice of 
providing that the treaty was only to apply to such territor-
ies as were specifically namedl)) and the practice of provid-
ing that treaties would not be applicable to overseas territori es 
14) 
unless accepted by them. I f no express provisions were 
inserted it was a question of interpretation whether the 
treaty was to apply to overseas territories though the principle 
was that acceptance of a Convention by the United Kingdom would 
ipso facto make it operative in the United Kingdom and its 
overseas territories, unless by express provision or necessary 
intendment the treaty was territorially limited to the United 
Kingdom or to one or more of its overseas territories. 15) 
Thus the principle of separate accession to United Kingdom 
treaties by overseas terr itories arose. The principles 
which governed such separate participation in practice were 
as follows: The subject matter of the treaty in question 
would concern a field in which the overseas territory was 
self-governing, the assent of the other states parties to 
the treaty to such separate participation would naturally be 
16) 
required and the participation would be diplomatically 
effected by the United Kingdom. 17 ) The territory which 
-------------
-------------
--a.ccedes/ ... 
12) 
13) 
14) 
15) 
16 ) 
Ibid., 
Ibid., p.95. 
Ibid., p.96. 
Ibid., p. 101. 
This assent would of course be evident from the terms of a treaty 
which made provi sion for separate accession. 
17) Fawcett, note 10) supra , p.lo6. 
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accedes to such a treaty becomes a separate party to the 
treaty and it is no less essentially a party to the treaty 
merely because its acceptance is formally communicated by the 
18) 
metropolitan power. 
In practice, separate accession would be provided for where 
the subject matter concerned was an administrative or technical 
matter in which the colony was self-governing.
19 ) In relation 
to extradition treaties it has been the practice since the 
First World War to make provision for separate accession by 
20) 
dominions and self-governing colonies. Great Britain 
ceased to include self-governing colonies within the ambit of 
commercial treaties as early as 18So.
21 ) Thus Southern 
Rhodesia became a separate party apart from the United Kingdom 
to various treaties being the constituent instruments of 
. 22) 23) international organizations, to the G.A T.T. and to 
certain protocols made under the Q.A.T.T. 24) 
____
____
____
____
____
_ (c)/ ... 
18) Ibid., p. 102. 
19) Ibid., p. lc6. 
20) Robert E. Clute, "Law and Practice in Commonwealth Extradition" 
(8) American Journal of Comparative Law, 1959, p.8 at p.16. 
21) Ibid . 
22) Supra, pp. 85-1?6, 105. 
23 ) Fawcett, note 10) supra,p. 102; Chayes, II, p.1319. Its separate 
participation in the G.A.T.T. is particularly significant in that 
the G.A.T.T. takes the attitude that a state can only be a member 
if it possesses full autonomy in the conduct of its external affairs . 
Broderick, 11 Associated Statehood - A New Form of Decolonization" 
(17) r.c L.Q., 1968, p.368 at p.395, considers that the degree of 
autonomy required is doubtful because of the Southern Rhodesian 
pr ecedent. 
24) The formalities of participation were, of course , executed by the 
United Kingdom at the request of Southern Rhodesia. See Fawcett, 
note 10) supra, p.102. 
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(c) Treaties concluded by Southern Rhodesia as such. 
The competence of Southern Rhodesia included, as we have seen, 
the right to conduct all negotiations and agreements with 
foreign countries subject to the need to safeguard the United 
Kingdom's international responsibil i ties. 25 ) Thus on the 
dissolution of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, a 
former extradition treaty was continued by exchange of notes 
between South Af rica and Southern Rhodesia. This was, in 
eff ect, a new treaty to continue the application of a former 
26) 
one. In 1965, South Africa and Rhodesia formally concluded 
a treaty of extradition.27 ) Southern Rhodesia negotiated a 
conunercial agreement with Japan without making use of United 
Kingdom instrumentalities. 28) Southern Rhodesia also concluded 
agreements with Commonwealth countries.29 ) $..lch agreements 
were strictly speaking not treaties as the intention to con-
clude an agreement to which international law would apply 
~--------------------------------------------------------would/ ... 
25) Supra, p~. 83, 84 , 88-&J. ; F~wcett , not e 3 ) supra , p. 105; 
Droderick, not e 23) supra , p. 378. 
26) s. v. Bull, 1967 (2) s .A. 636 (T); s. v. Eliasov, 1964 (4) s.A. 583 
~A .D.); S. v. Eliasov, 1965 (2) S .A. 770 (T); C .J R. Dugard, "The 
Signing and Ratification of Treaties", Annual Survey of South 
African Law , 1967, at pp. 49, 51. The Exchange of Notes was held 
not to be a treaty of extradition in South African municipal law 
because it did not comply with the provisions of s.2. of the 
Extradition Act No. 67 of 1962. R.H.C. "State Succession to 
Tr eaty Rights" (5) Rhodesia L.J. 1965, p.56 at p. 58. This would 
not, of course, affect its validity as a treaty in international law . 
27) Proclamation Rl51 dated 25th June, 1965, Government Gazette, (South 
Africa). This treaty was held to be valid in South African municipal 
law in S. v. Eliasov, 1967 (2) S. A., 423 (T). It also concluded 
commercial and double taxation agreements with South Africa. 
O'Connell , note 39) infra, pp. 175 , 176. 
28) Broderick, note 23) supra, pp. 378. A~er the dissolution of the 
Federation, a series of economic agreements were signed between 
Rhodesia and Portugal, further tightening relations between the 
two countries. The Times, 12th November, 1965 , p . 8(e). 
29) For example, the Commonwealth Telegraphs Agreement concluded between 
the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, South Africa, India and 
Southern Rhodesia. See Fawcett, note 10) supra, p.105. 
would usually be excluded by the application of the inter se 
doctrine in such cases.30) 
(d) Treaties of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland to which 
Southern Rhodesia succeeded. 
The Federation was a limited international person with a limited 
treaty-making capacity.31 ) On dissolution it ceased to exist 
and the question whether its treaties devolved on the former 
constituent members of the Federation, and if so, to what 
extent, arose. Though the Federation was not :: 9.n independent 
32) 
state, the succession problem is precisely the same in principle 
as would arise on the dissolution of an independent Federal 
State.33 ) Thus we consider the principles which apply in the 
case of the dissolution of a federation. 
There are different criteria which are of relevance in deter-
mining whether the treaties of a federatiorr devolve a~er its 
dissolution. In the first place, continuity of identity between 
the former constituent states of the federation and the newly 
~-------------------------------------------------------emerging/ . .. 
30) Ibid. On the inter se doctrine and its scope, see Fawcett, note 5) 
supra, pp. 144, 175-176, 194. 
31) Supra, pp. 83,84; S. v. Eliasov, 1965 (2) S.A. 770(T) at 773. 
32) Though the problem is similar in principle, the degree of succession 
would naturally be much less for the simple reason that a non-
independent state such as the Federation was, would have negotiated 
far fewer treaties than an independent state because of its limited 
international personality and treaty-making capacity. There would 
thus be far fewer treaties t o devolve upon its constituent members. 
The principles which would govern the devolution of such treaties 
would, however, be similar to those governing the devolution of the 
treaties of an independent federal state. 
33) C.J.R. Dugard, "Succession to Federal Treaties on the Dissolution of 
a Federation" (82) s .A.L.J., 1965, p.430 at p.436. 
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emerging units may give rise to succession.34 ) The question 
of the intentions of the parties also plays an important part 
and here the intentions of both the original parties and the 
"successors" are relevant in determining the question of 
succession.35) In addition, state practice in general would 
appear to favour the devolution of such treaties.36 ) There 
is a considerable, if not unanimous body of Juristic opinion 
in favour of such devolution and there may in fact be said 
to be a general tendency in favour of continuance of extra-
dition treaties.37) The Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland 
concluded various trade and customs agreements, 38) visa and 
double taxation agreements,39) and an extradition agreement 
with South Africa. 40 ) 
Taking into account the general tendency in favour of the 
continuity of federal treaties and the continuity of identity 
in/ ... 
------------------
-------------
34) Ibid. Dugard asserts that continuity of personality is the key to 
the whole question of succession and if the personalities of the 
constituent states were not materially affected, succession occurs. 
Ibid., pp. 431-432 and "Succession to Federal Treaties Revisited" 
(84) S.A.L.J., 1967, p.250 at p.254. It would appear that what 
Prof. Dugard means here is that where there has not been a material 
change in the constitutional personality of constituent states, 
succession takes place on dissolution of the federation. For it 
would appear to be apparent that if the federation was an internat-
ional person, then substantial changes in international personality 
must take place on its dissolution. 
35) Dugard, note 34) supra, p.252; Palley, p.725; R.H.C. note 26) supra, 
p.57; S. v. Eliasov, 1965 (2) SA. 770 (T} at 773; S. v. Bull, 
1967 (2) S.A. 636 (T); S. v. Devoy, 1971 (3) S.A . 899 (A.D.} at 9o6. 
36) Dugard, note 33) supra, p. 436; S. v. Devoy, 1971 (3) S.A. 899 (A.D. ) 
at 904. 
37) Ibid., at 9o4F - 9 05A, 905H, 
38) Fawcett, note 3) supra, p.lo6. Supra, p. 84. 
39) 
40) 
D.P.O'Connell, State Succession in Municipal Law and International 
le!:!, 1967, pp. 176-177. Supra, p.64. 
Proclamation R.44 dated 15th March 1963, Government Gazette Extra-
ordinary (South Africa). 
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in the case of Southern Rhodesia a~er the dissolution of the 
Federation41 ) it is submitted that federal treaties devolved 
in principle on Southern Rhodesia unless some specific reason 
42) 
exists in individual cases which would preclude such devolution. 
This is what has happened in practice. Generally, federal 
treaties were continued in force by all the three territories 
and after independence by Malawi and Zambia but separate con-
sideration must still be afforded to each particular agreement~3 ) 
The result is that though there is a presumption of succession, 
no universal rule . can be laid down and in the last analysis 
"each case must ... be decided upon the particular facts relat-
ing to it. 1144 ) 
Individual treaties have been considered. In relation to the 
double-taxation and visa agreements no uniform policy would 
appear to be followed in relation to their devolution. 45)The 
devolution of the extradition agreement of 1963 with South 
Africa/ ... 
-----------------------------· 
41) Dugard, note 33) supra, p. 436 submits, and with respect, correctly, 
that such continuity is present in the case of Southern Rhodesia. If 
continuity was not present then a "new" state would have emerged from 
dissolution of the federation and the rules relating to state success-
ion would apply. (Discussed infra,pp.736-753). But even here 
there is a tendency to regard extradition treaties as automatically 
devolving. Dugard, note 33) supra, pp. 433-434 cites cases which 
support this tendency but points out that P. O'Higgins "Irish Extra-
dition Law and Practice" (34) B.Y.I.L., 1958, p. 298 says this is 
only a Judicial tendency and whether there is any applicable rule of 
international law is doubtful. 
42) Dugard, note 33) supra, p. 436 says that succession should be presumed. 
43) O'Connell, note 39) supra, p.175, In fact the general view taken by 
the Government of Southern Rhodesia was that except where practical 
considerations would exclude succession, existing treaties,rights 
and obligations of the Federation would pass without resort to any 
positive processes of affirmation. See O'Connell, note (152) supra, 
p.174. 
44) Per Ogilivie Thompson, C.J. in S. v. Devoy, 1971 (3) S.A. E$9 (A.D.) 
at 905 G-H. 
45) O'Connell, note 39) supra, pp. 176, 177; S. v. Devoy, 1971 (3) S.A. 
899 (A.D.) at 905E, 
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Africa has been judicially considered. In S. v. Eliasov, 46) 
the extradition treaty was held not to devolve on Southern 
Rhodesia. 47) In S. v. Bull, however, the same treaty was held 
to devolve upon Malawi. The court distinguished s. v. Eliasov 
on the grounds that both South Afri ca and Southern Rhodesia had 
intended the treaty to come to an end and this was evidenced 
by the fact that they had entered into a new treaty by ex-
change of notes to revive the old.48 ) On the other hand in 
~ the parties intended to keep the treaty in force. 49) 
Such intent i on on the part of Malawi was evidenced by the 
constitutional steps taken to ensure that the agreement contin-
ued in force after dissolution of the Federation as the law of 
Nyasaland and as the law of Mal awi after its achievement of 
independence.50) In this way continuity and thus succession was 
ensured.5l) South Africa's intention to keep the treaty in 
force and thus to achieve cont inuity and succession was 
apparent from the off icial attitude of the Government as re-
f lected in an executive certificate signed by the Minister of 
Justice, Police and Prisons that it was their wish that the 
agreement should continue in force.52 ) Ins. v. Devoy, the 
Appellate Division confirmed the devolution of the treaty on 
Malawi and confirmed the reasoning of the court ins. v. Bull.53) 
________
________
________
 It/ . .. 
46) 1965 (2) S.A. 770 (T). 
47) 1967 (2) S.A. 636 (T). 
48) At 637G-638E. Dugard, note 26) supra, p.51; Note 34) supra, p.252. 
49) At 640 . 
50 ) Extradi tion of Offenders Enactments (Adaptat ions and Modifications ) 
Regulations, 1964; Malawi Independence Order , 1964. 
51 ) S . v. Bull, 1967 (2) S .A. 6)6(T) at 640 . 
52 ) ~-, 637, 640. 
53) 1971 (3) S . A. 899 (A.D.) at 908. 
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It would thus appear that the court in S. v. Eliasov refused 
to apply the general principle that a federal state's 
treaties devolve on the constituent members of the federation 
on the grounds that sue~ succession was excluded in casu 
by a specific intention on the part of the "successors". 
Finally, we may add that the intentions of the original 
parties to the treaty (i.e. the Federation and the outside 
state) may also be relevant in relation to succession. If 
the original intention in concluding a treaty with the Federat-
ion had been to contract with a dependency for which Britain 
was internationally responsible, the treaty would continue to 
bind the constituent states as dependencies. If, however, 
the intention was solely to contract with the Federation 
then the treaty might require re-negotiation with the individ-
ual territories. 54 ) There is much to be said for the emphasis 
on original intention here. There seems to be some juristic 
inconsistency in determining whether succession has taken 
place in the light of the intentions of the "successors".55) 
Logically such intention should only be relevant in determin-
ing whether there is a new treaty between the "successors", 
the effect of which is to continue the operation of the old 
one.56 ) The emphasis on original intention here, however, 
has the additional merit of taking into account the unusual 
position of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland which 
was in effect a dependency though with a limited international 
personality. 
--:-:-----~------,.,..---------<3 )/". 54) Palley, p. 725 _: 0 'Connell, "State Succession and Entry in to a compos:i.te 
55) 
Relationship" (39) B.Y.I.L.,1963, p.54 at p.128. O'Connell, note 
39) supra, p.174. 
This difficulty was referred to but not disposed of in S. v. Bull, 
1967 (2) S.A. 636 at 638:s-D. 
As in S. v. Eliasov, 1965 (2) S.A. 770(T). 
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(3) Diplomatic Rights. 
Southern Rhodesia was allowed to exchange High Commissioners with 
Commonwealth countries and did so.57) This amounted to giving its 
representatives diplomatic status as the office of High Commissioner 
gradually became assimilated to that of diplomatic representative. 
In 1948 the Commonwealth Prime Ministers agreed in conference that 
the status of Commonwealth representatives should be assimilated to 
58) 
that of foreign envoys. High Commissioners were then given the 
rank of Ambassadors and Diplomatic Immunities legislation applied 
to them.59) Such legislation even applied in terms to Southern 
Rhodesia as such. Thus the Diplomatic Immunities (Commonwealth 
Countries and Republic of Ireland) Act 1952 60) applies to Southern 
Rhodesia. This equation of Southern Rhodesia with the independent 
dominions and the Republic of Ireland - a sovereign republic outside 
the Commonwealth - shows that Southern Rhodesia's representatives 
had full international law status.
61 ) As far as foreign countries 
were concerned it had the right to appoint representatives to the 
diplomatic staffs of H.M. embassies and it did so appoint represent-
atives to the British Embassies in Washington, Tokyo, Lisbon and 
Bonn.62) These were not, of course, independent missions. It also 
maintained consular representation in Mozambique,
63) but its attempts 
to appoint a representative with independent diplomatic status in 
Lisbon in July 1965 finally failed when the Portuguese Government 
-------
-------
-------
-------
'recognized/ ... 
57) Fawcett, note 5) supra, pp. 198, 199. 
58) 1!2.!Q., p. 198. 
59) Ibid., pp. 198-199. 
60) 15 &16 Geo. 6 & 1 Eliz . 2, C.18. See too the New Zealand legislation . 
Fawcett, note 5 supra, p.199. 
61) See R.Y.Jennings, "The Commonwealth and International Law" (30) 
B.Y.I.L., 1953 , p.320 at p.322. 
62) Fawcett, note 3) supra, pp. 105-lc.6; Palley, p.725. 
63) Fawcett, note 3) supra) , p.106. 
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recognized Britain's responsibility for Rhodesian diplomatic represent-
64) 
ation in foreign countries. Southern Rhodesia was, however, 
permitted to have an Accredited Diplomatic Representative in the 
Republic of South Af rica. According to the Commonwealth Secretary, 
Mr. Arthur Bottomley, the appointment of such a representative to a 
foreign country was no precedent. It had historical reasons in that 
Southern Rhodesia was represented in South Africa when the latter was 
a member of the Commonwealth. When South Africa le~ the Commonwealth, 
65) 
Britain did not find it necessary to make any change in the situation. 
(4) International Responsibility. 
To the extent that a colony has capacity to undertake obligations it 
may attract the application of rules of law and international re-
sponsibility to itself and its delinquencies here may not be the 
responmibility of the parent state.66 ) Within the sphere of its 
67 ) 
international personality, which was in effect that of the Federation, 
--~~------~~~--~--~~~--~~~--------~
~------:Southern/ ... 
64) Ibid.; Palley, pp. 725-726. It is arguable however that Southern 
Rhodesia may have actually had the right to appoint an independent 
diplomatic mission in Lisbon despite the objections of the United 
Kingdom. The entrustment made to the Federation in 1957 included 
'the right to appoint its own diplomatic agents, who will have full 
diplomatic status and who will be in charge of Federal missions, in 
any foreign countries prepared to accept them, and to receive such 
agents from other countries'. (See supra. p. 8.3. This entrustment 
probably devolved on Southern Rhodesia on the dissolution of the 
Federation. (See supra,pp. 88-89.This was, in effect , the argument 
of the Rhodesian Minister of External Affairs. See Palley, pp . 725-
726. On the other hand,it can probably also be argued that as 
Southern Rhodesia was a dependency of the United Kingdom, the limited 
entrustment ma.de to it could probably be prospectively withdrawn by 
the United Kingdom but not of course retrospectively so as to prejudice 
third states who had already acquired rights against Southern Rhodesia 
in reliance on such entrustment. See however, Broderick, note 23) 
supra, p. 378 who poses the question whether such entrustment, once 
made, can be revoked. 
65) H.C. Debates, Vol. 717, col. 469, 28th July, 1965; Palley, p.725. 
66 ) Sorensen, p. 262. 
67) Supra, pp. 88-89. 
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Southern Rhodesia could, therefore, incur responsibility to other 
states. Thus if matters such as the Indian complaints concerning 
treatment of its diplomats and the question of intervention in 
Katanga arose after 1963 Southern Rhodesia would have had the same 
capacity for incurring responsibility in these cases as the erstwhile 
Federation. 68) 
(5) Capacity to protect nationals. 
Originally Southern Rhodesia did not have a separate nationality. 
Southern Rhodesian citizenship was first created by the Southern 
Rhodesian Citizenship and British Nationality Act, 1949.69) This 
was repealed in 1958 a~er the Citizenship of Rhodesia and Nyasaland 
70) 
and British Nationality Act, 1957 was enacted by the Federal 
Legislature. This Act ceased to apply by virtue of the Federal 
Laws (Cesser) Order, 1963 71 \r:a.de in t erms of Section 2 (2) of the 
Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland (Dissolution) Order-in-Council 
1963. 72 ) A new Citizenship of Southern Rhodesia and British 
· 73) Nationality Act was enacted by the Southern Rhodesian Legislature 
in 1963. 
Citizens of Southern Rhodesia were also British subjects ::f.n terms of 
Section 1 (3) of the British Nationality Act, 1948. 74 ) It was how-
ever, the local citizenship which counted primarily in the internat-
ional law sense and thus the local state is the state with the 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~--rrimary/ ... 
68) Supra, pp. 87-88. 
69) No . 13 of 1949. 
70) No. 12 of 1957, 
71) S.R.G N. No. 7e6 of 1963. 
72) s.1. 2085 of 1963. 
73) No. 63 of 1963. 
74) 11 and 12 Geo. 6,c. 56. 
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primary right of protection against foreign states. 75) In practice, 
however, the United Kingdom afforded protection to the holders of 
. 76) 
southern Rhodesian passports when abroad. 
One question of an incidental nature remains to be considered here. 
Did the United Kingdom have a right to protect Southern Rhodesian 
citizens against third states on the ground that they were also 
British subjects? Clive Parry77 ) considers that this is a possibil-
ity because of United Kingdom control over the foreign affairs of 
Southern Rhodesia. He points out that the United Kingdom still 
plays a role- in the foreign affairs of some Commonwealth countries 
and r ecalls the I'm Alone claim78 ) which was presented by the United 
Kingdom on behalf of C8nada at a time when the latter had already 
achieved such a hallmark of international personality as independent 
membership of the League of Nations. He further points out that it 
is still the practice of the United Kingdom missions to represent 
Commonwealth countries in territories in which they have no separate 
missions. 
In conclusion, it may be stated that the United Kingdom would have 
had an undoubted right in international law to protect an individual 
who was both a citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies and of 
Southern Rhodesia, against foreign states. 79) 
----------------------__,PART II/ ... 
75) Jennings, note 61) supra, p.346. Southern Rhodesia was placed in the 
same position as a Dominion in being allowed to pass her own citizen-
ship and nationality laws. This was an unusual step in relation to 
a state whi ch was not a Dominion. Palley, p.564. 
76) Palley, p. 737. 
77) "Plural Nationality and Citizenship with Special Reference to the 
Commonwealth" (30) B.Y.I L., 1953, pp. 244 at p.28o. 
78) (1933), Ann. Dig., 1933-1934, Case No. 85. 
79) For the cases in which dual United Kingdom - Southern Rhodesia 
nationality can arise see Parry, note 77) supra, p.288. See too 
Palley, p. 735. 
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PART II 
RHODESIA SINCE THE UNILATERAL DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 
CHAPTER III 
THE STATE OF RHODESIA 
SECTION I 
THE UNILATERAL DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE. 
On the 11th of November, 1965 the Government of Southern Rhcxiesia made 
a Unilateral Declaration ~bat Rhodesia was an independent state.
1 ) 
Three questions arise for separate discussion in relation to this 
Declaration viz. its nature, its lawfulness and its legal effect. In 
discussing these aspects the Declaration will be viewed from the point 
of view of international law and its constitutional l aw aspects will only 
merit such treatment as may be necessary for the purposes of elucidating 
the international law position.2 ) 
_____
_____
_____
_____
__ (1)/ ... 
1) Proclamation No. 53 of 1965, Rhodesian Government Notice 737 N/65 
(1965). For the text of the Declaration see Chayes, II , pp. 1313-
1315. 
2) Constitutional law is of course municipal law and as such contrasts 
with international law. Municipal law (including constitutional 
law) can be reduced simply to facts which are either in conformity 
with international law or which infringe it. See Scharzenberger, 
Manual , p.48; Briggs , p.60; Case of Certain German Interests in 
Polish Upper Silesia (Merits) (1926) P.C I.J., Ser. A, No.7; Starke , 
pp. 96-97, This doctrine is sometimes termed as the "supremacy" o:r 
the "primacy" of international law. There are, however , contrary 
views. See Starke , pp. 79-81. Thus it is apparent for instance 
that an act might be unlawful in constitutional law without bearing 
a similar stigma in international law. The converse is also 
apparent in that a provision of constitutional law might contravene 
international l aw. There is,therefore , no necessary connection 
between the two systems. As s ~hwarzenberger . Manual, p.55 points 
out, subjects of international law do not necessarily concern them-
sel ves with the constitutionality of domestic activities. However , 
there are points of contact between the systems where each may be-
come relevant in the application of the other. It is only at such 
"points of contact" that constitutional law will receive attention 
in this work. 
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(1 ) The nature of the Declaration. 
Fr om a constitutional law point of view the Declaration in essence 
purported to achieve two things. 
•'. a) I t purported to establish Rhodesia as an independent state. 
This is clear from the conduct and statements of the Prime 
Minister of Rhodesia , from the terms of the Unilateral Dec-
laration and from the contents of the Constitution of Rhodesia , 
1965 which was annexed to the Declaration. 
In t he period shortly a~er the Unilateral Declaration 
Mr. Smith is reported as saying that Britain no longer had 
any power over Rhodesia, that the Governor Sir Humphrey Gibbs 
no longer had power and that in fact Rhodesia no longer had a 
Governor.3 ) He also wrote to Her Majesty the Queen on behalf 
of the Ministers o f the Government of Rhodesia asking for the 
appointment of Mr. Clif ford Dupont as Governor-General under 
section 3(2) of the 1965 Constitution.4) 
The Unilateral Declaration itself stated , 
" ... the Government of Rhodesia ... consider i t essential 
that Rhodesia should attain without delay, sovereign 
independence . . . NOW, THEREFORE, WE , THE GOVERNMENT OF 
RHODESIA . . . DO , by THIS PROCLAMATION, adopt, enact and 
give to the people of Rhodesia the Constitution annexed 
hereto." 
The 1965 Constitution refers to the attainment of sovereign 
independence by Rhodesia. 5) The Constitution also makes the 
following provisions. Executive government in regard to any 
---------
---------
--------a.spect/ ... 
3) The Times , 13th November , 1965, p. l O(a); 16th November , 1965, p. 
p. 12 (a). 
4) The Times, 3rd December , 1965, p.12 (b). 
5) s. 143. 
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aspect of internal or external affairs is vested in Her 
Majesty acting on the advice of the Ministers of the Govern-
ment of Rhodesia and may be exercised by the Officer Administer-
ing the Government as the representative of Her Majesty.6) 
Provision was made for the appointment of the Officer 
Administering the Governme~t by the Executive Council. 7) The 
Of ficer acts on the advice of the Ministers of the Government 
of Rhodesia save where he has a discretion. 8) H.H Marshall 
considers that the independence of Rhodesia is to some extent 
called in question in that the Queen had executive powers · 
but declined to act. The Officer Administering the Govern-
ment did not represent anyone and could not therefore be 
advised to act. 9) D.B.Molteno says that the vesting of 
executive power in the Queen is no more inconsistent with 
Rhodesian independence than similar provisions in the contemp-
orary constitutions of Canada or Australia or in the former 
South Africa Act after the Statute of Westminster 1931, that 
the executive power is exercisable by Her Majesty or by the 
Officer Administering the Government.lo) It is submitted 
that the view expressed by Molteno is preferable. 
-------------------
---------Legislative/ . .. 
6) s. 47. 
7) s. 3(1)(b ) 
8) s. 4. 
9) H .H. Marshall, "The Legal Effects of U.D.I." (17) I.C.L.Q., 
p.1022 at p. 1033, 
10) Molteno , p. 426. 
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Legislat i ve power is bestowed by Section 26. Under it 
Parliament is given power to make laws for the peace, order 
and good government of Rhodesia. 11 ) No Act of the United 
Kingdom is to extend to Rhodesia unless extended thereto by 
12) 
an Act of the Rhodesian Legislature. The Colonial Laws 
Validity Act . 1865 is not to apply in future. 13 ) No future 
law is to be void on the ground that it is repugnant . to the 
law of England or a future Act of the United Kingdom Parliament 
and the Rhodesian legislature may repeal or amend any such 
United Kingdom Act. 14 ) 
The Legislature of Rhodesia was thus endowed by section 26 
with sovereign legislative powers in terms clearly modelled 
in part on the Statute .of Westminster, 1931 and in part on the 
Status of the Union Act , 1934 .15) There is nothing in the 
1965 Constitution corresponding to section 111 of the 1961 
Constitution which made certain reservations in favour of the 
16) 
United Kingdom Government. There is nothing in the 1965 
Constitution corresponding to section 105 of the 1961 Constit-
ution which prohibited the Southern Rhodesian legislature from 
legislating on these topics. Indeed the legislat ive powers 
conferred by section 26 are clearly inconsistent with any 
such reservations in favour of the United Kingdom or prohibit -
17) 
ions on the Rhodesian legislature. Nor is there anything 
_______
_______
_______
_____ in/ ... 
11) s. 26(1). 
12) s. 26(3). 
13) s. 26(4). 
14) s. 26(5). 
15) Molteno, pp. 426-427, 
16) Ibid., p. 427. 
17) Ibid. 
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in the 1965 Constitution reserving the limited power or 
disallowance embodied in section 32 of the 1961 Constitution 
. 18) to the United Kingdom Government. On the contrary the 
existing Constitution of 1961 was repealed in toto by the 
1965 Constitutionl9) which also provided that no enquiry 
was to be made into the validity of the 1965 Constitution. 20 ) 
Thus the 1965 Constitution did not recognize any of the erst-
while limitations in favour of the United Kingdom .21 ) 
(b) The Unilateral Declaration, to which the 1965 Constitution 
was annexed, purported to increase the powers of the Legislat-
ure. 
The 1961 Constitution entrenched certain provisions, regarded 
as fundamental, such as civil rights contained in the 
"Declaration of Rights" and certain other matters. 22 ) These 
could not be removed or amended by the Legislative Assembly 
alone. 23 ) 
The 1965 Constitution repealed the 1961 Constitution. 24 ) 
Under it there is no provision which the Legislature cannot 
amend. 25 ) The power to legislate is only restricted by 
procedural requirements which the Legislature had to observe 
in relation to legislation concerning the franchise26 )and 
---------------------------constitutional/ .. . 
18) Ibid. 
19) s. 2. 
20) s. 142. 
21) R.H.Christie, "Practical Jurisprudence in Rhodesia" (1) C .I.L.S ,A. , 
1968, p.390 and (2) C.I.L S.A.,pp.3 , 2o6 at p.207. 
22) See su12ra, pp. 12, 16; Molteno, p . 262. 
23) For the amending procedure see su12ra, p. 12; Molteno, p.262. 
24) s. 2. 
25) s. 114. 
26) s. 15. 
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constitutional amend.rnents. 27 ) Even these were subject to the 
important exceptions relating to Acts of Indemnity.28) Thus 
while the 1965 Constitution purported to "specially" entrench 
pr ovisions which corresponded to those in the 1961 Constitut-
ion, the entrenchment was fundamentally different in that the 
1965 Constitution di d not recognize the erstwhile limitations 
on the powers of the Legislature.29 ) 
The above were the main changes which the Unilateral Declarat-
ion purported to bring about. The organs which purported to 
achi eve these results were clearly incompetent t o do so in 
terms of existing constitutional law. The Government of 
Southern Rhodesia made the Unilateral Declaration in which 
they purported to adopt and enact the 1965 Constitution. 
Under the 1961 Constitution they had no authority to enact 
legislation and a fortiori to repeal the Constitution itself. 
The 1965 Constitution was later confirmed and ratified by the 
Legi slature.30 ) It would appear to be clear however that the 
Legislature's adoption of this new Constitution was also in 
31) 
excess of their legislative powers. In the first place 
the Legislat ure could not have effected the amendment of the 
"specially" entrenched clauses i n the 1961 Constitution or 
altered those provisions which made reservations in f avour of 
---------------------------the/ •.. 
27) s . 114-117. 
28 ) s. 114 , 143. 
29 ) Madzimbamuto v. Lardner-Burke, N.O., 1968 (2 ) S. A. 284 (R. , A.D.) 
at 303; Molteno , pp. 262-263; Christie, note 21 supra , p .207. 
30 ) Constitut i on (Ratif ication) Act, 1966. 
31 ) Molteno , p. 286. 
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the United Kingdom Government.32 ) To the extent to which the 
1965 Constitution purported to bring about such alterations it 
was invalid in terms of the existing law and ratification by 
the Legislature could not validate it. In the second place 
the constitutional competence of the Rhodesian Legislature to 
make any law at the time was seriously open to question. Thus 
its purported ratification of the 1965 Constitution was prob-
ably entirely invalid in terms of the existing constitutional 
law. In terms of Section 3(1) of the Southern Rhodesia 
(Constitution) Order, 196533 ) made under the provisions of 
Section 2(1) of the Southern Rhodesia Act, 1965,34 ) the Legis-
lature of Southern Rhodesia was prohibited from ma.king laws.
35) 
In the light of what we have said the Unilateral Declaration 
can only be described as being a constitutional revolution and 
has been so described.36 ) The organs which brought about the 
revolution/ ... 
-------------
-------------
---
32) Supra, p. 12. Nor could it remove the residual power of the United 
Kingdom Parliament to legislate for Rhodesia or repeal the Colonial 
Laws Validity Act as it purported to do in Section 26 of the 1965 
Constitution. See Molteno, pp. 261, 282-28.3. 
33) S.I. 1952 of 1965. 
34) An Act of the United Kingdom Parliament. 
35 ) Molteno, pp. 285-289 discusses the validity of this Act and Order 
in the light of the Convention against the United Kingdom legislat i ng 
for Rhodesia save with the consent of the Government of Rhodesia . 
(Supra , pp.18-19). He concludes (p.289) that the applicability of 
the Convention was a matter for decision by the British Government 
alone, and the introduction of the legislative measures in question 
amounted to a decision by that Government that the Convention was 
non-applicable in the a~ermath of U.D.I. This decision was not 
justiciable by the courts. Hence the 1965 Act and Order-in-Council 
were validly part of the law of Rhodesia. See too Molteno, p.405. 
Sed contra MacDonald, J A. in R. v. Ndlovu, 1968 (4 ) S.A. 515 (R., 
A.D.) at 552-553, 
36) See for example the views expressed by Sir Elwyn J ones, the British 
Attorney-General _, The Times _, 13th November, 1965 , p. 6 (f); Beadle , 
C.J . in Madzimbamuto v. Lardner-Burke N.O., 1968 (2) S.A. 284 (R., 
A.D.) at 302; Molteno , p. 263. Christie , note 21 supra, p.391 
describes it as a "bloodless revolution". HR. Hahlo, "The Privy 
Council and the ''Gentle Revolution'" (e6) S.A L.J., 1969, p .419. 
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revolution were the Government, with the support at least of 
impo,rtant and powerful elements among the public and later 
the Legislature, which, as we have seen, purported to ratify 
the 1965 Constitution which the Government had "enacted1
1
•
37) 
The revolution which occurred was in fact a twofold revolution. 
(a) It was a revolt against the United Kingdom. It has there-
fore been described as a revolution against the residual 
38) powers of the United Kingdom, a ~ejection of the 
connection with the United Kingdom39) and a usurpation 
of the powers of the United Kingdom Government and 
40) Parliament. Thus it purported to remove the residual 
sovereignty of the United Kingdom completely by erasing 
provisions such as sections 32 and 111 of the 1961 
Constitution which contained the power of disallowance 
and reservation in favour of the United Kingdom Govern-
ment respectively and by enacting section 26 Qt the 1965 
Constitution to remove the legislative powers of the 
United Kingdom Parliament.41 ) In effect the revolution 
was/ ... 
---------------
--------------
37) Molteno, pp. 274, 286 , 288; Christte, note 21 supra, p. 391. A.J .G. 
Lang , "Madzimbamuto and Baron's · case at First Instance" ( 5) 
Rhodesia L.J., 1965, p. 65 at p. 107 says that only the governing 
party 1n Parliament was a party tothe revolt. H. Kelsen, General 
Theory of Law and the State, New York, 1961, p. 117 points out that 
it is irrelevant whether the revolution is effected by a mass move-
ment or through action by those in government positions. 
38) Christie, note 21 supra, p. 391. 
39) " ..• a final and formal rejection of the tenuous British connection" 
W.P. Kirkman, "The Rhodesian Referendum - the Significance of June 20. 
1969" (45) International Affairs; 1969, p. 648. 
40) Sir ElwYil Jones, British Attorney-General, regarded it as such. 
The Times, 13th November, 1965 , p. 6 (f). See too B.A. Hepple, 
P.O. Higgins, c.c. Turptn, "Rhodesian Crisis - Criminal Liability", 
Criminal Law Review, 1966, p. 5 at p. 6. See too Palley, pp. 751-
753. 
41) Molteno, pp . 426, 427. 
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was brought about by the retention of power through an act of 
42) 
usurpation by legitimate government. The United Kingdom 
immediately retaliated by dismissing the Rhodesian Government 
through the Governor. 43 ) The Rhodesian Government continued 
in office despite this, and this retention of power by a dis-
missed government must be regarded as a further aspect of the 
overall revolution against the authority of the United Kingdom. 
(b) It was a revolt against the people of Rhodesia being a usurpat-
ion at their expense. Their rights, which were entrenched 
against legislative interference under the 1961 Constitution, 
were no longer so entrenched and the change was brought about 
in a manner which was not consistent with the existing law.
44 ) 
Molteno regards this usurpation at the expense of the people 
as being of the essence of the revolution rather than the 
revolt against the United Kingdom's powers which he regards 
as being of a more formal nature.45) This usurpation at the 
expense of the people was an "internal" revolution but as far 
as _QQnstitutional law is concerned, it was, as Molteno points 
out, the substance of the revolution. Being an "internal" 
revolution, it was not however the substance of the revolution 
from an international law point of view. From that point of 
view of international law this "internal" revolution at the 
expense of the people is superfluous for it has nothing to do 
with the independence of Rhodesia. 46 ) On the other hand the 
~--------------------------------
------------------------------revolution/ •.• 
42) Molteno, p. 276. 
43) The Times, 12th November, 1965, p. 12(a),. 
44) Molteno, pp. 262-263, 265; Palley, pp. 754-756. 
45) !!214. pp. 264-265. 
46) Molteno, p. 263 points out that fundamental though this "internal" 
departure from the 1961 Constitution was, it did not affect 
Rhodesia's independence. See ibid. , p. 260. 
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revolution against the United Kingdom is crucial to the 
existence of Rhodesian independence. 
From an international law point of view the Declaration can 
also be interpreted as an attempt to achieve two ~esults. 
(1) The alteration of the status of the territory. Prior to 
11th November, 1965 Southern Rhodesia was a British Dependency 
47) 
with primary international personality in the United Kingdom. 
The Declaration attempts to alter this by the constitution of 
Rhodesia as an independent state for international law purposes. 
In effect it is a statement by an entity that it regards itself 
as a fully sovereign state in international law, that it 
renounces. any form of foreign control and that henceforth 
it intends to guide its own destiny and will brook no outside 
interference either in its domestic affairs or in its relations 
with other sovereign states. It is simply a statement of fact 
for the information of other subjects of international law and 
it is therefore submitted that it is in essence the employment 
of the device of notification. 48) It is the notifying of other 
subjects of international law of a new state of affairs which 
these other subjects of international law may or may not con-
sider opposable by them. The notification anticipates that 
the notified factual situation will be recognized by other 
subjects of international law and thus acquire a legal basis 
in that system. 49) (11) The constitution of the Government 
-----------
-----------
---·and/ .•. 
47) See supra, p. 90. 
48) See the writers "Status of Rhodesia in International Law", Acta 
Juridica, 1967, at p.39. On the device of notification see 
Schwarzenberger, Manual, p.69; Oppenheim, I, pp. 788-7f$. 
49) It can in fact be construed as a request for such recognition. 
See Whiteman, II, p. 48. See too the discussion of the United 
States' Declaration 1776 and the Dutch Republic's Act of Abduration, 
1581 as addresses to the world in general in A.P. Rubin, "Tibet's 
Declaration of Independence" (60) A.J.I.L., 1966, p. 812. 
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and other organs of state with powers as provided for 1n the 
1965 Constitution as the Government and organs of state of the 
newly independent state. Again, it is submitted, that the device 
of notification has been employed here. A new factual situation 
viz. the creation of a new governmental struct1.~re for a newly 
independent state, has been brought to the attention of other 
subjects of international law. This again anticipates that 
the new government will be recognized internationally and will 
thus acquire a legal basis in that system. 
The essence or nature of the Unilateral Declaration will emerge 
from the above. It is in fact the making of a claim - or a two-
fold claim. In the first place a claim is made that Rhodesia 
is an independent state and in the second place a claim is made 
that the Government constituted by the 1965 Constitution is 
entitled to represent and commit that newly declared independent 
state. 
(2) The Effect of the Declaration. 
We have just pointed out that the Unilateral Declaration of Inde-
pendence was merely the making of a claim to new territorial status 
and new representative capacity in international law. In itself 
therefore the claim cannot achieve the desired result. It may be 
an unsuccessful claim. Something additional is required before 
the desired result can be achieved and that is recognition of the 
content of the claim by other subjects of international law. Thus 
if the territory of Rhodesia is to have an independent status and 
if the present authorities are to have the capacity to commit 
that/ .•. 
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that territory in international law there must be recognition of 
state and recognition of government by other states.50) 
Even though, in itself, the Unilateral Declaration cannot bring 
about the desired result, it certainly has legal implications, it 
does affect the status quo in international law to some extent. It 
may afford a basis for the achievement of the desired results. 
Once claims are made, other subjects of international law may 
afford recognition to them, thus validating them and giving them a 
basis in international law.5l) Again a subject of international 
law might specifically wish to preserve the legal status guo of 
government and territory as it existed before claims were made 
and with the object of rebutting any possible implication of 
50) This statement is made on the basis of the Constitutive theory of 
recognition. The respective merits and demerits of the Constitutive 
and Declaratory theories of recognition are fully discussed infra, 
pp.170-284 and a preference for the former theory is expre~by 
the writer. If, however, the Declaratory theory is the correct one 
this still makes no difference to the point under discussion. The 
mere making of a claim to personality would not for example have the 
effect of making Rhodesia an international person. Something 
additional would be required and applying the Declaratory theory 
this would either be the objective existence of the indicia of 
independent statehood (see infra, pp.170-171) or recognition for 
even the adherents of the Declaratory theory concede that if a 
regime lacks the essentials of a state, to recognize it is to 
constitute it as a subject of international law. See Sorensen, 
p. 278. Sed contra A.J,G,M. Sandars, "Die Erkening van State en 
Regerings" (33) T.H.R-H.R., 1970, at p.260. 
51) On the capacity to be recognized Le Normand, p. 55 says "guand une 
.L , , 
entit~ politigue reunit et presente tousles caracteres constitutifs 
d 'un Etat, elle a l 'aptitude necessaire: mais cette aptitude i": ' · · - . 
n'engenr;e pas une obligation a la charge des autres." H.H.Marshall, 
note 9 supra, pp. 1024, 1033 sees difficulties in relation to the 
recognition of Rhodesia because of the attempt to establish a 
sovereign independent monarchy rather than a republic. These 
difficulties, it is submitted, did not exist, and in any event 
they would no longer be of relevance since the Proclamation of a 
Republic of Rhodesia. 
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. 52) 
recognition it might specifically declare its non-recognition. 
This is in effect the employment of the device of protest and 
reservation of rights.53) 
The Unilateral Declaration t.herefore affords an opportunity for the 
employment of these devices of international law, recognition and 
protest.54 ) The use of these devices has definite and decisive 
consequences in international law - they either alter or maintain 
the legal status guo ante.55) Because these consequences may follow 
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
__ upon/ ... 
52) Thus when in 1931 Japan invaded Manchuria the United States announced 
its intention not to recognize any situation brought about by means 
contrary to the obligations in the Treaty of Paris, 1928. For text 
of this doctrine called the Stimson Doctrine see (26) A.J.I.t.,1932, 
p.342. See too Oppenheim, I, p. 138. Similarly when Great Britain 
became a party to the International Sugar Agreement 1958, it stated 
that it could not regard signature of the agreement by a Nationalist 
Chinese Representative as a valid signature on behalf of China since 
Britain did not recognize the Nationalist Government . The object was 
to -rebut any possible implication of recognition of the latter 
government. See J.G.Starke, An Introduction to International Law, 
5th Ed., p. 128. 
53) See Schwarzenberger, Manual, p. 69. A protest constitutes a formal 
objection by which the protesting state makes it known that it does 
not recognize the legality or validity of the acts against which the 
protest is directed, that it does no t acquiesce in the situation 
which such acts have created or which they threaten to create and 
that it has no intention of abandoning its own rights in the matter. 
In the latter connection it purports to be a reservation of rights. 
See I.C. MacGibbon, "Some Observations on the Part of Protest in 
International Law" (30) B.Y.I .L., 1953, p. 293, at pp. 294, 297, 298. 
54) Both recognition and protest are in fact in themselves other species 
of unilateral declarations. Schwarzenberger, Manual, pp. 171-2. In 
a new situation states have a choice between protest and recognition. 
"La protestation peut, ... etre basse simplement sur des considerat-
ions d'interets ... ou comporter, au contraire, l'allSgation gue 
l' acte cont re leguel on proteste est illegal ... " A. Raestad, "La 
Reconnaissance internationale des nouveaux ~tats et des nouveaux 
gouvernements" (17) Revue de Droit International et de Legislation 
comparE!e,1936, p. 257 at p. 264. 
55) Thus by virtue of the Unilateral Declaration and British action, 
Rhodesia ceased to be a self-governing colony. Other states could 
then recognize it as the independent state it cla_imed to be or on 
the other hand could recognize the full sovereignty and control of 
the United Kingdom over it. See J.E s. Fawcett, "Security Council 
Resolutions on Rhodesia" (41) B.Y.I.L., 1965-1966, p. 103 at p.llO. 
The options which other states had and their exercise of these opt i ons 
is fully discussed infra, pp. 338-377. 
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upon a unilateral declaration of independence the declaration itself 
has, to this extent, legal significance in international law.
56 ) 
(3) Legality of the Declaration. 
From the point of vi ew of constitutional law the Unilateral Declarat-
ion has been described as a revolution57 ) and it must therefore be 
deemed to be illegal in ter ms of the existing law at the time it was 
made.58) It amounted to the imposition of a new grundnorm59 ) which 
had/ ... 
-----------------------
-------
56) See in general the writer's article referred to in footnote 48 supra, 
at p.40. 
57) Supra, pp. 126-129. 
58) The overwhelming majority of opinions expressed in the political, 
judicial and academic spheres are ,..to this effect. Thus the British 
Attorney General expressed the view that it was illegal. The Times, 
13th November, 1965, p. 6 (f). The Governor Sir Humphrey Gibbs, in a 
message to the people of Rhodesia stated that he r€mained their legal 
governor whose duty it was to uphold the constitution and that he 
would not recognize the illegal government or the constitution they 
had presented to the country. The Times, 15th November, 1965, p.lO( a) .. 
In the judicial sphere see Madzimbamuto v. Lardner-Burke N.N.q.,1968 
(2) S.A. 284 (R., A.D) at 334; Madzimbamuto v. Lardner-Burke and 
Another, [1968], 3 W.L.R. 1229; R. v. Ndlovu, 1968 (4) S.A. 515 
(R., A.D.) at 521 A~B. For academic opinions as to the illegality 
of the Declaration see Molteno, pp. 263, 274, 276, 288; G.N.Barrie 
who in "The Shifting Sands of Allegiance and Treason in Rhodesia" 
(1) C.I.L.S.A., 1968,p. 289 at p.293 describes it as a de facto 
government and in "Rhodesian U .D.I. - an unruly horse" (1) C.I.L.S. A., 
1968 p. 110 at p.111 describes the Declaration as illegal; Christie , 
note 21 supra, p. 391; Kirkman, note 39 supra, p. 648 who says that 
the subsequent Proclamation of a Republic did not add to the illegal-
ity which was final with the Unilateral Declaration. This is surely 
correct; R.S. Welsh, "The Constitutional Case in Southern Rhodesia 11 
(83) L.Q.R., 1967, p.64 at pp.64-65; Hahlo, note 36 supra, p.432; 
J.M. Eekelaar, "Rhodesia: the abdication of Constitutionalism" 
(32) M.L.R., 1969, p,19 at p.21; A.J.G. Lang, "Madzimbamuto's and 
Baron's Case at first Instance" (5) Rhodesia. L.J, 1965, p.65 at 
pp. 97, 98, 105; J.R. Dewhurst & R.G. Nairn, "The Objects of Law 
and the Rhodesian Constitutional Case" (1) Responsa Meridiana, 1968, 
no, 5, p. 165 at p. 173; C. W .H. Schmidt, "U .D.I. and the Law" (7) 
Codicillus, 1966,no. l,p. 31; G.N. Barrie, "The High Court of 
Rhodesia and U.D.r." (30) T.H.R-H.R., 1967, p. 147 at pp. 152-153; 
G.N. Barrie, "Die Geheime Raad en U.D.I." (32) T.H.R-H.R., 1969, 
p. 171 at p. 172; John w. Halderman, "Some Legal Aspects of 
Sanctions in the Rhodesian Case" (17) I.C.L.Q., 1968, p.672 at p.699; 
Palley, pp. 8o2-810; Alan Wharam, "Rhodesia and the Crown" (9) 
Rhodesia. L.J., p. 21 at p. 37 although he sees the later actions 
of the British Government as removing Rhodesian allegiance (pp.36-38). 
Sed contra J.A. Coetzee, The Sovereignty of Rhodesia and the Law of 
Nations, Pretoria, 1970, who regards the process as one cf 
(~ootnote continued on page 134) 
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60) 
had no legal basis in the previously existing grundnorm. At 
61) 
first this new grundnorm was not accepted by the Rhodesian courts. 
But l ater it was so accepted and the courts regarded the new 
Constitution and the Government established thereby as de iure 
constituted in Rhodesia.62 ) From the British point of view the new 
Gr undnorm has however, no validity whatsoever.63 ) The position 
therefore appears to be as follows. In terms of municipal law (as 
it existed in Rhodesia) on the 11th November, 1965, the Unilateral 
Declaration of Independence was illegal. In terms of British 
Constitutional law it still continues to be illegal. As far, however, 
as Rhodesian municipal law is concerned, the revolution is complete , 
the/ ... 
----------------
-------------
58) continued from previous page · 
evolution rather than revolution. The main consequences of the 
illegality were that the Governor dismissed the Cabinet by Proclamat-
ion. The Times, 13th November, 1965, p. lO(b); the Rhodesian branch 
of the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association was expelled because 
the Rhodesian Parliament had condoned an aot of rebellion and had 
actively supported the regime. The Times, 30th November, 1965, p. 
lO(b). The Queen refused to appoint a Governor-General on the 
advice of Mr. Smith. The Times, 4th December, 1965, p. 8(c) . See 
too Palley, pp. 756 et seqq. 
59) The Constitution of Rhodesia, 1965. 
60) The 1961 Constitution. See supra, pp. 126-129. 
61 ) Madzimbamuto and Another v. Lardner-Burke, N.O. and Another, 1966(4) 
S.A. 462 (R.); 1968 (2) S.A. 284 (R.,A.D .). The court in effect 
avoided taking a stand on the issue in Central African Examiner (Pvt. ) 
Ltd. v. H0wman and Others, NN.O. 1966 (2) SA. 1 (R.). A.M.Honore, 
"Reflections on Revolutions" (2) Irish Jurist, (n.s.) 1967, p.268 
at 277 says that the Rhodesian court in the interim period "is here , 
it seems, propounding a legal theory to straddle a transitional 
period between two constitutions. It is, in fact, conducting a 
foray into the uncharted regions of inter or super-systematic laws, 
but is doing so as between successive and not, as is usual, between 
sirrrultaneously operating systems". 
62) R. v. Ndlovu and Others. 1968 (4) SA. 207 (R); 1968 (4) S.A. 515 
(R., AD.). In Dhlamini and Others v. Carter, N.O. and Another, N. O. 
1968 (2) SA. 464 (R., A.D .) the court went some distance towards 
recognizing the new situation when it satisfied itself that an 
appeal to the Privy Counsel would be of no value because whatever 
the Judgment might be it would be wholly ineffective in Rhodesia. 
See too, 1968 (2) SA. 445 (R., A.D.), 1968 (2) S.A. 467 (R.,A .D.) and 
R. v. Muzesa and Others, 1968 (4) S.A. 2o6 (R.). 
63) Southern Rhodesia Act, 1965; Southern Rhodesia (Constitution) Order , 
1965 (1965 S.l. 1952); Madzimbamuto v. Lardner Burke and Another , 
[1968), 3 W.L.R. 1229. 
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the grundnorm has shifted and the Unilateral Declaration and the 
new position has acquired a legal basis in that system but it had 
to wait for a period of almost three years to acquire that basis 
and it acquires it in Rhodesian municipal law alone. 
The Unilateral Declaration was therefore unconstitutional at -the 
time at which it was made and it must now be asked whether this has 
any legal significance in international law. In general, it may be 
said that from the point of view of international law the unconstit-
utionality of the Declaration does not matter greatly.64 ) Even if 
the United Kingdom had formally enacted legislation in terms of 
which Rhodesia was given independence, the newly independent state 
would, in principle, still require recognition by other states to 
be capable of enjoying international law rights against them. 65) 
It is submitted, however, that the unconstitutionality of the 
Declaration has an international law significance in three respects: 
(a) If Rhodesia had received a constitutional grant of independ-
ence from the United Kingdom this in international law would 
amount at least to recognition of an independent Rhodesia by 
the/ ... 
------------------------------
64) See footnote 2 supra. C.A Crause, "Enkele Opmerkings oor Besluite 
van die Veiligheidsraad ten opsigte van RhodesH!" (29) T.H.R-H.R., 
1966, p.320 at p. 330. See too J.E.S. Fawcett, "Security Council 
Resolutions on Rhodesia" (41) B.Y.I.L., 1965-1966, p. 103 at 
p.113 who says that illegality of the rebellion is not the factor 
which renders U.D.I. without international effect. 
65) The grant of recognition would appear to be entirely discretionary 
and this is the position whether the new entity evolves constitut-
ionally or is born in revolution. See infra, pp. 285-295. 
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the United Kingdom itself.66 ) Rhodesia would thus be a full 
international person in its relations with the United Kingdom 
but would still await recognition by other states in order to 
attain an effective personality against them. 
(b) If Rhodesia had constitutionally received a grant of independ-
ence from Britain there could be no question of the doctrine 
of premature recognition being relevant in the Rhodesian case. 
Other states could fully recognize Rhodesia immediately be-
cause in doing so they would not interfere with any rights 
which the United Kingdom might have. There would, in other 
words, have been no question of a conflict between the inter-
national law position of Rhodesia as maintained by the United 
Kingdom and that maintained by Rhodesia itself. Both would be 
precisely in accord and immediate recognition could therefore 
be accorded. In such circumstances Rhodesian independence 
would not a be opposable by the United Kingdom. The doctrine 
of premature recognition can only play a part wl:'ere there are 
conflicting claims as to international status as in the present 
case. The rules relating to premature recognition are then 
applicable to third parties who have to make a choice between 
the competing claims.67) (c,} / ... 
66) A. Raestad, "La Reconnaissance internationale des nouveaux etats et 
des nouveaux gouvernement", (17) Revue de Droit International et de 
Legislation Comparee, 1936, p.257 at p. 273, O'Connell, I, p.130 
says that when a State is granted independence by the mother country 
it acquires capacity by virtue of this act. Here recognition of 
independence is constitutive of the personality of the new state. As 
an instance he says that Burma existed in law from the moment that the 
Burma Independence Act, 1947, 11 & 12 Geo. 6,Ch. 3 became operative. 
The point is that the grant of independence amounts to recognition by 
the mother country. The same may be said of other instances where the 
United Kingdom has systematically granted independence to former de-
pendencies. For the United States see Proclamation by the President , 
D.S.Bulletin, XV, No.36i p. 66 in relation to the Philjppines . See too 
the Netherlands-Indonesia, Charter of the Transfer of Sovereignt~U.N. 
DOC. S/1417/Add. 1. 14th Nov., 1949, p. 66. 
67) The doctrine of premature recognition and its applicability to the 
Rhodesian situation is discussed infra, pp.295-301 in the context 
of the "duty not to recognize". 
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(c) If Rhodesian independence had been constitutionally granted, it 
is probable that international recognition by other states 
would be granted far more readily than in the case of an un-
constitutional claim such as the present. 
We must now turn to the question of the legality or otherwise of the 
Declaration in international law. The question here simply is 
whether the Declaration infringes an established norm of international 
law. In international law there is certainly no such rule prohibit i ng 
constitutional revolutions.68 ) International law does not prevent 
revolution aimed at secession or the acquisition of independence.
69) 
In other words, there is nothing in international law to prevent an 
entity which has no international personality from claiming such 
personality and there is nothing to prevent a government which has 
come to power in an unconstitutional manner from claiming to repre-
sent the state internationally. Whether or not such claims will 
ever be successful is another question which depends primarily on 
~--------------------------------
--------------------~whether/ ... 
68) O'Connell, I, p. 137 says 
"There can be no suggestion of making constitutional legitimacy a 
condition of recognition; such a rule would be tantamount to one of 
perpetual non-recognition of any revolutionary regime, and this is 
certainly not a rule of international law." See too D. Anzilotti, 
Cours de Droit International, Paris, 1929, Vol. I, p. 169 who says 
there is no such thing as the doctrine of legitimacy or a legal or 
illegal state and Rosalyn Higgins, "International Law, Rhodesia and 
the United Nations" (23) The World Today, 1967, pp.94-96 who says 
that neither international law nor the Charter prohibit rebellion. 
69) Grotius,I ch. IV; C. Wolff, Ius Gentium, 1764, 613, 1010-1012; 
Vattel, III, ch. 18, 295; Lauterpacht, p. 8; G.I.A.D. Draper, "The 
Geneva Conventions 1949" (114) HR., I, 1965, p. 59 at p.100; 
Akehurst, p. 72; Rupert Emerson, "Self-Determination" (65) A.J I.L., 
1971, p. 459 at 474 and Rosalyn Higgins, The Development of Internat-
ional Law through the Political Organs of the United Nations, Q.:ford,15/53, 
p. 211 both are of the opinion that there is a right of revolution 
but they would appear to link it with the idea of self-determination. 
It is submitted that no such link is necessary . There has always 
been a right to revolt. M.C. Bassiouni, "Self-Determination and the 
Palestinians", Proceedings A.S.I.L., 1971, p. 31 at p. 33 points out 
that self-determination is invoked as a basis for revolution, cession , 
unification, m1nor1ties 1rights. 
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whether other subjects of international law are disposed to grant 
recognition to such claims. 70 ) But certainly such claims can be 
made. 71 ) In the past many such claims have been made as there 
are many examples of Unilateral Declarations of Indepen~ence in 
the history of international law. 72 ) Thus the Dutch Republics 
separated from Spain in an Act of Abjuration of 1581. 73 ) In 1641 
Portugal declared itself independent of Spain. 74 ) Declarations 
of Independence were made by North Carolina on 12th April 1776, 
Pennsylvania probably on 14th May, 1776, New Hampshire on 15th 
June, 1776, and Virginia probably in May, 1776. 75) This was 
followed by the American Declaration of Independence on 4th July, 
1776. 76 ) 
-----------------------------
70) See in this connection the discussion of the Tobar Doctrine, the 
Wilson Policy and the Stimson Doctrine in O'Connell, I, pp. 137-140. 
71) It is possible that a duty not to recognize unconstitutional 
regimes may be undertaken by treaty e.g. the 1907 Treaty in which 
five Central American Republics undertook not to recognize govern-
ments which came to power by unconstitutional means. See O'Connell, 
I, p. 137. Even this however, does not make such constitutional 
revolut i on illegal in international law. All it does is impose 
a duty not to recognize the claim arising from the revolution. 
Recognition of the revolution in such circumstances would of course 
be illegal in international law as it would be a breach of treaty 
but this would in no way render the revolution itself illegal. On 
the duty not to recognize see infra, pp. 295-333. 
72) Crause , note 64 supra, p. 320. 
73) Oppenheim, International Law, 8th Ed., London, 1955, Vol. I, p.579; 
A.P. Rubin, note 49 supra, p.812; Jochen A. Frowein, 11Transfer 
or Recognition of Sovereignty - Some early Problems in Connection 
with Dependent Territories" (65) A.J.I.L., 1971, p. 568. 
74) Ibid., p. 570. 
75) Wharam, note 58 supra , at pp. 34-35. In Ware v. Hylton (1795) 
(U.s.s. Ct.) 3 Dallas 197 at 223 the court regarded independence 
as dating from the abolition of the old government in Virginia -
probably May 1776. In addition several other North American 
colonies set up provisional governments or councils of safety at 
about the same time and in New Jersey the Governor was arrested 
on 3rd July, 1776. See Wharam, lac.cit. 
-139-
1776.76) Between 1810 and 1~ various Latin American colonies of 
Spain declared their independence. 77 ) In 1822 Brazil broke away 
from Portugal, in 1830 Belgium broke away from the Netherlands 
and Greece from Turkey . 78~ In 1878 Montenegro, Rumania and 
Serbia declared independence from Turkey, 79) in 1898 Cuba from 
Spain, in 1903 Panama from Columbia.Bo) In 1912 Tibet possibly 
81) declared independence and in 1913 Albania declared independence 
from Turkey. 82 ) In 1916 the Irish Republic proclaimed independence 
from the United Kingdom.83) A~er the first World War many 
European states made such declarations, e.g. Finland, Latvia, 
Lithuania and Estonia from Russia , Poland from Germany and Austria. 
Manchuko in 1932, Slovakia in 1939 and Cr oatia in 1941 all made 
decl arations of independence. 85 In 1940, with the fall of France, 
Laos/ ... 
-------------------------------
76) Ibid.; Rubin, note 49 supra, p. 812; Oppenheim, note 73 supra, 
84) 
p. 579, The Rhodesian U.D I. has been said to be a paraphrase of 
the American Declaration but without the assertion that "all men are 
created equal." See Palley, p. 750; Chayes, II, p.1316. The 
characterization of this provision as an obvious difference is 
strange in view of the existence of the institution of slavery in 
America. There were however di f ferences between the American and 
Rhodesian declarations. As D.B.Molteno,"The Flexibility of a 
'Rigid' Constitution" (87) S.A .L.J., 1970, p. 2o4 at p.205 points 
out, the American secession was achieved by armed colonists and 
not by the agency of a subordinate colonial legislature. Marshall, 
note 9 supra, pp. 1023-1024 points out that the Americans declared 
a Republic while the Rhodesians retained the Queen as Head of State. 
77) J.P.A. Francois, Handboek van het Volkerecht , Vol. I, Zwolle, 1949, 
p. 176. Oppenheim, I, pp. 124-125. 
78) Oppenheim, note 73 supra, p. 579. 
79) Francois, note 77 supra, p. 175, 
8o) Oppenheim, note 73 supra, p. 579. 
81) Rubin, note 49 supra , at pp. 812-814 discusses in general whether 
Tibet can be said to have made a declaration of independence from 
China in 1912 or shortly thereafter and comes to a negative conclus-
ion. 
82) Francois, note 77, supr a , p.175. 
83) For text of the Proclamation see T.P. Coogan, Ireland Since the 
Rising, London, 1966,pp. 17-18. The outcome of the Proclamation 
was not however a Republ i c but an Irish Free State with Dominion 
status. Ibid., p .35. 
84) Oppenheim, note 73 supra, p.579; Francois, note 77 supra, p.175. 
85) Ibid., pp. 175-176. 
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Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam made proclamations of independence. 86 ) 
In 1967 the Republic of Biafra proclaimed itself independent of 
Nigeria. 87 ) In 1967 Anguilla declared itself to be independent 
of st. Kitts/Nevis/Anguilla. 88 ) In 1971 Bangladesh declared 
independence from Pakistan.89) 
The Rhodesian Unilateral Declaration is therefore not illegal in 
international law. Nor can the situation which results therefrom 
be illega1. 90 ) But neither is the situation legal in the sense 
that it acquires a basis in international law. The matter is 
simply extra-legal. In the same way as international law refuses 
to condemn it , that law also refuses to put the stamp of legality 
upon it until recognition is afforded. We are in effect here 
concerned with the concepts of invalidity and unlawfulness.9l) The 
-------------------------------------------------------situation/ ... 
86) But French rule was reimposed after the war. See M, Broderick, 
"Associated Statehood - a new form of decolonization" (17) I.C.L.Q. , 
1968, p. 368 at p. 397, 
87) For text of the Pr oclamation of the Republic of Biafra see (6) 
I~L.M. 1967, pp. 665-68(). 
88) J .A C. Gutteridge, The United Nations in a Changing World, 
Manchester, 1969, p. 69. 
89) For Proclamation of Independence see (11) I.L.M., 1972, pp. 119-121 . 
90) Halderman, note 58 supra, p.700 states specifically that the 
Rhodesian secession was not illegal in international law. 
91) See the interesting discussions revolving around these concepts in 
R.Y. Jennings, "Nullity and Effectiveness in International Law", 
Cambridge Essays in International Law, 1965, pp. 64-87 and 
E. Lauterpacht, "The Legal Effect of Illegal Acts of International 
Organizations" , ibid., pp. 88-121. It is apparent that there is a 
clear distinction between the concepts. An act can be lawful but 
invalid in the sense that it is ineffective to achieve its designs. 
The converse is also true. An act can be valid but unlawful e.g. 
an act of premature recognition. See infra, pp.328-333 Jennings, 
op. cit., p. 65 says that an act which produces no legal effects 
is not necessarily wrongful or illegal. Interhandel case, 1959 
I.C.J. Rep., p. 6 at 118. · At p. 66 Jennings says that acts which 
are performed by an entity with lack of capacity are null in the 
sense of being non-existent. Akehurst, p. 72 states the position 
concisely. There is no rule of international law which forbids 
secession nor is there any rule which forbids the mother-state from 
crushing the secession i f it can and whatever the outcome of the 
struggle it will be accepted as legal in the eyes of international 
law. 
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situation resulting from the Unilateral Declaration is not unlawful. 
It conflicts with no established norm of international law. But 
it has no validity in the system either in that legally Rhodesia 
does not become an international person by virtue of the Unilateral 
Declaration.92 ) The situation can only be validated by recognition. 
Yet we find that organs of the United Nations persist in referring 
to the Unilateral Declaration and the resulting situation as being 
"illegal".93) It is extremely doubtful whether this linguistic 
usage correctly reflects the international law position se~ing 
that international law does not condemn rebellion. 94 ) If by the 
term "illegal" the organs of the United Nations mean that the 
Unilateral Declaration and regime resulting therefrom are illegal 
as a matter of constitutional law., the use of the word is correct. 
The only international law significance of the usage is that it 
underlines a determination on the part of the majority of the 
_____________________________ members/ .•. 
92) The distinction between unlawfulness and invalidity also applies 
in the sphere of municipal law. An obvious example would be the 
case where a person without testamentary capacity goes through the 
necessary procedure for making a will. His act is not illegal but 
it is invalid in the sense that it cannot achieve the desired 
effect. 
93) See S. Res. 216 (1965); s. Res. 217 (965); S.Res. 232 (1966) ; 
A. Res. 2151 (XXI); S. Res. 253 (1968); A. Res. 2383 (XXIII). 
In S. Res. 277 (1970) the proclamation of Republican status in 
Rhodesia is also labelled illegal. A. Res. 2765 (XXVI) ; A. Res. 
2769 ( XXVI). 
94) Higgins, note 68 supra, pp. 94, 96 points out that neither inter-
national law nor the Charter of the United Nations pl?')h~bits re-
bellion. Halderman, note 58 supra, pp. 700, 701 refers to the 
fact that the General Assembly and the Security Council have de-
scribed the Rhodesian secession as illegal. He regards this as 
an assertion of judicial powers by the two organs, powers which 
are not to be found in the Charter. He is of the view that the 
Rhodesian secession ls not illegal in international law and points 
out that the Seneral Assembly itself has on several occasions 
recommended that secession movements should succeed e.g. Indonesia, 
Algeria, Angola. 
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members of the United Nations not to accord any measure of recognit-
ion to the situation resulting from the Unilateral Declaration.95) 
The Unilateral Declaration has also been characterized as illegal 
on the grounds that it (i) constitutes an act of aggression,96) 
(ii) constitutes an infringement of the principle of self-determin-
ation, and, (iii) was an act of irresponsibility and a violation of 
the basic policies of the Charter of the United Nations .97 ) The 
present writer has criticized these views and a summary of the 
criticism will not be given.98) 
An act which is unlawful in in ternational law can only be committed 
by an entity which enjoys personality in that system. There are 
only two possible entities which can bear responsibility for the 
Unilateral Declaration (a) the State Rhodesia and (b) the Individual 
members of the Rhodesian Government.99) The State of Rhodesia is 
not however a full international person in the absence of recognit-
ion and contemporary international law goes no further in the matter 
of individual responsibility than to concede that under international 
law/ ... 
------------------------------
95) The fact that Rhodesia proclaimed a Republic on 3rd March 1970 
neither adds to nor subtracts in any way from the international law 
status of the territory. Precisely the same arguments apply to the 
Proclamation of a Republic as to the Unilateral Declaration itself. 
The Proclamation is not illegal in international law but neither 
does it have a valid basis in the system. Again, it is extra-legal. 
Kirkman, note 39 supra, p. 648 is correct when he says that the 
Proclamation of the Republic adds no further illegality. 
96) McDougal ;& Reisman, "Rhodesia and the United Nations : The Lawfulness 
of International Concern" (62) A.J.I.L., 1968, p . 10. 
97) Ibid. , p. 12. The United States Representative to the Security 
Council of the United Nations considered that the Rhodesian secession 
violated the rights of the Rhodesian people under Chapter XI of the 
Charter. See Halderman, note 58 supra, p. 700. 
98) "Rhodesia and theUUnited Nations: The Lawfulness of International 
Concern - A Qualification" (2) C.I.L.S .A., 1969, pp. 454-466. 
99) And perhaps also the individual members of the Ruling Parliamentary 
party. 
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law the individual has a duty not to commit piracy, war crimes, 
crimes against peace and crimes against humanity, the last category 
even being doubtful. The Unilateral Declaration is therefore not 
attributable to an international person and cannot for this basic 
reason be illegal in international law.loo) 
Apart from this basic argument it is clear that the Unilateral 
Declaration cannot constitute aggression either for it does not 
101) 
transcend the boundaries of internationally recognized states. 
It took place within the frontiers of one internationally recog-
nized state only viz. the United Kingdom and Colonies. Further, 
the concept of aggression is so fluid and imprecise that even 
were the act to have transcended international frontiers it might 
not be an act of such a nature as to constitute aggression. It is 
extremely doubtful if economic or .1ideological "aggression" is 
aggression in the legal sense and the act in question - the Uni-
lateral Declaration - does not even go so far. 102 ) In support of 
this contention reference may also be made to the United Nations 
Dra~ Proposals on Defining Aggression. Three such proposals were 
submitted. 103 ) (1) By the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,l04) 
(ii) by Colombia, Cyprus, Ecuador, Ghana, Guyana, Haiti, Iran, 
Madagascar , Uganda and Yugoslavia,l05) (iii) by Canada, Italy, 
--------------------------------Japan/ ... 
100) Ibid., pp. 456-457. 
101) Quincy Wright, "The Chinese Recognition Problem" (49) A. J .I.L.,1955, 
p. 320 at p. 333 says that if the Nationalist or Communist Chinese 
attacked each other, it would be civil strife. Neither could be 
accused of aggression "since that term in internat ional law implies 
an international jural frontier." See too the writer, note 98 
supra, pp. 457-458. 
102) Ibid., p. 458. 
103) For the texts of the three dra~ proposal see (8) I.L.M., 1969, 
pp. 661-666. 
lo4) U.N. Doc. A/AC. 
105) U.N. Doc. A/AC. 
134/L.12, 27th Feb., 1969. 
134/L.16, 24th March, 1969. 
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Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States.lo6) It will be 
noted that all three proposals limit "aggression" to acts involving 
the use of force107 ) by a state against another state.108) Acts 
considered to be aggression are described in some detail. The 
provisions of the third dra~ are particularly interesting here 
in that it is provided that aggression cannot be committed by a 
political entity against a state to whose authority it is subject.l09) 
Thus even if the Rhodesian government had utilized armed force to 
accomplish its revolution, it is extremely unlikely that this would 
have constituted aggression as Rhodesia was subject to the authority 
of the United Kingdom on 11th November, 1965. It must be conceded 
of course that these dra~ resolutions are in no way conclusive in 
relation to the definition of aggression but it is submitted that 
where they coincide substantially their evidential weight on the 
existence of the requisite elements of aggression is great because 
in such a context they represent a general consensus of opinion on 
the topic. They do so coincide in their emphasis on force utilized 
by one state against another as an essential element of aggression. 
It is also interesting to note that economic and ideological aggress-
ion are missing from the drafts as these appeared prominently in 
110) past dra~s which aimed at defining aggression. It is in any 
event practically impossible to define aggression satisfactorily. 
John N. Hazard/ ... 
----------------------------
lo6) U.N. Doc. A/AC. 134/L. 17, 25th March, 1969. 
107) See (63) A.J.I.L., 1969, p. 569. 
108) With the possible exception of attacks on armed forces, ships and 
aircra~ of another state, all incidents of aggression seem to 
contemplate the crossing of frontiers. Ibid. 
109) U.N. Doc. A/C Note lo6 supra. 
110) See the drafts submitted by the Soviet Union U.N. DOC. A/AC.66/L.2, 
25th August, 1953; U.N. DOC. A/AC. 77/L.R., 23rd October, 1956; 
U.N. DOC. A/C. 6/L. 399, 3rd October, 1957; by Dahomey U.N. DOC. 
A/AC. 91/4, 15th March 1965; by the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo - U.N . DOC. A/AC. 91/4/Add. 1, 23rd March, 1965, p.2; by 
Burundi, ibid., p. 3. 
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John N. Hazard has highlighted some of the political difficulties 
involved. He says · 
"The definition of aggression is one of the most politically 
orientated operations i n a f i eld where politics always plays 
some role", 111) 
"It is general legal principles designed to fit dangerous 
situations that must be discussed and not carefully selected 
cases chosen to demonstrate the presence of a mote in an 
opponent's eye and no beam in one's own." 112) 
On the technical difficulties, he says : 
"There is no way · to create situations which will confer upon 
states subjected to hostile action unquestioned authority to 
exercise their right of self-defence while waiting for the 
Security Council to act." 113) 
On the legal difficulties involved, he says that the definitions 
" ... may be motivkted by considerations of legal technique 
quite removed from power politics. The record of past attempts 
presents arguments based on the legal techniques of the principal 
legal systems of the world." 114) 
He is here referring to the different attitudes to definitions held 
by common lawyers, civilians and the Marxian socialist legal systems. 
Hazard in fact sees the principle role of the activities of the 
Special Committee on the Question of Defining Aggression established 
by the General Assembly of the United Nations as being educative. 
"Clearly there are many views as to what should be included, 
what form the definition should take, and what consequences 
it should have. Conceived in educational terms the current 
return to attempts to define aggression can be meaningful in 
exploring these fundamental problems if the participants re-
strict themselves to discussion and education of each other. "115 ) 
__________
__________
________ we/ ... 
111) "Why try to define aggression?" (62) A.J.I.L., 1968, p. 701 at 
p. 703, 
112) Ibid., p.710. 
113) Ibid., p.703. 
114) Ibid. 
ll5) Ibid. 
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We may also mention that the United States now stresses the futility 
of trying to define aggression when the invasion of :· .Czechoslovakia 
violated every one of the Soviet Union's own proposed definitions 
ll6) 
of aggression. 
Finally we may note that quite recently the normative character of 
the rule which prohibits reprisals involving the use of armed force -
an undoubted example of "aggression" - has been called in question 
because of its divorce from the actual practice of states.
117 ) 
In the light of what we have said, the contention that the Rhodesian 
Unilateral Declaration of Independence amounted to aggression 
against the United Kingdom must be unequivocally rejected. 
It is also clear that the Unilateral Declaration does not constitute 
an infringement of the principle of self-determination for this right 
is too controversial, unaccepted and even vague to be used by the 
118) 
Rhodesians as a shield or by anyone else as a sword against them. 
Finally, even if we accept the fact that the Unilateral Declaration 
was an act of irresponsibility and that it militates against the 
pelicies of the majority of the members of the United Nations, this 
does not necessarily mean that it is also a violation of international 
law and thus illegal.ll9) 
The overall conclusion therefore is that the Unilateral Declaration 
and the resulting situation are neither legal nor illegal in inter-
national law but are extra-legal. The same is the position in 
relatton to the Proclamation of the Republic of Rhodesia. 
----------------------
-"SF.CTION II/ ... 
116) (63) A.J.I .L., 1969, pp. 329, 570. 
117) Derek Bowett, "Reprisals Involving Recourse to Armed Force" (66) 
A.J.I.L., 1972, p.l. 
118) For amplification of this argument see infra, pp.472-520 and the 
writer at (2) C.I .L.S.A., 1969, pp. 458-460. 
119) See the writer at (2) c.r.L.S.A., 1969, p. 465. 
STATEHOOD OF RHODESIA. 
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SECTION II 
As we have seen , Rhodesia by virtue of the Unilateral Declaration of 
Independence claims to be an independent state. The concept of state-
hood must therefore be examined to see whether this assertion is correct. 
For if Rhodesia is a state, and claims to be such , then it is capable or"· 
recognition as such. It must be understood,of course, that Rhodesia 
would merely enjoy the capacity to be recognized. Such recognition 
might never follow. 1 ) 
The traditional international law requirements of independent statehood 
are all factual2 ) and are the following: 
(1) The state must have a specific territory with more or less defined 
boundaries.3 ) Clearly Rhodesi a meets this requirement. 
(2 ) The state must have a population.4 ) Again there is no doubt that 
Rhodesia fulfills this requirement. 
(3) The state must have a government which must have two characteristics 
viz independence and effectiveness.5) These requirements merit 
separate discussion. 
______
______
______
___ (a)/ ... 
1) See the writer's "Status of Rhodesia in International Law", Acta 
Juridica, 1967, p.40. 
2) Brierly, p. 137. 
3) Schwarzenberger, Manual p. 55; Starke, p. 101; Montevideo Convent i on 
on the Rights and Duties of States, 1933; Whiteman , II, p.17; 
Oppenheim, I, p.114; Briggs, pp. 70-71; Chayes, II,p.1336; Chen, 
pp. 55-57; David A. Ijalaye, "Was Biafra at any time a state in 
International Law?" (65) A .J .I.L., 1971, p .551; B.R. Bot, Non-
recognition and Treaty Relations, Leiden, 1968, p.21; C.A. Crause , 
"Enkele Opmerkings oor Besluite van die Veiligheidsraad ten opsigte 
van Rhodesie 11 (29) T.H.R-H.R., 1966, p. 320 at p. 330; Lauterpacht , 
p.30; Deutsche Continental Gas-Geselschaft v. Polish State, Ann Di g. 
1929-1930, Case No. 5 (c) pp. 14-15. 
4) See authorities quoted in footnote 3) supra. 
5) Ibid. 
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(a) The requirement of independence.
6 ) 
This requirement embodies the following essential features~ 
(i) There must be factual freedom from the control of other 
states including naturally freedom from the application 
of the law of other states. 7) Thus if any organ of state 
is subjected to a degree of control by the governmental 
organs of any other state and if this position is ac-
knowledged by the constitutional law of the former state , 
the requirement of independence is not present. If, 
therefore, the Constitution of a British territory admits 
the application of the Colonial Laws Validity Act, 1865
8) 
and a power of disallowance in the Crown acting on the 
advice of its United Kingdom ministers, that territory 
cannot be independent. The 1961 Constitution of -Southern 
Rhodesia made such provisions9) and therefore Southern 
Rhodesia could not be said to be independent. On the 
other hand, the Constitution of Rhodesia 1965 does not 
admit of any such controls by the organs of an outside 
statelO) and so it is submitted that Rhodesia fulfills 
11) 
this requisite of freedom from external laws. 
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
__ (ii)/ ... 
6) Oppenheim, L pp. 114-115 describes the requirement of independence 
by saying that the government must be sovereign. 
7) H. Kelsen, · "Recognition in International Law - Theoretical Observat -
ions" (35) A.J.I ~., 1941, pp. 605 at 607-608. A state which de-
prives itself of its organic powers ceases to be independent. See 
Austro-German Customs Union case, P.C.I.J. ser. A/B no. 41 (1931) 
at pp. 45, 57-58, 77. 
8) 28&29Vict., c.63. 
9 '_,l Supra, p. 12. 
10) Supra, pp. 123-124. 
11) Subjection to international law rules operative in favour of another 
state does not of course detract from the characteristic of independ-
ence. See Kelsen, note 7) supra, pp. 607-608; Austro-German Customs 
Union case,note 7) supra, loc.cit. 
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(ii) The government must not in fact be dependent on another 
state to maintain order and effectiveness. 
Thus a Committee of Jurists entrusted by the Council of 
the League of Nations to give an advisory opinion .on the 
Aaland Islands controversy decided that Finland was not a 
state at the relevant time, one of the grounds being that 
its authorities were not strong enough to assert themselves 
thloughout the territory without the assistance of foreign 
troops.12 ) So too Manchuria, between 1932 and 1945, was 
in fact dominated by Japan and also Slovakia and Croatia 
13) during the Second World War. It has been suggested that 
Rhodesia is not independent because it is dependent on 
South Africa for economic, military and moral support.14 ) 
With respect, however, it is submitted that economic or 
military dependence on another state (or group of states ) 
does not affect legal independence. 15) Such phenomena 
are extremely common in present-day international relat-
ions. It is true that South African forces have been 
present in Rhodesia since 1967 but it is submitted that 
not even this affects the independence of Rhodesia because 
these forces are present to combat armed infiltration into· 
Rhodesia from beyond its borders. It is only at the stage 
when such armed forces are necessary to bolster the 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~_,_,overnment/ ... 
12) Lauterpacht, pp. 50-51, 
13) Lauterpacht, pp. 27-28. 
14) M.A . Mahmoud, The Juridical Manifesto, The Hague, 1969, p.104. 
15) The legal conception of independence has nothing to do with the 
numerous and constantly increasing states of de facto dependence 
which characterise the relation of one country to other countries. 
Austro-German Customs Union case, note 7) supra. 
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government of Rhodesia in maintaining internal order 
that they could be said to affect Rhodesian independence. 
16) 
That stage would not appear to have been reached. 
In the case of a breakaway state such as Rhodesia, the 
entity must naturally be independent of both the mother 
state and third states.17 ) This means that in such a 
case the following additional features must be present: 
(A) The Constitutional claims of the mother country 
a~er secession must not be acknowledged by the 
breakaway entity.18) In the case of Rhodesia it 
is clear that the constitutional claims of the 
United Kingdom made a~er the Unilateral Declaration 
of Independence have not been acknowledged in 
Rhodesia.19 ) 
(B) The mother state must have lost factual control of 
the situation. Its authority must have been displaced 
and it must have lost its effectiveness. This will 
-----------
-----------
------'be/ ... 
16) In Madzimbamuto v. Lardner-Burke N.O. & Another, 1968 (2) S A.284 
(R.,A.D.) the court found at 325 that there were no signs of revolt 
at all against the Government which was in effective control. See 
too R. v. Ndhlovu and Others, 1968 (4) S.A. 515 (R, A.D.) 531-532, 
536. See the writer's "Does South Africa Recognize Rhodesian 
Independence?" (86) SA L.J., 1969, p.438. 
17 ) Lauterpacht, pp. 26, 27; Chen, p.58; Crause, note 3) supra,p.330. 
18) In Yrlsarri v. Clement (1825) 2 Car. & P. 223 Best, C.J. held at 225 
that 11 ••• it makes no difference whether they [the Latin American 
Republics] formerly belonged to Spain, if they do not continue to 
acknowledge it .... " 
19) "None of the leg;slative acts of the United Kingdom has been recognized 
or enfor ced in the country since the Declaration of Independence." 
Per Beadle, C. J . in Madzimbamuto's case, note 16) supra, 307, 
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be the position when the entity claiming independence 
is in possession of a force sufficient to support 
20) 
itself in opposition to the mother state. 
It would appear from the following that the authority of the 
United Kingdom has been successfully dispaced in Rhodesia. 
Molteno. 21 ) points out that United Kingdom legislation passed 
a~er U.D.I. remained on paper only; Rhodesia was administered 
in direct opposition to the Queen , advised by United Kingdom 
Ministers; the Governor appointed by the Queen was entirely 
ignored and finally not only did the Rhodesian Government 
ignore United Kingdom legislation imposing economic sanctions 
but they successfully defied it. 
22) Christie points out that 
the lack of effective practical power in the United Kingdom 
was dramatically demonstrated by the incident involving the 
purported exercise of the Royal Prerogative of mercy23 ) and 
by the rejection by the court of a certificate of the Secretary 
of State for Commonwealth Relations that the Government of 
Rhodesia was not recognized by the Crown and was therefore 
illega1.24 ) 
Molteno says that it is difficult to conceive what more 
---------------------
---------------------
---------------------
----------------effective/ ... 
20) Lauterpacht, p. 26; Yrisarri case, note 18) supra, at 225. 
H. Kelsen. General Theory of Law and the State, New York, 1961, p.219 
says that the moment at which a national legal order ceases to be 
valid is determined by positive international law according to the 
principle of effectiveness. This delimits the temporal sphere of 
validity of a national legal order. 
21) P.427. 
22) R.H.Christie, "Practical Jurisprudence in Rhodesia" (1) C ,I.L.S .A. 
1968, pp. 390-407, (2) c.r.L.S.A., 1969, pp. 3-23, 2o6-221 at 
pp. 218, 219. 
23) Dhlamini v. Carter N.O. & Another, N.O., 1968 (2) S.A. 467 (R.,A.D.) 
24) See Madzimbarnuto's case. note 16) supra, 285-289. 
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effective steps the Rhodesian Government could have taken to 
demonstrate more convincingly its usurpation of the sovereignty 
of the United Kingdom25) and Crause concludes 
"Dit wil voorkom asof die Rhodesiese regering geheel en 
al onafhanklik van Brittanje, as ook van enige ander 
staat, optree. BrittanJe skyn geheel en al vervang te 
wees, terwyl die Rhodesiese regering sy funksies 
effektief op sy eie uitoefen,." 26) 
The factual findings of tribunals sitting in Rhodesia and 
presumably conversant with the circumstances prevailing there 
must, it is submitted, carry great evidential value on the 
factual question whether the authority of the United Kingdom 
is ineffective in Rhodesia. In this regard Beadle, C.J., held 
in Madzimbamuto's case that : 
"None of the legislative acts of the United Kingdom has 
been recognized or enforced in the country since the 
Dei".'-l1:1ration of Independence" and 11 ••• that few well-
informed persons living in Rhodesia at the moment would 
disagree with the statement that the territory has b~·nn 
'effectively governed during the past two years' .... the 
question to be asked is · 'By whom?' Certainly not the 
Government of the United Kingdom ... 11 27) 
The same judge held in Dhlamini's case that 
"The legislation passed by the United Kingdom Government ... 
has at all relevant times been totally ineffective and 
certainly has no validity in Rhodesia today." 28) 
---------------
---------------
---------------
--------'Finally/ ... 
25) p, 427. 
26) Note 3) supra, p. 330, 
27) Note 16) supra, at 3o6-307 and 321. 
28) Note 23) supra, at 468. Christie, note 22) supra, pp. 210-212 
points out clearly the reasons for the ineffectiveness of the 
United Kingdom legislation. It had the disadvantage that it was 
not exercised by agreement (as it always had been before) so 
had no support from the habit of obedience that ties people to 
familiar sources; it was not promulgated ext~nsively in Rhodesia; 
it had the disadvantages inherent in its own incompleteness and by 
ignoring its own effectiveness in Rhodesia, it reduced its prospects 
of becoming effective in the future. At p.218 he draws a distinction 
between actual and potential power. The potential power of Britain 
is much greater than that of Rhodesia but for reasons of self-
restraint it lacks effective practical power. 
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Finally in relation to the requirement of independence we 
must discuss briefly the relevance of the att itude of the 
mother-state to the breakaway entity. Here a posit i ve 
attitude on the part of the mother state (i.e. an attitude 
that the breakaway ent i ty is independent) raises a strong but 
not conclusive presumption of independence. 29) This is of 
course irrelevant in the Rhodesian context at present as no 
such attitude has been displayed by the United Kingdom Govern-
ment. On the other hand a negative attitude on the part of 
the mother state is irrelevant, i.e. the mere assertion of 
right by the mother state does not affect the independence of 
a breakaway entity.30 ) Applied in the context of Rhodesia 
this means that continued assertion of United Kingdom author-
ity over Rhodesia cannot prevent Rhodesia from being an 
independent state.3l) 
It is submitted from all we have said above, that the Rhodesian 
Government exhibits the characteristic of independence. 
_____
_____
_____
____ (b)/ ... 
29) Lauterpacht , p. 26. 
30) Lauterpacht, p. 26; Crause, note 3) supra, p. 330; Oppenheim, I, 
pp. 124-125; the writer , note 1) supra, p. 46. 
31) J.E.S. Fawcett, 11Security Council Resolutions on Rhodesia" (41) 
B.Y.I.L., 1965-1966, p. 103 at p.111. In Madzimbamuto v. Lardner-
Burke N.Q. and Another, 1968 (3) All ER. 561 (P.C.) at 574-575 the 
Privy Council seemed to hold that as long as the lawful government 
was striving to assert its l awful right, the usurping government 
could not become legitimate. Molteno interprets this to mean that 
as long as the status of the usurper is challenged by the legitimate 
government, the achievement of legitimacy will , in practice, be 
hampe~ed. He points out various objections which can be raised 
against the Board's rea soning here (pp. 431-432). In any event t he 
Board was concerned with the relevance of continued assertion of 
right by the mother state in relation to the question of the attain-
ment of constitutional law l egitimacy and not in relation to the 
question of the attainment of international law independence, with 
which we are here concerned. 
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(b) The requirement of effectiveness. 
With the requirement of independence we were in essence concerned 
with the ineffectiveness of other states in relation to the 
government of the state in question. With this requirement 
we are conc~rned with the domestic effectiveness or efficacy 
of the government in question and of course such efficacy does 
not necessarily follow from the fact that other states are in-
effective. It is clear that traditional international law 
32) 
required efficacy on the part of the government. This 
means that there has to be factual control of the organs of 
government33 ) and a sufficient degree of internal stability.34 ) 
The traditional test for such internal effectiveness or stability 
was whether the population of the territory rendered habitual 
obedience to the government.35) If the government is able to 
exercise its functions without substantial resistance this re-
quirement is present. Absence of resistance need not rest on 
free consent. De facto submission is enough whG.ther happily, 
indifferently, grumblingly, voluntarily or out of fear.36 ) 
----------------
-------------The/ ... 
32) Yrisarri v. Clement, note 18) supra at 225; Madzimbamuto's case, 
note 31) supra , at 573-574; Crause, note 3) supra, p. 330; Molteno, 
pp. 410, 421-422; Lauterpacht, p. 28; J .L. Kuntz, 11 Critical Remarks 
on Lauterpacht's 'Recognition in International Law'" (44) A.J.I.L. , 
1950 . p . 713 at p. 715; B.R. Bot, Non-recognition and Treaty Relat-
~. Leiden, 1968. Kelsen, note 20) supra, pp. 121, 219 says that 
the moment when a national legal order, and thus the state, begins 
to be valid is determined by positive international law according 
to the principle of effectiveness. 
33) H.R. Hahlo, "The Privy Council and the 'Gentle Revolution'" (e6) 
S.A L.,J., 1969, p.419 at p.432. quoting Berber, Public International Law, 
I, (1960) p.235. 
34) Lauterpacht, p.28. 
35) 
36 ) 
Starke, p.101; 
note 33) supra, 
note 20) supra, 
Hahlo , note 33 ) 
Whiteman, II, p, 17; A.Res. 195 (111 ) para. 2; Hahlo, 
p.432; Lauterpacht, p. 28; Chen, pp. 57-58; Kelsen , 
pp. 39-40, 219. 
supra , p. 432. 
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The question whether the Government of Rhodesia is effective 
has been examined by the Rhoiesian courts and their findings, 
as tribunals situated in Rhodesia and presumably acquainted with 
surrounding circumstances, must, it is submitted, be very 
persuasive here. 
In Madzimbamuto's case, Beadle, C.J., held that the Government 
of Rhodesia was in effective control over the territory.37 ) 
The former constitution was held to be completely defunct. 38) 
But though Beadle , C.J. held that the G~vernment of Rhodesia 
was an effective government, he would not go so far as to hold 
that it was an established government.39) It is clear, however, 
that a government can be effective in the sense of extracting 
habitual obedience without being as yet firmly established4o) 
and if so it possesses the requirement of effectiveness for 
international law purposes. 
-----------------------------Quenet,J .P ./. .. 
37) Note 16) at 3o6-307, 321, 326. 
38) Ibid., 321, 331. 
39) Ibid., 326. He therefore held that the Government of Rhodesia was a 
de facto government thereby drawing a distinction between de iure and 
de facto governments which he would appear to equate with established 
governments and effective governments respectively. He then outlined 
the limits of the powers of a de facto government, saying that they 
must govern in terms of the suspended constitution. Ibid., 352. With 
respect, it is submitted that the view of MacDonald, J.A. (ibid 415-
416) that in municipal law there is no distinction between a govern-
ment de facto and one de iure is preferable. The distinction is one 
which pertains to international law recognition. 
40) According to Beadle, CJ. the distinction between a de facto (i.e. 
effective) government and a de iure (i.e. established) one lies in 
the fact that the former is merely likely to continue while the latter 
is firmly established. Ibid., 326. Again, with respect, it is sub-
mitted that these notions pertain primarily to the question of inter-
national law recognition. In municipal law these are merely evident-
ial factors which have a bearing on the effectiveness or otherwise 
of the regime. See Molteno, pp. 421-422. 
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Quenet, J.P. held in the same case that internal stability was 
41) 
being maintained by the Government which was in control. 
Fieldsend, A J.A., held however that if the Government was to 
be a de facto government it should exercise all the powers of 
government, executive, legislative and judicia142 ) and that in 
the case of Rhodesia the present authorities had not usurped 
the judicial authority and hence usurpation was not complete. 
43) 
It is submitted, however, that the fact that the Rhodesian 
judges, or at least some of them, may have purported to act 
under the 1961 Constitution even after the Unilateral Declarat-
ion of Independence, did not affect the effectiveness of the 
Rhodesian Government. For, as Beadle , C.J. pointed out, the 
court derived authority from the fact that the present govern-
ment allowed it to function and allowed officials to enforce 
its orders.44 ) In addition, it is clear that if the Judiciary 
came int o such direct confrontation with the government as the 
latter were not prepared to tolerate, the judiciary or individ-
ual members of it could have been effectively removed from 
office .45 ) 
Regardless/ . .. 
------------
------------
-----
4 l) Madzimbamuto's case, note 16) supra, 369E, 370A. Similar conclusions 
were reached by MacDonald , J.A. at 416-417 and Jarvi s, A.J .A. at 422. 
42) Ibid. , 427. 
43) .Illl£·, 428. 
44) Ibid., 331. Section 128(2) of the 1965 Constitution provided that 
the existing judiciary should continue in office and be deemed to 
have been appointed under the 1965 Constitution . · .. . Beadle, C. J. of 
course regarded the regime as being a de facto government. Molteno, 
pp. 416-417 points out that the logical outcome of the court's 
deriving its authority from such a· regime must be that the court 
itself is a de facto court. 
45) Section 128 (4) (b) of the 1965 Constitution provided that a judge 
might be required to accept the 1965 Constitution and take the oath 
of loyalty and Judicial oath set out in that Constitution and i f he 
refused to do so, his office should be deemed vacant. 
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Regardless, however, of what the position may have been bPfore 
15th August, 1968, it is submitted that since that date there 
can be no doubt whatsoever as to the efficacy of the Qovern-
ment of Rhodesia. In R. v. Ndhlovu and Others,
46 ) decided 
on that date, Beadle, CJ. held that the factual situation 
had changed since Madzimbamuto's case and that the government 
which was then merely 'likely to continue' now was firmly 
established. 47 ) 
The overall submission then is that Rhodesia today meets the 
traditional requirement of effective government and that in 
all probability even before 15th August, 1968, it met the 
requirement. 48) 
In a cecent work, an additional requirement for effectiveness 
was postulated.49) This new proposal requires that the govern-
ment of a state should not only be effective (in the traditional 
sense of exacting habitual obedience) but should also be 
effective : 
"for the purpose of making and executing those decisions 
that good government entails". 
The requirement will not be present: 
"·f/ 1 ••. 
---------------
--------------
46) 1968 (4) S.A. 515 (R.,A.D.) 
47) Ibid., 528-532, 536. See too the Judgment of Quenet, J.P. at 
539-543. 
48) Molteno, p. 427 referring to the finding of Beadle, C.J. in Madzim-
bamuto's case that though the Rhodesian government was effective , 
it was not firmly established, says that it is difficult to con-
ceive what more effect i ve and decisive steps the Rhodesian Govern-
ment could -have taken t o demonstrate its usurpation more convincing-
ly. Crause, note 3 ) supra, p.330, writing in the pre-1968 era, 
considers that" . . . die Rhodesiese regering sy funksies effektief 
op sy eie uitoefen". 
49) J.E.S. Fawcett, The Law of Nations , London, 1968. 
"if there is a systematic denial to a substan,ial minority 
and still more to a majority of the people, of a place and 
a say in the government as well . . .. " 50) 
If this novel requirement has established itself as an inter-
national law requirement for the existence of statehood, it 
can of course be argued that Rhodesia is not a state.5l) The 
present writer has previously labelled the requirement as the 
requirement of "good government"52 ) and he has examined the 
requirement to see whether it has established itself as a 
53) 
matter of internati...mal law. He concluded that it had 
not so established itself54 ) for the following reasons 
(i) There is no previous authority for such E requirement. 55 ) 
(ii) The proponent of the requirement claims that it has 
established itself because: 
---------------------
----------"The/ ... 
50) Ibid., pp. 38-39; J .E.S. Fawcett, "Security Council Resolutions on 
Rhodesia" (41) B.Y.I.L. 1965-1966, p.103 at pp. 112-113, Earlier 
the same writer put the same proposition in terms of recognition. 
See J.E.S. Fawcett,"Some Recent Applications of International Law by 
the United States" (35) B. Y .I.L., 1959, p. 244 at 249-250 where it 
is stated that a government which deliberately flouts international 
standards of conduct is not entitled to recognition. See too J.E.S.F. 
at (34) M.L.R., 1971, at p.417 and note 49) supra, .p.39. This new 
requirement in relation to recognition is discussed infra, p .32, 
51) This is precisely what J.E .S. Fawcett argues in relation to Rhodesia . 
Note 49) supra, p. 39; (41) B.Y.I.L., 1965-1966, pp. 112-113; (34 ) 
M.L.R., 1971, p. 417. 
52 ) J.E .S. Fawcett (34) M.L.R., 1971, p. 417 criticises the use by the 
present writer of the phrase "good government" to describe the new 
requirement. According to him, the new requirement is to be equated 
with the right of all people to have effective representation, direct 
or indirect, in their government, which has nothing to do with 
whether the government is good or efficient. The present writer 
accepts Mr . Fawcett's new requirement as explained by him here. 
Indeed the phrase "good government" is only adopted as a convenient 
term for indicating the requirement. 
53) "The Requirements of Statehood Re-examined" (34) M.L.R ., 1971, 
pp. 410-417. 
54) 
55) 
The writer's conclusions were in turn criticized by J.E.S. Fawcett 
(34) M.L.R., 1971, p. 417, Such criticism will be referred to in 
the course of the following discussion at the relevant places. 
The writer, note 53) supra , pp. 411-412. J.E.S. Fawcett (34) M.L.rt. 
1971 p. 417 regards it as a "new and additional criterion of st~ hoodA. B.R.Bot, note 3) supra, pp. 21-22 says that states consider~ng 
recognition have o~en insisted on free elections, the hallmark of 
democratic legality an6 other criteria but none seem to constitute an 
~ssential element in the evaluation of a new government's internat-ional effectiveness. 
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"The massive condemnation of the Unilateral Declaration 
of Independence in Rhodesia suggests that a new state 
cannot now claim recognition if it fails to meet this 
criterion." 56) 
But the resolu tions in question5?) do not say that Rhodesia 
is not a state. They seem to be more concerned with the 
question of other states recognizing the State of Rhodesi~~) 
(iii) In any event even if the resolutions can be interpreted 
to mean that Rhodesia is not a state, this would in no way 
be conclusive as to the absence of statehood in Rhodesia 
because the Assembly is not possessed of a judicial cap-
~city to determine the existence or absence of such facts 
in a legally binding manner. The subjective views of the 
majority of the General Assembly cannot affect the object-
ive existence of the characteristics of independence in 
a state. These are facts.59) 
(iv) The new requirement to be accepted would need to have 
established itself through the operation of the custom-
forming process. But no general practice has as yet 
------------------
------------evolved/ ... 
56) Fawcett, note 49) supra, p. 39, 
57) A. Res. 2379 (XX III); A. Res. 2024 (XX); A.Res. 2151 (XXI); A, Res. 
2383 (XXIII). 
58) The writennote 53) supra, pp. 412-413, It is arguable that the 
United Nations even regards Rhodesia as being a state. Ibid., p.412. 
See too Beadle, C.J . in Madzimbamuto's case note 16) sup~t 309-310 
who says · "These resolutions certainly cannot be construed as any 
form of international recognition but it is implici t in them that the 
organization must have regarded Rhodesia as possessing the character-
istics of a state because the actions which these resolutions have 
set in train are actions which, in terms of the United Nations 
Charter, can only be taken against another state." For the view that 
the United Nations does not consider Rhodesia to be a state see 
Michael Akehm1 st, "State Responsibility for the Wrongful Acts of 
Rebels - an Aspect of the Southern Rhodesian Problem" (43) B.Y.I.L., 
1968-1969, p. 49 at p.55. 
59) The writer,note 53) supra, p. 413. 
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evolved in this particular connection and even if such a 
practice had developed it is extremely doubtful if it 
would meet the test of continuity seeing that it would 
seem to have developed with reference to the isolated 
instance of Rhodesia.60 ) J.E.S. Fawcett replies to this 
argument by stating that the general practice that is in 
issue here is not that of other cases of new states being 
treated in the same way as Rhodesia - but the emerging 
acceptance of self-determination as a basic principle of 
law and government. 61) 
With respect, the present writer would like to make two 
observations on this argument. In the first place it is 
controversial whether the principle of self-determination 
has as yet evolved into a rule of customary international 
62) law. In the second place, even if the principle of self-
determination has ~stablished itself unequivocally as a 
matter of international customary law, this would still 
not prevent Rhodesia from being a state (assuming of course 
that it infringed the principle of self-determination). 
Mr. Fawcett's argument here, it is submitted with respect, 
is an argument by analogy. It is an argument which 
determines status (or rather the lack of it) from non-
observance of obligations. From Rhodesia's failure to 
observe the obligation to concede self-determination, it 
is deduced that Rhodesia has no status. It is submitted, 
60) Ibid., pp. 413-415. 
61) (34) M.L.R., 1971, p.417. 
62) This question is discussed in detail infra, pp.472-520. 
-161-
however, that precedents from the field of international 
obligations may not be correctly applied in the field of 
status. A precedent that an existing subject is obliged 
to act in a certain way - here to concede self-determinat-
ion - is not of relevance to the question whether a new 
subject has status as a subject because it does not observe 
the obligation. It is, of course, a precedent that the new 
subject is obliged to act in a certain way but it is sub-
mitted that it is irrelevant in so far as its status qua 
subject is concerned.63) 
In the same paper the present writer also drew attention to 
the practical difficulties such a requirement would create, 
the possible reason for the postulation of the requirement 
and the necessity for the existence of the requirement. 
If the requirement was accepted it would mean that those 
states which did not meet the requirement would no longer 
be states and this could conceivably apply to the majority 
of states in the international community. Withdrawal of re-
cognition with resultant international outlawry would 
then be a possibility. A/ .. . 
-------------------------
-----------
63) On argument by analogy see the North Sea Continental Shelf cases 
I.C.J. Rep. 1969, at paragraph 79 where the World Court considered 
that median-line delimitations between opposite states were suffic-
iently distinct not to constitute precedents for the delimitation of 
lateral boundaries. See too paragraph&::, where the Court held that 
not even the division of adjacent territorial waters to be analogous 
to that of the Continental Shelf. 
64) The writer, note 53) supra, pp. 410-411. Withdrawal of recognition 
is not an arbitrary act of policy but is an application of inter-
national law, namely, a declaration that the objective requirements 
for recognition have ceased to exist. See Chen, note 3) supra, p.260. 
It is a declaration that a community ceases to fulfil the conditions 
which general international law attaches to the existence of a state . 
The consequence of withdrawal is that international law no longer 
governs relations between the withdrawer and the entity from which 
recognition is withdrawn. H. Kelsen , "Recognition in International 
Law - Theoretical Observations" (35) A.J.I.L. , 1941, p. 605 at p.611 . 
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A possible reason for the requi rement was found to lie 
in the recl aratory theory of recognition according to 
which a state with the characteristics of statehood is 
automatically an international person. This theory is 
in fact more popular in contemporary international law 
thought than its rival, the Constitutive theory, which 
would make personality dependent upon recognition.65) 
Applying t he ~claratory theory, the inescapable conclus-
ion is that Rhodesia is an international person but as 
this conclusion would be anathema to the majority of 
states , a new requirement of statehood is postulated 
which Rhodesia would experience difficulty in meeting. 
It can then be argued that Rhodesia is not a state and the 
Declaratory theory is rescued from the production of an 
unpalateable result. 66) 
It was also submitted that the requirement was unnecessary 
and super fluous if one was prepared to apply the O:,nstit-
utive theory of recognition consistently. Other states can 
then simply deny Rhodesia a personality (even though it is 
in fact a state) simply by refusing to recognize it. And 
i f t his were insuf ficient the Security Council of the 
United Nations could even impose a duty not to recognize 
on member states of the United Nations. The views of the 
community of states in relation to the creaton of a 
personality in Rhodesia could find expression in this way~7) 
------------
------------
----__,For/ . .. 
65) The merits of these conflicting theories are fully discussed infra, 
pp. 1 70-284. 
66) The writer, note 53) supra , pp. 415-416. 
67) Ibid., pp. 416 -417. 
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For the above reasons it is submitted that the requirement 
of "good government" has not established itself as a matter 
of international law, that such a requirement would be an 
unwelcome addition to international law jurisprudence and , 
in the last resort, unnecessary. 
(4) A fourth requirement of independent statehood is sometimes postulated , 
that the state must have the capacity to partake in international 
intercourse.68 ) With respect, it is submitted that this fourth re-
quirement is superfluous for if a state has an effective and inde-
pendent government it will inevitabl y have the factual ability to 
participate in international intercourse.69) In any event, even if 
there is such a ,,requirement, Rhodesia, it is submitted, meets it. 
This has been amply demonstrated by the fact that Rhodesia was in a 
position to conduct informal negotiations with the United Kingdom 
concerning the future of the country with a view to a possible settle-
ment70) and undoubtedly would be able to do so in the future; was 
---.~-------------
-----------able/ ... 
• , 1 1 L II;.;, 
68) Starke, p. 102 considers this the most important characteristic . See 
too, Briggs, p. 70; Restatement of Foreign Relations Law of the 
Uni ted States, §100; Chayes, II, pp. 1335-1336. 
69) The writer , note 53) supra , p. 410; David A. Ijalaye, "Was Biaf r a at 
any Time a State in International Law", (65) A.J.I.L., 1971, p.551 
at p. 552 appears to regard the requirement as superfluous in that the 
existence of the factual el ements and recognition between them provide 
sufficient criteria for the personality of a state. He comments as 
fol l ows on Starke's requirement - the capacity to maintain external 
relations : "It would appear that there is no way of acquiring thi s 
'recognised capacity' than by the grant of formal recognition by 
existing states. The question of capacity to enter into relations 
with other states thus shades into the question of the nascent state' s 
being formally recognized by other states". See too Akehurst, p.72 
who couples the requirement with that of effective government. 
70) The so-called Fearless and Tiger proposals. These are discussed i n 
Baron, "The Rhodesian Saga", (1) Zambia Law Journal, 1969, pp.36-64 
and infra, pp. 
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able to conclude an agreement with the United Kingdom; 71 ) by the 
fact that Rhodesia has an accredited representative in South Africa
72 ) 
and that for four and a half years after the declaration of independ-
ence consular relations were in effect maintained by several 
countries with Rhodesia. 73) 
(5) The requirement of legitimacy has sometimes been asserted as an 
essential characteristic of statehood. This requirement asserts that 
the new entity or the new regime must be constitutional i.e. it must 
be legal in terms of municipal law. In the Rhod9sian context this 
would mean that independence could only be transferred to Rhodesia 
by the United Kingdom Parliament and failing such transfer Rhodesia 
could not be an independent state. 
It is true that there is some evidence of the existence of a doctrine 
of legitimacy in the state practice of the 16th and 17th centuries. 
The Netherlands declared its independence from Spain in 1581. 
England and France refused to recognize it and refused to receive 
its ambassadors on an equal footing with those of other states. 74 ) 
In/ ... 
------------------------------------
' 
71) See Anglo-Rhodesian Relations - Proposals for a Settlement, Cmd.R.R. 
46:, .... ::-·l;97h· 0 ; The proposals failed t he test of acceptability when the 
Pearse Commission reported that they were not acceptable to the people 
of Rhodesia as a whole. 
72) See the writer, "Status of Rhodesia in International I.aw", Acta 
Juridica, 1967, p.41. 
73) At the time of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence the foll ow -
ing states maintained consular relations with Rhodesia: Australia, 
Austria, Belgium, Canada, Finland, France, Greece, Italy, Japan, 
Netherlands, Portugal, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, 
United States of America, \\est Germany. Six of these closed their 
consulates after the Unilateral Declaration; Australia, Canada, 
Finland, Japan, Sweden, Turkey. See Die Burger, 11th March, 1970. 
All the remaining lands with the exception of South Africa closed 
their consulates in the months following the Proclamation of the 
Rhodesian Republic. See Die Burger, 11th March, 1970; 27th April,197C 
Cape Times, 20th March, 1970. 
74) Jochen A. Frowein, "Transfer or Recognition of Sovereignty - Some 
:liarly Problems in Connection with Dependent Territories" (65) A,J.I.L., 
1971, p. 568. However this practice is equivocal because France and 
England did receive ambassadors and did conclude treaties of alliance 
with the Netherlands. Ibid. 
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In addition the Holy Roman Emperor refused in 1646 to give its 
ambassadors the title of "Excellency" as long as Spain did not 
grant them this title. 75 ) Portugal declared independence from 
Spain in 1641. She was not allowed to send representatives to the 
Westphalia Peace Conference of 1648 because she was not treated as 
a fully sovereign state and later in the 17th century there were 
still doubts about Portuguese sovereignty because Spain had not 
76) formally renounced her rights. The Swiss Confederacy was recog-
nized by the Treaty of Westphalia. There was doubt as to whether 
such sovereignty had actually been transferred from the Holy Roman 
Empire. 77 ) There is thus some evidence of the existence of a 
doctrine of legitimacy in early state practice but, as pointed out, 
the evidence is equivocal and when we examine the classical writers 
we find that they are opposed to it78) and Moser does not consider 
that sovereignty was transferred by the Holy Roman Empire to the 
Swiss Confederacy but that the latter had attained independence 
by itself. 79 ) The doctrine of legitimacy was next resurrected by 
---------------
-------------the/ ... 
75) Ibid., p. 569. 
state in 1648. 
Spain did recognize the Netherlands as a sovereign 
76) Ibid., p. ~10. This was so despite the fact that Spain had concluded 
a treaty with Portugal in 1668. It is submitted that again the 
practice was equivocal because France, the Netherlands, England, 
Sweden and even Spain (in 1668) concluded treaties with Portugal. 
~ 
77) ~. The quality of the Swiss Cantons as subjects of international 
law even before the Treaty was not in doubt. 
78) Pufendorf, De Jure Naturae et Gentium, 1672,Book VII , ch. VIII, 9; 
Bynkershoe~, Quaestiones Juris Publici, Book II, ch. III; Paschalius, 
Legatis, XII; Vattel, Le Droit des Gens, Book IV, ch. V, §68; Moser , 
Grundsatze des Jetzt ublichen Europaischen Volcher-Rechts in Fridens-
~eiten, 1736 , ch. V. 
79) Moser,Die gerette to vollige Souverainete der Loblichen Schweitzer-
ischen Eydgenossenschaft, 1731, p. 49. 
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the Holy Alliance but was discarded again a~er it.Bo) In 1907 it 
was incorporated into a Treaty between five central American Republics 
who undertook inter se not to recognize governments coming to power 
in an unconstitutional manner but this is the only expression of 
81) 
the doctrine in the last 120 years. 
Today writers reject the doctrine of legitimacy. It is even alleged 
that it never formed part of international law. 82 ) It is asserted 
that unconstitutional1ty in origin does not affect the existence of 
83) 84) 
an entity. In addition the doctrine is rejected bf case law. 
It is also in conflict with the liberty to revolt and secede which 
international law undoubtedly does not prohibit.85) Dean Acherson's 
statement on the doctrine of legitimacy and its application to ,···, : ·" 
Rhodesia is entirely apposite: 
"International law does not proclaim the sanctity of British 
dominion over palm and pine." 86) 
______________
______________
 we/ ... 
SJ) 
81) 
82) 
83) 
84) 
85) 
86) 
Lauterpacht, pp. 26, 103. 
Lauterpacht, p. 103; the writer,"Rhodesia: A Duty not to Recognise?" 
(33) T.H.R-H.R., 1970, p.152 at p.157. It is always of course 
possible to incorporate such a doctrine into a treaty and it will 
then be operative inter partes. But such a particular treaty has of 
course no relevance in determining whether the doctrine is part of 
general international customary law - which is the question here. 
Lauterpacht, p.26. 
~ •• pp. 26, 103; J.L. Kuntz, note 32) supra, p. 715; Crause, 
note 3) supra, p.330. 
Dreyfus case, Franco-Chilean Arbitration, Descamps et Renault, Recueil 
International des Traites du XXe si~cle, (1901) p.294; Republic of 
Peru v. Dreyfus Brothers and Co. (1888) L.R. Ch. D. 348, 355; Tinoco 
Arbitration, Great Britain v. Costa Rica, Ann. Dig., 1923-1924, Case 
no. 164,p. 247; George W. Hopkins case, United States v. Mexico, 
Ann. Dig., 1925-1926, Case no. 170, p. 232. 
For discussion of the liberty to revolt see supra, pp. 137-142. 
Letter to Washington Post 11th December 19Q6 reproduced in 
Cha~qs, II, at pp. 1379-I)SJ. We might add of course that internat-
ional law does proclaim British dominion over its territories as far 
as other states are concerned. But Acheson is right in that it does 
not proclaim it as far as the inhabitants of these territories are 
concerned. These have liberty to revolt and secede if they can do so. 
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We have seen the requirement of legitimacy in its traditional form 
and we have found it to be inapplicable. But a legit imacy require-
ment in a new form has recently been asserted. 87 ) According to this 
view, a state can only emerge from the indigenous people of a territ-
ory. Thus: 
"If a government emerges from other than the indigenous people 
it will not only be illegal, but will also be a government 
without a legal territory." 
It is the indigenous people at the time of colonisation whc count. 
If a government other than from a majority of the indigenous people 
emerges, the statehood has been "manipulated" and the manipulated 
state is not a true state for international law purposes. 88) The 
argument is applied to Rhodesia and Rhodesia is found to be a manipu-
lated state - an "illegal" state. This is in effect an argument that 
Rhodesia is not a state at all.89) 
With respect, it is submitted that there is no requirement of 
legitimacy in this new sense in international law either. 
In the first place the requirement, if it exists, can only be 
based on the existence of a right of self-determination. There 
is no other authority for it. But the existence of a right of 
self-determination is extremely controversial in international 
law and it is to be doubted whether it is more than an aspiration.90 ) 
Even if its existence as a right were freely admitted, this would 
go no further than to establish a requirement of statehood such as 
"good government".9l) The requirement of "good government", if 
-----~~------~~~-----------------~-------------------established/ ... 
87) Mahmoud, note 14) supra. 
88) Ibid., pp. 70-71, 
89) Ibid., pp. 99, 138-139. 
90) The "right" of self-determination is discussed fully infra,w. 4~-163. 
91) Discussed supra, pp.157-163. 
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established, would be a narrower requirement than the concept of 
legitimacy at present under discussion in that (a) it is not stated 
to operate to protect indigenous people only and (b) it would require 
some place and say in government for minorities as well as major-
ities.92) As previously submitted, however , international law does 
not go so far as to admit the requirement of "good government".93) 
A fortiori it does not admit a concept of legitimacy in the sense 
at present attributed to it. 
In the second place, the requirement of legitimacy in this sense 
would have the effect of nullifying the statehood of a large number 
of presently existing states.94) 
It is therefore submitted that the doctrine of legitimacy, either 
in this new sense or in its traditional sense does not furnish an 
additional requirement for statehood. 
Some overall conclusions may now be expressed in the light of the 
preceding discussions. In the first place the requisites of statehood 
are the traditional requirements viz. people, territory and a govern -
ment which is independent and effective in the traditional ·sense of 
exacting/ . .. 
----------------------------
92) Fawcett , note 49) supra, pp. 38-39. 
93) Supra, pp. 157-163. 
94) The statehood of the following would, for example , be affected 
and called into question; all states in the Americas, all states 
south of the Zambesi in Africa, Mauritius, Singapore., Fiji, 
Australia, New Zealand, Israel. Dr. Mahmoud applies his arguments 
principally to Rhodesia and Israel but it is submitted that, once 
admitted , their implications would be much wider. 
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~~acting habitual obedience.95) Other requirements are either 
superfluous or are not established as a matter of international 
law. In the second place, Rhodesia has these traditional require-
ments of independent statehood.96 ) Finally, as a result of the 
above it is submitted that Rhodesia meets the test of independent 
statehood. It is, in fact, a state. The legal significance of 
this is that it has the capacity to be recognized as a full inter-
national person.97) 
SF.CTION III 
RECOGNITION OF A STATE AS A PREREQUISITE FOR THE ENJOYMEN!' OF 
INTERNATIONAL PERSONALITY. 
(1) General rules of recognition. 
The device of recognition may be used for a variety of important 
purposes in the realm of international law. 1 )rt may be used to 
2) 
create specific rights in a state. It may be used to consolidate 
----------------------------specific/ ... 
95) Crause's application of the requisites of statehood to Rhodesia 
is therefore correct. Note 3) supra, p. 330, See too A.J.G.M. 
Sanders, "Die Erk.enning van State en Regerings" (33) T .H.R-H.R., 
1970, p. 259 at p. 263. If there exists a legislative body which 
makes laws, a judiciary which interprets and applies the laws and 
which has at its disposal a considerable force responsive to its 
will, there will undoubtedly be a government. Briggs, p. 71, 
99) Fawcett, note 31) supra, p. 110; Fawcett (34)M.L.R., 1971, p.417; 
Ijalaye, note 69) supra, p. 552. 
97) "Quand une entite politigue reunit et presente tousles characteres 
constitutifs d'un etat, elle a l'aptitude necessaire". Ren~ Le 
Normand, La Reconaissance et ses Diverses Applications, Paris, 1899, 
p. 55 · 
1) See Lauterpacht, pp. 261-263. 
2) Thus recognition of nationality bestowed by another State on an 
individual or corporation means that the recognizing State con-
cedes to the other State the right to protect the individual or 
corporation in question on the international level. Nottebohm 
~, I.C.J. Rep., 1955, at 17-20; Barcelona Traction case, I.C.J. 
Rep. 1970, at para. 72. 
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specific rights which were formerly weak.3 ) It may be used to 
validate that which would otherwise be illegal.4 ) It may be used 
to establish a representative capacity.5) Finally, recognition is 
intimately @onnected with the creation of international personality 
in various entities such as insurgents and belligerents,6 ) inter-
national organisations and states. It is with the creation of 
international personality in the state, that we are here concerned. 
(2) The principal theories on recognition. 
The role of recognition in the creation of international person-
ality is one of the most disputed topics in the ambit of internat-
ional law. This divergence of opinion must therefore be analysed 
and opinior.s must be expressed on the nature of recognition and 
its function in the process of establishing international person-
ality in the state. 
There are two main theories on the nature and function of recognit-
ion. The Declaratory theory holds that statehood exists as an 
objective fact regardless of whether or not the state has been 
~----~----------------------------------------------~r.ecognized/ ... 
3) 
4) 
5) 
6) 
Thus territorial titles, though weak, may be recognized. Sir John 
Fisher Williams, "La doctrine de la reco~issanoe en droit inter-
national et ses developpements recents" (44) H.R., IL p.203 says 
at p.209 that the field of application of recognition is" ... ~ 
relations avec les nouvelles situations de fait telles gue celle 
resultant d'une annexion de territoire." See too the same writer 
in "Some Thoughts on the Doctrine of Recognition in International 
Law" (47) Harvard Law Review, 1933-1934, p. 776 at p.793. In the 
Eastern Greenland case (1933) P.C.I.J . Ser. A/B, No. 53 it was held 
at 68-69: "Norway reaffirmed that she recognized the whole of 
Greenland as Danish; and thereby she has debarred herself from 
contesting Danish sovereignty over the whole of Greenland." 
Schwarzenberger, I, p. 127 says recognition raises an estoppel. The 
recognizing state is estopped from disputing the right recognized . 
Lauterpacht, p. 429; Sir John Fisher Williams, note 3) supra (44) 
H.R., II, p. 203 at p.204. 
This is discussed infra,pp.4b9-4I2in the context of recognition of 
the Government of Rhodesia. 
This is discussed infra, pp.562-567 in the context of the possible 
rights of para-military forces operating in Rhodesia. 
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recognized. International personality can be enjoyed without 
recognition. The function of recognition is thus declaratory or 
evidentiary. rt merely confirms a personality which already 
exists. 7 ) The Constitutive theory asserts that the objective 
indicia of statehood do not in themselves suffice to create 
internatinnal personality. Something further is required, viz. 
recognition. Recognition is a starting point of rights of state-
hood, of governmental capacity and of belligerency rights. 8) 
The Constitutive theory is essentially a conceptualist and positiv-
istic approach. It starts from the basic premise that each legal 
system, including international law, must determine who its subjects 
are and at what point precisely personality exists in an entity. 
In the sphere of international law there is no central organ 
which can pronounce capably on the existence of personality. I t 
is thep.efore le~ to each state, i.e. each existing full internat-
ional person, to determine when a new person exists. Each existing 
person performs this function by recognizing new entit1es.9) 
Recognition is therefore constitutive of the personality of the 
new person. The Constitutive theory is positivistic in that it 
is based on the consent of states and the doctrine of sovereignty. lo ) 
Recognition is a consensual act on the part of existing sovereign 
states so that the personality of new states depends upon the will 
of existing states. The Declaratory theory on the other hand is a 
Natural law doctrine which assumes an objective system of law apart 
from the assent of states. 11 ) Just as there is respect for the 
___________________________ .,ersonality/ ... 
7) Fisher-Williams, note 4) supra, p. 238. 
8) Lauterpacht, p. 370 . 
9) Briggs, pp. 113-114. 
10) Chen , p. 18. 
11) Ibid. 
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personality of the individual in municipal law because he exists, so 
too "le fondament du droit des gens" is "le respect de la personalite 
collective gu'est la nation". 12 ) Accordingly the source of the 
rights of a state in international law is the fact of its actual 
supremacy within a specified territory over a specified portion of 
humanity, which enables it to exert physical pressure on all those 
who choose to disregard its rights. 13 ) In other words the source 
of rights and personality is the fact of existence. The Declarat-
ory theory is also an idealistic theory: 
" ... 11 est certainement permis d'affirmer gue, dans la ligne 
de la Justice ideale, tout agregat humain a, par le seul fait 
gu'il existe et gu'il presente certains caracteres, des droits 
et des obligations a l'egard des autres agregats .... " 14) 
(3) Incompatibility of the theories. 
Many writers try to evade making a choice between the two conflicting 
theories by asserting that the correct solution lies somewhere be-
tween them. A "middle of the road" or compromise approach is 
advocated.l5) It is submitted that the issue cannot be evaded in 
this way. A choice must be made between the two main conflicting 
theories. The basic difference between the two schools is this. 
According to the Constitutive theory, a state can only have rights 
and personality on recognition. According to the Declaratory 
theory it can have rights and personality though unrecognized. 
On this basic difference there can be no compromise. Either a 
____________
____________
 s_tate/ ... 
12) Le Normand, p. 57. 
13) Chen, p. 3. 
14) D. Anzilotti, Cours de Droit International 
Paris, 1929, I, p. 173. 
(Tr. Gidel) 
15) See Sorensen, pp. 276-277; Whiteman, II, p. 21; Briggs, p.114. 
These compromise approaches are discussed infra, pp. 265-270. 
-173-
State can have personality and rights before recognition or it 
cannot. 16 ) For these reasons the present writer feels himself 
compelled to make a choice between the two theories a~er a care-
ful examination of the respective arguments on both sides and an 
analysis of the "compromise" approaches. 
(4) Adherents of the two theories. 
The Constitutive 
Lauterpacht, 19) 
17) 18) 
theory is supported by Kelsen, Oppenheim, 
Anzilotti, 20) Quincy Wright, 21 ) Le Normand, 22 ) 
Triepel, Liszt, Lawrence, Wheaton, Redslob, Bluntschli and 
23) Schwarzenberger. The Declaratory theory is supported by 
Borchard, 24 ) Hall, 25) Rivier, 26 ) Fisher-Williams, 27 ) Chen, 28) 
Erich, 29) Vattel, Westlake, Moore, Brierly, Fauchille, Fiori, 
Hyde, The Institute of International Law,30 ) the American Law 
Institute,31 ) and Kidd.32 ) 
Of/ ... 
------------------------------
-
16) 
17) 
18) 
19) 
20) 
21) 
22) 
23) 
24) 
25) 
26) 
27) 
28) 
29) 
30 ) 
31)' 
32) 
Chen, p. 16 aptly summarizes this as follows: "The most important 
point of departure between the constitutive and declaratory theories 
lies in the question whether the legal personality of a state exists 
prior to recognit ion, that is to say, whether the unrecognized stat e 
can be a subject of international law, having capacity~r rights 
and duties." 
"Recognition in International Law, Theoretical Observations" (35) 
A.J.I.L .. 1941, p.608. 
I, p.121. 
P. 320 . 
Note 14) supra , p. 161. 
"The Chinese Recognitbn Problem" (49) A.J.I.L., 1955, p. 320 at 
p. 325. But he says that recognition of a new state is more con-
stitutive and less declaratory than re0ognition of a new government 
in an old state. 
P. 9. 
See Whiteman, II, p. 20 . 
"Recognition in International Law" (36) A.J.I.L, 1942, p.110. 
International Law, 8th ed., pp. 19-20. 
Principes du Droit des Gens (1896) I. p.57. 
Note 4) supra, pp. 236, 238; "Some Thoughts on the Doctrine of 
Recogni tion in International Law" (47) Harvard Law Review, p.776 
at p. 778. 
P. 4. 
"La Naissance et la Reconaissance des Etats", H.R., II (1926) 
p. 431 at pp . 459-461. Tbe recognition of government and state is 
declaratory but the recognition of bellige~ents is constitutive. 
For these and others see Whiteman, II, p. 21. 
Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States,s.101 , 
108. 
"Statehood and Recognition" (33) M.L.R., 1970, p. 99 at p.101. 
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Of the two theories the Declaratory theory is more popular among 
writers. Lauterpacht points out that the reason for this is the 
positivistic nature of the Constitutive theory as an assertion of 
sovereignty with its attendant arbitrariness.33) 
State practice would appear to be inconclusive in expressing a 
preference for one or the other theory. While Lauterpacht34 ) and 
Anzilotti35) assert that state practice supports the Constitutive 
theory, Kuntz makes the opposite assertion.36 ) One finds isolated 
instances in which states express views which support the Declar-
atory theory. The replies of Denmark and Switzerland to information 
requested by the ~Peparatory Committee for the Codification Con-
ference of 1930 give an indication of the viewpoints of these 
states to the question. The Danish Government considered that 
it would not be right to make the responsibility of a state, 
from the standpoint of international law, depend on recognition 
by other states. Switzerland was of the view that a new etate is 
bound to observe principles of international law even in its 
relations with those states which do not recognize it.37) Against 
this it would appear that the practice of the United Nations 
Secretariat supports the Constitutive theory.38 ) O'Connell 
remarks: 
" it becomes profitless when writers seek to prove 
from State practice that one or the other doctrine is 
positively adopted in international law. For every ounce 
of practice the constituvist can put in the scales the 
declaratory theorist can add his ounce. And in any event 
the practice is usually ambiguously expressed." 39) 
----------------------------T.he/ ... 
33) Pp. 61-62. 
34) P. 61. 
35) Note 14) supra, p. 162. 
36) "Critical Remarks on Lauterpacht's 'Recognition in International 
Law!" (44) A.J.I.L., 1950, p. 713 at p. 717, 
37) See Briggs, pp. 100-101. 
38) o. Schacter, "The Development of International Law through the Legal 
Opinions of the United Nations Secretariat" (25) B. Y .I.L., 1948, 
p. 91 at pp. 109-115, 
39) I, pp. 130-131. 
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The practice of the World Court oj the dispute is also ambivalent. 
In Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia, the Permanent 
Court of International Justice favours the Constitutive theory. 40) 
In its Advisory Opinion on Reparations for InJuries Suffered in 
the Service of treUnited Nations, the International Court held that 
the member states of the United Nations could create an internat-
ional organization with objective international personality i.e. 
a personality effective against non-members and independent of 
41) 
recognition by such non-members - a personality valid erga omnes. 
Since Rhodesia has all the characteristics of statehood, 42 )it 
follows that the dispute between the two theories is of vital 
importance in relation to its international status. For if the 
Declaratory theory is correct Rhodesia may have full international 
personality as an independent state even in the absence of recog-
nition. On the other hand if the Constitutive theory is correct 
Rhodesia cannot have personality, rights or duties in internat-
ional law in the absence of recognition. 
In the specific context of the Rhodesian situation certain writers 
have already expressed views on the merits of the theories and 
these views also reflect the long-standing dispute. 
David A. Ijalaye, who regards Rhodesia as having the traditional 
requirements of statehood, makes the constituvist assertion that: 
--------------------------" ... recognition/ ... 
40) (1926) P.C.I.J., Ser. A, No. 7 at 28. For criticism of this 
decision see Brownlie, p. 8.3. 
41) I .C.J. Rep. 1949, at 174. For criticism of this see Schwarzenberger , 
I. p. 128 and Chen, p. 92 who describes it as a rather authorit-
arian interpretation of declaratory doctrine. 
42) Supra, pp.168-169. 
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" ... recognition forms an integral part of that factual 
situation which must manifest itself before an entity can 
claim to have attained statehood in international law." 43) 
G. N. Barrie considers the principle to be that a new state 
acquires personality by recognition - de facto or de iure. 44 ) 
On the other hand the Declaratory theory has been supported by 
J.A. Coetzee and C.A.Crause. The theory is applied to Rhodesia and 
the logical conclusion is drawn that: 
"Indien dit dan aanvaar word dat Rhodesie aan die basiese 
vereistes voldoen om as 'n staat te kwalifiseer, maak die 
fei t dat Rhodesie nie deur ande1' state erkeri word nie, geen 
verskil daaraan dat Rhodesie 'n staat is en bly nie, en dat 
Rhodesie as sodanig behandel moet word nie." 45) 
The writer interprets Crause as saying that Rhodesia is ·an inter-
national person with rights and duties as such and should be 
treated accordingly. 
Similarly Sandars would appear to favour the Declaratory theory 
which he also brings to its logical conclusion. 
"Rhodesie beantwoord ... aan al die volkeregtelike voorwaardes 
wat vir. staatskarakter gestel word en is op krag daarvan volgens 
ohs deklaratiewe uitgangspunt 'n volkeregtelike subJek." 46) 
The/ ... 
-----------------------------
43) "Was Biafra at any time a state in International Law?" (65) A. J ,I .L., 
1971, p. 551 at p. 552. Later however (p. 559) he doubts whether 
recognition of Biafra by five states only was sufficient to con-
stitute Biafra an independent nation. Cf. the writer, "Rhodesia: 
A .Duty not to Recognize" (33) T.H.R-H.R., 1970, pp. 155-156 whose 
views coincide with those of Ijalaye in that recognition of Biafra 
was premature but differ in that a relative international personal-
ity available against the recognisers was considered to be con-
stituted in Biafra. 
44) "The High Court of Rhodesia and U.D.I." (30 ) T.H.R-H.R., 1967, p.147. 
45) "Enkele opmerkings oor Besluite van die Veiligheidsraad ten opsigte 
van Rhodesiei•' (29) T.H.R--H.R., 1966, p. 320 at p. 332, 
46) "Die Erkennings van State en Regerings" (33) T.H.R-H.R., 1970, 
p. 259 at p. 263. See too ibid., pp. 261, 262. 
-177-
The present writer formerly inclined towards the Declaratory theory 
but without real conviction. 47 ) In _order to ascertain the status 
of Rhodesia he now feels obliged to discuss the two theories fully 
and to express a conclusion in favour of one of them. In view of 
the fact that writers hl.ve argued for and against each theory, in 
view of the fact that state practice and the practice of internat-
ional tribunals give no clear indications as to an appropriate 
solution, the approach will be to consider the merits and demerits 
of the arguments advanced on both sides, and of the compromise 
approaches, and to state a conclusion after a critical discussion 
of these matters. 
(5) Arguments against the Constitutive theory and in favour of the 
Declaratory theory. 
There are so many arguments to consider here that for the purpose 
of clarity and exposition an attempt is made to systematise them 
under the following headings: (a) Anomaly-orientated arguments; 
(b) Policy-orientated arguments; (c) Practicality-orientated 
arguments ; (d) Historically-orientated arguments; (e) Concept-
ually-orientated arguments and (f) Arguments of a miscellaneous 
nature. 
(a) Anomaly-orientated arguments . 
Here it is proposed to deal with the following arguments: 
(i) States have no legal origin but a factual one; 
(ii) relations with a state are inevitable even before 
--------------------------------------------------~recognition/ ... 
47) "Status of Rhodesia in International Law", Acta Juridica, 1967, 
p. 39 at pp. 44-45. See the attitude of Sandars, note 46) supra, 
p. 260 to this. After further reflection the writer changed his 
views and expressed preference for the Constitutive theory. See 
"Does South Africa Recognize Rhodesian Independence?" (86) 
S.A.L.J., 1969, p. 438 and note 43) supra, p. 152. 
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recognition; (iii) the unrecognized state must observe inter -
national law; (iv) rights are conceded to the unrecognized 
state even before recognit!on; (v) recognition is sometimes 
afforded to the internal acts of an unrecognized entity; 
(vi) the argument based on the anomaly of two unrecognized 
states recognizing each other; (vii) constitutive recognit i on 
makes the recognized a delegated authority derived from the 
will of the recognizer and this is incompatible with the 
equality of states; (viii) since a non-sovereign state can 
be an international person, why cannot a sovereign but un-
recognized state be so? 
(i) States have no legal origin but a factual one. 
The argument here stresses the anomaly which may result 
from the Constitutive theory being at variance with the 
factual position before recognition, viz. the existence 
of a state with no i nternational law rights.
48 ) The 
argument is that whether a state exists is a matter of 
fact, not of law. 49) It is an exorable fact that a state 
may exist as a de facto regime and that its power may be 
exercised and felt even though it is not recognized.50 ) 
With these assertions the present writer is in general 
agreement but they do not help in the solution ef the 
---------
---------
---------
-
controversy/ ... 
48) Briggs, pp. 66-67, 114. 
49) Norms of international law do however determine the coming into 
existence of a state. See J.L. Kuntz, note 36) supra, p. 713. These 
are the rules which prescribe the criteria of statehood as to which 
see discussion supra, pp. 168-169. The criteria for the existence 
of statehood are therefore legal but whether in an individual case 
a particular entity complies with these norms or criteria is of~ 
course a question of fact. 
50) E. Borchard, "Recognition and Non-Recognition" (36) A.J.I.L., 
1942, p. 108 at p. 109; P. Marshall Brown, "The Legal Effects of 
Recognition" (44) A.J.I.L . , 1950, p. 617 at p. 634. 
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controversy at all. The answer is that a clear distinct-
ion can be drawn between the concept of statehood and 
that of international personality. If, as a matter of 
objective fact, an entity possesses the legal criteria 
of independent statehood, it is certainly a state. It 
does not follow, however, that it is also an international 
person. In other words the origin of the independent 
state must be carefully divorced from the origin of the 
international person, though o~en, as a matter of 
historical coincidence, they may both arise sumultaneously 
e.g. where a dependency is granted independence by its 
mother state, the statehood and personality of the former 
commence together. But this coincidence need not exist. 
The reason is that the international law norms which govern 
the existence of statehood5l) are different from the norms 
which govern the creation of international personality.5
2 ) 
If there is compliance with the former norms only, the 
entity will be a state, but not an international person.53) 
This/ ... 
----------------
---------------
5 l) For the norms which establish the criteria of statehood, see supra, 
footnote 49) . 
52) According to the Constitutive theory this is the norm requiring 
recognition and perhaps also the norms establishing the criteria 
of statehood though it may be possible to have full international 
personality existing in an entity which is not an independent 
state. "If the regime recognized lacks the essentials of a state, 
to recognize it is to constitute it a subject of international law." 
Sorensen, p. 278. Sed contra Sandars, note 46) supra, p. 260. The 
net point is whether full international personality has two ingred-
ients, viz. (1) recognition and (ii) the criteria of statehood, or 
one ingredient only - recognition . 
53) The distinction between "natural" statehood and membership of the 
international community was first clearly brought to light by 
G. Jellinek, Die Lehre von den Staatenverbindungen, Vienna, 1882, 
pp. 92-99 and Die Rechtlicke Natur der Staatenvertrage, Vienna, 
188o, p. 48. See too F. von Liszt, Das Volkerrecht, 12th ed., 
1925, p. 91 and Oppenheim, International Law, 3rd ed., 1920, I, 
§71. 
-18o-
This distinction between statehood and international 
personality has been criticised. It is asserted that even 
the most convinced constituvists do not claim that recog-
nition creates the state. Hence a distinction between 
statehood and international personality must be drawn by 
constituvists.54) The argument then proceeds that inter-
national law (even according to the constituvists) concedes 
that the state is in existence independently of recognit-
ion.55) The question is then posed as to what legal 
significance this "existence" has if the state is not 
an international person. 
It must of course be conceded that the state does exist 
objectively in international law independent of recognit-
ion. It is an entity with legal significance. This is 
so because it has complied with the criteria which inter-
national law prescribes for the existence of statehood. 
What then is the legal relevance of this "existence" in 
international law of a state which has no rights and 
duties in the system? It is submitted that the relevance 
is as follows. An entity which is legally a state has 
the capacity to be recognized.56 ) When recognition 
follows, that entity, previously existing in the legal 
system but without rights, now acquires rights in the 
system and becomes a person in the system. Recognition 
------------
------------
----does/ ... 
54) Chen, p. 30. 
55) Chen, p. 31. 
56) This was in fact the submission which we made in respect of 
Rhodesia in the previous section as a result of the view that it 
was a state. Supra, p. 169. 
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does indeed operate on an entity which legally exists and 
gives that entity rights and, as a result, personality. 57) 
A distinction must therefore be drawn between the position 
of the entity prior to an subsequent to recognition. The 
distinction is that between statehood and international 
personality. 
To clarify the above an analogy might be drawn between the 
position of the unrecognized state in international law 
and that of the slave in Roman law. The slave existed 
as a legal institution. The law recognized him as a 
human person but gave him no rights. From the fact that 
he was a human person (as defined by the law) he had the 
capa.city to be manumitted in which event he enjoyed rights 
and duties. But his legal personality dated from his 
manumission only. Before that he was an entity in the 
system without rights. 
(ii) Relations with a state are inevitable even before 
recognition. 
It is common knowledge that all kinds of relations 
may exist between a state and another state which 
it does not recognize.58 ) Thus it is not only 
possible for states to have "unofficial" relations 
with the unrecognized entity59) such as commercial 
~----------------------------------------------
--------relations/ ... 
57) This in effect answers the point raised by Lauterpacht, pp. 40-41 
that a unilateral act such as recognition, if it is to have Juridical 
effects, must operate on an entity which already exists within the 
legal system in question. 
58) Briggs, pp. 114-115; Chen, p. 37; Marshall Brown, note 50) supra, 
p. 362; M. Lachs, "Recognition and Modern Methods of International 
Co-operation" (35) B.Y.I.L., 1959,p. 252 at p. 256; Herbert W.Briggq. 
"Recognition of States: Some Reflections on Doctrine and Practice" 
(43) A.J.I.L., 1949, p. 113 at p. 117. 
59) Ibid. 
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relations, but in addition official relations, 
relations officieuses, political relations, repre-
sentative relations and even diplomatic and consular 
relations.60 ) In addition an unrecognized state 
might conclude bilateral agrewnents with states 
which do not recognize it, 61 ) participate in multi-
lateral agreements to which its non-recognizers are 
62) parties and become a member of international organ-
izations in which its non-recognizers are also 
members. 63 ) 
In the event of the above relations, or any of them, 
existing with a state which has not been expressly 
recognized, there are two possibilities. (A). 
Recognition is implied from the existence of the 
relations in question or from one or more of them. 
(B) Recognition cannot be implied from any of the 
relations in question. We must now discuss each of 
these possibilities in turn. 
(A) If recognition can be implied from the existence 
of the relations the position is that the entity 
-------------------------------
is/ •.. 
6 o) Chen, pp. 216, 217. 
61) B.R.Bot, Non Recognition and Treaty Relations, Leiden, 1968, p.30; 
Briggs, note 58) supra, p. 117. For early examples see Jochen A. 
Frowein, "Transfer or Recognition of Sovereignty - Some early 
problems in connection with Dependent Territories" (65) A.J.I.L., 
1971, pp. 568-570. Lachs, note 58) supra points out that since 
the nineteen twenties there has been an ever-growing number of bi-
lateral agreements concluded on all sorts of matters between states 
which do not recognize one another. 
62) Bot, note 61) supra, p. 30; Lachs, note 58) supra, pp. 253-259. 
63) Lauterpacht, pp. 402-403; Kelsen, note 17) supra, p. 614. 
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is now an international person by virtue of 
the implied recognition in question.64 ) While 
on this topic of implied recognition we shall 
briefly discuss the circumstances in which 
recognition may be implied from common particip-
ation in multilateral treaties and international 
organizations.65) The general principles 
applicable to implied recognition stress that 
intention is paramount and that recognition 
will not lightly be implied.66 ) If an intention 
to recognize can be gleaned from participation 
in a multilateral treaty, then there will be 
recognition. The general rule of thumb, however, 
is that participation in a multi-lateral treaty 
does not imply recognition67 ) (unless of course 
an intention to recognize is clearly present). 
There are however two cases in which recognition 
may be implied from mere participation in a 
multilateral treaty: (i) where there is 
simultaneous signing of the treaty rather than 
subsequent adherence to the treaty by the un-
68) 
recognized state; (ii) where the unrecognized 
________
________
________
_____ state/ ... 
64) The recognition implied need not necessarily be full de iure 
recognition but might be limited in scope. The distinction between 
full and limited recognition and the scope of the latter are dis-
cussed infra, pp. 184-188, 198-208, 238, 279-28o. 
65) The circumstances in which recognition may be implied from all the 
other relations mentioned above is fully discussed infra,pp. 344-365 . 
66) Infra, pp.342-344. 
67) Lauterpacht, p. 374; Bot, note 61) supra, p. 30. 
68) Chen, p. 204. 
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state adheres to a "closed" convention.69) 
both of these cases there is a strong pre-
In 
sumption in favour of recognition (but it can 
of course be displaced by showing a contrary 
intention). If no intention to recognize fully 
can be implied, an intention to bestow a limited 
recognition might still be implied. Here recog-
nition would be limited to bestowing personality 
on the "unrecognized" entity for the purposes 
of participation in the multilateral treaty and 
enjoying rights and duties thereunder only.?O) 
Finally, there may be an intention not to accord 
any kind of recognition, either full or limited 
to the state which participates in a multi-
lateral treaty to which its non-recognizer is 
also a party. The non-recognizing state might 
specifically declare its non-recognition thus 
rebutting any implication of recognition. It 
might for instance state ex abundanti cautela 
that participation is not to be interpreted as 
recognition; it might refuse to admit the non-
recognized to any participation in the treaty 
with it; it might refuse to accept any obligat-
ions resulting from the treaty in its relations 
---------------------------with/ ... 
69) Ibid., pp. 204-205; Bot, note 61) supra, p. 31, If the consent of 
the original signatories is necessary for subsequent adherence to 
the treaty by other states, the treaty in question is "closed", 
otherwise it is open. Ibid.; Chen, pp. 204-205, 
70) There is an admission of the treaty-making capacity of the "unrec-
ognized" and recognition for the purposes of the treaty in question. 
See Chen, p. 193 and Lachs, note 58) supra, p. 258. On the concept 
of limited as opposed to full (i.e. de lure) recognition see 
discussion infra, pp. 184-188, 198-208, 238, 279-28o. 
with the unrecognized. 71 ) In all these cases 
where there is no recognition, there will be 
no relations under the lm.lltilateral treaty 
between the unrecognized and its non-recognizer 
but there will be relations between the un-
recognized and other parties to the treaty 
which do recognize it.72 ) 
In general the same rules ahd principles govern 
the question of implied recognition when an 
unrecognized state becomes a member of an 
international organization. Though full recog-
nition can be implied from admission to such 
membership, the general rule is that admission 
does not imply such recognition. 73 ) Limited 
recognition for the purpose only of enjoying the 
rights and duties incidental to membership of 
the international organization might be implied. 
Thus Kelsen asserts that a state admitted to 
membership of the League of Nations got the 
rights and duties in the Covenant of the League 
against its non-recognizers. 74 ) The Secretary-
General/ ... 
----------------------------
71) 
72) 
73) 
74) 
Lachs, note 58) supra, pp. 256-257. 
As Lauterpacht, p. 372 points out there is no compelling reason why 
there should be contractual relations between each contracting party 
and all other signatories. Thus though East Germany is an accession-
ary to many multilateral treaties the United Kingdom refuses to 
recognize this. For a list of these treaties see O'Connell, I,p.287. 
Lauterpacht, p. 93. 
Note 17) supra, p. 614. 
to the United Nations, he 
implies full recognition. 
1951, p. 947. 
But in relation to the admission of a state 
would appear to take the view that it 
See The Law of the United Nations, London, 
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General of the United Nations advocated the 
doctrine that admission to the United Nations 
is a collective act which is distinct from the 
recognition of each of the member states. 75) 
Dependent states are sometimes admitted to 
international organizations. Here there cannot 
be full recognition of the dependency but there 
must of necessity be a limited recognition for 
the purposes of enjoying the rights and duties 
of a member of the international organization 
in question. 76 ) This is of particular signific-
ance to Rhodesia which, as a dependency, was a 
member of several international organizations 
and still continues to hold such memberships. 77 ) 
Chen poses an interesting question in relation 
to the implication of recogniti?n from admission 
to an international organization. If admission 
amounts to recognition, would that recognition 
be considered withdrawn if the state in question 
ceased to be a member?78) If the recognition 
implied was full recognition, it would continue 
despite cessation of membership as de iure 
recognition, once accorded, cannot as a general 
-----------------------------'rule/ . .. 
75) Ibid. 
76) Lachs, note 58) supra, p. 255. 
77) Supr:a, pp_.105-1, 6; Infra, pp. 38o-382. 
78) Chen, p. 213 
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rule be withdrawn. 79) On the other hand if 
the recognition implied were limited, it is 
submitted that it could be withdrawn.Bo) 
Finally the admission of a state to an inter-
national organization might not imply any form 
of recognition if the intention not to recog-
nize in any way is quite clear. Thus Switzer-
land and Belgium expressly assented their 
continued non-recognition of the Soviet Union 
and their right to do so was not challenged 
81) by other members of the League. Great 
Britain adopted the same attitude to Lithuania 
when it was admitted to the League of Nations. 82 ) 
The admission of Israel suggests that ~xisting 
members do not regard membership of the United 
Nations as automatically entailing recognition.8:3 ) 
We must note however Kelsen's assertion that 
limited recognition was necessarily implied 
from admission of a state to the League of 
Nations, the reason being that the members of 
the League had transferred their competence to 
recognize to the organs of the League but the 
~-------------------------------------------
-------~transfer/ ... 
79) Starke, p. 153. 
Bo) De facto recognition, a relatively comprehensive form of limited 
recognition, can, in principle, be withdrawn; Starke, p.158. 
A fortiori other forms of less comprehensive limited recognition 
can be withdrawn. 
81) Lauterpacht, p. 402. 
82) Ibid., p, 403. 
83) Chen, p. 215. 
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transfer was limited to the question whether a 
state should be admitted to memb~rship. 84 ) In 
relation to admission to the United Nations he 
would appear to favour an implication of full 
recognition. 85) 
(B) The second possibility is that recognition of 
a state cannot be implied from any of the 
relations subsisting with it. 
In this case the relations are simply not 
governed by international law. Neither the 
unrecognized state nor the non-recognizing 
state has any rights or duties in respect of 
such relations. Even if agreements subsist 
these do not create international law obligat-
ions. They are either mere "gentleman's" agree-
ments or contracts under some municipal law 
system. Which of these exist depends naturally 
on the intentions of the parties.e6) 
The relations which exist before recognition 
have been described, and it is submitted, 
correctly, as being de facto intercourse. 87) 
-----------------
---------They/ ... 
84) Note 17), supra, p. 614. 
85) Note 74), supra, p. 947. Chen, p. 213 would appear to hold similar 
views but concedes that this is at variance with practice which 
illustrates that in several cases states have insisted on the right 
to withhold recognition from a new member of an organization. 
e6) For discussion of the possibilities where the agreement does not 
create international law obligations see infra, pp. 357-360. 
87) Lauterpacht, p. 347. De facto intercourse must be distinguished 
from de facto recognition. The former subsists before recognition. 
The latter is a species of limited recognition which does create 
international personality so that resulting relations a~er de facto 
recognition may be legal (i.e. international law) relations. 
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They are not governed by international law and 
there is thus no anomaly. 
Marshall Brown says that the problem concerning 
relations is to determine the nature and extent 
88' of such relations. ' This is an apt summary of 
the problem. As far as the nature of such 
relations is concerned we must establish whether 
there is recognition or not. If there is no 
recognition the relations amount to de facto 
intercourse only. If there is recognition, the 
relations may be legal, i.e. governed by inter-
national law. To establish the extent of such 
legal relations we have to enquire into the 
extent of the recognition accorded, to see 
whether it is full de iure recognition or 
limited recognition, and if the latter, the 
precise extent of such recognition. 
(iii)The unrecognized state must observe international law. 
This argument in effect says that since an unrecognized 
state has duties under international law it is an inter-
national person.89) Therefore personality does not stem 
from recognition in this case and the Constitutive theory 
i s incorrect . 
------------------------___:BY/ ... 
88) Note 50 ) supra, p. 632. 
89) Brownlie, p. 8.3; Briggs , p. 115; Sorensen, pp. 269-270; Whiteman , 
II, p. 648; Herbert W. Briggs, "Recognition of States: Some Reflect -
ions on Doctrine and Practice" (43) A.J .I.L., 1949, p. 113 at p .118 . 
Naturally claims may ee made against such unrecognized states for 
breaches of internati ona l law. 
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By way of preliminary observation one may be permitted to 
remark that if this rule exists in international law it 
would appear to be unnecessary. A state need never be 
prejudiced by the conduct of an unrecognized state, and 
if it is prejudiced, the remedy lies in its own hands. All 
it has to do is to accord recognition to the unrecognized 
state and the latter will then be fully bound by the rules 
of international law in its relations with its recognizer?O) 
To avoid prejudice the state need only bring the legal 
position into line with the effective facts by according 
recognition. If it is unwilling to do this, it should 
have to bear the consequences of the legal vacuum, viz. 
that the unrecognized state owes it no obligations. 
Four points now arise for consideration in relation to 
the above-stated rule: 
(A) Has this rule established itself in international law? 
(B) If so, when do these duties actually exist? 
(C) How can the existence of such duties be explained 
juristically? 
(D) What is the extent of personality in these cases? 
(A) If the rule has established itself, it must have 
done so by operation of the custom-forming process. 
The general practice of states must admit the 
ossibility/ ... __________________________ _..-
90) A possible exception might be where there is a duty not to 
recognize a particular state. See infra, pp. 295 et seqq. 
-191-
possibility of an unrecognized state being bound by 
international law and the general view should be that 
this is legally possible - the ".'.lpinio Juris sive 
necessitatis. A general practice would appear to 
involve continuity, in that it should emanate from 
a multiplicity of precedents, and extensiveness, in 
that it should emanate from the practice of a suffic-
ient number of states to be representative of the 
community of nations.9l) There is certainly evidence 
of state practice in which international claims have 
been preferred against unrecognized states. 92 ) In 
modern/ ... 
------------------------------
91) Sorensen, pp. 130-132. 
92) That states may present claims against unrecognized entities is 
recognized by British practice, though originally the British view 
was that this was not possible. Whiteman, II, p.649. There are 
also examples of United States claims against unrecognized regimes, 
e.g. when a British aircraft was shot down by the Communist Chinese 
over the High Seas in 1954 with loss of United States lives, Sec-
retary of State Dulles stated that the Chinese must be held respon-
sible. The regime at Peking was informed that the United States 
reserved the right to present claims as the act was "illegal and 
wrongful" and an "illegal attack". The Chinese authorities could 
not "under established international law" dispose of their respon-
sibility. The Department of State said it was necessary to invoke 
"universally recognized rules of international law" and that the 
act constituted "a wrong t o the United States ... in violation of 
international law ... for which the United States demands redress". 
The Chinese expressed regret and sympathy and paid a lump sum for 
compensation. In the George W. Hopkins Clai~, United States-Mexican 
Claims Commission, it was held that the United States could make 
claims against Mexico arising out of the conduct of the Huerta 
government which it had not recognized. On the above see Whiteman, 
II, pp. 650-653. On 9th May, 1922 the United States protested to the 
authorities of unrecognized Albania for depriving Americans of their 
~assports and forcing Albanian passports on them. See Briggs, note 
89) supra, p.118. 
-192-
modern times the most pertinent examples are United 
States charges against North Vietnam and Arab 
charges against Israel.93) The latter call for some 
particular comment as they have been the subject 
matter of p~oceedings at the United Nations and they 
therefore afford an opportunity to establish general 
practice and views concerning the matter at issue. 
When the June, 1967, "Six-day'War, took place the 
Security Council of the United Nations had the 
opportunity to express its views on the matter and 
it passed five resolutions.94) Two of these resolut-
ions throw some light on the matter at hand. After 
a cease-fire had been arranged between Israel and 
Syria the Security Council passed a resolution in 
which it condermed "any and all violations of the 
cease fire". 95) This, it is submitted, indicates 
that in the view of the Council, Israel has a duty 
to Syria to observe the cease-fire. later the 
Security Council considered: 
" ... that all obligations of the Geneva 
Convention relative to the Treatment of 
Prisoners of War of 12 August, 1949 should 
be complied with by the parties involved in 
the conflict." 96) 
This is a very clear indication that the Council is 
of the view that Israel has duties to the Arab 
~---------------~-------------
--------~~~~~~--------------
-------States/ ..• 
93) Brownlie, p. 83. Israel is a member of the United Nations and yet 
is unrecognized by the Arab States, also members. Chen, p. 215. 
94) S. Res. 233 (1967); 234 (1967); 235 (1967); 236 (1967) ; 237 (1967 ) . 
95) S. Res. 236 (1967) paragraph 1. 
96) s. Res. 237 (1967). 
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states under the Convention in question.97) Some 
three weeks later the General Assembly welcomed the 
latter resolution of the Security Council and expressed 
its views on the applicability of the above Convention 
to the parties involved in the conflict.98 ) This 
resolution, it is submitted, is extremely relevant 
because it was passed by an affirmative vote of 116 
states and what is more important there was no opposit-
.!£!1 to it. This clearly means that it is the near-
universal view that Israel, an unrecognized state, 
owes certain duties under the Convention in question 
to the Arab states which do not recognize it. 
The General Assembly also expressed the view that 
Israel has a duty not to change the status of 
Jerusalem.99) This resolution is not such over-
whelming evidence of view as the previous one because 
although it did not encounter any opposit i on there 
were twenty abstentions in voting. It does however, 
add to the weight of the available evidence. The 
Security Council, almost a year later, recalled the 
Assembly resolution and expressed similar views in 
which it considered: 
" ... that all legislative and administrative 
measures and actions taken by Israel, including 
expropriation of land and properties thereon, 
which tend to change the legal status of Jerus-
alem are invalid and cannot change that status" 
-------
-------
-------
-----~and/ ... 
97) U.N.T.S, Vol. 75 (1950) , No . 972. 
98) A. Res. 2252, 4th July, 1967, paragraph 1 (d). · 
99) A. Res. 2253, 4th July, 1967, paragraph 2. 
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and urgently called upon Israel 
"to rescind all such measures already taken 
and to desist forthwith from taking any further 
action which tends to change the status of 
Jerusalem." 100) 
Thus in the view of the Council (in which there was 
no opposition to the motion) Israel has not only a 
duty not to take such measures but also to rescind 
those already taken. 
It is clear too that the views of individual states 
and groups of states reflect the above expressed 
views. The u.s.s.R. presented a dra~ resolution 
to the General Assembly demanding that Israel should 
unconditionally withdraw its forces, respect the 
status of the demilitarized zones as prescribed in 
the armistice agreements, make good all damage in-
flicted by its "aggression" and return all seized 
property.lOl) It can be cogently argued that this 
dra~ supports the contention that the Soviet view 
would regard Israel as having international law 
obligations to the Arab States in the above respects. 
The U.S A. also presented a dra~ resolution which 
called on the parties inter alia to scrupulously 
observe the cease-fire.102 ) This, it is submitted, 
means that the U.S.A . regards all parties as having 
------------------------------
--------------------~·international/ .. . 
100) s. Res. 252 (1968), paragraphs 2, 3. 
101) For text of the draft resolution (which was not adopted, nor was 
any single paragraph thereof adopted though the paragraphs were voted 
upon individually) see (6) I.L.M., 1967, pp. 837-838. 
102) For text of draft resolution (which was not put to a vote because 
the U.S.A. did not press for a vote on it) see (6) I.L.M., 1967, p. 8)S. 
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international obligations to each other here. Further 
103) 
resolutions were also presented by Albania, 
lo4) 
Afganistan and sixteen otter Afro-Asian states 
and twenty Latin-American States~05) From these 
resolutions it may also be concluded that in the 
view of the respective proposers Israel may have 
international law duties to the Arab States. 
The conclusion from the examination of the above 
material is that there is very weighty evidence in 
favour of the view that an unrecognized state may 
have international law duties. In fact it would 
appear to be the general view that such a customary 
rule exists. It is significant that in all the 
resolutions and dra~ resolutions relating to the 
Middle East situation referred to above, Israel's 
lack of recognition is not once mentioned. It is 
simply assumed automatically that Israel is the 
bearer of duties towards the Arab States (and that 
it has even broken some of them). The rule would 
also appear to reflect the practice of states in 
general including the more important powers. The 
writer's submission, therefore, is that an unrecog-
nized state may be the bearer of duties towards those 
states which do not recognize it. 
---------------
-------(B)/ ... 
103) For text of draft resolution (which was not adopted though it received 
twenty-two votes in its favour) see ibid., pp. 840-841. 
lo4) For text of dra~ resolution (which was not adopted though it receivec 
fifty-three votes in its fa'\Our) see ibid., pp. 842-843. 
105) For text of dra~ resolution (which was not adopted though it received 
fi~y-seven votes in its favour) see~., pp. 844-845. 
~lZ<!o' -..,,. d-, ,_,.._ .••.•• :~}~...., - , """ 
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(B) We have Just argued that in principle an unrecognised 
state may have duties. However, these duties, it is 
submitted, are not automatic and so the question 
arises as to precisely when such duties may be said 
to exist in an individual case. Lauterpacht's view 
that 
" ... there is no objection to treating the unrec-
ognized state as if it were bound by obligations 
of international law ... if the non-recognizing 
state acknowledges itself to be bound by them."lo6) 
describes the conditions which must be fulfilled before 
the unrecognized state has international duties in an 
individual instance. These are : (l) the state must 
be treated as if it had obligations. This treatment 
must be accorded by the non-recognizer. The latter 
will therefore call upon the unrecognized state to 
observe certain international law duties towards it or 
it will complain that the unrecognized state has not 
observed such duties towards it. Such a complaint, 
it is submitted, might be directed either to the 
unrecognized entity or to some body with power to 
deliberate or adjudicate on the subject matter of 
the dispute e.g. the General Assembly or the Security 
Council of the United Nations or the 'International 
Court of Justice'. It is submitted that Arab charges 
against Israel and United States charges against North 
Vietnam amount to such complaints.lo?) In the absence 
----------
----------
----------
----------
----------
----of/ ... 
lo6) P.54. 
107) Also the other instances mentioned in footnote 92) supra. 
' 
"' "<a.. 1 
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of such a call or such a complaint, the unrecognized 
state has no duties to its non-recognizers because 
it has not been treated by them as if it had inter-
national obligations. (ii) The non-recognizing 
state must acknowledge itself to be bound by such 
duties. This is no more than the application of a 
principle of reciprocity . The non-recognizing state 
may impose international law duties on the non-recog-
nized state without according formal or full recognit-
ion to it but the price of this is the assumption of 
reciprocal duties to the non-recognized state and, of 
course, the concession of the correlative rights to 
the unrecognized state .108) This results in an in-
evitable concession of some international personality 
to the unrecognized state but not even this need be 
conceded if the non-recognizing state does not treat 
the unrecognized state as having international oblig-
ations. In the latter event it cannot complain about 
the conduct of the unrecognized state towards it for 
it cannot assume rights without undertaking corres-
ponding duties . 
(C) We have now described the conditions under which an 
unrecognized state was submitted to have duties (and 
corresponding rights). In such a position the entity 
will have an international personality and it is now 
~--~·---------------------
---------------------------
----~our/ .•• 
108) On reciprocity in relation to recognition see Le Normand, p.60 . 
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our task to explain this personality Juristically. 
It is undoubted that here there is no full recognition , 
either express or implied, of the state in question 
and that is why we have referred to it as the 
"unrecognized state". It is submitted however, that 
when the matter is analysed closely there is a form of 
limited recognition here. The recognition is limited 
because it only concedes the capacity to be the bearer 
of a limited number of rights and duties. Full recog -
nition would, by way of contrast, concede the capacity 
to be the bearer of all conceivable rights and dut i es 
in international law vis-a-vis the recogni zer. Recog -
nition whether full or limited, is a consensual act
109 ) 
and as such it must be either expressly granted or 
must be impliedllO) from some conduct on the part of 
the state alleged to have accorded the recognition. 
In the case under consideration limited recognition 
is necessarily implied from the conduct of the non-
recognizing state in calling upon the unrecognized 
state to observe rules of international law or in 
complaining that it has not done so. This implied 
but limited recognition Juristically explains the 
international personality residing in the state 
which has not been formall y recognized. 
There is , it i s submitted, much evidence in favour 
of the proposition that recognition can be limited. 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~---Lauterpacht/ . .. 
109) Schwarzenberger, Manual, p. 171 describes it as a unilateral 
consensual act . 
110 ) Schwarzenberger, I, p.128. 
111) P. 340. 
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Lauterpacht states the position correctly when he 
says that the necessities of international intercourse 
do not favour a rigid dichotomy between full and 
111) 
no recognition. Limited recognition is possible 
and this idea has been described in various ways. 
Thus it is said that there can be recognition for 
112) 
certain purposes only, there can be a concession 
of certain faculties to an unrecognized state,
113) 
there can be a pro tanto admission of the capacity 
of an unrecognized state while refusing recognition 
114) 
for other purposes, there can be partial recognit-
ionll5) and limited recognition. 116 ) There is in 
other words, no implication that the limited relations 
which exist prior to full recognition are not governed 
by international law. 117 ) When there is partial 
recognition the recognized does not have the capacity 
of an equal member of the international community.
118 ) 
We may also add that established categories of such 
limited or partial recognition with a crystallized 
content have appeared. Thus in former cent~r.ies three 
112) Lauterpacht, p. 54; Le Normand, p. 74. 
113) Lauterpacht, p. 375. 
114) Ibid. 
115) ~ reconnaissance partielle on limitee dans le temps." A. Raestad, 
11 La Reconnaissance internationale des nouveaux etats et des nouveaux 
gouvernements" (17) Revue de Droit International et de Legislation 
Comparee 11, 1936, p. 257 at p. 284. 
116) Schwarzenberger, I, p. 459. 
117) Briggs, note 8<)) supra, at p. 120 . 
118) R. Erich, "La Naissance et la Reconnaissance des Etats" (3) H.R., 
1926, p. 431 at p. 464. 
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different degrees of recognition were accorded depend-
ing on whether the community was regarded as civilized, 
barbarous or savage, the latter two being species of 
partial recognition. 119) Today de facto recognition 
is in effect an established category of partial or 
limited recognition with a crystallized content. Thus 
de facto recognition is provisional in nature, is 
liable to be withdrawn and is limited to certain 
120) juridical relations. The limited nature of de 
facto recognition is often illustrated by contrasting 
it with de iure recognition which is full or complete 
recognition for all purposes of international law.
121 ) 
Thus de facto recognition is like de iure recognition 
in that both depend upon intention, express or 
implied, 122 ) both are forms of legal recognition and 
thus create personality, 123 ) the entity recognized 
has jurisdictional immunities in both cases, 124 ) 
internal acts may be recognized as valid in both 
cases,
125) in both cases recognition may be retro-
126) 
spective. On the other hand de facto recognition 
is/ ... 
------------------
--------------
119) Le Normand, p. 63. 
120) Lauterpacht, p. 338; Institute de droit International, Resolutions 
Concerning the Recognition of New States and New Governments, Art.3. 
For text see (30) A.J . I.L., 1936, supp. p. 185. 
121) Ibid.; G.N .Barrie, "The High Court of Rhodesia and U.D.I." (30 ) 
fF.R-H.R.,1967, p.147. 
122) Institute de Droit International, note 120 ) supra, Arts. 3, 9, 
123) Barrie, note 121) supra, p. 147. Kelsen, note 17) supra. p.612. 
The latter goes so far as to say (p.613) that the distinction between 
de facto and de iure recognition has no importance from a jurist i c 
point of view, that the effects of de facto recognition are the same 
as those of de iure recognition. If this is so de facto recognition 
would be full recognition. But practice establishes that ~tis 
limited in certain respects. 
124) The Gagara [1919] P.95; The Arantzazu Mend! [1939] A.c. 256. 
125) Luther v. Sagar [1919] 3 K.B. 532. 
126) Luther's case, note 125) supra. Sed contra OetJen v. Central Leather 
Company (1918) 246 U.S. 302 . Lauterpacht, p.342 points out however 
that the limitation of retroactivity to de iure recognition in the 
latter case was unintentional. 
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is more limited than de iure recognition in that 
the entity so recognized is not normally accorded 
succession rights127 ) and diplomatic immunities. 128) 
Such recognition does not carry with it full and 
normal diplomatic intercourse. 129) Thus it would 
appear that the international personality of the 
state recognized de facto is limited because a 
limited form of recognition has been accorded to it.l30 ) 
(D) We have now submitted that a limited personality flows 
from an implied but limited recognition when a state 
treats another state which it has not fully recognized 
as being subject to international law obligations. It 
now remains to consider the extent of the resultant 
limited personality about which there appears to be 
some doubt. It has been asserted that the non~recog-
nized state (or government) is bound to observe 
universally/ ... 
---------------------
---------
127) Haile Selassie v. Cable and Wireless Ltd. (No.2) [1939] Ch.182; 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics v. Onou, Ann. Dig., 1925-1926, 
case no. 74, p. 96; Union of Soviet Socialist Republics v. Balaiew, 
ibid., case no. 123, p. 172. 
128) ~on Textile Association v. Krassin (1922) 38 T.L.R. 260. 
129) Ibid. As Kelsen, note 17) supra, p. 612 points out this factor is 
Juristically irrelevant because there is in any event no international 
obligation to establish diplomatic relations with a fully recognized 
state. 
130) For a summary of the principal restrictions on the rights of a state 
recognized de facto see Starke, pp. 156-158; Sorensen, pp. 277-278. 
The whole institution of de facto recognition is criticised by Kelsen, 
note 17 supra, pp. 612-613. See note 123 supra, for the criticism. 
It is also attacked by Baty, "Abuse of Terms: 'Recognition' : 'War' " 
(30) A.J.I.L., 1936, p. 377 as follows. "This desire of politicians 
to create a new status of de facto states with truncated rights, 
unknown powers and undefined responsibilities, is a phenomenon of t hts 
illogical twentieth century." This criticism, it is submitted, goes 
too far. The limitations on the rights of a state recogniz.ed de 
facto have crystallized into fairly definite categories and apart 
from these limitations, the rights of a state recognized de facto 
are the same as those of a state recognized de iure. 
universally recognized rules of international law. 131 ) 
Presumably the personality would not be so extensive 
here as to bind the state by rules of general inter-
national law132 )or regional customary international 
law.133) 
There are, it is submitted, difficulties in the 
path of accepting the above view. In the first place, 
assume that the non-recognizing state calls upon the 
unrecognized state to observe a rule of general or 
regional international law (as opposed to universal 
law). Does this mean that the call in question 
will be completely ineffective because the unrecog-
nized state will thereupon obtain a personality 
whi ch will bind it to the observance of universal 
norms only?134 ) In the second place such a result 
may militate against the intentions of the non-
recognizing state. The non-recognizing state may 
call upon the unrecognized state t o observe a single 
norm of internat i ona l l aw. Its i nt ention may be 
to impose rights and dut ies i t 
131) Sorensen, pp. 269-270; Lauterpacht, p. 54. 
132) In view of the possible application of the doctrine of persistent 
opposit i on in the custom-forming process (see Sorensen, pp.136-137 ) 
it is submitted that one must draw a distinction between rules of 
universal customary law and rules of general customary law. The 
latter bind the great majority of stat es whi ch are representative 
of the world community as a whole but they do not bind all states. 
The former bind universally without exception. 
133) Asylum Case (1950) I.C.J Rep. 266. 
134) Lauterpacht, p. 54 seems to be of the view that the unrecognized 
state may only be treated as being bound by obligations which are 
so compelling as to be universally admitted. 
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relation to that particular norm only. We have 
already submitted that this call will in fact be a 
a form of implied but limited recognition. Since, 
as pointed out too, recognition is an essentially 
consensual act, its scope and effects must be deter-
mined in accordance with intention. 135) As such, a 
construction which militates against the intentions 
of the recognizer by according a status in which 
the entity would be subject to all duties of a 
universal nature, instead of the single duty in-
tended, is unacceptable. 
The only acceptable solution lies, it is submitted, 
in relating the extent of personality conceded to 
the intentions of the state which treats the un-
recognized state as if it were bound by certain 
norms of international law. The unrecognized state 
will have duties to observe the particular norms 
which it is called upon to observe, or about the 
infringement of which a complaint has been made, 
and no further. 136 ) The unrecognized state will 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-naturally/ . .. 
135) Intention is paramount in relation to recognition. Lauterpacht, 
pp . .369, 370, 371, 372, 378; Bot, note 61) supra, p. 32; Institute 
de Droit International, note 120 supra, Arts, 4, 9. See too dis-
cussion infra, pp. 342-343 where the question of implied recognition 
of Rhodesia is considered. 
1.36) " ... a situation is thus created in which the unrecognized community 
is treated for some purposes as if it were a subject of international 
law, namely to the extent to which existing states elect to treat 
it as such ... " Lauterpacht, p. 54. It enjoys personality to the 
extent that this is conceded by other states. Ibid., p.375. 
D. Anzilotti, Cours de Droit International (Tr. Gidel) Paris, 
1929, I, says at p.171 " ... la reconaissance est susceptible d'effets 
assez differents qui dependent de la volonte des parties ... ", and 
at p. 173, "les effets de la reconaissance sont done tous ceux, et 
seulement ceux, qui ant ete voulus par les parties." 
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naturally have the benefit of these norms and so 
will enjoy corresponding rights. It does not matter 
whether the norms in question are norms of a universal, 
general or regional character provided only that the 
unrecognized state would be bound by them were it 
fully recognized. 137 ) The non-recognizing state 
may at any time extend personality by treating the 
unrecognized entity as if it were bound by further 
norms of international law. The non-recognizing 
state cannot be prejudiced here because it lies 
solely in its discretion whether to extend the 
personality and if so in what direction and to 
what degree. It cannot complain however, about 
any conduct by the unrecognized entity which is 
not related to the norms for the observance of which 
it has called. The personality of the unrecognized 
entity will only expand into a full personality when 
it is accorded full recognition which may be express 
or implied. 138) This theoretical construction is , it 
is/ . . . 
---------------
---------------
-
137) Thus for instance, calling upon an entity to observe the provisi ons 
of a treaty to which it was not a party would, it is submitted, be 
completely ineffective as a form of limited and implied recognit i on 
because even if the entity were fully recognized it would not be 
bound by such norms. 
138) Thus when a state which was formerly recognized de facto, is 
recognized de iure its personality expands into a full internat-
ional personality. See Barrie, note 121) supra, p. 147. This too 
explains the position of Albania with which the United States con-
cluded a most-favoured nation agreement by exchange of notes on 
June 23rd and 25th, 1922 and to which the United States protested 
on account of deprivation of the passports of American citizens 
on 9th May, 1922 but which was not recognized by the United States 
until the 28th July, 1922. See Briggs, note 89) supra, p.118. 
Before 28th July, 1922 recognition of Albanian personality was 
limited to the norms about which the United States protested and 
to those in the agreement in question. On 28th July, 1922 Albanian 
personality became complete when full recognition was accorded. 
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is submitted, in accordance with the practice of 
Foreign offices which, in the words of Briggs 
" ... have ... regarded recognition as extending 
the scope of rights and obligations between rec-
ognizing and recognized states." 139) 
From the above we may come to the conclusion that 
international personality, when it is not a full 
personality, but a limited personality, con-
sists of a complex of rights and obligations, the 
extent of which depends upon the degree of recognit-
ion already afforded. This complex may be of a 
changing and expanding character as new degrees of 
recognition are accorded. Expansion is only complete 
when ~111 de iure recognition has been given. I f we 
apply these theories it becomes easy to explain 
situations such as the constitution of the older 
Dominions in the British Commonwealth as independ-
ent states for international law purposes. Limited 
degrees of international personality were gradually 
conceded to these entities. This limited personality 
continued to expand with further concessions until 
eventually the Dominions emerged as full inter-
140) 
national persons. In the same way it is easy to 
explain the expanding but always limited international 
personality of Southern Rhodesia in the years between 
1923 and 1965. 141 ) 
The/ ... 
------------------------
-------
139) P. 116. 
140) Adopting this construction, one avoids the difficulties inherent 
in questions such as whether the Statute of Westminster, 22 Geo.5 , 
Ch. 4, constituted recognition of the Dominions. See Whiteman, II . 
pp. 22-23; Chen, p. 26. 
141) Supra, pp. 81-90, 105-119. 
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The above construction of the position of the "unrecog-
nized" state is strengthened by the presumption against 
the inference of unilateral acts which are capable of 
express formulation and that against the renunciation 
of rights by subjects of international law. 142 ) In 
the present context these presumptions would operate 
to give as restrictive an effect as possible to the 
conduct of the state calling for the observance of 
certain norms of international law. 
It will be necessary to apply the above conclusions 
at a later stage when the possible existence and 
extent of Rhodesian personality are determined. 
(iv) Rights are conceded to the unrecognized state even before 
recognition. 
It is said, for example, that except perhaps in such 
fields as the extraterritorial effect to be given to 
certain state acts, practice with regard to unrecognized 
states reveals no wholesale disregard of the rights 
stipulated by international law for the governing of 
international relations. 143) Thus its territorial 
integrity will be respected, relations may exist with it, 
agreements will be observed and its power to govern and 
determine legal relations within the territory will be 
respected. 144 ) Further,should an unrecognized community 
------
------
------
------
--.:become/ ... 
142) Schwarzenberger, I, p. 552. 
143) Briggs, p. 116. 
144) Briggs, note 89) supra, p. 117. 
-207-
become engaged in war, the laws of war will be followed.
145) 
Likewise should such a community remain neutral in an 
international war, its neutrality must be respected .
146 ) 
The fact, however, that established subjects of internat-
ional law may, in individual cases, allow an unrecognized 
state to enjoy de facto some of the privileges of a recog-
nized state does not mean that they concede rights in this 
regard to such an entity de iure. Nor does it mean that 
they consider themselves subject to an international law 
duty to the unrecognized state to act in such a way. The 
unrecognized state is simply le~ alone as a matter of 
courtesy, comity, lack of interest or perhaps even self-
interest and not as a matter of obligation.
147) And of 
course the non-recognizing state may at any time change 
its policy in this respect and may attempt to deny, in 
so far as it is able to do so, such privileges to the 
unrecognized state. It will not thereby incur any inter-
national responsibility to the unrecognized entity,because 
the latter had no rights to be infringed. 
---------
---------
---------
---------
---------
---------
....cFinally/ ... 
145) Chen, p. 34 who quotes Lauterpacht, p. 54, in support of this. But 
it will shortly appear that Lauterpacht did not intend to assert 
that such relations would be legal relations. 
146) Chen, p. 34; Brierly, 11Regles Generales du Droit de la Paix11 (58) 
(4) H.R. 1936, p. 5 at p. 54. 
147) Lauterpacht , p. 54 says that in all probability the mutual observance 
of most rules of warfare between the unrecognized and its non-
recognizer will naturally follow f or reasons of humanity, of fear 
of retaliation, of military convenience, of conservation of military 
energy and generally for considerations similar to those for whi ch 
the rules of warfare are observed in a civil war between the lawful 
government and rebels whom it has declared to be traitors. Lauter-
pacht does not say t:ra.t the rules of warfare are observed because 
they are considered to be legally binding. 
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Finally it must be conceded of course that a state which 
is not fully recognized may have rights before full recog-
nition. Indeed this will be the position whenever the 
state has obligations before full recognition.
148) As 
we have seen the state will enjoy rights corresponding to 
its obligations.149) But the limited rights and obligat-
ions existing in such circumstances are in fact directly 
attributable to the fact that there has been an implied 
and limited recognition.l50) As such the existence of 
rights (and obligations) before formal and full recognation 
is perfectly in accord with constitutive doctrine. 
(v) Recognition is sometimes afforded to the internal acts of 
an unrecognized entity. 
The int~rnal legal system embodying the legislative, 
Judicial and executive acts of an unrecognized entity may 
be afforded legal validity by the legal system of a non-
recognizing state. 15l) The reason asserted for this is 
that the regime of an unrecognized entity exists in fact , 
it has the power to change legal relations in the place 
where it exists, and that power, together with its effects, 
must be admitted by the courts of other states.
152 ) There 
is a substantial body of precedent in which validity has 
been accorded to the internal acts of unrecognized entities . 
-----
-----
-----
-----
-----
---Thus/ ... 
148) For the circumstances in which the state will have such obligations , 
see supra, pp. 196-197. 
149) Supra, p.197. 
150) Supra, pp. 197-201. 
151) Kuntz, note 36 supra , p. 717 . 
152) Borchard, note 50) supra, p.110; Marshall Brown, note 50) supra, 
p. 634; Briggs, note 89) supra, p.117. 
-209-
Thus one finds effect given to the acts of unrecognized 
entities in Judicial precedents from the United States,
153 ) 
Italy, 154 ) Germany, 155) Switzerland, 156 ) and by way of 
exception, the United Kingdom.
157) 
There is , however, also a substantial body of precedent 
which would deny any effect to the internal acts of an 
unrecognized regime. Thus it took the United States 
courts over ten years to conclude that they could give 
effect to the internal acts of the Soviets in the absence 
of recognition of the Soviet Union by the United States.
158) 
In the United Kingdom the general principle would appear 
159) 
to be to deny e f fect to the acts of unrecognized entities . 
In the Carl-Zeiss case the courts carved out an exception 
160) 
to this general rule. 
Because of the divergence of practice here it cannot be 
stated/ ... 
---------
---------
---------
-
153) Salimoff v. Standard Oil Company of New York, 262 N.Y. 220 (1933) ; 
Ann. Dig. 1933-1934, Case No. 8; Wolfsohn v. R.S.F.s.R: (1922) N.Y. 
Supp; 282, 472 ; (1923) 234 N.Y. 372, 375. 
154 ) I talian courts will apply the law of an unrecognized state as a 
general rule . See Kuntz, note 36) supra, p. 717 . 
155 ) Counterfeiting of Stamps (Czechoslovakia) Case (1920) Ann. Dig. 1919-
1922, Case No . 24 , p. 45 . 
156) In Re M. and o. (1921 ) Ann.Dig.,1919-1922, Case No. 42, p. 70. 
157) Carl-Zeiss-Stiftung v. Rayner and Keeler, Ltd. [1966] 2 All. E. R. 
536; In Re Al Fin Corporations Patent [1969] 3 All. E.R. 396. The 
latt er case is interpreted by C .J F . Kidd, "Statehood and Recognit ion'' 
(33 ) M. L.R., 1970, p. 99 at p. 101 a s yet another defeat for the 
protagonists of the Constitutive theory . 
158) Bor char d, note 50) supra , p. 109. See too The Maret, 145 F. 2d 431 ; 
Ann. Dig~ 1943-1944, Case No . 9; Gelston v. Hoyt, 3 Wheat. 246 ; 
Rose v. Himely (18o8) 4 Cranch. 241. 
159) J .G. Merrills, "Recognition and Construction" (20 ) I.C .L.Q., 1971 , 
p . 476 ; City of Berne v. Bank of England (18o4) 9 Ves. Jun.347; 
Jones v. Garcia del Rio (1823) Turner and Russell, 297. 
160 ) Note 157) supra. See Merrills, note 159) supra, p. 476. 
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stated that any international law rule has been established 
which would require a non-recognizing state to give effect 
in its own legal system to acts performed in accordance 
with the legal system of an unrecognized entity. Neither 
can it be stated that any international law rule has been 
established which would require the non-recognizing state 
to refuse to give effect to them. 
In so far as a non-recognizing state, through its courts, 
refuses to give effect to the internal acts of an unrecog-
nized entity, it is doing no more than international law 
entitles it to do. Here in effect the courts of the state 
are resorting t o a doctrine of judicial self-limitation 
under which they refuse to acknowledge their competence t o 
give effect to the acts of an entity until it is recognized . 
Here in effect the courts simply "shut their eyes" and f ollow 
the executive.161 ) 
In so far as the non-recognizing state, through its court s , 
gives e f fect to the i nter nal acts of an unrecognized 
ent i ty it does so as a matter of comity, courtesy, self-
interest, practical convenience or even because it must 
l ·t 11 1 th . . f ·t 1 i 1 ti 
162 ) i era y app y e provisions o 1 sown eg s a on , , 
It does not do so as a matter of international law oblig --
ation because no such obligation exists . Here the courts 
of the non -recognizing state are unhampered by a doctrine 
of Judic i al self-limitation.163) 
In/ ... 
-----------------------
-----
161) Chen, pp. 7, 89. 
162) As in the Al Fin case, note 157) supra, where the court simply 
had to interpret whether North Korea was a state within the meaning 
of section 24 (1) of the Patents Act, 1949 though it was not recog-
nized by H.M . Government. 
163) Chen, p. 89. 
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In effect the question whether or not validity is to be 
given to the internal acts of an unrecognized entity is 
purely a question of Private International law. The 
municipal law of the non-recognizing state may create 
rules determining precisely the circumstances in which 
it is prepared t o gi ve effect to the municipal law of 
unrecognized states. Public International law prescribes 
no rules or restrictions for it here. It is thus free to 
create nrunicipal law rules giving effect (total or partial) 
to such acts or to create rules which would completely 
deny any effect whatsoever to· the municipal law of unrecog -
nized states. Thus it is free to adopt or reject a doctrine 
of judicial self-limitation and the choice here is one for 
164) 
its own Private International law system. 
We may conclude that whenever effect is given to the 
internal acts of an unrecognized entity, the matter is 
extra-legal from an international law point of view. Al l 
that happens is that the municipal law of a non-recog-
nizing state gives effect to the municipal law of an 
unrecognized state.165) What one cannot do is to deduce 
that an entity is an international person with rights 
under international law from the mere fact that effect 
________
________
________
____ is/ ... 
164) Chen, p. 8g says that when it is unhampered by the doctrine of 
judicial self-limitati on it applies the Declaratory theory of 
recognition (thus in effect supporting that theory). With respect, 
it is submitted that this is not so. It applies its own system of 
Private International law, which is of course muni cipal law. It 
does not apply publ i c international law as such. 
165 ) Anzilotti, note 136) supra, p. 165 says that the internal validity 
of acts and laws depends upon an internal norm which obliges us to 
apply it. This norm may be wide or narrow. 
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is given to its municipal law by the municipal law of 
another state. 166 ) As Starke puts it: 
"Recognition of the validity of the laws decreed 
or enacted by a particular entity, does not necess-
arily import recognition of the law-making entity."167) 
Anzilotti puts it as follows: 
"Il est certain gue la possibilite ~'appliguer des 
lois, des sentences et des actes etrangers n'est pas 
liee a la personalite internationale de l'ordre Jurid-
igue auguel appartiennent ces lois . . . Jugements ... 
actes ... " 168) 
The principal confusion in the thinking, which would 
infer international personality from the act of giving 
effect to the municipal law of the unrecognized, is 
caused, it is submitted.by the fact that in practice the 
municipal law of a state very often requires recognition 
(in the international law sense) of a foreign entity by 
the executive as a condition precedent to giving municipal 
law validity to the municipal law of the foreign entity 
in question. It is not however fully appreciated that 
such a requirement is accidental and in no way essential 
to the accord of validity. Municipal law can, and very 
often does, lay down criteria other than international 
law recognition by the executive for the purpose of 
extending validity to a foreign legal system. It is for 
each municipal law system to determine its own criteria 
----------------------------for/ ... 
166) The actions of the courts of a state have no international standing. 
This follows from the premise that the Judicial department is not 
the representative organ of the state in international relations. 
Chen, p. 239. Concessions by the courts do not therefore amount 
to international law recognition. 
167) P. 148. He quotes the Carl-Zeiss case, note 157) supra, to 
support this. 
168) Note 136) supra, pp. 164-165. 
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for the application of foreign law. T~e fact that 
different municipal l aw systems provide different 
criteria for the solution of this problem is reflected 
in the divergence in practice which we described above. 
(vi) Attention is drawn to the anomaly of two unrecognized 
states, Slovakia and Manchuko, recognizing each other and 
thereby, it is said, creating each other vis-a-vis each 
other. 169) 
This criticism of constitutive doctrine is invalid, it is 
submitted, for two reasons. 
(A) The objection overlooks a basic facet of constitutive 
theory, namely that international society is a co-
option society.l?O) By the device of recognition, 
existing full members of international society, i.e. 
independent states which have been recognized as 
such, co-opt new full international persons and other 
limited right-bearing entities. In the absence 
therefore of recognition by at least one recognized 
independent state, a state cannot be a full inter-
national person. It cannot therefore create inter-
national personality in another entity because it 
does not have the capacity to recognize. If it 
attempts to recognize, the "recognition" will not 
amount to a valid international law recognition 
and will not create international personality in 
___________
___________
_ the/ ... 
169) See O'Connell, International Law, London, 1965, I, p.141. The 
argument has been given in full in the heading for the purposes of 
convenience and clarity. This method will also be adopted where 
appropriate infra. 
170) Schwarzenberger, I, p. 89. 
-214-
the "recognized". Whatever standards would there-
fore govern relations between two unrecognized 
states which "recognized" one another, such relations 
would not be governed by international law because 
neither had been co-opted into the int ernational 
community as a full international person. 
(B) The particular example quoted is not apposite because 
171) Manchukuo was recognized by Japan's allies. It 
would therefore be competent to recognize Slovakia 
and create in the latter an international personal-
ity available against it, the recognizer. 
(vii)Constitutive recognition makes the recognized a delegated 
authority derived from the will of the recognizer and this 
is incompatible with the equality of states. 172 ) 
Even if it is true that a state obtains its international 
personality by virtue of the unilateral exercise of will 
by another state, the~e is no stigma of subordination 
once full de lure recognition is granted. 172 ) The reason 
is that such recognition constitutes the recognized as a 
legal equal and the doctrine of the sovereign equality of 
states now operates between recognizer and recognized.l73) 
___________________
___ (viii)/ . .. 
171) O'Connell, I, p. 144. 
172) See Lauterpacht, p. 58. 
173) A. Cavaglieri, Corso di Diritto Internazionale, Naples, 1934, 
p. 216 correctly points out that the doctrine of equality of 
states only applies between existing states. 
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(viii) If a non-sovereign state can be an international 
person, why cannot a sovereign but unrecognized state 
174) be an international person? 
It is true that one must accept this possibility if one 
adheres to constitutive doctrine. The non-sovereign 
state will have limited international personality be-
cause of limited recognition. The sovereign state will 
have no personality when it is totally unrecognized. The 
sovereign state will however have a greater inherent 
capacity. ~or it can be recognized as a full internat-
ional person . On the other hand, since the non-sovereign 
state does not claim to be sovereign, it does not have 
the capacity to be recognised as a full international 
person 
We have now seen the various anomaly-orientated argu-
ments against the Constitutive theory and it may be 
observed in conclusion that the mere fact that anomalies 
sometimes occur does not mean that a conceptual theory is 
incorrect . 
(b) Policy-orientated arguments . 
Here it is proposed to deal with the following arguments: 
(i ) the argument based on absence of rights and duties; 
(ii) the argument that constitutive recognition is an arbit-
rary and unjustified weapon : (iii) the argument based on 
positivism and sovereignty. 
____
____
____
____
____
_ (i)/ . . 
174) Chen . p .31 . 
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(1) If recognition is constitutive in nature a new state can 
be denied rights in international law and may not be 
subJect to duties in that system. 175) 
This criticism involves two assertions. In the first 
place , it is argued that if a state has no duties in 
international law, then other states are unprotected. 
But the argument is not valid. As pointed out previously, 
other states can achieve protection by the simple expedient 
of recognizing the state in question. The latter will then 
have duties in international law to its recognizer. 176) 
In the second place . it is asserted that since the un-
recognized state has no rights it is placed outside the 
ambit of international law and is thus unprotected. 
Thus other states need not respect it, its t~rritory 
might even be invaded and the rules of warfare might not 
be applied in relation to it. 177 ) Certainly this is the 
position. It is the logical result of the consistent 
application of constitutive doctrine. Two observations 
may however be made. In practice the consequence of non-
recognition will usually not be as drastic as described 
above as there is always the possibility of retaliation 
by the unrecognized .178) In practice there will not be 
a wholesale disregard of the unrecognized though in 
theory this is a possibility. In the second place, the 
above criticism is in reality directed to the inequitable , 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~and/ 
175) Sorensen, p. 277; Crause, note 45) supra, p. 331. 
176) Supra , p. 190. 
177) Lauterpacht . p. 58. 
178) Lauterpacht , pp. 52-53 . 
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and perhaps unsatisfactory, results which the application 
of the Constitutive theory may sometimes produce . It is 
therefore a naturalistic or humanitarian argument , and as 
such is merely moral in character - an argument that the 
Constitutive theory is offensive to considerations of 
ethics and humanity .179) It cannot therefore be consider-
ed to embrace a basic or fundamental objection to the 
theory itself . 
(ii) Si nce the grant of recognition is discretionary, constit-
utive recognition amounts to an arbitrary and unJustified 
weapon in the hands of existing subJects of international 
law. l8o) 
It is said that the grant of recognition is always dis-
cretionary . There is no duty to recognize~Bl) />E, such 
recognition is arbitrary 182 ) and in consequence the 
commencement of international personality lies outside 
the orbit of international law. 18.3) This arbitrariness 
only becomes unjustifiable when recognition is conceived 
of as being constitutive .184 ) 
The arb i trary character of constitutive recognition then 
leads to undesirable results. It may be given or re-
fused for purely polit i cal reasons. Sandars says 
-------
-------
-------
-------
-" dat/ . . . 
179) Anzilotti , note 136) supra , pp. 163, 164 ; Lauterpacht, p. 52. 
18o) Starke , p. 144 ; Chen, p . 52. 
181) Le Normand, pp. 52 , 53 , 105: Chen, p.239. This matter is fully 
discussed infra , pp. 285-295. Both the Constit·..ltive and Declarat or y 
theories admit the di scretionary character of recognition. See 
Lauterpacht , pp . 1, 63 . 
182) Chen , p . 46 · Lauterpacht , p. 61. 
18.3) Lauterpacht , p. 1. 
184) Chen , p. 52 , 
-218-
" dat erkenning self, vanwee sy politieke 
gekleurdheid, geen suiwere rnaatstaf kan wees 
om volkeregtelike status aan te toets nie . .. " 185 ) 
Recognition may also be withheld until it can be exchanged 
1e6) for benefits. Guarantees and undertakings can be 
extracted in return for the grant of recognition.187) 
All the above is true, but the objections taken are 
humanitarian objections and as such they are of a merely 
moral character. The mere fact that the power to recog-
nize may be abused as a matter of arbitrary policy is not 
a fundamental objection to the Constitutive theory. 188) 
The mere fact that the theory may work hardship in 
isolated cases does not mean that it is incorrect. 
(iii)The Constitutive theory is rooted in ~sitivism and is 
an extreme assertion of sovereignty. 1 ) 
It is said that the Constitutive theory is based on the 
positivistic consent theory of international law - that 
a state can only incur obligations which are based on 
its consent.l90) The consensual basis of international 
law is false l9l) and therefore the Constitutive theory, 
which/ ... 
------------------------------
185) Note 46) supra , p. 262. It is submitted however that recognition 
does provide a legally pure criterion for the commencement of inter-
national personality. It is only the political reasons which might 
lie in the background behind that pure criterion that are suspect. 
le6) Starke , p . 144. For various examples of this see Lauterpacht, 
pp. 33-36 . 
187) Conditions, terms and modalities in the form of stipulations access-
oires can be arranged . See Anzilotti, note 136) supra, p. 175. 
These practices are strongly denounced by Lauterpacht, pp.360-361. 
188) Lauterpacht , p. 55 
189) Ibid . . p . 62 ; Chen, pp. 18-20; C H.Alexandrowicz, "New and 
Original States - The Issue of Reversion to Sovereignty" (45) 
International Affairs , 1969, p. 465 at p.467. 
190) Chen, p.18. 
191) The consent theory is attacked and criticized by Chen, pp.19-29, 
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which rests upon this basis, must be incorrect. It is sub-
mitted however, that mere demonstration of the falsity of 
the consent theory does not show that the Constitutive 
theory is incorrect . It is not necessary to find a basis 
for the Constitutive theory in the consent theory. The 
Constitut"'.ve theory can exist, and apply, whether or not 
all rules of international law are based on the will of 
states . There is no reason why~ at least of the rules 
of international law should not rest exclusively on the 
will of states. It is so with regard to rules emanating 
from treaties and unilateral declarations. Why should not 
this also be the position with regard to the rule for the 
creation of international personality by recognition 
(which is , in fact, a species of unilateral act)? To 
argue from the premise (correct, no doubt) that because 
all rules of international law are not based on the will 
of states, that some individual rules are not so based, 
is a non sequitur . 
Thus though positivism need not, and probably does not, 
lie at the root of every rule of international law, it 
may certainly manifest itself in the case of individual 
rules such as those relating to the creation of personal-
ity by recognition. At this stage the argument based on 
positivism becomes policy-orientated . The positivistic 
manifestations of the rule are considered to be undesirable. 
The mere fact however that an individual rule is based on 
positivistic principles, and the fact that it is un-
desirable (if indeed that should be the case) does not 
mean that the rule does not exist. 
Finally/ ... 
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Finally , the principle of sovereignty . a positivistic 
manifestation, even if it is not an all-embracing principle 
lying at the root of all international relations , still re-
mains a fundamental principle in contemporary international 
law, lies at the root of many rules, and governs many 
relations 192 ) 
(c) Practicality-orientated arguments . 
Here it is proposed to deal with the following arguments 
( i) the argument based on refusal by a single state only to 
recognize · ( ii) non-recognition is not conclusive evidence of 
the absence of the qualifications in the non-recognized to be a 
state : (iii) a non-recognized state cannot be treated as a non-
entity · (iv) the unrecognized state cannot be ignored; (v) the 
Constitutive theory may lead to an unrealistic Juridical vacuum . 
(i ) Mere refusal by a single state to recognize does not affect 
the position of a state if a great number of other states 
193) have already recognized it. 
The answer is that although the practical position of such 
a state is not really affected, its legal position is 
affected, however slightly. The state in question will 
enjoy international personality in its relations with all 
other states except the one state which refuses to recog-
nize it . Its international personality is relative and 
--------------------------will/ . . . 
192) Schwarzenberger, I, pp . 9-10 regards it as being one of seven 
fundamental principles from which all rules of international law 
are derived . 
193) Starke, p. 144 
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will only become absolute or objective when it is univers-
ally recognized .194) In the particular circumstances 
mentioned the relative international personality is so 
strong and so consolidated that it is unlikely that the 
single instance of non-recognition will present practical 
di fficulties in international relations . 
(ii) Non-recognition is not conclusive evidence of the absence 
of the qualifications in the non-recognized to be a stat~~5 ) 
Certainly this is correct but as an argument against the 
Constitutive theory of recognition it is irrelevant. The 
argument fails to take into account the clear distinction 
which the Const i tutive theory makes between the concepts 
of statehood and i nternational personality. The former 
can exist objectively without recognition while the latter 
can exist only by virtue of recognition .196) Thus a state 
can certainly exist and yet not be an i nternational person 
because it is unrecognized . The Constitutive theory will 
admit the objective existence of the unrecognized state. 
( iii)A non-recognized state cannot be treated as a non-entity. 
Here reference is made to Israel and it is stated that 
few states would take the view that the Arab states coul d 
afford to treat Israel as a non-entity and that respons i ble 
Uni ted Nat i ons organs and i ndi vi dual states have t aken the 
vi ew that I srael is protected, and bound, by the pr i nciples 
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
 of/ 
194 ) Kelsen , note 17) supra , pp. 608-609. The idea of relative personal-
ity is di scussed infra , pp . 230-233. 
195) Starke , p . 144 . 
196) Supra , pp . 17e-1e1 . 
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of the United Netions Charter governing the use of force.
197) 
We have here however the phenomenon of a non-recognizing 
and a non-recognized state becoming members of an inter-
national organization. 198) In these circumstances there 
will normally be an implied but limited form of recognit-
ion present .199) The "non-recognizing" state is deemed 
to have recognized the other entity for the purposes only 
of membership of the organization. 200 ) This means that 
inter se the respective states will be entitled to the 
rights conferred by and will be subject to the duties 
imposed by the constituent instrument of the organization 
in question. Thus the position of Israel in relation to 
to the above-mentioned Charter provisions is probably 
explicable on the basis of implied but limited reco~it-
i 201) on. If such recognition is present then legally 
Israel cannot be treated as a non-entity. 
(iv) The unrecognized state cannot be ignored. 
This is a basically similar argument to the last one. Here 
reference is made to the German Democratic Republic and 
it is stated that several states which do not recognize 
it have nevertheless accepted it as a party to the 
--------
--------
--------
-----Nuciear/ ... 
197) Brownlie , p. 85. 
198) The recognition possibilities when this occurs are discussed supra, 
pp. 185-188. 
199) Supra, p. 185. It is possible however that not even this limited 
degree of recognition need be present if the non-recognizing State 
makes a clear-cut reservation of rights as this will rebut any 
implication of limited recognition. See supra, p. 187. If this 
is the position pertaining between Israel and a non-recognizing 
Arab State, then legally the latter would be entitled to treat 
Israel as a non-entity but for practical reasons it would probably 
not do so . 
200) Schwarzenberger, Manual , p. 71; Supra, pP, 185, 187-188. 
201) For further discussion of the position of Israel see supra,pp. 192-
195. 
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Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, 1963.202 ) The position here is 
that an unrecognized state and non-recognizing states 
have become parties to a multilateral treaty.203) Normally 
here there will be an implied recognition which is limited 
in that it exists only for the purposes of participation 
in the multilateral treaty in question. 204) Thus the 
rights and duties which affect East Germany under the 
Nuclear Test Ban Treaty , 1963 are probably attributable 
to implied but limited recognition. As such the limited 
personality of East Germany is in accordance with constit-
utive doctrine , and in so far as this limited personality 
extends, it cannot of course be legally ignored. 
(v) The Constitutive theory may lead to an unrealistic ,1urid-
. 205) ical vacuum. 
There seems to be two aspects of this argument. 
(A) There may be an international law juridical vacuum in 
that relations between the non-recognizer and the un-
recognized state are not governed by international law. 
This is certainly2o6) so but the argument is essent-
ially directed against the undesirability of this 
and as such is a humanistic on naturalistic argument . 
--------------------------
--The/ ... 
202) Sorensen . p. 269. 
203) The recognition possibilities when this occurs are discussed supra, 
PP . 183-185. 
204) Schwarzenberger, Manual , p . 71; supra , p. 184. 
205) Sandars, note 46) supra, p. 262; Chen, pp. 37-38; P .Marshall Brown, 
"Effects of Recognition" (36) A.J.I.L., 1942, p. lo6. 
2o6) See discussion supra, pp. 217-217. 
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The mere fact that undesirable results are produced 
in certain cases by the operation of a rule does not 
mean that the rule does not exist. 
As a wesult of this legal vacuum Chen alleges that 
nationals of the unrecognized state are deprived of 
international law protection and that nationals of 
the non-recognizing state who may come within the 
jurisdiction of the unrecognized state would find 
207) themselves in a legal no-man's land. This, it 
is submitted, goes too far. For as Chen himself 
points out the present-day international community 
extends over all the earth's territory and is all-
pervading and all-inclusive.208) Thus if a new state 
is unrecognized, there must , of necessity, be an old 
state which is recognized and as such has title to 
the territory in question, can protect the inhabitants 
of that territory when elsewhere, and which can be 
responsible for what happens to aliens in the territ-
ory.209) In any event even were international 
protection to be absent altogether and even were the 
territory a no-man's land , the argument which draws 
attention to these undesirable consequences of non-
recognition would be merely a naturalistic or human-
itarian one, a moral rather than a legal objection. 
-------------------(B)/ ... 
207) P. 38. 
208) Pp. 37, 39 . 
209) These matters are actually discussed i nfra, pp. 597-619. 
in the context of United Kingdom title to Rhodesian territory, the 
right of the United Kingdom to protect the people of Rhodesia and 
the responsibility of the United Kingdom for acts of the Rhodesian 
"rebels". 
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(B) There may be a municipal law Juridical vacuum . Here 
it is said that non-recognition of a state does not 
and cannot suspend all intercourse between individuals 
across frontiers . Economic and social activities 
continue and these inevitably give rise to legal 
questions which cannot be ignored. One cannot have 
a legal vacuum within the borders of a state.2lO) We 
may make two observations here. In the first place, 
there need be no municipal law vacuum. There is no 
reason why the municipal law of the non-recognizing 
state should not give effect to the municipal law of 
of the unrecognized state as a matter of private 
international law and as a matter of practical recip-
rocity.211) Even if the municipal law of the non-
recognizer refuses to give effect to the municipal 
law of an unrecognized new state it might still give 
effect to the legal system applied to the territory 
by the old state whom it continues to recognize. 
There would thus be no municipal law vacuum before 
the courts of other states.212 ) There ls thus no 
necessary connection between non-recognition and a 
--------------------------municipal/ ... 
210) Chen , pp. 37-38. 
211) See discussion of this supra, pp . 210-213. 
212) Thus for instance, states which recognize United ~ingdom sovereignty 
over Rhodesia give effect to the British version of Rhodesian 
municipal law in their own legal systems. This would include the 
Southern Rhodesia Act , 1965 , the Southern Rhodesia Order-in-Council , 
1965 and various other Orders made under it . It would exclude the 
1965 Constitution of Rhodesia and all enactments subsequent to 
11th November , 1965, in Rhodesia, all acts of Rhodesian officials 
and many pronouncements of the courts in Rhodesia after that date. 
See infra, pp. 446-453. There would thus be a legal system to 
apply consisting of the common law, the 1961 Constitution, applic-
able legislation up to 11th November, 1965, and British legislation 
after that date. There need not be any municipal law vacuum. 
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municipal law vacuum. The latter is not the invariable 
consequence of the former. In the second place even 
if there is a municipal law vacuum, the argument 
which draws attention to this undesirable result is 
again merely a moral argument and not a legal one. 
(d) Historically-orientated arguments. 
Here it is proposed to deal with the following two arguments: 
(i) the argument dealing with the creation of the first 
personality; (ii) the argument based on the prerogative to 
recognize . 
(i) rt is asked how the first personality was created if per-
. 213) 
sonality depends on recognition . 
. ... •n.::. 1_ .,_.- r \i 
Thus Chen alleges that the Constitutive theory fails to 
explain how the first states came into existence.
214 ) 
Liszt considers that the co-existence of a plurality of 
states is a necessary condition for the existence of inter-
national law and that there must be some states at least 
whose personalities are not derived from recognition.
215) 
Kelsen would answer this objection by saying that a state 
first recognizes itself. It then becomes a subject for 
216) 
itself. Later it can recognize others and can in tur n 
be recognized by them. 
It is submitted however that this does not explain the 
difficulty satisfactorily. The idea of a state recogniz :i.ng 
itself/.;. 
------------
------------
---
213) Chen, pp. 4, 39. 
214) P 4. 
215) See Chen, p . 39 . 
216) Note 1 7) su,prr , p. 609. 
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itself and becoming a legal subject for itself but not for 
others is meaningless. Legal subjectivity implies, at the 
very least , a bilateral relationship. A legal system de-
mands at least two subjects. The idea of legal subjectiv-
ity existing for the subject in question alone is a contra-
diction in terms . Liszt is correct when he says that in-
ternational law demands a plurality of states as a condit i on 
for its existence. 
The answer to the particular difficulty posed is much less 
abstruse and lies in the history of international law it-
self. European states up t o the nineteenth century did 
not require recognition for admission to the family of 
nations. Lawrence, referring to such European states, 
says that there never was a time when they were outside 
the pal e of international law. They fc.-med the nucleus 
of internati onal society, and there was no need for them 
to be formally admitted to it. 217 ) The classic writers 
on international law never formulated any coherent theory 
of recognition and there was no Constitutive theory in 
218) 
the pre-positivist world of the nineteenth century. 
Even before the 19th Century, African and Asian entities 
were admitted to the family of nations but not as full 
members thereof.2l9) In their case however recognition 
was required. 220 ) 
-------
-------
-------
-----It/ ... 
217) T J Lawrence, The Principles of International Law. 61'h Ed. , New York, 
1915, p . 83; La.chs, note 58) supra , p. 253. 
218) Alexandrowicz , note 189) supra , p . 467. 
219) Ibid. , pp. 468-471. 
220) ~ence , note 217) supra , p. 83; La.chs , note 58) supra, p.253. 
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It was only from 1856 onwards th~t non-European states 
were allowed into the family of nations as full members, 
the first being Turkey, which was followed by Persia, 
China and Japan. 221 ) R iti id d t b ecogn on was cons ere o e 
necessary in such cases.222 ) 
Later the principle of recognition was extended even to 
new European states. Thus in 1878 the independence of 
. 
. d 223) Th Roumania, Serbla and Monteneg~o was recognize . e 
World Court in Certain German Interests in Polish Upper 
Silesia favoured the Constitutive theory in relation to 
224) 
the non-recognition of Poland by Germany. 
We may summarize by saying that originally recognition 
was not required in the case of European States but in 
the case of non-European states it was so required. Since 
the 19th Century recognition is required in the case of 
all new states. In other words the Constitutive theory 
of recognition is relatively recent in origin and thus 
no explanation is required for the existence of the person-
ality of the original European members of the family of 
nations . 
____
____
____
____
___ _...ii)/ ... 
221) Lawrence, note 217) supra, p. 84. 
222) Ibid. , p. 83 . 
223) Ibid . p . 89 . Where recognition had been accorded to European 
states in past centuries this was considered to be indicative of 
a willingness to have diplomatic, commercial and other relations 
with the recognized state . See Alexandrowicz, note 189) supra, 
p . 467. 
224) Note 40) supra. 
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(11) It is asked from where the existing sub.)ects of inter-
national law obtained their prerogative to recognize. 225) 
The answer to this criticism appears to lie in two 
characteristics which international society possesses. 
In the first place,international society is a co-option 
society. 226 ) This means that new members are brought into 
the society by the existing members thereof. In the second 
place, international society is a decentralized society.227 ) 
There is thus no organ in international society to perform 
the function of co-opting new members into the society. 
The act of co-option is therefore performed by the various 
existing members of the society individually. The pre-
rogative of recognition in existing merr.bers is simply the 
means by which this individualized process of co-option 
operates. 
(e) Conceptually-orientated arguments. 
As will shortly be seen , many of these arguments revolve around 
characteristics or alleged characteristics possessed by recog-
nition. Here it is proposed to deal with the following 
arguments : ( i) the argument based on relative existence; 
(ii) the argument based on the number of recognitions required 
to constitute personality; (iii) the argument based on the 
retrospective character of recognition; (iv) the argument 
based on the bilateral character of recognition; (v) the 
--------------
--------------
'argument/ . . 
225) Sir John Fisher Williams , "La doctrine de la reconnaissance en droit 
international et ses d~veloppements rtfoents" (44) (2) !:!..:11,, 1933, 
p. 203 at p. 236 . 
226) See supra,pp.213-214 where the co-optive nature of internati0nal 
society is discussed with reference to the possibility of two un-
recognized states recognizing each other. 
227) See infra, pp. 257-258, 274. 
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argument based on the unilateral character of recognition ; 
(vi) the argument based on implied recognition; (vii) the 
argument based on premature recognition ; (viii) the argument 
based on reciprocal recognition; ( ix) the argument based on 
the withdrawal of recognition; (x) the argument based on the 
status of belligerents. 
(i) If recognition is constitutive this may mean that a state 
exists for some states but not for other states and this 
is no help in deciding whether it exists obJectively in 
law.228) 
The answer to this would appear to be that the state does 
exist objectively if all the condit i ons of statehood are 
present. On the other hand the international personality 
of a .state may be relative. 229) It may exist against some 
states but not against others. The personality of the 
state exists against those states which have recognized 
it .230) Anzilotti says that the consequences of the 
Constitutive theory are relative personality at the same 
time and changing personality at different times in the 
same state . This corresponds exactly to the realities 
of international order and the phenomenon of relativity 
is known to municipal law too but international law 
231 ) 
carries it to a much further degree than does municipal law. 
-----------------
-----------The/ . . 
228) O'Connell , I . p. 130 : Fisher Williams, note 225) supra , p. 239; the 
same writer , "Some Thoughts on the Doctrine of Recognition in Inter-
national Law" (47) Harvard Law Review, 1933-1934, p. 776 at p,779 ; 
Crause, note 45) supra , p. 331, 
229) See supra , pp. 179-181 for the distinct i on between statehood and 
international personality . 
230) Kelsen , note 17) supra, p. 609. 
231) Note 14) supra, p .168. An interesting example of relative person-
ality in relations involving the allied Occupiers of Germany, West 
Germany and East Germany is given by ,Joseph W. Bishop, "The 
Contractual Agreements' with the Federal Republic of Germany" 
(49) A.JI L., 1955, p. 125 at p. 147 . 
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The Constitutive theory therefore involves the possibility 
of relative international personality and this is in turn 
criticised by declaratory theorists .232 ) It is said that 
the vital question is whether at a given time a particular 
state is a member of the international community and the 
answer to this question cannot be both "yes" and "no 11 • 233 ) 
It is submitted however that such a state is a member of 
the international community and as such has rights against 
:l ~s recognizers though it may not have rights against 
other members of the intirnational community which do not 
recognize it . In any event it is submi tted that the vital 
question is not whether state Xis a member of the inter-
national community or not . Instead there is a series of 
vital questions viz . does X bear rights against A, or B 
or C etc . Each of these questions can be answered either 
in the affirmative or in the negative 
I t is also said that if we accept relativity no state can 
have an absolute existence 234) This I interpret to mean 
that no state can have an objective or absolute internat-
ional personality because , as we have seen, a state does 
exist objectively . independent of the degree of internat-
ional personality which it may have. It is submitted 
that a state can have an absolute international personal-
ity when it has been recognized by each other existing 
_____
_____
_____
_____
____ full/ . .. 
232) Fisher Williams , note 228 supra , p . 879. 
233) Chen , p . 4o . 
234) Chen , p 41 Kelsen, note 17) supra, p. 609 . These ideas are 
based on the alleged reciprocal character of recognition which wil l 
be discussed infra, pp. 249-252, 
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full member of the international community. This is 
fortunately the positj_on with the vast majority of states. 
Again it is said that relativity leads to an undesirable 
and embarrassing state of confusion. 235) On the contrary, 
it is submitted that relativity leads to a greater degree 
of certainty . Once recognition is present one knows that 
legal relationships may subsist between recognized and 
unrecognized. If recognition is not present . one knows 
that the position is the opposite . Where then is the con-
fusion?236) Even if the application of constitutive 
doctrine did lead to confusion . arguments based on the un-
desirability of this state of affairs would be naturalistic . 
Whether or not relativity is undesirable, and there is 
much to be said for the view that it is, it is an integral 
and necessary part of international relations in view of 
the decentralized nature of international society. 
Lauterpacht says in relation to the criticism of relativity 
that · 
'' . this is a criticism not of the constituvist 
doctrine . but of the imperfection of international 
organization due to the fact that there is no 
authority competent to recognize . .. " 237) 
The position may therefore be unsatisfactory in view of 
the dual role of a recognizing state as an organ administer-
ing international law and as a guardian of its own interests. 
-------------------------T.his/ ... 
235) Chen , pp 39-40 ; See too Sandars , note 46) supra p. 261 . 
236) The greater certainty afforded by constitutive doctrine is dis-
cussed infra . pp 277-278, 
237) P 58 
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This must reveal itself in a disturbing fashion whenever 
there is occasion to use recognition for political advant-
age. The solution is to transfer the function of recognit-
ion to an international organization thus centralizing 
international society in this respect. 238) But until 
such centralization comes about the above defect is in-
herent in the existing imperfection of international 
organization It is not a valid objection to the constit-
utive view of recognition 239) 
(ii) If recognition is constitutive .it is asked how many states 
must recognize a state before it is an international 
person . 240) 
The answer to this is that recognition operates relatively 
and thus international personality may be relative. Rec-
ognition by one state alone will be enough to create 
international personality in the recognized state which 
is effective against its recognizer. 241 ) 
______
______
______
_____ (iii)/ . . 
238) Lauterpacht , p . 67. 
2)9) Ibid p. 50 . 
240) Brownlie, p. 84 David A. Ijalaye, "Was Biafra at any time a state 
in International Law" (65) A.J .I L., 1971 , p. 551 at p. 559. 
241) Failure to appreciate this highly individualized relativity has 
sometimes led jurists to compromise solutions here. Thus Cavaglieri 
maintains that recognition by the majority of states including the 
more influential powers has the effect of creating a status valid 
erga ornnes . But he bases his views on the silence of the remainder 
of the international community amounting to tacit acquiescence . See 
A. Cavaglieri, Corso di Diritto Internazionale, Naples, 1934, p .218. 
One might ask what the position would be if one of the remaining 
states instead of acquiescing, expressly stated its non-recognition . 
The theory of tacit consent is criticised by Kunz . Die Anerkunning 
von Staaten und Regierungen im Volkerrecht : 1928 at p.91 and 
K. Strupp, "Les Regles generales du droit de la Paix" (47) (1) 
H.R., 1934 p 263 at p. 444 . 
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(iii) When a new state is recognized recognition may be retro-
242 ) 
spective to the date of the actual inception of the state . 
The rationale for the rule which would attribute retro-
specti ve effect to recognition i s that there should be no 
lacuna in time during which international personality is 
in abeyance in respect of a particular territory.243) 
We must now examine the institution of retrospective 
recognition to see whether it exists as an international 
law institution and if so its nature and extent . Brownlie, 
for example , would appear to hold the view that the 
institution does not exist - because retrospective recog-
244) 
nition would be superfluous. It is submitted , however , 
that this argument does not take the matter any further 
because it is based on the hypothesis that the Declaratory 
theory is correct . 
When we examine the Judicial practice of states we find 
that retrospective effect has been given to recognition 
on/ . . . 
-------------------------
----
242) Aksionairnoye Obschestvo A.M Luther v. Sager (James) and Co . (1921] 
3 K.B 532 ; Bank of Ethiopia v. National Bank of Egypt and Liguori , 
(1937] Ch 513 . Chen. pp . 4-5, says that the practice of states 
to regard recognition as retrospective can only be explained by the 
fact that the power in question existed prior to, and independently 
of . recognition . He says (p .1&5) that the very idea that legal effect 
can be given to acts of previously non-existent entities is fatal t o 
constitutive contentions . Chen's criticism is , it is submitted not 
valid . The state did exist i:rtor to recognition but its personality 
did not Chen fails to appreciate the constituvist distinction be-
tween statehood and personality . Right throughout his monograph he 
interprets the Constitutive theory as asserting that "existence" is 
created by recognition, whereas it is "personality" that is created 
by recognition . according to the constituvist. 
243) Starke , p . 145. It is submitted however that this rationale is not 
valid where a particular state or government is recognized and at 
a later stage a different ·state or government. Here there need be 
no time lag and thus no need for the rule . 
244) Pp . 88-89 . 
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on many occasions245) while on other occasions it has been 
denied. 246 ) From this diversity in practice it is sub-
mitted that we may draw two conclusions. 
(A) When recognition is accorded, international law 
does not require it to operate retrospectively to 
the date the state came into existence.247) 
(B) States may, if they so wish, allow recognition to 
operate retrospectively. 
They have the option of making it retrospective but 
they do not have to. The rule which allows retro-
spective recognition is therefore of a permissive 
character .248) This conclusion is bolstered by the 
240) 
fact that recognition is in principle discretionary . ~, 
This being so retrospective recognition should also 
be discretionary . 
We have Just seen that recognition might or might not be 
retrospective. From this two questions arise : (A) When 
will recognition be retrospective? (B) What is the scope 
or extent of retrospective recognition? 
--------
--------
---(A)/ ... 
245) Underhill v . Hernandez (1897) 168, U.S 250 : Oet.jen v. Central 
Leather Co (1918) 246, U.S 297; Dougherty v. The Equitable Life 
Assurance Society (1934) 266 N.Y. 71 ; United States v. Belmont (1937 ) 
301, US . 324; Luther v . Sagor (1921] K.B. 532; White, Child and 
Beney Ltd. v . Simmons, 38 T.L.R. 616; The Jupiter [1927] P,122, 250 : 
Kolbin and Sons v . William Kinnear and Co. (19).0) s.c. 724; 
Princess Olga Paley v. Weisz (1929) 1 K.B . 718. 
246) Guaranty Trust Company of New York v. United States (1938) 3o4, U.S. 
126; KoninkliJke Lederfabriek 'OisterwiJk' NV. v. Chase National 
Bank (1941) 32 N Y.S . 2d. 131; 263 App. Div . 815; Union of Soviet 
~alist Republics v. National City Bank of New York (1941) 41 F. 
Supp . 353 . 
247) In the French case In re Marma.lscheff, Ann . Dig., 1929-1930, Case No . 
150, p. 247 it was argued that retrospective recognition was not a 
rule of international law. Oppenheim, I, p. 144 says there is not 
direct authority in international law to support retrospective recog-
nition . 
248) Oppenheim L p. 144 says tha:t retrospective recognition is a matter 
of convenience rather than principle. 
249) Bee discussion infra, pp . 285-295. 
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(A) It is submitted that the key to the question whether 
recognition is retrospective in a given case is to be 
found in the intention of the recognizer. 250) If, 
therefore, the recognizer does not intend recognit-
ion to be retrospective , then recognition will not 
be retrospective. 25l) If, on the other hand, the 
recognizer does intend recognition to be retrospective , 
it will be so.252 ) 
Given that the intention of the recognizer is decisive 
in determining the retrospectivity of recognition, 
there would appear to be a dispute as to whether · 
recognition is retrospective unless there is an 
intention to the contrary or whether recognition is 
only retrospective where it is clearly intended to 
be so. In other words there is a dispute as to 
whether there is a presumption in favour of the re-
trospectivity of recognition or not. 253 ) Thus 
Raestad says that recognition is not retroactive in 
principle but retrospectivity is possible in certain 
cases.
254 ) Nisot on the other hand says that 
retrospectivity/ . . , 
-------------------
--------
250) Kelsen, note 17) supra , p . 613 . 
251) Thus the British Foreign Office furnished a certificate to the court 
in Gdynia Ameryka Linie Zeylugowe Spolka Akcyzna v. Boguslawski [1953] 
A.C 11 (H .L. ) that · "Up to and including midnight of July 5-6, 1945, 
His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom recognized the Polish 
Government having its headquarters in London as being the government 
of Poland, and as from midnight of July 5-6, 1945, His Majesty's 
Government in the United Kingdom recognized the Polish Provisional 
Government of National Unity as the Government of Poland .. . " The 
court inclined to the view (at 29) that this was intended to exclude 
any retrospective effect of the change of recognition. With respect , 
it is submitted, that the court was correct . 
252) As in the Bank of Ethiopia case . note 242) supra, the Luther, Under-
hill and Oet.jen cases, note 245) supra. and Williams v. Bruffy, 
96 US . 176 at 1&5. 
253) Writers are not agreed as to whether retroactivity is inherent in the 
act of recognition or not . See Chen, p. 175. 
254) A. Raestad, Note 115) supra , pp . 292-293. See too Institute de Droit 
International , note 120) supra , Art. 7 . 
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retrospectivity is not inherent in the act of recog-
nition.255) In any event, regardless of the above 
dispute, and regardless of whether or not there is 
a presumption, the presence or absence of retrospect-
ivity ultimately depends upon the intention of the 
recognizer. 
(B) We must now examine the possible scope of retrospect-
ive recognition. In practice it would appear that 
retrospective recognition is a phenomenon of limited 
application and is usually employed to validate certain 
acts of revolutionary governments performed before 
recognition while the deposed government was still 
recognized. 256 ) It is therefore sometimes stated 
that retrospective recognition is only retroactive in 
so far as it serves to validate the acts of the re-
cognized entity performed within the territory in 
question. 257) It is B.lbmitted, however, that there 
is no theoretical objection to the extension of 
retrospective recognition beyond this limited function 
and indeed even generally. 258) The submission is 
that the scope of retrospective recognition (like the 
existence of such recognition itself) is governed by 
the intention of the recognizer. Starke summarizes 
the position succinctly when he says: 
-----------
-----------
----" ... whether/ ... 
255) See Chen , p . 176. 
256) See Castel , pp. 175-176. 
257) See Starke , p .. 165; Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States (1938) 3o4 
U.S. 126 at 140 . 
258) Starke p . 165 says that the rule limiting the effects of retro-
spective recognition to acts in the relevant territory is only a 
prima facie rule . Presumably therefore retrospective recognition 
may be more extensive in operation (or more restricted). 
-258-
" . . . whether and to what extent the act of recog-
nition is retroactive must be governed by the 
intention of the recognizing State, and this is 
logically consistent with the nature of recog-
nition . 11 259) 
We are now in a position to state some conclusions on the 
scope of recognition. Recognition has three dimensions. 
(A) A geographical dimension: It only applies as between 
recognizer and recognized. This dimendion is inherent 
in the relativity of recognition. 
(B) A content dimension: Recognition may vary in content 
from full de iure recognition to recognition for one 
purpose, one right or one duty only. This dimension 
is inherent in the possibility of limited or partial 
recognition. The precise scope of recognition here 
depends upon the intention of the recognizer. 
(C) 260) A time dimension: Here recognition can be retro-
spective or not. If retrospective the degree of 
retrospecitivity can vary in time. Intention will 
again be decisive in determining firstly whether 
recognition is retrospective and secondly, if retro-
spective, the scope of such retrospectivity . 
Granted that recognition can be retrospective, we now 
have the task of harmonizing retrospective recognition 
with constitutive doctrine under which rights can only 
flow from recognition. Lauterpacht , a constituvist 
himself , considers that such harmonization is imposs-
:!ble~6l) For if a state has rights before recognition 
there/ . .. 
-----------------------------259) P. 164. 
260) As Raestad , note 115) supra, p. 284 puts it: 
"une reconnaissance ... limitee dans le temps." 
261) Pp. 59-60. He also considers retrospective recognition to be in-
compatible with the Declaratory theory. 
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there is no need of a special doctrine. Retrospective 
recognit i on may then be conceived as an exception to 
the Constitutive doctrine whi ch harmonizes municipal 
law - a principle of convenience - an institution 
based on polit i cal considerations rather than Juris-
tic logic . 
It is submitted however, that retrospective recognit-
ion can be harmonized with constitutive doctrine. 
The fact that a recognition is retrospective does 
not mean that a state has rights before recognition . 
It does not - for recognition can have no effect until 
it is granted . But once granted , recognition creates 
an international personality and the international 
person has rights and duties which only arise on 
recognition. There is . however, no reason why the 
vestitive facts of such rights and duties (other 
than those relat i ng to the creation of personality 
itself) should not consist of occurrences which pre-
date recognition . Indeed this will very often be 
the case in practice even where recognition is not 
retrospective, e .g. a new state is recognized and 
succeeds to rights and duties under a treaty con-
262) 
eluded with a predecessor. The vestitive facts 
of such rights and duties (other than those relating 
to the creation of personality itself) lie in past 
occurrences which ante-date recognit ion , viz. the 
--------------------------------
--------------------~conclusion/ . .. 
262) See in general, O'Connell, I, pp. 313-376. 
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conclusion of the treaty in question. Naturally, 
however, the rights and duties of the successor state 
only arise with the establishment of the personality 
of this new state . There is no reason why the vest it -
ive facts of rights and duties (other than those 
relating to the creation of personality itself) shoul d 
not lie in past action of an entity itself performed 
before it was recogni zed. It is the function of 
retrospective recognition to create rights and duties 
arising out of such past occurrences but naturally 
these rights and duties can only be created simultan -
eously with (or later than) the creation of the person-
ality of the ent i ty which is to bear such rights and 
duties which only arise on recogni tion. Nisot puts this 
very well when he says that for the recognizing state , 
the recognized is , as from the moment of recognition , 
competent to state authoritatively the law , past and 
present , of the recognized state. 263) On this con-
struction there is no discord between retrospective 
recognit i on and constitutive doctrine. 
The institution of retrospective recognition could 
obviously be of very great importance to Rhodesia in 
the future . For i f it obtained recognition in the 
future , that recognition might be retrospective so 
as to validate all the acts of the regime since 11th 
November , 1965 in t he eyes of the recognizing state . 
--------
--------
-------...:Finally/ , . 
263) See Chen , p .176. 
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Finally , in relation to retrospective recognition, 
it is said that the courts of a new state will re-
gard that state as having come into existence on 
the date when the requirements of statehood were 
in fact first fulfilled and not when recognition 
264) 
was granted by other states. I n the past the 
. 265) 266) . 267) 
courts of Czechoslovakia , Poland, Austria , 
Italy, 268) and the United States269 ) have taken this 
attitude . In the case of Rhodesia the attitude has 
been somewhat different ,270 ) but in any event recog-
nition of Rhodesia by the Rhodesian courts has ante-
dated recognition by other states . 
Even if we accept that the courts of an unrecognized state 
will recognize it even though it has not been accorded 
recognition by other states . such a situation is in no 
way/ . . . 
-------------------------------
264) Starke . p . 144 . 
265) Establishment of Czechoslovak State case, Ann. Dig . , 1925 -1926, case 
no . 8, p. 13 · Foreign Bills Decree (Establishment of Czechoslovakia ) 
~ , Ann . Dig., 1925-1926 , case no. 9, p. 14; Payment of War Tax 
(Czechoslovakia) case, Ann. Dig., 1919-1922, case no. 4, p.11; 
Rights of Citizenship (EstablishmP,nt of Czechoslovak State)~' Ann . 
Dig . 1919-1922 , case no. 5 , p. 15; Rights of Citizenship (Estab-
lishment of Czechoslovak Nationality) , Ann. Dig . , case no. 6, p .17, 
266) Republic of Poland v. HaraJewicz, Ann . Dig. , 1923-1924, case no.l,p.9. 
267) A.LB . v. Federal Ministry for the Interior, Ann.Dig., 1919-1922, 
case no. 7, p . 20 
268) Faro Italiano , vol. 46 (1921) Part.V . 
269) Mcilvaine v. Coxe's Lessee, 4 Cranch 214, 215. 
270) The courts only accepted an independent Rhodesia in 1968 and it is 
doubtful if the recognition then accorded can be considered retro-
spective to 1965." . . . the present government is lli2!'.! (italics suppl i ed ) 
the de iure government and the 1965 constitution the only valid 
constitutlon u Per Beadle, C J . , in R. v. Ndhlovu and Others, 1968 
(4) S . A 515 at 537 (R . , A.D.) The recognition of government is 
clear from the above dictum. Recognition of the state as independent 
is implicit in the recognition of the 1965 Constitution as the only 
valid constitution since this provides that Rhodesia is independent. 
Constitution of Rhodesia, 1965 , s 26 , 47 , 143. 
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way fatal to constitutive doctrine. The courts of an 
unrecognized state have to decide whether the state 
exists and whether its government is lawful in accordance 
with their own constitutional law, i e. under nrunicipal 
law. Should they decide that the state is independent 
and the government legitimate ,271 )it cannot be concluded 
from this that the state is also an international person. 
The decision simply operates on the constitutional law 
level and in the internal sphere. It does not operate 
in the sphere of international law. 272 ) 
(iv) Recognit ion is bilateral but the state to participate in a 
bilateral .1uristic act nrust have pre-existing internationa l 
personality 
Anzilotti first developed the theory that recognition was 
nrutually constitutive and based upon contract. According 
to him personality stems from an accord which i s called 
recognition and is based on pacta sunt servanda. 273 )we 
may make three comments on the general argument here. 
(A) It is extremely unlikely that recognition is a bi-
lateral act. Such a theory finds no support in the 
practice of states. 274 ) Recognition is essentially 
------------------------a/ ... 
271) As in R . v . Ndlovu . supra note 270). 
272) Even as evidence of international law, the value of such 
decisions is limited because there is a natural nationalistic trait 
here and in addition it is necessary, from a municipal law point of 
view , that the courts of such a state should sooner or later make 
such decisions. See Lauterpacht, p 44 
273) Note 14) supra. p 161 . According to Anzilotti all norms come from 
pacta sunt servanda, so those relating to personality should also 
come from this source (p.166). Accordingly a new state is free to 
reject recognition (p .167). Sandars, note 46) supra, p .261 prefers 
a bilateral act of recognition to a unilateral one . 
274) Lauterpacht, p . 56 
. . - - - -----
~ ... .__~ ............................. ~ ... --~·~~~-'-------- - ··--... ~-
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a unilateral act275) and the furthest one can go is 
to say that it is a unilateral compliance with a uni-
276) lateral request . If this is so the argument 
against the Constitutive theory based on the premise 
that recognition is an agreement disappears. 277 ) 
(B) The construction of request and recognition as offer 
and acceptance is artificial and unnecessary .278) 
(C) Even were recognition a bilateral act, this does not 
necessarily suppose a pre-existing international 
personality . Personality could in theory commence 
with the performance of the bilateral act. Lauterpacht 
points out that even where recognition is actually 
provided for in a treaty , it is not difficult to 
regard the treaty in question as fulfilling two 
purposes at the same time, viz. recording the uni-
lateral act of recognition of the new state which 
thereupon takes part in the contractual relationship 
contained in the treaty in question. 279) In this 
case a state actually concludes a bilateral treaty 
wi thout having a pre-existing international person-
ality. 
(v) Recognition is unilateral and this is incompatible with the 
theory in three ways. 
--------------
--------(A)/ ... 
275) A Cavaglieri, Corso di diritto interrazionale. Naples , 1934, p .214; 
Kelsen . note 17) supra, p. 609 : Schwarzenberger , I, pp . 128, 549. 
Raestad , note 115) supra , pp . 273-274. 
276) Lauterpacht, p 56. 
277) Ibid 
278) Ibid . , p.57 . 
279 ) Ibid. , p . 56. 
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(A) The Constituvist theory involves relativism, and 
unilateral recognition is incompatible with relativ-
ism. It is said here that recognition can only 
function if the recognizing state is an international 
person in the absolute sense. In other words the 
unilateral investiture of personality by a state 
which does not have an absolute (or objective) person-
2Bo) ality can have no meaning. This argument, it is 
submitted. is not conceptually correct. There is 
no reason in theory why a state with a relative 
international personality cannot by unilateral act 
extend the ambit of its relative international law 
281) 
relations . 
(B) The Unilateral Act theory is in conflict with positiv:!sm 
i.e. tlmt a state should not be subjected to inter-
national law without its consent. 282 ) The answer to 
this is that it is only the state with discretion to 
accord recognition which cannot be brought into legal 
relations without its consent exhibited in recognition. 
Positivism only underlies this aspect of recognition . 
The unrecognized state is liable to be brought into 
legal relationships without its consent and thus, 
from its point of view, positivism does not underlie 
the operation of recognition. 283) 
-------------------(C)/ ... 
2Bo) Chen, pp . 41 , 45 
281) Supra , pp . 21.~4where the co-optive nature of international society is 
discussed with reference to the Slovakia-Manchuko mutual recognition. 
282) Chen p . 46. 
283) On positivism in relation to recognition see discussion supra, 
pp . 218-220 . 
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(C) Unilateral recognition infringes the principle of 
equality of states . This argument is not correct as 
j 
the principle of equality of states only applies in 
relations between recognized stat.es. 284) 
(vi) The fact that recognition may be implied poses difficult ies 
for the Constitutive theory. 
Here it is argued as follows: 
(A) There are cases where states conclude agreements with 
new entities but insist that there is no recognition. 
This poses difficulties for the Constitutive theory 
because recognition can be implied from such agree-
ments. 285) It is submitted , however , that the 
difficulties are illusory. Recognition need not 
necessarily be implied from agreement. Thus where 
a state insists that there is no recognition there 
are two possibilities. In the first place, the state 
intends to refuse all recognition to the entity with 
which it concludes the agreement. Here relations 
under the agreement will not be governed by inter-
national law and the position i s in accordance with 
constitutive doctrine . In the second place . the 
intention might be to refuse full recognition but 
to .accord a limited recognition for the specific 
purpose of bearing rights under the agreement in 
question/ . . . 
-----------------------------284) Cavaglieri, note 275) supra , p . 216. 
285 ) Chen , p .193. 
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question. Here the treaty-making capacity of the state 
is recognized for one particular agreement but not for 
2&5) 
any other purpose. Chen criticizes this saying : 
"This would mean that there can be an intermed-
iate situation be~ween the total absence of 
personality because of non-recognition and the 
total enjoyment of capacity in consequence of 
recognition. It is not clear how such an 
ar gument can be brought into harmony with 
constitutive theory. 11 287) 
With respect. it i s submitted that there is no diff-
:i.culty in reconciling such an "intermediate" position 
with constitutive doctrine. The concept of a limited 
and implied recognition creating a limited internat-
ional personality . which we previously advocated,
288 ) 
adequately explains the position . 
(B) Recognition is implied from certain acts. 289)However , 
the performance of these acts assumes the previous 
existence of the recognized entity .290) The answer 
to this is that the entity may very well have existed 
as a state before recognition. but it was not an 
int~rnational person. Here again we refer to the 
clear distinction which we have drawn between the 
29=_) 
concepts of statehood and international personality. 
---------
---------
---(C)/ ... 
2&5) The various possibilities which may exist when an agreement is 
concluded between a state and another state, which it does not 
recognize . are discussed more fully with reference to the question 
of possible implied recognition of Rhodesia. Infra, pp . 354-358. 
287) P. 193 . 
288) Supra . pp.197-201. 
289) For example concluding an agreement, accrediting diplomatic rep-
resentatives. 
290) Chen. p 45; Briggs _, note 89) supra, p. 115. 
291) Supra, pp . 178-181. 
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(C) Implied recognition creates logical difficulties for 
the Constitutive theory. Recognition may be achieved 
by an act not intended by the recognizing state and 
thus this state might find itself burdened with 
international obligations without its consent .292 ) 
It is submitted that this argument is based on a 
false premise. It asserts that implied recognition 
may be unintentional. It is our thesis, however, 
that this cannot be so because one of the essential 
ingredients of recognition is the intention to recog-
nize , which is either express or implied. 293) 
(D) Recognition might be implied from the conclusion of 
a signed treaty with an unrecognized entity. After-
wards the treaty might fail to secure ratification 
and thus might not come into operation. Would it be 
possible for the "recognizer" to say that since the 
treaty is without effect, the personality of the 
other must be deemed non-existent? 
The answer to this is that the treaty in question 
may perform two functions, viz. the unilateral grant 
of recognition and the creation of a bilateral con-
tractual relationship .294 ) The mere fact that it 
fails in the latter function does not mean that the 
former function of bestowing recognition has not 
------------
------------
-----been/ .. 
292) Chen, p.190 . 
293) See supra . pp . 202-20~ infra , pp. 279-281. 
294) Lauterpacht. p. 56 . 
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been validly performed . The basic question then is 
whether or not the mere signing of the treaty implies 
recognition. If it does, then the personality of 
the other party cannot be denied . If it does not, 
personality in the other party can of course be de-
nied for the simple reason that there has been no 
recognition . 
Whether or not recognition is to be implied from 
the mere signing of a treaty, as yet unratified, is 
a matter of intention. Thus in Republic of China v. 
Merchants Fire Assurance Corporation of New Y~rk, 
the court found that a treaty , though unratified, 
contained a clear recognition. 295) On the other hand , 
it is equally possible that the intention to recog-
nize only on ratification might be made explicit in 
the treaty. 296) 
(vii)The doctrine of premature recognition contradicts the 
Constitutive theory . 
Under this doctrine which is fully discussed later, 297) 
a state may have a duty to a parent state not to recognize 
a breakaway state prematurely. It is argued that this 
doctrine contradicts the absolute creative power of 
recognition. 298 ) I n relation to this doctrine there 
are two possibilities. 299 ) In the first place, premature 
recognition/ ... 
---------------------------~ 
295) ·30 F .2d 278 ·(1929). 
296) H. A. Smith, Great Britain and the Law of Nations , 1932 , I, p.150 
who cites as an example a letter from Canning to Bosanquet of 
31st December , 1824 that a commercial treaty on ratification would 
constitute recognition . 
297) Infra , pp . 295-301. 
298) Chen pp 50-51 -
299) These are fully discussed infra , pp . 328-333. 
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recognition might be void, i .e . ineffective. Here there 
would be no recognition of course and so no international 
personality would flow from it. It is submitted therefore 
that it is incorrect to introduce the idea of the "absolute 
creative power" of recognition in this context. It is be-
side the point if a premature recognition is no recognition 
at all . In the second place, a premature recognition 
might be valid and thus create an international personal-
ity in the recognized while at the same time constituting 
a tort against another subject of international law .300 )If 
this is the correct position, recognition is seen in its 
constitutive but relative role of creating international 
personality. 
(viii)Recognition may be reciprocal in character and if so this 
conflicts with constitutive doctrine. 
The argument here is that not only must State A recognize 
State B to create legal relations between them but that 
in addition State B must recognize State A.)Ol) Reciprocal 
recognition is necessary here because otherwise State B 
would be burdened with obligation~ to State A without its 
consent.302 ) The question is then posed how State B can 
perform tpe reciprocal act of recognition if it has no 
legal existence.303 ) 
The following observations may be ma.de on the above 
..--------------
---------------
--....;arguments/ . . . 
300) This is in fact the alternative preferred by the present writer. 
See infra, p. 333. 
301) Kelsefl , note 17) supra, p.609; Le Normand, p.60. 
302) Chen, p .41 . This is of course based on the positivistic view of the 
will of the state as the· source of all obligations. 
303) Ibid. , p.43 
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arguments : 
(A) If we assume that reciprocal recognition is necessary, 
there is no reason why a previously unrecognized state 
cannot perform the act of reciprocal recognition. It 
can perform the Juristic act of concluding a treaty 
with its recognizer which is simultaneous with, and 
which in fact constitutes an implied recognition of 
it .304 ) If it can perform the bilateral juristic 
act of concluding a treaty though it was not an 
international person prior to such treaty, surely 
it can also perform the unilateral juristic act of 
reciprocal recognition? It is erroneous to assert 
that the state in question had no legal existence 
prior to its recognition. As we previously pointed 
out it did exist legally but was not an international 
person.305) As a result it did not have rights and 
duties in international law but it could have the 
inherent capacity to exercise certain powers e.g. 
to assert its independence (thus making it possible 
for other states to recognize it) and to accord 
reciprocal recognition (if indeed this be necessa~C{?) 
-------------------(B)/ .. 
3o4) See infra , pp .354-356 where the possibility of implying recognition 
from the conclusion of bilateral treaties is discussed. 
305) See supra , pp . lgf-201. 
3o6) For the distinction between rights and duties on the one hand and 
powers on the other hand see W.N. Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal 
Conceptions (Edited WW Cook) Yale, 1963, pp. 38, 50-51 et seqq. 
An example from the field of Roman law will afford an analogy. A 
slave had no rights in Roman law. He was however, a legal entity 
and he had the capacity or power to bring his owner into legal 
relationships of a contractual nature in certain circumstances. 
See Leage's Roman Private Law , 3rd Ed. (Edited A.M. Prichard) 
London , 1961 , pp. 65-66 . 
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(B) Again even if we assume that reciprocal recognition 
is necessary, this simply means that two things are 
necessary to create international personality, namely 
a unilateral recognition of State B by State A, 
followed by another unilateral recognition of State 
A by State B. Whether we insist on reciprocal recog-
nition by B or not, it is clear that at least one 
act of recognition will always be essential and this 
accords with the constitutive doctrine. Whether 
personality flows from one act of recognition or two 
such acts, it is abundantly clear that in any event 
it flows from recognition. 
(C) In so far as the argument asserts that reciprocal 
recognition is a necessary corollary to constitutive 
doctrine, the argument may be doubted . The assertion 
here is based on the premise that a state would be 
burdened with obligations without its consent if 
recognition is not reciprocal. This premise in 
turn is based on the extreme positivistic notion 
that all obligations in international law flow from 
consent. This premise is false. As we have seen 
many obligations, and thus many rules of internat-
ional law, are in fact based on consent. But it 
is untrue to say that all obligations and all rules 
of international law rest on a consensual basis.307) 
The obligations arising from legal relationships 
created by an act of recognition of State B by 
---------
---------
-------'State A/ ... 
307) Supra, pp. 218-220 . 
State A are , it is submitted , examples of obligations 
308) being imposed on State B without its consent. 
(D) It is in any event improbable that recognition is 
reciprocal. Insistence on reciprocity amounts to an 
assertion that a state can refuse recognition by the 
expedient of omitting to afford reciprocal recognit-
ion. When, however , a state first makes a claim to 
international personality, it lays itself open, as 
a necessary consequence , to being recognized by 
existing subjects of international law and it cannot , 
it is submitted , refuse to accept recognition of i ts 
claims. Insistence on reciprocal recognition would 
in addition run counter to the unilateral nature of 
recognition and the co-optive nature of international 
society .309) 
( i x ) The circumstances surrounding the withdrawal of recognition 
create difficulty for constitutive doctrine . 
Here attention is drawn to the fact that , according to the 
Constitutive theory , withdrawal of recognition is not an 
arbitrary act of policy but an application of international 
law where the objective characteristlcs of statehood have 
ceased to exist.310) This, it is argued, makes withdrawal 
almost declaratory in nature. 311 )we may make the following 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~observations/ . .. 
308) Of course if we look at the obligations created for State A by its 
act of recognition , it is apparent that the principle of positivism 
does underlie the creation of such obligations. The obligations 
flow from the act of recognition which is a unilateral consensual 
act on the part of the recognizer and without this act they would 
not exist. This i s yet another facet of the co-optive nature of 
international society. 
309) Schwarzenberger, I , p. 89. 
310) Chen , p . 260. 
311) Chen, pp. 260-261 . 
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observations on this argument: 
(A) It must be generally conceded that according to con-
stitutive doctrine recognition cannot be withdrawn 
as long as the objective characteristics of state-
hood are present.312 ) Thus, once recognized, the 
personality of the state is independent of recognit-
ion, as long as it maintains the objective character-
istics of statehood, i.e . as long as it continues to 
be a state. But when the entity ceases to have the 
characteristics of statehood, recognition may then 
be withdrawn and the entity will cease to have inter-
national personality.3l3) The point however is that 
withdrawal of recognition is discretionary here.3l4 ) 
Thus recognition need not be withdrawn and if not 
withdrawn the entity will continue to be an inter-
national person though it is no longer a state.3l5) 
--------------------------This/ ... 
312) Kelsen. note 17) supra, p. 611 says that there is a duty not to 
withdraw recognition in such a case . The present writer considers 
however that there is not even a capacity to withdraw recognition 
here (at least de iure recognition) and thus that any purported 
withdrawal in such a case would actually be invalid and not merely 
a breach of duty . 
313) Kelsen, note 17) supra, p. 611 says withdrawal is the actus contrarius 
of recognition and when it takes place international law no longer 
governs relations. 
314) Kelsen, note 17) supra, p. 611 correctly points out that there is 
no duty to withdraw when the objective characteristics of statehood 
are lost. 
315) O'Connell, I. p. 130 says: "Ethiopia remained a member of the League 
of Nations for two years a~er its subjugation by Italy. Continued 
recognition in this case kept an entity alive in law that no longer 
existed in fact. Perhaps we must conclude that there is a rule of 
law permitting a legal entity once created to survive the facts 
which gave it birth." So too governments-in-exile may continue to 
be recognized after they have lost effective control. See Sorensen, 
p. 289. Finally these notions are even apposite in the case of 
Rhodesia. For the international law claims ma.de by the United 
Kingdom in respect of Rhodesia are validated by recognition on the 
part of other states (see infra, pp. 365-366, 592-593) though as we 
huve seen the United Kingdom is ineffective a s the Government of 
Rhodesia. (See supra, pp. 150-152) 
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This clearly distinguishes constitutive doctrine 
from declaratory doctrine . According to the former 
it is only by virtue of withdrawal that an entity 
loses its personality, though such withdrawal cannot 
take place whi le it remains a state. According to 
the latter the mere loss of the characteristics of 
statehood will automatically terminate personality. 
(B) The grant of constitutive recognition is discretion-
ary but the discretion is not absolute. There is 
sometimes a duty not to recognize.316 ) If a break-
away entity is obviously not a state there is a 
duty not to recognize it.317) If it is a state 
there is normally a discretion to grant or refuse 
recognition (thus granting or withholding personal-
ity according to constitutive doctrine). In the 
same way the withdrawal of recognition is discretion-
ary but once again the discretion is not absolute 
for recognition must not be withdrawn as long as 
the state continues to exist as such.3lS) Once it 
has ceased to exist , the discretion may be exercised 
(here according to constitutive doctrine retaining 
or terminating personality in accordance with the 
way in which the discretion is exercised) . 
---------------------(C)/ . .. 
316) This is discussed infra , pp. 295-333-
317) Infra, pp. 295-296. 
318) Kelsen , note 17) supra. p . 611. 
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(C) According to constitutive doctrine, withdrawal of 
recognition (like the grant of recognit i on) may be an 
arbitrary act of policy - once the circumstances 
creating the discretion to withdraw have come into 
being . 
(D) In the last analysis, the rules relating to the 
withdrawal of recognition are not relevant to the 
question we are considering. They are concerned with 
the termination of international personality whereas 
we are here concerned with the creation of inter-
national personality, our enquiry being whether such 
creation can take place without recognition. 
(x) Belligerents have international personalit>(l9) and hence 
it is difficult to see how their status could be less 
a~er they have succeeded in their rebellion and formed 
an independent state which is not as yet recognized.320 ) 
The answer to this argument is that if the belligerents 
are successful and attain their objectives by forming an 
independent state, they will certainly not enjoy a lesser 
degree of personality than they enjoyed during the struggle 
----------------------------------------------------------------They/ ... 
319) The Constitutive theory asserts of course that recognition as 
belligerents is necessary to establish personality, But here again 
this contention is disputed by the Declaratory theory. See note 6) 
supra. The ~atter is discussed infra, pp. 562-567in the context of 
the rights of military forces operating in Rhodesia. The Constitut-
ive theory finds more support however in the context of belligerence. 
See for example R. Erich, "La Naissance et la Reconnaissance des 
Etats", 1926, H.R . , III, p. 431 at pp. 460 , 461 who asserts that 
while the recognition of States is declaratory, in the case of 
belligepents it is constitutive. 
320) O'Connell, I, p. 130 . Chen, p. 37 argues that it is unthinkable 
that a portion of humanity once under the protection of internat-
ional law should suddenly be deprived of that protection merely be-
cause it has reorganized itself into a new state. See footnote 169) 
supra . 
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They will not lose their international personality for it 
is only permissible to withdraw recognition from belliger-
ents when they lose the characteristics of their personal-
ity by being defeated.321 ) Thus successful belligerents 
maintain their limited international personality because , 
being undefeated, no withdrawal of recognition is per-
missible. They will only obtain full international 
personality when they are recognized as an independent 
state. 
(f) Miscellaneous arguments. 
Here it is proposed to deal with the following arguments: 
(i) states cannot by their independent Judgment establish 
any competence in other states which is established by inter-
national law; (ii) the argument based on the lack of central-
ized institutions in international society; (iii) the 
argument based on collective recognition; (iv) the argument 
based on the Charter of the Organization of American States. 
(i) States cannot by their independent judgment establish 
any competence in other states which is established by 
international law. 322) 
With respect , this argument begs the question. The 
fundamental point in dispute is - how is international 
personality established by international law? Does 
international law require recognition to establish this 
competence? The argument assumes however that internat-
ional personality is created by international law without 
recognition but this is precisely the point in issue. 
______
______
______
__ (ii)/ ... 
321) 
322) 
Oppenheim, I p.151 ; Schwarzenberger. Manual, p. 77. It is sometime:; 
asserted however that if the belligerents lose, their personality 
terminates automatically. See Sorensen, p .28?. 
Brownlie, p. 83. 
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(ii) The Constitutive theory gains its plausibility from the 
lack of centralized institutions in international law 
which perform the function of recognition. 
It is argued that the Constitutive theory treats this 
lack not as an accident due to the stage of development 
reached by international law, but as an essential fea t ure 
of the system .323 ) The answer to this is that decentral-
ization is certainly an accident due to the development 
of international law but it is nevertheless an essential 
characteristic of present-day international law. The 
fact therefore is that there must be some method of 
determining international personality and as long as 
there are no centralized organs in international society 
capable of determining the existence of personality object-
ively, the determination must be made by each existing 
independent state individually . The device by which 
such a determination is made is recognition. 
The position is of course unsatisfactory in that the 
recognizing state fulfils a dual role as an organ ad-
ministering international law and as a guardian of its 
own interests . This must reveal itself in a disturbing 
fashion whenever there is occasion to use recognition 
324) 
as a weapon for political advantage . There is also 
the unsatisfactory relativity of personality.325) These 
defects are however inherent in the existing imperfection 
______
______
______
______
_ of/ ... 
323) Ibid; Sorensen . p . 268 . 
324) Lauterpacht , p. 67. 
325) Ibid . , p . 50. 
of international organization . They do not constitute 
valid objections to the Constitutive theory.326 ) As 
long as international society remains decentralized,
327 ) 
constitutive recognition will be an essential feature of 
that society. Decentralization is the rationale for the 
existence of constitutive recognition. 
(iii)Collective recognition may be either constitutive or 
declaratory. 
With the rise of international organizations such as the 
United Nations, recognition of a state may be collective 
in that the admission of a state to such an organization 
may in appropriate cases be deemed to be implied recognit-
ion by the other member states. Recognition tends to 
become generalized in practice.328) But this collective 
recognition is merely a practical way of according implied 
recognition. It must not obscure the fact that recognit-
ion remains an essentially unilateral act, the grant of 
which by each state remains discretionary. Thus collect-
ive recognition is no more than a series of individual 
recognitions simultaneously accorded~ any one of which 
might be individually withheld.3291 
--------------
-----------'Let/ ... 
326) Lauterpacht, pp. 67, 78. 
327) For proposals for the centralization of recognition in accordance 
with a standard procedure see Philip .Jessup, A Modern Law of Nations . 
1948, pp. 44-51. Lauterpacht, p. 67 suggests the transfer of the 
function of recognition to an international organization. 
328) See in general Castel . p. 144. See too R. Y. Jennings, The Acquisit-
ion of Territory in International Law, Manchester , 1963, pp . 85-86 
who says that collective recognition (i.e. the representation of 
opinion of the international community)is relevant to entitlement 
to territory which has been reduced into possession. 
329) As for instance Arab non-recognition of Israel despite common member-
ship of the United Nations Organization. See supra , pp. 185-187. 
See too, Anzilotti, note 14) supra , p. 170. 
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Let us now examine the . contention that collective recog-
nition is sometimes declaratory and sometimes constitutive. 
State Xis admitted to the United Nations Organization 
and prior to such admission it was recognized by State A, 
also a member of the United Nations. Here one can argue 
that recognition of State Xis merely declaratory of an 
existing personality. The point however is that such 
declaratory recognition is superfluous. It is in reality 
a second recognition which is without effect because the 
operative recognition was th~ recognition accorded in the 
330) past prior to admission. On the other hand if State 
X had not been recognized by State A prior to such admiss-
ion to the United Nations , the admission might be regard-
ed as a constitutive recognition in appropriate cases .
331 ) 
(iv) The Charter of the Organization of American States, 1948 
is a binding treaty which enshrines and confirms the 
Declaratory theory. 
Article 6 provides that the rights of a state depend 
upon the mere fact of its existence. Article 9 provides 
that the political existence of the state is independent 
of recognition. Even before recognition a state enjoys 
certain/ . . . 
-----------
-----------
----
330) Admission might however be construed as recognition of the fact that 
State X has the qualifications specified by the Charter for member-
ship of the United Nations. (Article 4). But this is something 
quite different from recognition of the international personality 
of State X. 
331) The recognition might not of course be a full recognition. It 
might be limited to the enjoyment of rights and the imposition of 
obligations incidental to membership of the organization as between 
recognized and recognizer inter se. See supra, pp.185-le.6. Kelsen , 
note 17) supra, p.614 goes so far as to say that by admission to 
the League a non-recognized State got the rights and duties in the 
Covenant against its non-recognizers even if they voted against 
admission . The basis of this was that competence to recognize had 
been transferred by members to the League organs. But the transfer 
was limited to the question whether states should be admitted as 
members. 
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certain rights which are specified in the article and 
which appear to be of a basic character.332 ) Article 10 
then provides that the function of recognition is essent-
ially to bestow what we may call a full personality on 
the recognized state. 
There would appear to be two explanations of these 
treaty provisions'. 
(A) The provisions in question create a treaty - made 
exception to constitutive doctrine. Our point of 
departure here is the principle that by way of 
treaty states are free to add to, subtract from or 
alter , the customary law which would otherwise be 
applicable.333 ) Such alterations will, of course, 
only be effective as between the parties to the 
treaty.334 ) The position therefore is that even 
if the Constitutive theory represents international 
customary law, states are free to conclude treaties 
departing from it and entrenching the Declaratory 
theory as far as they themselves are concerned. The 
members of the Organization of American States may 
therefore have bound themselves to a declaratory 
approach, by way of exception . 
------------
------------
'But/ . .. 
332) Compare Article 3 of the Montivideo Convention on the Rights and 
Duties of States, 1933. 
333) The exceptions would appear to be as follows: (i) states may not 
conclude treaties which conflict with peremptory norms of general 
international law as defined by Article 53 of the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties, 1969; (ii) Member States of the United 
Nations may not conclude treaties inter se which conflict with the 
Charter of the United Nations. See Charter , Article 103. 
334) Schwarzenberger, Manual, p. 31; Wimbledon case, 1923 P.C .I.J. 
Ser. A. No.l. 25 at 30. 
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But the treaty seems to require recognition for the 
creation of a~ international personality, if not 
for the creation of certain basic rights. There are 
however difficulties in the way of this explanation. 
If a political entity establishes itself as a state 
in any part of the world, e.g. Rhodesia, is it auto-
matically an international person with limited and 
basic rights as far as member states of the Organ-
ization are concerned? If this is so then such a 
state would appear to derive rights from a treaty 
to which it is not a party, a treaty which was 
concluded before it existed and a treaty to which it 
could never become a party for the Organization of 
American States, being regional in character, is 
continental in range of membership.335) This 
difficulty can be overcome however, if we regard the 
treaty in question in this respect as a stipulation 
pour autrui by means of which benefits are created 
for third parties.336 ) If the treaty stipulates 
certain conditions, compliance with these is essent-
ial if the third state is to claim the benefit. 
Here the condition is the attainment of independent 
statehood . Designation ad nominem of the benefic-
iary is not necessary. There may even be a plurality 
____________
____________
___ of/ ... 
335) Sorensen, p. 107 . 
336) Benefits (but not obligations) may be conferred on third states by 
treaties and even by unilateral acts. Sorensen, pp. 154-155, 217-
219; Jimenez de Arechaga, "Treaty Stipulations in Favour of Third 
States" (50) A.J .I L., 1956, p. 338 at p. 355. 
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of beneficieries determined in a general way. The 
beneficiaries might even be "all nations" and it is 
even possible for future states to derive rights 
from such stipulations.337) 
(B) It is also possible to explain the terms of the 
Bogata Charter in terms of constitutive doctrine. 
Our starting point here is that an act of recognit-
ion may be embodied in a treaty. The act of recog-
nition is of course a unilateral act here, though 
it is contained in an instrument which otherwise 
operates bilaterally.338) This act of recognition 
normally operates in relation to some other party 
to the treaty. But seeing that the act is essent-
ially unilateral, there is no theoretical (or 
practical) reason why it should not operate in 
relation to a non-party to the treaty and even to 
a non-party which is not yet in existence, if, of 
course, such an intention can be gleaned from the 
provisions of the treaty in question. On this 
reasoning the relevant provisions of the Bogata 
Charter would be interpreted as an act of limited339) 
and conditional recognition granted a priori by 
members of the Organization to such entities as 
might in future fulfil the requirements of independ-
ent statehood. 
---,-------~-----------------T.here/ ... 
337) Ibid. , p. 356. 
338) See discussion supra , pp. 243, 247-248 and infra, pp. 354-355 on 
recognition implied from treaties. 
339) It is limited recognition because the provisions only concede 
certain basic rights to the "unrecognized" state. It follows from 
this that the term "recognition" when used in the context of 
Articles 9 and 10 must of necessity refer to full recognition. This 
would in any event appear to be clear from the provisions of 
Article 10 itself . 
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There is Juristic controversy as to whether recognit-
ion can be conditional or not and since we have 
stated that recognition may be conditional, it is 
now necessary to refer to this controversy. Kelsen 
340) 
is of the view that recognition cannot be conditional. 
Chen states that conditional recognition, i.e. recog-
nition subject to the materialization of uncertain 
future events, may be regarded as simple recognition 
or not recognition at all. A recognition sub mode 
is legally possible but non-fulfillment of the mod-
ality will not affect the recognition. Many cases 
of so-called conditional recognition are in fact 
only recognition sub modo~4l) Lauterpacht also 
considers conditional recognition to be impossible. 
A stipulation attempting to constitute a condition 
is merely a modus in the Roman law sense.342 ) 
On the other hand Anzilotti argues that since recog-
nition depends on intention one can provide condit-
ions, modalities and stipulations accessoires.343) 
Le Normand also considers that recognition can be 
conditional. He says: 
"Ainsi, double liberte de l'etat: 1° de fair 
la declaration de recormaissance; 26 de fixer 
les condit i ons auxguelles cette declaration 
lui semble subordonnee." 344) 
--------------
--------------
It/ ... 
340) Note 17) supra, p.612. His view is based however on the premise that 
recognition establishes the legal existence of the state. 
341) P 269. 
342) P.362 . 
343) Note 14) supra, p. 175. 
344) On the question of the impermissability of withdrawing recognition 
see discussion of such withdrawal supra, pp. 252-255. 
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It would appear that a simple answer cannot be given 
to the question of whether or not recognition can be 
conditional. A distinction must be drawn between 
suspensive conditions and resolutive conditions. It 
is submitted that recognition cannot be made subject 
to a resolutive condition. The reason is tm.t recog-
nition, once given, cannot, as a general rule, be 
withdrawn .344 ) A stipulation attempting to impose 
such a condition will operate as a modus, non-
345) 
fulfilment of which will not affect recognition. 
On the other hand, it is submitted, that recognition 
can be subject to a suspensive condition.346 ) For 
a suspensive condit i on does not operate to terminate 
personality but to withhold it. Allowing such a 
condition would moreover be in accordance with the 
completely discretionary character of the grant of 
recognition. 347 ) It would also be in accordance 
with the thesis that the scope of recognit i on is a 
matter of intention. 
This brings us to another facet of the time-dimension 
of recognition. We saw previously that recognition 
could operate retrospectively if the recognizer so 
intended.348) So too , it is submitted, that there 
--------
--------
--------
----is/ ... 
344) On the question of the impermissability of withdrawing recognition 
see discussion of such withdrawal supra, pp. 252-255. 
345) To this extent Chen and Lauterpacht are, it is submitted, correct. 
346) And to this extent, it is submitted, Anzilotti and Le Normand are 
correct. 
34 7) See discussion infra, pp. 285-295 on the duty to recognize. 
348) Supra , pp. 236-239. 
is no reason why the operation of recognition cannot 
be postponed until some future date or the happening 
of some future event if the recognizer so intends. 
Thus conditional recognition, like retrospective 
recognition, is merely an example which illustrates 
the fact that the scope of recognition may have a 
time-dimension. Conditional recognition is like 
retrospective recognition in that both seek to fix 
a date for the commencement of the operation of recog-
nition, one in the past (retrospectively) the other in 
the future (prospectively). It is obvious that only 
a suspensive condition can so harmonize with the time-
dimension of recognition, for a resolutive condition 
does not seek a time for the commencement of recog-
nition at all but instead a time for the termination 
(or withdrawal) of a recognition already accorded. 
(6) Compromise approaches to the Constitutive and Declaratory theories . 
Here the following arguments are advanced· (a) recognition by a 
mother state is constitutive but otherwise recognition is declaratory: 
(b) a state has some rights before recognition but only full rights 
on recognition : (c) where the facts are ambivalent, recognition is 
constitutive, but otherwise it is declaratory; (d) a state has 
rights before recognition but can only exercise them on recognition; 
(e) recognition is constitutive but there is a duty to recognize; 
(f) Kelsen's theory of political and legal recognition. 
(a)/ .. . 
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(a) Recognition granted by a mother state when granting independence 
is constitutive but otherwise recognition may be declaratory . 
"When a community asserts its independence it acquires 
capacity if it has the qualifications for statehood. 
When it is granted independence by the mother country 
it acquires capacity in virtue of this act, and not in 
virtue of its own subsequent assertion. In the former 
case recognition is subsequent to the legal fact; in 
the latter the recognition of independence by the mother 
country is constitutive of it; in neither case does the 
legal fact depend upon the recognition of other states."349 ) 
These views, it is submitted, adhere to the Declaratory theory, 
for according to them a state can have international person-
ality in certain cases in the absence of recognition. The 
Constitutive theory always asserts that personality flows 
from recognition . We may put this another way. According to 
the Declaratory theory, the investitive facts of personality 
may be either (i) the attributes of statehood 2.!'.. (ii) recog-
nition.350) On the other hand the Constitutive theory asserts 
that there is only one vestitive fact of personality, viz. 
recognition. The compromise approach above is obviously in 
accordance with the former attitude and at variance with 
the latter. 
(b) A state may have some rights before recognition but these 
will only mature into ful} rights and full personality when 
recognition is accorded . 
Thus it is argued that prior to recognition a state possesses 
certain fundamental or universally admitted r i ghts but as 
______
______
______
______
 to/ .. 
349) O'Connell, I, p. 130, .See too Raestad, note 115) supra, p.273 who 
states that the grant of independence constitutes recognition. 
350) See Sorensen, p. 278. 
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to other specific rights recognition is constitutive. This 
approach to the question of recognition is termed mi-constitutive 
or mi-declarative.351 ) 
The theory has recently been supported by Bot who advocates it 
as a way out of the impasse between the Constitutive and 
Declaratory theories and who attempts to give it substance.35
2 ) 
Bot conceives of international law not as a system ordering 
relations between recognized states but as a ius inter potestates 
in which the unrecognized state would be accorded its own place. 
Ba.sic rights and duties should be extended to it including 
those pertaining to the use of force. The sui Juris status of 
an unrecognized state, in some respects inferior to its recog-
nized counterpart, should be accepted. 
It is submitted however that this compromise approach is no 
more than an application of the Declaratory theory for it 
accepts the principle that a state may have some rights (and 
thus at least a limited international personality) prior to, 
and independent of, recognition. It is completely at variance 
with constitutive doctrine.353) 
(c) Where the facts relating to the effectiveness of independence 
are subJect to different evaluations recognition is constitutive 
but where there can be no controversy about statehood recognit-
ion .. is purely declaratory. 
---------
---------
---------
Once/ .. . 
351) Chen, p . 17 gives a list of the important jurists who support such 
an approach. It includes Cavaglieri, Miceli, Romano, Fedozzi, 
Savioli , Kelsen (though Kelsen later became in effect a constituvist), 
Verdross, Kunz, Guggenheim. The approach was one which formerly 
also appealed to the present writer. See the writer's "Status of 
Rhodesia in International Law", Acta Juridica, 1967 at pp . 43-44. 
See too Briggs. p. 114. 
352) Note 61) supra, p. 19. 
353) See comment of Chen , p. 17. 
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Once again the argument outlined in (b) above is appropriate. 
The view expressed here is that a state can have rights inde-
pendent of recognition when its statehood is beyond doubt.35
4 ) 
This again is simply an application of declaratory doctrine. 
A very similar approach, and one which is subject to the same 
criticism, is, that if a state is recognized no proof of its 
existence is necessary but if it is not recognized proof 
becomes necessary.355) 
(d) A state has rights before recognition but can only exercise 
them on recognition. 
" les attributions de la souverainete . . . lui (a l'etat) 
appartiennent independamment de toute recornaissance, mais c'est 
gu'aprgs avoir ete reconnue gu'elle en aura l'exercise assur~. 
Des relations politigue regulieres n'existent gu'entre Etats 
gue se reconaissent reciproguement" . 356) 
This theory can be criticized. It is difficult to imagine an 
entity posses-sing full legal personality and yet having its 
rights remain unexercisable until recognized by some other 
entity . Personality under such a disability would be devoid 
of meaning .357 ) 
When/ ... 
---------
---------
---------
--
354) Sorensen , pp. 276-277. 
355) Yrlsarri v. Clement (1825) 2 Car. and P. 223 at 225. Other jurists 
put this proposition as follows. Recognition has an evidential 
value in that the recognizing state is henceforth bound by its 
declaration. See R. Erich (13) H.R., 1926, III, p. 461 ; H.Kelsen , 
Das Problem der Souveranitat, 1920, p . 231. 
356) Rivier, Principes des Droits des Gens , 1896, I , p.57. Other 
declaratists who hold similar views are Pradier-Fodere, Fauchille , 
Fiore , Diena, Twiss, de Louter and Hyde. See Chen , pp. 15-16 and 
Lauterpacht, p. 42. The American Law Institute is of a similar 
view See Restatement of the Foreign Relatiohs Law of the United 
States , s . 107, 108. 
357) Chen , p . 16; Whiteman , II - p . 21. 
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When reduced to its essentials, the view expressed above is 
358) 
simply an affirmation of the Declaratory theory, with the 
addition of a qualification which is Juristically unacceptable 
because it suggests that the obstruction of the exercise of 
the "rightsn of an unrecognized state is legitimate. If this 
is indeed so . the unrecognized state surely has no rights 
since they need not be respected. Thus the basic premise that 
the unrecognized state has rights must fall to the ground. 
In addition the above statement that regular political relat-
ions only exist between states which recognize one another, 
is, it is submitted . juridically irrelevant. Political relat-
ions can be maintained with an unrecognized entity but these 
will not be governed by international law.359) Further: 
"A state may refuse to enter into diplomatic relations 
with even a well-established State without thereby deny-
ing the latter's personality." 360) 
(e) Recognition is constitutive but there is a duty to recognize a 
state which meets the test of independent statehood. 361) 
This is in essence a compromise approach. Its merits are 
later discussed and the submission is made that a "duty to 
recognize" does not exist.36
2 ) 
(f) Kelsen conceives of two kinds of recognition, political and 
legal.363) 
Political recognition indicates a willingness to enter formal 
relations with the state recognized. Such recognition pre-
------
------
------
------
---supposes/ .. 
358) Whiteman , II .. p . 21. 
359) Supra, pp . 181-182. 
360) Whiteman, II, p. 21. 
361) Lauterpacht , p. 26 . 
362) Infra, pp . 285-295. 
363) Note 17) supra, pp. 605, 609 . 
-270-
presupposes the existence of the state and is therefore 
declaratory. It has no legal consequences. 364) 
Legal recognition on the other hand constitutes a subject of 
international law with the rights and obligations stipulated 
by general international law.365) 
It is submitted that if political recognition has no legal 
effect , then it is completely superfluous and does not merit 
treatment as a legal concept. That leaves Kelsen with legal 
recognition and his views on this make him clearly a constit-
uvist in the traditional sense. 366 ) There is no compromise 
approach here. 
(7) Arguments in favour of the Constitutive theory and against the 
Declaratory theory. 
Here the following arguments are advanced· (a) judicial practice 
supports the theory; (b) the death of states supports the theory; 
(c) the Declaratory theory admits that sometimes recognition is 
constitutive; (d) the Constitutive theory is more in accord with 
the anomalous realities of international relations; (e) the 
argument based on the function of recognition; (f) the argument 
based on consistency ; (g) the argument based on practicality. 
_________
_________
__ (a)/ ... 
364) Ibid .. p. 605 . 
365) Ibid . , p. 609 . 
366) Chen, p . 48 says that as far as legal personality is concerned 
only the legal act of recognition matters . Therefore Kelsen's views 
have little to differentiate them from traditional views. Borchard 
"Recognition and Non-Recognition" (36) A.J .I .L., 1942, p.108 
doubts the existence of Kelsen's distinction and whether it can have 
any practical significance. For further criticism see Sandars, 
note 46) supra, p. 261 . 
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(a) Judicial practice of many states does not allow the unrecognized 
state full and complete rights before national courts.367) 
Thus, it is a~gued, courts may refuse to admit the validity of 
the acts of an unrecognized state and may apply the law of a 
parent state up to recognition ,368 ) may refuse relief if this 
depends on the allegation of the existence of an unrecognized 
state,.369) may decline the ordinary Jurisdictional immunities 
370) 371) 
to an unrecognized state and may deny it the right to sue. 
The argument here is unconvincing. Court practice is here 
ambivalent. There are many instances i ndeed of municipal 
courts embracing a declaratory appr oach,372 ) granting state 
immunity to unrecognized entities373 ) and allowing these 
entities to appear as plaintiffs in proceedings before them.374 ) 
Borchard says that the Judicial attitude of courts in the 
United States and other countries to the Soviet Government seems 
to show that even before recognition, a community legally 
exists and must be accepted as such by foreign courts.375) 
From the above it is apparent that national court practice 
favours neither one theory nor the other. In any event . 
------------
------------
----w.hether/ ... 
367) Sorensen . p. 276; Starke . pp . 145, 160. 
368) Gelston v~ Hoyt,3 Wheat, 246 ; Rose v. Hinely (18o8) 4 Cranch, 241 : 
The Nereide (1815) 9 Cranch, 388. 
369) Taylor v. Barclay (1828) 2 Sim. 213; Thompson v. Prowles (1828) 
2 Sim . 194; Jones v . Garcia del Rio (1823) Turner and Russell , 297 . 
370) The Annette; The Dora [1919] P.105. 
371) City of Berne v. Bank of England (18o4) 9 Yes. Jun. 34 7. 
372) Consul of Spain v . La Conception (1819) 2 Wheel . Cr . Cas. 597; 
Yrisarri v. Clement (1826) 3 Bing 432; Doe d. Thomas v. Acklam 
(1824) 2 B. and c, 779 at 795; Counterfeiting of Stamps 
(Ozeckoslovakia) Case (1920) Ann. Dig. , 1919-1922, Case No . 24,p.45 ; 
Bohemian Union Bank v. Administrator of Austrian Property [1927] 
2 Ch . 175 ; In re M. and O. (1921) Ann. Dig., 1919-1922, Case No .42 , 
p.70 . 
373) Wulfsohn v. Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic , 234 N.Y. 372 . 
138 N E. 24. 
374) Guaranty Trust Co . v. U.S . (1938) 3o4 U.S . 126, 137 , 
375) Note 366) supra, p. 110. But he points out that i t took the U.S. 
courts ten years to adopt thi s att i tude (p.109) . Thus even U.S. 
court practice alone is ambivalent. 
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whether the courts of a state allow locus standi in Judicio or 
state immunity to an unrecognized state or are prepared to 
apply the laws of the latter, is a matter which is regulated 
entirely by municipal law. Municipal law may adopt criteria 
other than recognition for the grant of such privileges. When 
granted such privileges operate merely in the sphere of municipal 
law and the courts are unhampered by a doctrine of judicial 
self-limitation based on recognition. There is no international 
law obligation on the state to grant these privileges and in-
deed there is no necessary connection between them and inter-
national law.376 ) 
(b) The death as opposed to the birth of states poses difficulties 
377) for the Declaratory theory. 
A state may have ceased to be such and yet it may continue to 
be treated as an international person. Thus Ethiopia remained 
a member of the League of Nations for two years after its con-
quest by Italy.378) Though the allies had assumed supreme 
authority exercising all powers possessed by the German Govern-
ment and authorities, the British Foreign Office certified 
that Germany still existed as a state and its nationality as 
a nationality.379) The argument is that if personality depends 
upon the facts of statehood for its creation, it should logic-
ally follow that the cessation of such statehood should be 
sufficient for the dissolution of personality. O'Connell how-
ever has a plausible answer to this argument which he himself 
poses. 
-------------------
--------"Perhaps/ ... 
3 76) See supra, pp . 208-213 . 
377) O'Connell, I, p. 130; Chen, p. 63. 
378) O'Connell, I , p. 130. 
379) R v. Bottrill, Ex parte Kuechenmeister [1946] 1 All. E.R. 635, 
[1947] 1 K.B. 41. For other examples see Chen, pp. 63-78. 
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"Perhaps we nrust conclude that there is a rule of law per-
mitting a legal entity once created to survi ve the facts 
which gave it birth." 38o) 
In any event the general argument based on the death of states 
is not apposite as a criticism of the Declaratory theory be-
cause it does not deal with the creation of personality but 
with the termination of personality.38l) 
(c) According to the Declaratory theory, recognition can sometimes 
be constitutive. 
In the case of limited international persons such as dependent 
states, belligerents and insurgents, international organizations 
and human beings , some declaratists admit that personality 
generally exists by virtue of recognition.382 ) In the case of 
full international persons recognition can be constitutive in 
certain circumstances even according to the declaratory view.383) 
It may therefore be asked why recognition should play a constit-
utive role in some cases and a declaratory role in others. 
Declaratists, it is submitted, could readily answer this 
argument by pointing out that the vestitive facts of internat-
ional personality can be either the objective criteria of state-
hood, belligerently, etc. , £.!:. recognition. In the latter case 
recognition is of course constitutive while in the former case 
recognition can only be declaratory. 
_________________ (d)/ . .. 
38o) I , p . 130 , 
381) We previously saw how a similar argument could not be used either 
to criticise the Constitutive theory . See supra, pp. 252-255. 
382) Erich, note 355) supra, pp . 360 . 361. 
383) Sorensen, p . 278. 
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(d) The Constitutive theory accepts the anomalous realities of 
international relations whereas the Declaratory theory seems to 
pretend that these anomalies do not exist. 
It is submitted that the basic reason for the divergence of 
view on the function of recognition is simply that the facts 
of effective power may very of'ten be at variance with the 
recognized position. This creates an anomaly. The Declaratory 
theory tries to solve this anomaly. It attempts to force the 
legal position into line with the factual position. In so 
doing, it must , of necessity, minimize and even discount the 
role of recognition in the establishment of legal personality. 
On the other hand . it is submitted, that the Constitutive theory 
accepts the anomaly and then explains that anomaly Juridically. 
It shows why the legal position is at variance with the facts 
of power _and in so doing it clarifies an awkward anomaly 
which would otherwise be inexplicable. An approach which is 
at least prepared to concede the existence of the anomaly 
(which it cannot eschew and which in the nature of things 
cannot be eschewed as long as international society is de-
centralized) and to offer a solution, is therefore, it is 
submitted, preferable to an approach which tr1:ee to minimize 
the difficulties involved by substituting an unattainable ideal 
for reality. 
(e) It is difficult to explain the function of recognition if one 
adheres to the Declaratory theory. 
Declaratists give various explanations of the function of 
recognition. To some recognition is merely a political 
declaration of willingness to have diplomatic relations 
with/ ... 
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with the recognized entity.384 ) To others it is merely a 
declaration of intention or readiness to enter into political 
relations.385) Recognition is also conceived as being evident-
386) ial of statehood in the recognized. Recognition is also 
conceived as a combination of these factors. It plays a dual 
role in that it is a declaration of fact (that the state 
3e1') 
exists) and a declaration of intention (to establish relations). 
In all the above roles, recognition is in fact superfluous. We 
may thus conclude that declaratists are rnanoevered into a 
position where they must either concede that recognition is 
superfluous (or at most evidentiary) or that it merely has the 
effect of increasing the rights which an already existing 
international person has,388) or that it is a precondition for 
the exercise as opposed to the enjoyment of rights38g) or that 
__________________________ it/ ... 
384) Kunz, Die Anerkunning von Staaten und Regierungen in Volkerrecht, 
1928, p. 95; Verdross, Volkerrecht, 1937, pp. 114-il6; Roma.no, 
Corso di diritto internazionale, 2nd ed., 1929, p. 59; Balladore 
Pallieri, Diritto internazionale publico, 1937, pp. 191, i92; 
Perassi, Lezioni di diritto internazionale, 1922, pp. 52-55; Scalfati 
Fusco, Il reconoscimento di stati nel diritto internazionale, Naples , 
1938, p. 272. 
385) Chen , p. 5; C.H Alexandrowicz, "New and Original States - The 
Issue of Reversion to Sovereignty" (45) International Affairs, 1969, 
p. 465 at p. 467. Chen, p. 8 goes on to say that recognition de iure 
and de facto are indicative of the degree of the relations the 
recognizer intends to enter into with the recognized. 
386) Chen, p. 6; Alexandrowicz, note 385) supra, p. 467; Herbert W.Briggs 
"Recognition of States: Some Reflections on Doctrine and Practice" 
(43) A.J I.L , 1949, p.113 at p. 119. Variations on this are that 
recognition tends to give stability to a r~gime and to assure its 
political position among nations, that it creates an estoppel against 
any subsequent denial of the existence of the recognized state. See 
Chen, pp. 6 , 78; Sir John Fisher Williams, "Some Thoughts on the 
Doctrine of Recognition in International Law" (47) Harvard Law 
Review, 1933-1934, p. 776 at pp. 793-794. 
387) Chen, p. 8. 
388) See supra, pp.266-267 where this proposition was discussed and 
rejected. 
389) See supra,pp. 268-269 where this proposition was discussed and 
rejected. 
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it merely gives validity to a variety of acts in a foreign 
state .390 ) 
It thus appears that declaratists can assign no satisfactory 
function to recognition. Lauterpacht says that the declaratory 
conception of recognition is oversimplified and devoid of use-
fulness ,39l) while O'Connell says· 
"The result ... is to reduce the Juridical significance of 
recognition and it has been argued that recognition has no 
other effect than to bring about ordinary diplomatic 
relations." 392) 
On the other hand if one adheres to the Constitutive theory, 
recognition is given a specific and consistent role as the 
only process for the establishing of personality. Shorn of 
this function it would lose much, if not all , of its significance 
and could be dispensed with as superfluous. It is inconc~ivable 
that such a body of practice and doctrine should have developed 
in relation to a superfluous concept and that Schwarzenberger 
should recognize it as one of the seven fundamental principles 
of international law .393) 
(f) The basic assumptions of the Constitutive theory are at least 
consistent but not so those of the Declaratory theory . 
Here it is argued that a new state , according to the Declaratory 
theory, cannot claim recognition but can claim what are normally 
regarded as the consequences of recognition - namely rights.394) 
------------------------W,ith/ ... 
390) Chen, p. 13. If this is all that recognition does, then it does 
not have any effect in international law at all but only in municipal 
law . 
391) P .61. 
392 ) I, p . 129 . 
393) I, pp. 15-16. 
394) Lauterpacht, p . 2. 
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With respect, thi s criticism of the Declaratory theory begs 
the question . It assumes the correctness of the Constitutive 
theory viz . that rights flow from recognition alone . But this 
is precisely the point in issue between the two theories. 
(g) Practical considerations favour the Constitutive theory . 
The Constitutive theory can furnish a higher degree of legal 
certainty until such time as international society becomes 
centralized and develops organs which have the capacity to 
adjudicate objectively and in a binding manner on the existence 
of personality in individual cases .395 ) Applying the Constitut-
ive theory one can always determine whether there is a juridical 
nexus between States A and B. Further one can determine pre-
cisely the extent of that juridical nexus by examining the 
scope of the recognition accorded.396) Balanced however 
against this consideration is the disadvantage of according 
an arbitrary discretion to existing states but this , it is 
submitted, is the price which a decentralized society must pay 
for a measure of certainty . 
By way of contrast there are grave practical difficulties and 
much uncertainty surrounding the application of the Declaratory 
--~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-theory/ ... 
395) It has been suggested that determinations of statehood by the General 
Assembly of the United Nations and co-membership in the United 
Nations provide two methods of collective recognition by the organ-
ized community of states . See H Briggs, "Community Interest in 
the Emergence of New St ates: The Pr oblem of Recognition", Proceed-
ings A.S I .L. , 1950, pp. 169-181 . It is probable however, that the 
"collect i ve" recognition is merely a series of simultaneous indivi d-
ual recognitions . all of which are in any event discretionary. See 
supra , P.· 258. 
396) The writer therefore , with respect , disagrees with Sandars, note 46 ) 
supra , p. 262 when he says that" . .. erkenning self, vanwee sy 
politieke gekleurdheid 1 geen suiwere maatstaf kan wees om volkereg-
telike status aan te toet s nie ... " Recognition does provide a 
pure criterion. I t is only the reasons which underlie the exercise 
of recognition that may be suspect. 
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theory. In the first place, the moment when a state first 
exists and thus becomes an international person may be incapabl e 
of solution.397 ) In the second place, there may be controversy 
as to whether an entity is a state and thus an international 
person.398 ) In the third place, even if the state exists, 
what is the extent of the rights which it enjoys before recog-
nition? Does it enjoy all rights under international law as 
the American Law Institute seems to suggest? 399) Or does it 
enjoy certain basic rights such as those mentioned in Article 9 
of the Charter of the Organization of American States?400) These 
problems need to be solved before the Declaratory theory can 
attempt to provide a workable and practical solution to the 
problem of the existence and extent of international personal-
ity . 
(8) Conclusions. 
From all that we have said, we are now in a position to abstract 
the essential features of recognition, international personality 
and international society. In stating his conclusions on these 
matters the writer is endeavouring to offer an explanation of one of 
the most perplexing aspects of international law and relations by 
postulating, what he hopes, is a logical and self-consistent theory 
of recognition, which can be utilized not only to explain the probl em 
under discussion, viz . the international status of Rhodesia, but 
which can also be used to afford a Juristic explanation of other 
----------------------------specific/ .•. 
397) Anzilotti , note 14) supra , p.165. Lauterpacht, p. 46 says that when 
the Declaratory theory asserts that a state exists from the moment 
it became independent , this is tautologous because this moment may 
be controversial. 
398) Lauterpacht, p. 50 says that the Declaratory theory assumes "exist-
ence" on the part of the state but this may be the very question in 
issue. 
399) Supra , p. 173, 
400) Supra , p . .262 . 
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specific instances drawn from the general field of international 
relations. The principal features of this theory are now summarized. 
(a) Recognition 
The essential features of recognition are as follows: 
(i) Recognition is a matter of intention. 
The consensual character of recognition is the most 
important fe~ture of recognition40l) and it accounts for 
the following characteristics. 
(A) Recognition has no stipulated form. 
It can be exp~ess or implied.402) But there is no 
conduct, however conclusive in ordinary circumstances, 
the normal legal consequences of which cannot be 
averted by a clear manifestation of a contrary 
. 4®) intention. 
(B) The scope of recognition is a matter of intention. 
Here recognition has various dimensions each of which 
depends on intention. 
Geographical dimension. 
Recognition only applies between recognizer and 
404) 
recognized . Thus recognition is necessarily relative. 
Content dimension. 
Recognition may be full recognition or limited recog-
nition. Full recognition we call de iure recognition. 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~---:Limited/ •.. 
401) 
402) 
403) 
4o4) 
Lauterpacht, pp. 371, 378; _ Anzilotti, note 14) 
supra, pp.203, 24i Schwarzenberger, I, p. 128; 
Whiteman, II, p. 48. 
supra, p. 173; 
Brownlie, p. 87, 
Anzilotti, note 14) supra, p. 170; 
Lauterpacht. p. 369. 
supra, pp.182-188,198,201,245-248. 
Supra, pp. 230-233. 
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Limited or partial recognition is recognition for a 
certain purpose or purposes only. The exact scope 
of limited recognition in any case is determined by 
intention. De facto recognition is a species of 
limited recognition, the content of which has 
crystallized. Limited recognition can be brought 
about by merely calling on another entity to obser ve 
certain norms of international law. 405) 
Time dimension. 
Recognition normally operates from the time at which 
it is accorded. But it can be accorded so as to 
operate retrospectively. Whether it is to operate 
retrospectively, and if so, to what extent, is 
entirely a matter of intention. 4c6)Recognition 
may also operate from a future date. Whether or 
not recognition is prospective in this way_, and if 
so , from what date , is again entirely a matter of 
intention. Thus it is possible for recognition to 
407) 
operate on the fulfilment of a suspensive condition . 
(C) Recognition is discretionary . 
Refusal to grant recognition is always in the absolute 
408 ) 
discretion of states. There is no duty to recognize . 
The grant of recognition is generally in the dis-
cretion of states but there are two cases where 
this/ ... 
------------------
------------
4 o 5) Supra , pp. 198-2c6. 
4o6) Supra. pp . 236-239. 
407) Supra, pp. 263-265. 
408) :Lnfra , pp.285-295. 
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409) this is not so and there is a duty not to recognize. , 
The discretionary features of recognition give it its 
characteristic of arbitrariness. 
( ii ) Recognition is a unilateral act. 
It is an individual matter for each state but in form it 
can be collective.410 ) Here however , collective recognit-
ion is no more than a series of simultaneous individual 
4n ) 
recognitions , 
(iii)Recognition is a diplomatic act. 
Recognition is the prerogative of each existing full 
subject of internat i onal law. By granting recognition 
to new states, the existing full members extend the 
412) 
community . Furthermore, recognition is an act for 
the government of a state to perform. It is not the 
funct i on of courts or private individuals to afford recog-
nition on behalf of the state. 413) 
(iv) Recognition is constitutive . 
The various criticisms directed against the Constitutive 
theory prove on analysis to be without foundation. 414 ) 
This feature gives recognition the characteristic of 
creativeness. The fact that recognition creates internat-
ional personality has three consequences. 
---------------------(A)/ .. . 
409) Infra , pp. 295 et seqq. ; 301 et seq. 
410) Anzilotti . note 14) supra, p . 170 . 
411) Supra, p. 258. 
412) Supra , p. 213 . 
413) Supra , pp. 210-213. 
414) Lauterpacht , p. 61 ; Supra , pp. 177-265. 
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(A) Recognition cannot, in general, be withdrawn. 415) 
(B) Recognition cannot be given subject to a resolutive 
condition . It can however be given subject to a 
modu~ but non-fulfilment of the modality will have 
no effect on the recognition accorded. 416 ) 
(C) Kelsen's concept of political recognition is not 
recognition at all since it has no legal effects. 
His concept of legal recognition is true constitutive 
. 417) 
recognition. 
By treaty it may be possible to create an exception to the 
operation of the doctrine of constitutive recognition but 
even here it is possible to harmonize the treaty in 
question with the constitutive doctrine if one is pre-
pared to interpret the treaty in question as effecting 
t f ·t· b' t t i d't' 418 ) an ac o recogni ion su Jee o a suspens ve con i ion. 
(v) Recognition normally becomes effective at the moment of 
unilateral communlcation to the addressee. 419) 
(b) International personality. 
The following conclusions may be expressed on this concept. 
(i) International personality and statehood are distinct 
concepts. 
Thus an entity may have all the objective characteristics 
which international law prescribes for statehood. This 
does not make it an international person. It merely has 
---------------------------the/ ... 
415) Supra_. pp . 253-255. 
416) Supra, pp. 263, 264. 
417) Supra . pp . 269-270 . 
418) Supra, pp . 264-265. 
419) Schwarzenberger , I, pp . 128, 552 . 
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the capacity to be recognized as an international person. 
It is only when it is accorded recognition that it will 
have international personality, i.e . be the bearer of 
rights and duties in international law. 420 ) 
(ii) International personality may be relative . 
It may exist against some states but not against others. 
Recognition is decisive here . Personality can only be 
absolute (or objective ) when a state is recognized by 
421) 
all other full international persons. Fortunately the 
vast majority of states today are in this position. But 
there are still the exceptions in the Koreas, Vietnams, 
East Germany , Israel, Bangladesh and Rhodesia. In these 
cases the concept of relative personality becomes important. 
(iii)International personality can be changing.422 ) 
Thus an entity may receive a very limited form of recog-
nition. At a later stage a further limited degree of 
recognition might be bestowed and eventually full de iure 
recognition might be accorded. Here the international 
personality of the entity gradually expands as it re-
ceives further recognition until eventually it has a 
full international personality when it gets de iure recog-
nition. 
Anzilotti says that these characteristics, viz. relative 
personality at the same time , and changing personality 
___________
___________
___ at/ ... 
420) Supra, p. 281 . 
421) Supra, p~ 279. 
422) Supra , pp. 204 -205 . 
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at different times to the same state, correspond exactly 
to the realHies of international life. 423) 
(iv) International personality may be full or limited. 
(c) International society . 
This comprises the sum total of international persons. It 
has the following characteristics: 
(i) It is co-optive. 
The co-optive nature of the society flows from the fact 
that recognition is constitutive, unilateral and diplomatic. 
The last-mentioned characteristic means, as we have seen, 
that existing full persons co-opt other right-bearing 
entities. 
(ii) It is composed of international persons with different 
degrees of international personality. 
This flows from the fact that personality may be relative 
and may be full or limited. 
(iii)Its membership changes from time to time. 
This will naturally occur where new recognitions are 
accorded and where old entities cease to exist with the 
result that withdrawal of recognition becomes permissible . 
The various conclusions which we have expressed here will 
be later applied, where relevant, in the context of the 
status of Rhodesia. 
-------------------------SECTION IV/ .. 
423) Note 14) supra, p . 168. 
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SECTION IV 
THE DUTY TO RECOGNIZE 
We have stated before, but without discussion, that the grant of recog-
nition is discretionary. 1 ) This means that in principle recognition may 
be withheld for any reason, political or otherwise or perhaps for no 
good reason at all . The contention then is that there is no duty to 
recognize and this contention rrrust now be examined. In this respect a 
novel theory of recognition, which can be described as a compromise be-
tween the Constitutive and Declaratory theories, 2 ) has been put forward 
by Judge Lauterpacht.3) Generally he favours the Constitutive theory of 
recognition but he alleges that if a state meets the test of independent 
statehood, other states have a duty to recognize it.4 ) Naturally if 
this theory reflects international law, Rhodesia is entitled to recognit-
ion . because as appears from previous discussion Rhodesia is in fact an 
independent state. 5) The "duty to recognize" has found some support 
among writers but these form a very small minority. 6 ) Thus Borchard 
alleges there is a legal right to recognition, breach of the duty to 
recognize is a wrong, an act of intervention and a politically hostile 
act./ ... 
-----------------------------
1) Supra , pp. 28o-281. 
2) Starke, pp . 145-146. 
3) Lauterpacht , ch . IV, V. 
4) Ibid., p. 58. 
5) Supra , p. 169. 
6) The duty has found some support in the works of certain Latin-
American writers and in the works of members of the natural law 
school. See Jimenez de Ar~chaga, Reconocimento de Gobiernos, 1947. 
For details of other writers who support the duty see Lauterpacht 
pp . 64-65 who admits such writers to be in the minority . 
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7) 
act. Quincy Wright also supports Lauterpacht's duty to recognize where 
the factual requirements of statehood are present .
8) 
Some writers seem to equivocate between supporting a duty to recognize 
and the pri nciple that recognition is discretionary. Thus Raestad says 
that the duty to recognize exists only in extreme cases because the 
question whether the facts of control, upon which such an obligation is 
based , are present is a mat ter about which there could be differences 
of opinion in good faith .9) This suggests that if objectively the re-
quirements of statehood are present, a state which is subjectively and 
bona fide in doubt as to their existence has a discretion to recognize 
but otherwise it has a duty to recognize. Honor~ says that although 
international law provides that recognition can and perhaps should be 
granted , the "should" is of a rather tenuous character as there are 
notorious examples of non-recognition over long periods of time which 
the international community seems to tolerate .
10 ) 
It is submitted that Lauterpacht ' s theory does not represent internation-
al law for the following reasons . 
------------------
-----------
(1 )/ ... 
7) E. Borchard , "Recognition and Non-Recognition" (36) A.J.I.L., 1942 , 
p. 108 at pp. 111-112. He goes on to draw the conclusion that Italy 
was entirely justified in withdrawing the exeguatur of certain 
German consuls in 1&50 when certain German states refused to recog-
nize Italy. This argument, it is submitted, is not of relevance to 
the point . The actions of Italy in casu could not infringe internat-
ional law for two reasons: (a) no state is obliged to maintain 
consular relations with other states ; (b) Italy was incapable of 
wronging the German states in question because it enjoyed no operat-
ive personality vis-a-vi s the German states until recognized by 
them. It was therefore unnecessary to attempt to justify Italian 
conduct as a reprisal for pri or German "wrongs". 
8) Quincy Wright , "The Chinese Recognition Problem" (49) A.J .I.L., 
1955, p.320 at p. 324 . 
9) A. Raestad, "La Reconnaissance internationale des nouveaux ~tats 
et des nouveaux governements" (17) Revue de Droit International 
et de Legislation Comparee,1936, p. 257 at p. 276. 
10) A.M . Honor~, "Reflections on Revolutions" (2) Irish Jurist (N.S.) . 
1967, p. 268 at p. 272. It would appear that Honor~ regards the 
duty to recognize as being more of a moral or political than of 
a legal character. 
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(1) Lauterpacht ' s reasons for his advocacy of the duty to recognize are 
unconvincing. His reasons are the following : 
(a) If recognition is a matter of policy or discretion, this means 
that the commencement of international personality is outside 
the orbit of international law. 11 ) This is in effect the same 
as the argument which the declaratists make against the Constit-
utive theory of recognition . namely that constitutive recognit-
ion (which the declaratists admit to be discretionary) is a 
weapon or advantage in the hands of existing subjects of inter-
national law which may be abused. 12 ) The objection is policy-
orientated. The mere fact that in isolated cases hardship 
may result from dis cretionary reco-;;n.ition is- no obj ection. 
(b) The attitude that there is no legal duty to recognize is 
rooted in positivism, namely the notion that the will of the 
state is the only source of legal obligation.13 ) The argument 
here would appear to deny the existence of discretionary recog-
nition because of its ancestry or progenitor, i.e . it i s the 
embodiment of positivistic notions. But one cannot discard an 
existing rule merely because one disagrees with the theories 
which may underlie it. In addition the acceptance of one 
institution, namely discretionary recognition in no way 
implies a blind adherence to positivism in general. One can 
hold the view that there are certain instances in international 
relations/ . .. 
---------------------------
11) Lauterpacht, p. 1. 
12) Supra , pp . 216-218. 
13) La.uterpacht, p . 2. Chen, pp. 50-51 explains it thus. Denial of 
a duty to recognize by constituvists is easy to understand as 
following the positivist principle that a state cannot permit 
duties to be thrust on it as a result of the emergence of a new 
cormrunity. 
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relations in which obligations can only be imposed on a state 
with its consent without holding the view that international 
obligations in general and without exception can only be imposed 
on a state with its consent. It is only the latter proposition 
that amounts to a blind adherence to positivism and while re-
jecting it we are free to admit that positivism still underlies 
certain international law institutions for this is indeed the 
case. One of such institutions happens to be discretionary 
14) 
recognition . · 
(c) If recognition is a matter of policy it is divorced from the 
scientific bases of fact on which all law must ultimately rest~5) 
The argument here is that the legal position should coincide 
with the facts of effective power . It is of course desirable 
for fact and law to coincide but they need not do so in every 
16) 
case . Anomalous legal situations are possible and indeed 
such anomalies may even be in accordance with the desires of 
the majority of states. As the present writer previously 
pointed out it would be anathema to the vast majority of the 
community of nations if the legal posit i on were brought into 
17) line with the effective facts of power in Rhodesia. The 
community of nations therefore intend a legal anomaly in 
Rhodesia and they can achieve it because of the discretionary 
character of recognition. 
-----------------------------
( d)/ ... 
14) Another is the rule that a treaty only binds the parties to it 
because only their consent is present. 
15) Lauterpacht , p . 5. 
16) Supra , p . 274. Of course if the anomalous situations become too 
numerous the ultimate effectiveness of the law will be called 
into question but individual anomalies can e;.nd do exist without 
such drastic effects. 
17) "Requirements of Statehood Re-Examined" (34) M.L.R., 1971,p, 410 
at p .416. 
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(d) Courts have described recognition as being a political and not 
a Judicial act .18) Lauterpacht interprets this to mean that 
the courts intended to convey that recognition is for the 
political organs and not the Judicial organs of state. They 
did not mean that in performing the function the political 
branch is entitled to act arbitrarily and without reference to 
applicable legal principles. 19) It is submitted that this 
argument does not take Lauterpacht's theory any further. It 
merely means that it is the function of government, not the 
courts, to recognize, and nothing is said as to the discretion-
ary character of governmental recognition.20 ) 
(2) The preponderance of Juristic opinion is firmly against the existence 
of any duty to recognize. 21 ) The majority of the writers of both 
the constitutive and declaratory schools of thought deny a duty to 
grant recognition and Lauterpacht readily admits this. 22 ) A duty 
to recognize is denied by the following inter alia, Kuntz, 23 ) 
Marshall-Brown/ ... 
---------------------------
18) OetJen v. Central Leather Co . (1918) 246 U.S. 297 at 302; Guaranty 
Trust Company of New York v. United States (1938) 304 U.S. 126 
at 137. 
19) Lauterpacht, p. 62. 
20) It is in any event clear that the Judiciary is not the representative 
organ of the state in international relations so that actions of the 
court do not ipso facto have international standing. See Chen, 
p . 239. Court actions may of course be of evidential value in 
determining the practice of a state where this is relevant to the 
formation of international custom. Akehurst , p. 40 . 
21) Sir John Fischer Williams, "Some Thoughts on the Doctrine of Recog-
nition in International Law" ( 4'() Harvard Law Review, 1933-1934 , 
p. 776 at p. 78o . But Si.r John regards the position as being 
unsatisfactory. 
22) P . 63. Lauterpacht in fact gives a list of these writers in 
footnote 1, p.63. 
23) J L . Kuntz, "Critical Remarks on Lauterpacht's 'Recognition in 
International Law'" (44) A.J . I.L., 1950, p. 713 considers Lauter-
pacht ' s duty to recognize to be entirely untenable and quotes 
E . .J Cohen (64) L.Q.R., 1948 pp. 4o4-4o8, H W. Briggs (43) A.J.I.L .. 
1949, pp. 113-121 and P.C Jessup, A Modern Law of Nations, New York., 
1948, p. 55 as denying the duty. 
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Marshall-Brown, 24) Chen, 25) Kelsen, 26 ) Le Normand, 27 )Fischer 
Williams, 28) Fauchille, 29) O'Conne1130 ) and the American Restatemeni~ ) 
(3) If there is a duty to recognize , it must be a positive one created 
by state practice alone . and it cannot be established a priori in 
the absence of state practice.32 ) When the practice of states is 
examined however , it would appear that a duty to recognize is at 
variance with such practice as Foreign Offices do not regard them-
selves as fulfilling a legal duty in granting recognition.33) It 
would appear to be clear that the practice of states treats recog-
nition as a matter of polic~4 ) and not of law and that there is 
thus no duty to recognize.35) The practice of the United States 
-------------------------------------------------------would/ ... 
24) P .Marshall Brown, "The Legal Effects of Recognition" (44) A.J.I.L., 
1950, p. 617 at p . 625 . 
25) P . 239 
26) H. Kelsen, "Recognition in International Law; Theoretical Observat-
ions" (35) A.J.I L., 1941, p. 605 at pp. 609-610 says that there 
is no duty but a power to recognize when the conditions for recognit-
ion are satisfied. 
27) Pp. 52, 53 . 55 , 60 . At p. 55 he says: "guand une entite politigue 
reunit et presente tousles caracteres constitutifs d'un etat, elle 
a l'aptitude necessaire: mais cette aptitude n'engenre pas une 
obligation a la charge des autres." 
28) Sir John Fischer Williams, "La Doctrine de la reconnaissance en droit 
international et ses develJppelll€11ts recents" (44) H.R., 1933, II , 
p. 203 at p. 238 says there is a political or mor;i-duty to recog-
nize and the time is approaching when it should be a legal duty. 
29) P . Fauchille, Traite de droit international public, 8th Ed., 1922, 
I, p. 318. 
30) O'Connell, I, pp.131-132. 
31) Restatement of Foreign Relations Law of the United States, 2nd Ed. §99. 
32) O'Connell _, I, p. 132 , 
33) Herbert w. Briggs, "Recognition of states: Some Reflections on 
Doctrine and Practice" (63) A.J ,I .L . , 1949, p. 113 at p. 119. 
34) Briggs, note 33 supra, p. 119 summarizes the particular considerat-
ions which states do take into account when deciding to grant recog-
nition. These are clearly political. 
35) Schwarzenberger, Manual, p. 69; Brierly, pp. 139-140: Hyde, 
International Law Chiefly as Interpreted and Applied by the United 
States, 2nd Ed., I, p. 160; G.H. Hackworth, Digest of International 
Law, I, p. 161; Akehurst, p. 82; O'Connell, I, p. 132; Sorensen, 
p . 277; Starke, p. 146. 
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would clearly appear to treat recognition as a matter of sovereign 
discretion. 
"Decisions regarding recognition ... are properly within 
the sovereign competence of each government granting recog-
nition, and should remain so." 36) 
"Recognit i on ... is wholly wi thin the discretion of the 
recognizing government . . .. While we may decry the fact 
that a government is declining to extend recognition ... I 
know of no rule of international law to force the hand of 
the government that is withholding recognition." 37) 
"President Munroe . . . said that it would . .. be our policy 
'to consider the government de facto as the legitimate 
government for us.' That has indeed been the general United 
States policy, and I believe that it is a sound general policy. 
However , where it does not serve our interest, we are free to 
vary from it." 38) 
"No government has a right to have recognition. It is a 
privilege that is accorded, and we accord it when we think it 
will fit in with our national interest, and if it doesn't we 
don't accord it . " 39) 
Senator Austin speaking in the United Nations on United States 
recognition of Israel said : 
"I should regard it as highly improper for me to admit that 
any country on earth can question the sovereignty of the United 
States . . . in the exercise of that high political act of recog-
nition." 40) 
"There/ ... 
---------------------------
36) U.S. Posit i on on Recognition of de facto Governments, First 
Meeting of the Inter-American Council of ,Jurists, Rio de Janeiro , 
1950, M.S. Department of State. See Whiteman, II , p. 5. 
37) G.H .Hackworth, Legal Adviser , Department of State, to Secretary of 
State Hull, Russia v . Poland Memorandum, Jan. 29, 1944, M.S . 
Department of State. See Whiteman, II, p . 6. 
38) Secretary of State Dulles, "The Threat of a Red Asia", address, 
New York , March, 29, 1954 , XXX Bulletin, Department of State, 
No . 772 , April 12 , 1954 , pp. 539, 540. See Whiteman, II, p .6. 
39) Secretary Dulles' news conference, Canberra, Department of State 
press release , No . 144 , Mar. 14, 1957. See Whiteman, II, p . 7. 
40) U.N s.c .o .R No. 68, 294th Meeting, May 18, 1948, p. 16. See 
Whiteman, II , p. 10 
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"There are some who say that we should accord diplomatic 
recognition to the Communist regime because it has now been 
in power so long that it has won a right to that. That is 
not sound international law . Diplomatic recognition is always 
a privilege, never a right .... One thing is established be-
yond a doubt. There is nothing automatic about recognition. 
It is never compelled by the mere lapse of time. 11 41) 
Soviet practice would appear to be similar. 
"Every state is free to enter into relations with other 
countries as it sees fit 11 • ••• " 42) 
Castel states that it is also well established in Canada that the 
recognition of a new state or government is a political act .43 ) 
The Draft Declaration on the Eights and Duties of States, drawn up 
by the International Law Commission in 1949, contains no statement 
that a state has a right to recognition and that there is a duty 
to recognize it. 44 ) rt is interesting to note that in observations 
forwarded to the United Nations in 1948 on the Draft Declaration, 
the British Government stated that it favoured a development of 
international law under which recognition would become a matter 
of legal duty for all states if an entity fulfilled the conditions 
of statehood .45) Nevertheless , despite this suggestion by the 
United/ ... 
----------------------------
41) Secretary of State Dulles, "Our Policies toward communism in China" , 
address before the international convention of Lions International, 
San Francisco, June 28, 1957, XXXVII, Bulletin, Department of State , 
No. 942, July 15, 1957, pp. 91, 93, 94. See Whiteman, II, p.13. 
42 ) A.A.Gromyko, Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs, speaking as chief 
of the Sovlet Delegation at the second session, May 12, 1959, of the 
Geneva Meeting of Foreign Ministers, held May 11 - June 20 and 
July 15 - Aug. 5 , 1959 . Foreign Ministers Meeting, May-August,1959, 
Geneva, (Department of State publication 6882) 18, 20 . See Whiteman 
II, pp . 13-14. 
43) J.G.Castel , International Law chiefly as Interpreted and Applied 
in Canada , Toronto 1965 , p. 141. For an ambiguous statement on the 
'duty to recognize' see Cohen, "Some International Law Problems of 
Interest to Canada and to Canadian Lawyers," Canadian Bar Review, 
1955, p. 389 at p. 397. 
44) For the text of the Declaration see A. Res. 375 (IV) . 
45) See Starke , p. 145; Briggs, p. 102. 
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United Kingdom, act ual British practice would appear to be contro. 
versia1. 46 ) 
From the above it may fairly be concluded that the practice of 
states does not establish a "duty to recognize" and that the concept 
cannot therefore be part and parcel of international customary law. 
Indeed it is the absence of such a duty which explains the anomalous 
positions of Rhodesia, East Germany, Israel and the Government of 
Communist China . Divergencies in recognition practice in these 
cases is surely irreconcilable with a "duty to recognize 11 • 47 ) 
Indeed Kuntz points out that even Lauterpacht has to admit that 
he cannot find a clear statement in the practice of states in 
favour of a duty to recognize. 48) 
(4) The operation of the theory poses conceptual and juristic problems 
of some magnitude. Assuming that there is a duty to recognize 
this duty must naturally correlate to a right. 49) The question 
therefore inevitably arises - to whom is the duty owed or in other 
words, in whom is the right vested? There can only be two possible 
solutions here. 50 ) 
(a) The duty is owed to the community of states in general. Each 
other state therefore would have a right to demand that 
entities/ ... 
----------------------------
46) For instances where the United Kingdom has acted inconsistently with 
the Lauterpacht doctrine see Akehurst , p. ~- But Akehurst con-
siders British Governments have accepted the doctrine since the 
Second World War but points to the United Kingdom position in relat-
ion to East Germany as hard to reconcile wit h the doctrine. 
47) See Starke, pp. 145-146. 
48) J L.Kuntz, "Critical Remarks on Lauterpacht's 'Recognition in 
International Law'" (44) A.J .I.L., 1950, p. 719. 
49) The postulation of such a duty assumes a right. See Starke, p.146; 
Whiteman, II, pp . 8-9 ; Oppenheim, International Law, 4th Ed., 
London, 1928, p . 144 . 
50) See Starke , p. 146; Chen , p.53. 
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entities bearing the characteristics of statehood should be 
recognized. This would in turn pose an insuperable practical 
difficulty whe~e State A decided that an entity did not have 
the characteristics of statehood and for that reason refused 
to recognize it but State B considered that the entity possess-
ed the necessary attributes, in consequence recognized it, and 
in addition called upon State A to recognize it. 
(b) The other possible solution is that the duty is owed to the 
entity possessing the necessary characteristics and that 
therefore this entity has a right to be recognized. This 
proposition is, it is submitted, Juristically inconsistent . 
For if the entity has a "right to be recognized" this right 
is an international law right and the entity in question is 
an international person because it has that right even though 
it has not as yet been recognized.5l) Recognition in such a 
case would be superfluous as an instrument for the creation of 
personality. One might as well simply accept the Declaratory 
theory and discard the concept of recognition. To summarize -
if the Declaratory theory is correct, the duty to recognize 
is superfluous, the state is already an international person. 
If the Constitutive theory is correct, "a duty to recognize'• 
is completely inconsistent with the operation of the theory 
because/ ... 
--------------------------
51) D. Anzilotti, _c_o_u_r_s __ d_e __ D_r_o_i_t __ I_n_t_e_rn ___ a_t_i_o_n_a __ l (Translated Gidel), 
Paris, 1929, I, p. 167 says: "On a dit, parfois, gue l'Etat 
existant en fait, s'il n'est pas une personne avant la reconnaissance, 
X 
a pourtant au moins un droit imparfait ... a etre reconnu comme tel 
Mais on ne peut pas, sans une contradition dans les termes, 
lier la personalit~ internationale a la reconnaissance et admettre 
en meme temps une pr~tention Juridigue a la reconnaissance: avoir 
une pr~tention signifie avoir un droit, c'est-a-dire etre une 
personne." See too Le Normand, note 27 supra, p. 55 who says 
that you cannot talk of a right to recognition before an entity 
has a Juridical existence and Chen, p. 51. 
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because the entity would be an international person even before 
it was accorded recognition seeing that it has a "right to be 
recognized." 
The conclusion then is that in international customary law 
there is no duty to recognize an entity which meets the test 
of independent statehood . 52 ) Rhodesia , therefore, cannot 
claim recognition as of right by other states nor have other 
states a duty to recognize Rhodesia. 
SECTION V. 
THE DUTY Netr TO RECOGNIZE . 
l) 
The decision to grant recognition to a state is in general discretionary . 
Once granted, of course, recognition wi ll have legal consequences but the 
initial dec i sion to grant it is extra-legal and may be based on political 
considerati ons. There are , however , a number of exceptional cases here 
in which recognition seems to have moved from the sphere of policy into 
that of law. In these cases there may be a duty not to recognize an 
entity. Each of these possible duties will now be examined and applied 
in the Rhodesian context . 
(1) There is a duty not to recognize an entity prematurely. 
In particular when a new state breaks away from its mother state 
____________
____________
___ there/ ... 
52) 
1) 
It is possible to create a duty to recognize by treaty. Whi teman, 
II , p. 7; Chen , p.51. But in this case the duty to recognize is 
naturally owed to the other parties to the treaty who can insist 
that the stipulated recognition be furnished . Ibid. 
Chen , p. 416; Sir J ohn Fi sher Williams, "Some Thoughts on the 
Doctrine of Recognit i on in Internati onal Law" (47) Harvard Law 
Review, 1933-1934 , p . 776 at p. 7&:J ; P.Marshall Brown, "The Legal 
Effects of Recognition" ( 44) A .J .I.L., 1950, p . 617 at p. 625 ; 
Akehurst , p. 79 , 
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there i s a duty not to recognize it prematurely.
2 ) The test for 
premature recognition i s whether the outcome of the struggle between 
the mother state and the breakaway state i s uncertain.3) If not, 
recognition is no longer premature. Thus if the breakaway state 
is likely to continue as such , if there is a reasonable chance of 
permanence, recognition can be given . Initial success , even if 
apparently complete, does not make recognition permissible .
4 ) But 
when the struggle for independence has obtained a tangible measure 
of success accompanied by a reasonable prospect of permanency, 
internati onal law authorises tM.rd states to recognize, thus in 
effect declaring that the sovereignty of the parent state is 
extinct . 5 ) The revolutionary struggle with the mother country 
must vi rtually have ended in favour of the breakaway state .
6 ) 
Formal renunciat i on of sovereignty by the mother state is not 
regarded as a condition for the lawfulness of recognition. 7) Thus 
other states may recognize a breakaway state even though the 
---------
---------
---------
--mother/ .. . 
2) Sorensen , p . 277 ; Akehur st, p. &::l ; I.auterpacht, p. 8; A.J.G.M. 
Sanders , "Die Erkenning van State en Regerings" (33) T.H .R. -H .R., 
1970 , p. 259 at p. 262 . The only writer in disagreement here is 
D. Anzilott i, Cours de Droit International, (Tr. Gidel), Paris, 
1929, I , p. 169. 
3) Sorensen , pp. 277-278. 
4) Lauterpacht , p . 10 . 
5) Lauterpacht , p . 12. The breakaway state should have not only 
strength and resources for a time , but afford a promise of stability 
and permanence. Ibid., p. 17. See too Chen , pp. 59-60 who requires 
a reasonable degree of permanence and concludes correctly that 
recognition durante bello is premature . 
6) J .L.Kuntz, "Critical Remarks on Lauterpacht ' s ' Recognition in Inter-
national I.aw'" (44) A.J . I.L. , 1950, p. 713 at p. 716. 
7 ) I.auterpacht, p . 9. However , in the very early history of internat-
ional law the posi tion may have been different. The idea seemed 
to be current in the 17th century that the Netherlands and Portugal 
could not be recognized as full subjects of internati onal law 
because Spain had not formally renounced her sovereignty over them. 
See Jochen A, Frowein, "Transfer or Recognition of Sovereignty -
Some early problems in connection with Dependent Territories" (65) 
A. J .I .L. , 1971, p. 568 at pp. 569-570 . 
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mother state still maintai ns its claims to the breakaway territory.
8 ) 
Naturally , too, recognition by the mother state is no prerequisite 
for recognition by other stat es .9) Naturally if the parent state 
itself recognizes the breakaway state , the quest i on of premature 
10) 
recognition cannot conceivably arise therea~er . 
The pertinent question then is whether Rhodesia is likely to continue 
and maintain its independence or whether the United Kingdom is 
likely to be successful in asserting its authority over Rhodesia. 
This is a factual question which the writer has previously examined~l) 
This question is essent i ally bound up with the doctrine of the 
efficacy of change .12 ) The writer previously discussed this 
doctrine. 13 ) He concluded that the 1961 Constitution of Southern 
Rhodesia and the United Kingdom Government were ineffective in 
Rhodesi a and that the 1965 Constitution and present Government of 
Rhodesia were effective .14 ) The arguments previously preferred 
-------
-------
-------
-------
----need/ . . . 
8) The Latin American colonies of Spain declared themselves to be 
independent in 1810. When it became apparent that Spain, though 
it still maintained its claims , was not able to bring the former 
colonies under i ts sway, the United States recognized them in 1822 
and the United Kingdom followed in 1824 and 1825. See the writer ' s 
"Status of Rhodesia in International Law" , Acta Juridica, 1967, p.39 
at p . 46 . 
9) Lauterpacht, p. 9; Deutsche Continental Gas -Geselscha~ v. Polish 
State , Ann. Dig ., 1929-1930, case no. 5(b), p. 14 ; A. Raestad, "La 
Reconnaissance internationale des nouveaux etats et des nouveaux 
gouvernements" (17) Revue de Droit International et de Legislation 
Comparee,1936, p. 257 at p. 274; J .E S . Fawcett, "Security Council 
Resolutions on Rhodesia" (41) B.Y.I.L . , 1965-1966 , p. 103 at p.110 
says that recognition need not be withheld as being contingent on 
that of the metropolitan country. 
10) No difficulties in recognition arise when the parent state informs 
third states that it has recognized the independence of the new 
state as was the case in the Act of Union between Denmark and Iceland, 
1918. In recognizing the independence of Bulgaria in 1909 Germany 
expressly referred to the communicat i on informing her that Turkey, 
the parent state , had recognized the new situation in Bulgaria. See 
Lauterpacht , p. 36. See too supra , p . 136. 
11) Note 8) supra, pp . 46-4 7; "Rhodesia : A duty not to Recognize" (33) 
T.H.R-H R. , 1970, p . 152 at pp.154-155. 
12) H. Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State, New York, 1961 , p. 219. 
13) Supra , pp. 148-157. 
14) Supra , pp . 153, 157· 
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need not be repeated here but the aforesaid conclusions strongly 
support the view that the United Kingdom is not likely to reassert 
its authority over Rhodesia. The following further factors may also 
be mentioned as being relevant to the question. 
In the first place, the regime itself would appear to be reasonably 
secure against domestic subversion and even shows signs of vitality~5 ) 
Government has been peaceful and effective with the regime firmly in 
control. In R. v . Ndlovu it was held that the Government was "more 
firmly in the saddle than ever before. 1116 ) 
In the second place the authority of the United Kingdom would appear 
to be ineffective. Not only is the 1961 Constitution ineffective 
but the 1965 Order-in-Council, 17 ) in terms of which the United 
Kingdom asserts authority , would also appear t o be.
18) Further, 
the United Kingdom made no provision for alternative government in 
the event of the 1965 Order-in-Council breaking down.
19) The mere 
assertion of plenary legal powers is irrelevant in view of the break-
down of the 1961 Constitution and the 1965 Order-in-Council.
2r) 
Whatever the United Kingdom Parliament determined did not affect 
the factual situation in which the United Kingdom remained ineffect-
ive .21) The Order-in-Council thus remains on paper. There is no 
-------
-------
-------
-------
-real/ ... 
15) See here International Conciliation, September , 1970, no.579, p. 88. 
R. v . Ndlovu , 1968 (4) S.A 515 (R.,A.D.) at 531, 
16) 1968 (4) S.A 515 (R.,A.D . ) at 531. See too G.N. Barrie, "Die 
Geheime Raad en UDI" (32) T.H R-H R., 1969, p. 171 at pp. 172-173; 
Molteno, p. 4o6 . Factors mentioned in Ndlovu's case at 528-529 were 
the financial situation which was such that it could provide all 
necessary services, the appointment of a judge who was accepted by 
his colleagues, an election which returned a government candidate 
and the li~ing of censorship. 
17) Southern Rhodesia (Constitution) Order, S.l. 1952 of 1965. 
18) Molteno, pp . 46 , 47. 
19) Molteno, p . 40. 
20) Molteno, p. 46. 
21) Molteno, p. 47. 
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real attempt to exercise governmental authority~
22 ) Fawcett con-
cludes that the United Kingdom assertion is a mere assertion of 
right23 ) and the Rhodesian courts have held the change to be 
completely efficacious .24 ) There is therefore an air of unreality 
when the organs of the United Nations call upon the United Kingdom 
as if it still had control over Rhodesia.
25) Christie gives the 
following reasons for the ineffectiveness of United Kingdom legis-
lation in Rhodesia . It had the disadvantage that it was not exer-
cieed by agreement (as it always had been before) so it had no 
support from the habit of obedience that ties people to familiar 
sources of law; it was not promulgated in Rhodesia ; it had the 
disadvantages inherent in its own incompleteness and by ignoring 
its own ineffectiveness in Rhodesia, it reduced its prospects of 
becoming effective in the future .26 ) 
In the third place, the international community by means of collect-
ive sanctions organized under the auspices of the United Nations, 
fail to deter Rhodesia and to restore British authority.
27 ) In 
addition the Rhodesian Appellate Division in R. v. Ndlovu examined 
the question of the effect of sanctions and came to the conclusion 
that/ . .. 
--------------
--------------
22) Molteno, p. 266. 
23) J .E S Fawcett , "Security Council Resolutions on Rhodesia" (41) 
B.Y.I.L., 1965-1966, p. 103 at p. 112 says the position of Rhodesia 
in November, 1965 , the failure of Britain to quell the revolution by 
force , in fact the renouncement of force in advance, the manifest 
inefficacy of the Southern Rhodesia Act, 1965 to restore legality, 
the inability of the United Kingdom to overthrow, or even unsettle, 
the Smith regime without massive international support together 
show that for the authority of the United Kingdom in Rhodesia there 
has been substituted a 'mere assertion of right'. 
24) R. v. Ndlovu , 1968 (4) S . A. 515 (R., A.D) at 532. 
25) International Conciliation, note 15) supra, p . 89. 
26) R.H.Christie, "Practical Jurisprudence in Rhodesia" (2) C.I.L.S.A ., 
1969, pp .210 , 211, 212. 
27) International Conciliation, note 15) supra, p. &5. 
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that while in the long term they might cause stagnation or recession 
in the economy there was no reason at all to suppose th~t they would 
introduce such an economic collapse as would cause the government 
to capitulate .28) 
Though the sanctions campaign against Rhodesia may not force the 
latter to capitulate, tt may nevertheless have implications in 
relation to the question of premature recognition. 
(a) Hahlo points out that a sanctions war cannot be equated with 
a struggle for power within a country; that economic sanctions 
are normally directed against a nation - such as Italy in the 
Abyssinian War - and are intended to persuade a government 
to change its course voluntarily. They amount to an implied 
29) 
acknowledgment of the de facto power of the government. 
This in turn means that the imposition of sanctions can be 
interpreted as an implied acknowledgment of the efficacy of 
the regime in which event recognition might be granted without 
being stigmatised as premature. 
(b) By invoking the aid of the United Nations, the United Kingdom 
in effect internationalised the Rhodesian situation. This 
could be interpreted as an inability to control a domestic 
issue which, it is submitted, other subjects of international 
law might (if they felt so inclined) take into consideration 
in deciding whether or not to grant recognition. We might 
say/ •.. 
------------------
---------
28) 1968 (4) SA, 515 (R., AD.) at 531. 
29) H.R Hahlo, "The Privy Council and the 'Gentle Revolution'" (86) 
S.A L.J .. 1969, p. 419 at p. 432, Hahlo uses the words "implied 
recognition" but as the imposition of sanctions does not amount 
to international law recognition, I have preferred the words "implied 
acknowledgment" which do not have such legal overtones. 
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say that the United Kingdom was here invoking "foreign aid" in 
the form of the cooperation of some one hundred and thirty 
member states of the United Nations, without which cooperation 
it would appear to be incompetent to assert its authority 
over the breakaway territory. This, it is submitted, is a 
factor which could very well indicate that recognition of 
30) 
Rhodesia would no longer be premature. 
The final submission based on all the foregoing arguments is 
that recognition of Rhodesia would no longer be premature and 
thus there is no duty not to recognize Rhodesia binding on 
other states under this particular doctrine. 
(2) Treaty obligations not to recognize. 
A state may undertake a duty not to recognize a situation by 
treaty and it will then have an international obligation to the 
other parties to the treaty to refrain from such recognition.3l) 
Treaty obligations not to recognize may be diverse in nature. An 
obligation not to recognize some illegal situation in international 
law may be imposed, thus preventing the regularising of the illegal 
---------
---------
--------situation/ ... 
30) 
31) 
See the writer's "Status of Rhodesia in International Law", Acta 
,Juridica. 1967, p . 39 at p. 46 and "Rhodesia; a Duty not to Recogni ze' 11 
(33) T.H.R-H .R., 1970, p. 152 at pp. 154-155. 
Schwarzenberger, I, p. 128; Sorensen., p. 277; Lauterpacht .• p.8; 
P. Marshall Brown, "The Legal Effects of Recognition" (44) 
A.J.I L., 1950 p. 617 at p. 625; ~incy Wright , "The Chinese 
Recognition Problem" (49) A.J.I.L, 1955, p. 320 at p. 324. 
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situation by recognition .32 ) On the other hand there is nothing 
to prevent the obligation not to recognize from being aimed at the 
recognition of a perfectly legal situation in international law, 
the aim here being the prevention of the validation of that situat-
ion in international law. 33 ) If there is a treaty duty not to 
recogn1ze Rhodesia , it would appear to be of the latter variety be-
cause . as we have seen, U.D.I . and the resultant situation are not 
illegal in international law. If there is a treaty duty not to 
recognize Rhodesia, it could only arise under the Charter of the 
United Nations. The Charter here does not of course impose a duty 
not to recognize Rhodesia direct1~
4 ) but it is possible that there 
may be indirect obligations under the Charter not to recognize 
Rhodesia. There are two possible species of such indirect obligat-
ions: (a) obligations not to recognize imposed on member states 
of the United Nations in terms of legally binding resolutions by 
organs of the latter; (b) obligations not to recognize in terms 
of Article 2 (5) of the Charter . 
-----------
-----------
-------
(a)/ . .. 
32) Lauterpacht, p. 419. Examples here include the duty not to recognize 
territorial changes brought about in violation of Article 10 of the 
Covenant of the League of Nations and Article 2 (4) of the Charter 
of the United Nations; the obligation not to recognize under Article 
2 of the Anti-War Treaty of Non-Aggression and Conciliation, 1953 (the 
Saavedra-Lamas Treaty between a number of American states including 
the United States) and under Article 11 of the Montevideo Convention 
on the Rights and Duties of States, 1933. The Stimson Doctrine of 
non-recognition does not however embody an obligation not to recog-
nize . It is merely a non-binding policy statement relating to the 
exercise of the discretion to recognize by the United States. See 
Lauterpacht , pp. 417 , 418, 419; Schwarzenberger, I. p. 302 ; 
O'Connell, I, p. 146; Quincy Wright, note 31) supra, p. 324. 
33) Lauterpacht, p. 419. Examples are Article 2 of the Declaration of 
the Holy Alliance, 1820 at Troppau and the Central American Treaties , 
1907 and 1923 which provide for non-recognition of the changes 
brought about by revolution. Lauterpacht, pp . 418-419; the writer , 
"Rhodesia; A Duty not to Recognize?" (33) T.H.R-H.R., 1970, p.157 . 
34) O'Connell, I, p. 146 points out that the background to the Charter 
explains the failure of the draftsmen to incorporate specific 
obligations of non-recognition. 
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(a) Obligations not to recognize under legally binding United 
Nations resolutions. 
The present writer previously examined the various resolutions 
of the Organs of the United Nations passed before the Proclam-
ation of the Rhodesian Republic to see whether they imposed 
binding legal obligations not to recognize Rhodesia.35) 
Three resolutions of the General Assembly of the United Nations 
dealt with the question of Rhodesian recognition.36 ) The 
conclusion was that none of these resolutions imposed binding 
legal obligations on member states of the United Nations not 
to recognize Rhodesia, the argument here being based on the 
constitutional incompetence of the General Assembly to pass 
binding resolutions on important political issues.37 ) Even 
if it had such a competence , the terminology of the resolut-
ions amounted to no more than requests for non-recognition by 
member states and in any event could not even be interpreted 
as undertakings by those states which voted for the resolut-
38) 
ions to bind themselves to observe the terms of the resolutions. 
The Security Council of the United Nations also passed three 
resolutions relating to the question of Rhodesian recognition 
------------------
---------before/ ... 
35) The writer, note 33) supra, pp . 157-166. The paper in question was 
written before the inception of the Rhodesian Republic and the 
consequent decision of the Security Council on 18th March, 1970. 
S . Res. 277 (1970) . 
36) A.Res . 2012 (-:xx); A.Res. 2022 (XX) ; A.Res. 2379 (XXIII). 
37) Such resolutions are recommendatory. The bulk of legal authority 
supports this. See here authorities cited by C.J .R. Dugard, "The 
Legal Effect of United Nations Resolutions on Apartheid" (83) 
S.A.L .J , 1966, p.44 at pp. 47,48. Sloan (25) B.Y.I .L., 1948, 
at p. 16 casts doubt on the orthodox view and C.J.F. Kidd, "State-
hood and Recognition" (33) M.L.R., 1970, p. 99 at p. 101 states 
that if the British Government had recognized North Korea, this 
would have contravened A. Res. 195 (III). Kidd does not however go 
so far as to assert that Britain has a duty not to recognize North 
Korea under the resolution. 
38) See the writer (33) T.H R-H.R., 1970, at pp. 157-159, 165 for full 
argument. 
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before the inauguration of the Rhodesian Republic.39 ) The 
wr i ter concluded also that none of these resolutions imposed 
b i nding legal obligati ons not to recognize Rhodesian independ-
ence . In bri ef the reasons were as follows . The resolution 
of 12th November , 19654o) was a Chapter VI Resolution because 
41) Chapter VII had not been invoked and there was no determin-
ation that there was a threat to the peace , breach of the peace 
or act of aggression. 42 ) The resolution of 20th November, 
196543 ) was also a Chapter VI resolution because it purported 
to deal with a situation the continuance of which was likely to 
endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, 
which situations are provided for by Article 34 of the Charter 
----------
----------
---------of/ . . . 
39) S. Res . 216 (1965) ; S.Res. 217 (1965); S.Res. 253 (1968). 
40) s . Res . 216 (1965). 
41) The International Court of .Just i ce in its Advisory Opinion on the 
Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South 
Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) , I C.J. Rep . 1971 paragraph 
115 held that whether a decisi on was made under Chapter VI or 
Chapter VII by the Security Council it was binding. It is submitted 
that the court was incorrect here. There is no authority for such a 
proposition which would ignore the dist i nction between the Chapters, 
an established distinction hardly open to dispute for 25 years before 
the court's opinion. See for instance C.J .R . Dugard, "The Simonstown 
Agreement : South Africa, Britain and the United Nations" (85) 
S . A L.J. , 1968 p. 142 at p . 148 who says that resolutions by the 
Security Council under Chapter VI are recommendatory and only those 
with a constitutional basis in Chapter VII are mandatory. Dugard, 
note 37) supra , p. 49 also avers that Chapter VI resolutions are 
gener ally accepted as non-bindi ng. See too Fawcett , note 23) supra ,. 
pp. 120-121. 
42) The writer , note 38) supra, pp. 159-160. It is for this reason t oo 
that John Hopkins , "International Law - Southern Rhodesia - United 
Nations - Security Council", Cambridge Law .Journal, 1967, p. 1 at 
p. 2 concludes thats. Res. 216 (1965) is probably not binding. A 
determination as aforesai d is a condition precedent for bringing 
Chapter VII into operat i on. See Dugard, note 41) supra, p. 148 and . 
note 37) supra , p. 49; Fawcett , note 23) supra, p. 116. See however, 
the view expressed by the representative of Jordan that whether the 
s i tuation falls within Chapter VII is not a question of legal inter -
pretation but is a question of evidence, proof and fact. See Chayes, 
II, p. 1349. 
43) S. Res . 217 (1965 ). 
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of the United Nations which deals with the powers of the 
Securi ty Council under Chapter VI of the Charter. 44 ) The 
r 45) 
resolution of 29th May, 1968 is undoubtedly a Chapter VII 
resol ution and so it has the capacity to bind member states of 
the United Nations where such an intention to bind can be 
gleaned from the terms of the resolution. 46 ) After an exam-
ination of such terms the writer came to the conclusion that 
though the matter was not free from doubt the better view 
would appear to be that the resolution did not impose a binding 
duty on members of the United Nations not to recognize Rhodesia~7 ) 
The conclusion therefore is that none of the pre-Republican 
resolutions of the Organs of the United Nations imposed a 
binding duty not to recognize Rhodesia on members of ',the 
United Nat i ons. 
The post-Republican resolutions must now be examined. On 
18th March, 1970 the Security Council passed a resolution whi ch 
contained the fol l owi ng provisions relat ive to the question of 
Rhodesian recognition . 
-------------'---,-------------"Reaffirming/ ... 
44) The wri ter , note 38 supra , at pp . 161-163. The same conclusion is 
expressed by Hopkins, note 42) supra , pp. 2-3 and Georges Fischer, 
"Le Probl~me Rhodesien", (11) Annuaire Francais de Droit Internation-
al, 1965 , p. 4i at p . 64 and for substant ially similar reasons. It 
should be noted however that the representatives of Uruguay and 
Bolivia and Ambassador Goldberg on behalf of the United States 
expressed the peculiar view that thi s resolution was neither a 
Chapter VI nor a Chapter VII resolution. See Chayes , II , p. 1349 and 
,John Halderman , "Some Legal Aspects of Sanctions in the Rhodesian 
Case" (17) L C.L.Q., 1968, p. 672 at p. 691. 
45) s. Res. 253 (1968) . 
46) See Advisory Opinion on South West Africa, note 41) supra §114, where 
the court hel d that the language of a Security Council Resolution 
should be carefully analysed to see whether it is exhortatory or 
mandatory . Only then can a conclusion be expressed as to its binding 
effect . 
47) The writer, note 38) supra , pp . 163-165 . 
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"Reaffirming that the present situation in Southern 
Rhodesia constitutes a threat to international peace and 
security. 
Acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, 
1 . Condemns the illegal proclamation of republican status 
of the territory by the illegal regime in Southern 
Rhodesia; 
2 . Decides that Member States shall refrain from recog-
nising this illegal regime or from rendering any 
assistance to it · 
3. Calls upon Member States to take appropiate measures, 
at the national level , to ensure that any act per-
formed by officials and institutions of the illegal 
regime in Southern Rhodesia shall not be accorded any 
recognition , official or otherwise, including judicial 
notice, by the competent organs of their State." 48) 
The resolution under discussion is undoubtedly a Chapter VII 
resolution. 
The Council has made the necessary preliminary finding of a 
threat to the peace and it has purported to act under Chapter VII . 
It therefore follows that this resolution is capable of imposing 
binding legal obligations on member states of the United Nations 
where _. in terms, it would appear to be the intention of the 
____________
____________
____ council/ . .. 
48) S. Res . 277 (1970). That a resolution of the Security Council is 
capable of imposing a duty not to recognize appears from the Advisory 
Opinion on South West Africa, note 41) supra, §133. The court how-
ever formulated this duty in a very clumsy way when it held that 
member states of the United Nations are under an obligation to recog-
nize the illegality of South Africa's presence in Namibia. It is 
submitted that the formulation of Judge Onyeama. in his separate 
Opinion is preferable . He said that States ~ere obliged not to 
recognize South Africa s right to remain in Namibia. See (10) I.L.M . , 
1971 , p . 746. No opinion is here expressed by the writer on the 
correctness of the courts' finding that there was such a duty in 
the case of South West Africa . 
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Council so to do. 49) In terms of the resolution the Security 
Council has decided that there shall be no recognition and it 
has called upon member states to ensure that no act performed 
by Rhodesian officials shall be accorded recognition. It is 
submitted that thi s language is sufficiently mandatory and un-
equivocal to impose binding legal obligations on member 
states.50) 
Given then that the resolution contains binding obligations 
pertaining to recognition, the question now ari ses what is the 
content of such obligations? Here, in the present writer's 
view , the terms are somewhat imprecise. Three points of 
difficulty arise. 
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
_ (i)/ ... 
49) See Articles 39, 41, 42, Charter of the United Nations. The only 
possible circumstances in which such a resolution would not enshrine 
binding legal obligations would be where the Security Council did not 
act in good faith . See W.M van der Westhuizen, ''Die Bevoegdheid 
van die Verenigde Volke om Die Mandaat vir Suidwes-Afrika te beeindig" 
(31) T .H.R-H .R., 1968, p . 330 at pp. 344-345. This is based on the 
rule that international organizations should act in good faith . See 
Schwarzenberger, Manual , p . 148. There are however , presumptions in 
favour of the good faith and law-abidingness of an actor. See 
Schwarzenberger, I , pp . 120, 647-649. In practice therefore a heavy 
onus would lie upon a member state of the United Nations which sought 
t o avoid the i mplications of a Chapter VII resolution on the grounds 
that a the Security Council did not act in good faith . 
50) See J ohn Dugard, "United Nations, Rhodesia and South Africa", Annual 
Survey of South African Law 1970, p. 73 who says that S.Res. 277 
(1970) was properly passed under Chapter VII and that though 
Mr . Vorster announced that South Africa would not abide by it, in 
law South Africa is obliged to do so. It could perhaps be argued 
that in the past when the Security Council has passed binding 
Chapter VII resol utions on the Rhodesian situation it has spec i fic-
ally called upon "all states members of the United Nations to carry 
out these decisi ons . . . in accordance with Article 25 . . . and reminds 
them that failure or refusal by any of them to do so would constitute 
a violation of that article" . See S . Res 232 (lg66) and S . Res.253 
(1968) . In the present resolution however there is no warning to 
states that failure to observe the terms of the resolution in 
question will constitute a vi olation of their Charter obligations 
and therefore by implication the Security Council did not intend 
its decisions to be binding . It is submitted however that this 
omission as an indicat i on of intention must give way to the mandatory 
language contained in §§ 2 and 3 when used in conjunction with a 
specific invocat i on of Chapter VII. 
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(i) Does the resolution prohibit recognition of the State of 
Rhodesia? 
(ii) If the resolution prohibits recognition of the State of 
Rhodesia, does it prohibit not only full , i .e. de iure 
recognition, but also more limited forms of recognition 
such as de facto recognition? 
(iii) If the resolution prohibits recognition of the State of 
Rhodesia, ls this a general prohibition of recognition 
of the state in whatever form it may take or alternatively 
does the resolution only prohibit recognition of the 
State of Rhodesia in Republican form - thus for example 
leaving states free to recognize the status quo ante the 
proclamation of a republic, i.e . to afford recognition 
to the State of Rhodesia as an independent monarchy with 
Queen Elizabeth II as Head of State? 
(i) At first sight it might appear that the prohibition of 
recognition here refers only to recognition of Government. 
Member states are told to refrain from recognizing the 
"illegal r~gime". These words primarily indicate a form 
of government.5l) It is submitted however that the 
prohibition intended by the Security Council here includes 
a prohibition on the recognition of the State of Rhodesia. 
The Security Council is using the expression "illegal 
r~gime" in a rather loose fashion, as it has done in 
several previous resolutions.5
2 ) The following factor 
____
____
____
____
____
____
__ indicates/ . . . 
51) The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, 3rd ed ., 1958. 
52) See S. Res. 216 (1965) . In S. Res . 217 (1965) reference is made 
to the "illegal authority" . 
-309-
indicates that the Security Council intended this rather 
loose expression to apply to the State of Rhodesia as 
well as to the Government of Rhodesia. Paragraph 12 of 
the Resolution in question 
"Calls upon Member States to take appropriate action 
to suspend any membership or associate membership 
that the illegal r~gime of Southern Rhodesia has in 
specialized agencies of the United Nations." 
Only states (independent or dependent) can be members of 
such international organizations as the specialized 
agencies of the United Nations. Clearly, therefore, the 
Security Council here was asking for the termination of 
the membership of the State of Rhodesia even though it 
uses the word "regime" . Precisely the same arguments 
apply in respect of paragraph 13 of the same resolution 
which reads that the Security Council 
"Urges Member States of any international or regional 
organizations to suspend the membership of the illegal 
regime of Southern Rhodesia from their respective 
organizations and to refuse any request for member-
ship from that r~gime." 
Clearly therefore the Security Council has used the term 
"illegal r~gime" to denote the State of Rhodesia in these 
two paragraphs. By implication the use of a precisely 
similar term in paragraph 2 aforesaid has the same meaning . 
On the other hand the following factors are some indicat-
ion that the term "regime" is meant to apply to the 
Government of Rhodesia only (and not to both State and 
Government) 
(A)/ . . . 
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(A) Paragraph 3 of the resolution in question is only 
explicable on the basis that the Government of 
Rhodesia should not be recognized. For if the 
Government of Rhodesia were to be recognized , the 
acts referred to in paragraph 3 might be recognized 
at the national level i n other states. Paragraph 
3 therefore contemplates the position where a. govern-
ment is unrecognized by another state but the municipal 
law of that other state will nevertheless give some 
effect at the national level to acts performed by 
officials of the unrecognized regime (as a matter of 
comity and without of course conceding any internation-
al obligation to give such effect}. The paragraph 
therefore , it is submitted, is directed merely 
against the extension of such comity to the acts of 
the unrecognized regime.53) Even though paragraph 3 
is therefore only explicable on the basis that the 
Government of Rhodesia should not be recognized, 
this is however in no way conclusive that the "illegal 
regime" in paragraph 2 is intended to refer only to 
the Government of Rhodesia for there is no reason why 
the combined effect of paragraphs 2 and 3 together 
should not be to prohibit : 
1. recognition of the State of Rhodesia 
2. recognition of the Government 
3. extension of comity to the acts of officials 
of an unrecognized Rhodesian Government. 
-----
-----
-----
-----
-----
-Thus/ ... 
53) The full implications of the paragraph will be discussed later in 
connection with the position of the Rhodesian Government and the 
Rhodesian legal system. See infra , pp. 443-465 . 
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Thus paragraph 3 is compatible with a duty not to rec-
ognize the State of Rhodesia. 
(B) Paragraph 1 of the resolution draws a distinction 
between the "status of the territory" and the "illegal 
regime". By the former expression the Security 
Council may have been referring to the State of 
Rhodesia . whilst the latter expression in the con-
text of the particular paragraph obviously indicates 
the government of the territory. Since "illegal 
regime" obviously indicates the government in para-
graph 1 it would not be unreasonable to ascribe a 
similar meaning to the term in the following paragraph 
2. 
Previous use of the expression "illegal regime" by 
United Nations organs in the Rhodesian context is 
equivocal and does not furnish us with much assist-
ance in ascertaining the meaning of the expression 
here . Sometimes the expression would appear to refer 
to the State of Rhodesia,54 ) sometimes to the Govern-
ment of Rhodesia,55) whilst at other times it could 
be interpreted as referring either to the State or 
to the Government or perhaps both . 5
6 ) 
------------
------------
---In/ ... 
54) S Res . 253 (1968) preamble commencing with the words "Gravely con-
cerned", paragraph 12. 
55) See for example the various references to the regime in the preamble 
to A. Res . 2151 (XXI) and in paragraphs 2, 3, 4 , 5, 8, 10, 11 . The 
use of the words "illegal racist minority regime" in all these 
instances would appear to give a more precise meaning to the word 
"regime" as denoting the government S. Res . 253 (1968) preamble 
commencing with the word "Condemning", §§ 4, 5(a), 5( b) ; A.Res. 
2383 (XXIII) , preamble commencing with the words "Deeply concerned", 
§§ 3 . 4, 7, 9(a), 10 . 
56) See S . Res. 232 (1966) §5; A.Res. 2383 (XXIII) preamble commencing 
with the words "Bearing in mind" , §5. 
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In conclusion, it is submitted , that though the 
matter is not free from doubt, in view of the provis-
ions of paragraph 1 of the resolution, the Security 
Council intended in paragraph 2 to impose a duty not 
to recognize the State of Rhodesia on members of the 
United Nations. 
(ii) Given then that member states of the United Nations are 
prohibited from recognizing the State of Rhodesia, is 
this prohibition general or does it only extend to prohibit 
recognition of the State of Rhodesia in its republican 
form? The writer is of the view that the prohibition only 
applies to recognition of the Republic of Rhodesia for the 
following reasons . 
(A) If paragraphs 1 and 2 of the resolution are read 
together they would appear to lead to such an inter-
pretation of the resolution. Paragraph 1 condemns 
the proclamation of republican status and paragraph 
2 decides that member states shall refrain from rec-
ognizing this illegal regime. The use of the word 
"this" is highly significant for it provides a vital 
link between the entity which is not to be recognized 
and the republican status of the territory. It is 
thus the republican status which should not be 
recognized. 
(B) One of the reasons given by the Council for the 
introduction of this measure of prohibition inter alia 
is the Proclamation of the ~public. In the preamble 
to the resolution the Security Council notes with 
grave concern: 
II (d) / • • • 
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"(d) That the situation in Southern Rhodesia 
continues to deteriorate as a result of the 
introduction by the illegal r~gime of new 
measures, including the purported assumption of 
Republican status, aimed at repressing the 
African people in violation of General Assembly 
resolution 1514 (xv)." 
Since the new measure involving the proclamation of a 
Republic is the prime motivating reason for the im-
position of the duty not to recognize, it can be 
inferred that the duty should refer to that new situ-
ation. In fact it can be said that the Security 
Council resolution in question was precipitated by 
the Proclamation of the Republic of Rhodesia and 
was passed within sixteen days of the assumption of 
republican status by Rhodesia.57) 
The conclusion from all that we have said is that 
member states of the United Nations have an inter-
national law obligation, imposed by the Security 
Council, not to recognize the Republic of Rhodesia. 
(iii)We must now consider whether the above obligation not to 
recognize the State of Rhodesia is limited to the grant 
of full, i.e. de iure recognition, or whether it extends 
to more limited forms of recognition such as de facto 
recognition . 58) In general there would appear to be 
---------------------
------
controversy/ . . . 
57) Rhodesia became a republic on 2nd March, 1970. On the very same day 
the Secretary General of the United Nations, U Thant called on 
members of the Security Council of the United Nations to hold an 
emergency meeting of the Council to consider the Rhodesian decision. 
See Die Burger, 3rd March, 1970, p.l. The meeting was set down 
originally for the 11th March, 1970, but was adjourned. See~ 
Burger, 11th March, 1970, p.3. The Resolution was eventually 
adopted on 18th March, 1970. 
58) For discussion of the nature of limited and de facto recognition see 
supra, pp . 198-201. 
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controversy on the question whether or not recognition 
de facto is contrary to an obligation not to recognize . 
Thus the Advisory Committee set up by the Assembly of the 
League of Nations in relation to the non-recognition of 
Manchuko was of the view that recognition de facto would 
not be compatible with the obligation of non-recognition.59) 
On the other hand Haile Selassie stated to the League Council 
in 1938 that de facto (but not de iure) recognition of the 
Italian conquest of Abyssinia would not be contrary to an 
obligation not to recognize. 60 ) Lauterpacht agrees with 
the latter view .61 ) He bases his view on the provisional 
character of de facto recognition which emphasises the 
62) 
absence of any obligation to continue the recognition. 
As such it may be deemed to be compatible with the limited 
purpose of the necessarily imperfect sanction of non-recog-
nition. 
It is submitted however that the above controversy only has 
relevance when the duty not to recognize is imposed without 
elaboration. If the instrument creating the duty not only 
imposes the obligation but also describes the extent of 
that obligation, the question merely resolves itself into 
one of construing the instrument in question to establish 
what is allowed and what is prohibited. The resolution 
of the Security Council in question63 ) does elaborate 
_______________________
____ upon/ . .. 
59) Lauterpacht, p. 347. 
60) Ibid. 
61) Ibid .. p. 348. 
62) De facto recognition can in principle be withdrawn. Starke, pp.153-
154 . Brownlie, p. 87 and O'Connell, I, p . 159 while admitting this 
general proposition criticise it. 
63) S . Res . 277 (1970) 
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upon the prohibitions which it imposes. We therefore 
turn to its terms to see if it imposes a prohibition on 
limited recognition of the State of Rhodesia. In partio~ 
ular here we may refer to paragraph 3 which obliges member 
states not to recognize any act of any official or instit-
ution of the regime. This, it is submitted, not only pro-
hibits recognition de facto of Rhodesia64 >but goes so far 
as to prohibit any degree of recognition even though such 
limited recognition might fall far short of de facto 
recognition. 
It must now be asked whether the imposition of this obliga-
tion not to recognize Rhodesia can affect any recognition 
which might have been accorded to Rhodesia before 18th 
March, 1970. It is submitted that it does not, for the 
following reasons. 
(A) The Security Council of the United Nations can, in my 
view, only make binding legal decisions on four matters. 
In the first place it can make a legally binding determ-
ination that certain conduct constitutes an act of 
aggression. In the second place, it can determine a 
breach of the peace. In the third place, it can determ-
ine that a situation constitutes a threat to interna-
tional peace.65) In the exercise of these 'three f'un:ltions 
we/ ••• 
64) If recognition de fact• is accorded this implies that at least the 
acts of the regime may be recognized as having effect within the 
territory of the state in question. See Aksionairnoye Obschestvo 
A.M. Luther v. Sagor (James) and Co. (1921] 3 K.B. 532; Bank of 
Ethiopia v. National Bank of Egypt and Liguori (1937] Ch. 513; 
The Arantzazu Mendi [1939] A.C. 256; See too the list of authori-
ties quoted by O'Connell, I, p. 1e6. See too Brownlie, p. 88; 
Starke, p. 156. 
65) Charter of the United Nations, Article 39. 
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we see the Council in an essentially judicial role .66 ) 
In its fourth function we see the Council in an 
essentially legislative role. A~er making any of 
the above determinations the Council may by resolut-
ion impose obligations on member states of the 
United Nations or oblige member states to submit to 
activities taken by it or some other entity on its 
behalr.67 ) Beyond these functions however, its 
Judicial and legislative capacities do not extend. 
Thus for instance, the Security Council, it is 
submitted, has no competence to alter the existing 
status of a territory - not even in the exercise of 
68) 
its peace-keeping functions. Were the Security 
Council/ . . . 
------------------
------------
66) In the Advisory Opinion on South West Africa, note 41) supra, para-
graph 117, the court would seem to allow general judicial powers to 
the Security Council , and in paragraphs 103, 105, lc5 it even appears 
to go so far as to concede binding judicial powers to the General 
Assembly! 
67) Charter of the United Nations, Articles 25, 39, 41 , 42. 
68) Thus it is submitted that the Security Council (and for that matter 
the General Assembly) did not have the capacity to terminate the 
Mandate for South West Africa because in doing so it would be alter-
ing the legal status of the territory, something which the Charter 
gives it no power to do . The World Court has held however that it 
has such power and not only the Security Council but also the 
General Assembly. See Advisol';l Opinion on South West Africa , note 41 ) 
supra, paragraphs 103, 105, 106 , 117 . See too, C.J R. Dugard, "The 
Revocation of the Mandate for South West Africa" (62) A.J .I L., 
1968, at p . 95 W .M. van der Westhuizen, "Die Bevoegdheid van di.e 
Verenigde Volke om Die Mandaat vir Suidwes-Afrika te beeindig" (31) 
T.H.R-H .R. , 1968, pp . 344-345. It is submitted however that what 
the Security Council could do would be to impose an obligation on 
South Africa to hand over control of the territory or even an 
obligation to co-operate with the General Assembly in dissolving 
the Mandate . But it could not simply alter the status of the 
territory as such by terminating the Mandate. See here the di.ssent 
of Judge Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice in the above Advisory Opinion in 
which he held that: "Even where the Security Council is acting 
genuinely for the preservation or restoration of peace and security, 
it has no competence as part of that process to effect definitive 
and permanent changes in territorial rights , whether of sovereignty 
or administration - and a mandate involves, necessarily, a territorial 
right of administration, without which it could not be operated." See 
(10) IL M., 1971, pp . 788-789. See too the attitude of the British 
Foreign/ . •. concluded at foot of next page. 
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Council to make the provisions of the resolution 
under question retrospective it would in effect be 
attempting to alter any international status possessed 
by the territory of Rhodesia by virtue of recognition 
previously accorded to it. It is one thing to impose 
an obligation not to recognize Rhodesia in the future, 
it is something quite different and , it is submitted , 
something beyond the competence of the Security 
Council to interfere with the vested status of a 
territory Its legislative competence is simply not 
so extensive as to be effective in the latter 
instance. 
(B) In any event the resolution in question does not 
purport to be retrospective. On the contrary, the 
Security Council in paragraph two decides that 
member states "shall refrain from recognizing" the 
r~gime. The resolution must therefore be contrasted 
with past resolutions where the Security Council has 
intended obligations to be retrospective and has 
specifically so stated in words.
69) 
(C) As previously stated, the resolution probably refers 
only to recognition of the Republic of Rhodesia. 
____
____
____
____
____
____
_ Th.is/ . . . 
68) concluded from previous page : 
, . . Foreign Secretary, Mr . Stewart on the question of the status of 
the Falkland Islands. The British view was that the United Nations 
was not competent to decide questions of sovereignty. The Times , 
14th January , 1966, p. 9(c) . It is submitted that these latter 
views are preferable to the former ones being more in accordance 
with the Charter . 
69) See S. Res. 253 (1968) paragraph 7 where the Security Council 
"Decides that all States Menbers of the United Nations shall give 
effect to the decisions set out in operative paragraphs 3, 4, 5 and 
6 of this resolution notwithstanding any contract entered into or 
licence granted before the date of this resolution." 
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This only came into being on 2nd March, 1970, It is 
therefore unlikely that the resolution was intended 
to have a retrospective effect prior to this date. 
From the above considerations it is submitted that the 
resolution is not retrospective in operation on the 
question of non-recognition. It is further submitted that 
it could not be so retrospective and thus any recognition 
accorded to Rhodesia previously and any resulting status 
acquired by Rhodesia is unaffected by the resolution. 
We may now summarise the effect of the resolution. 
1 . It prohibits both full and limited recognition of the 
State of Rhodesia in Republican form. 
2 . It does not operate retrospectively. 
(b) Obligations not to recognize under Article 2 (5) of the Charter. 
Article 2(5) provides: 
"All Members shall give the United Nations every assistance 
in any action it takes in accordance with the present 
Charter, and shall refrain from giving assistance to any 
state against which the United Nations is taking preventive 
or enforcement action . " 
It is argued that the Security Council is taking action 
against Rhodesia. The giving of recognition to a r~gime which 
the United Nations is trying to bring down must surely be re-
garded as giving "assistance" to that r~gime. Thus such recog-
nition is a clear violation of the spirit of Article 2(5). 70 ) 
Dr . Akehurst says that recognition of Rhodesia would be a 
________
________
________
_ violation/ ... 
70) Michael Akehurst, "State ResponsibiU.ty for the Acts of Rebels -
an Aspect of the Southern Rhodesian Problem" (43) B.Y.I.L . , 
1968-1969, p. 49 at pp . 55-56. 
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violation of the spirit of Article 2(5) because Rhodesia is 
not regarded as a state by the United Nations. 71 ) It is sub-
mitted however that one need not rely on the spirit of the 
Article in question because, as previously discussed, Rhodesia 
is a state regardless of the subjective view of the United 
Nations, statehood being a fact. 72 ) There is thus no objection 
to the proposition that recognition could be a violation of the 
letter of Article 2(5). 
There are however two points of difficulty here. In the first 
place , would recognition amount to the giving of "assistance" 
to Rhodesia? It may be doubted whether strictly speaking recog-
nition can amount to "assistance". The theories relating to 
the function of recognition would be of relevance . If recog-
nition is of a declaratory nature it is very difficult to see 
how it could amount to "assistance" as it is merely an ack-
nowledgment of an existing factual situation. On the other 
hand if recognition is constitutive in character, 73) the 
argument that it can amount to "assistance" is stronger. But 
even on this view it is open to doubt whether the bestowal of 
an international status on an entity through recognition 
amounts to "assistance" . The latter would seem to imply some-
thing in the nature of more positive help , succour , relief, 
backing , sustenance or benefit. The furnishing of recognition 
may merely amount to encouragement without amounting to concrete 
assistance. 
In/ . . . 
----------------------------71) Ibid., p. 55. 
72) Supra , pp . 159, 169. 
73) And in the view of the writer it is constitutive. See supra, p. 281. 
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In the second place there is a difficulty whi ch seems to be 
inherent in the provisions of Article 2(5), If this article 
is taken literally, it would seem to impose a variety of 
obligations of assistance or non-assistance, as the case might 
be , over and above the obligation. to observe the specific 
decisions of the Security Council as provided for in Articles 
25 , 48 and 49. Thus the effect of Article 2(5) could conceiv-
ably be to render these other Articles meaningless because it 
imposes the widest variety of obligations once the Security 
Council does take enforcement or preventive action against a 
state74 ) as in the case of :Rhodesia , To overcome this diffic-
ulty it is suggested that Article 2(5) should be interpreted 
in the light of Articles 25 , 48 and 49 and that its meaning 
should be restricted by the content of these articles. This 
would mean that "assistance" or "non-assistance" within the 
meaning of Article 2(5) would amount to the observance of the 
decisions of the Security Council which are binding on member 
states in accordance with Articles 25, 48 and 49 and no further. 
I t i s readi ly admitted however that there is no support for the 
writer's suggestion to overcome the difficulty here . It is 
further conceded that the writer's suggestion amounts to an 
assertion that Article 2(5) itself is superfluous in view of 
the provisions of Art i cles 25, 48 and 49 . 
----------------------If/ . . . 
74) For a full discussion of the meaning of enforcement or preventive 
action here see Hans Kelsen, The Law of the United Nations, London, 
1951, pp . 91-94 . 
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If, on the other hand . Article 2(5) is not superfluous, and if 
recognition amounts to assistance to Rhodesia, there would 
appear to be a duty not to recognize Rhodesia under Article 2(5). 
In view of the fact that there is already a duty not to recog-
nize Rhodesia under S .Res. 277 (1970) it may be asked whether 
the present duty , assuming it to exist, has any practical sig-
nificance . It is submitted that it would have practical signif-
icance in the following respects. It would apply to all forms 
of recognition both full, i.e . de iure, and limited, because 
once it is admitted in principle that recognition may amount 
to "assistance" , then of necessity all species of recognition 
must also amount to "assistance" . In addition the duty would 
have existed as early as 9th April, 1966 when the Security 
Council first took enforcement measures against Rhodesia. 75) 
On the other hand the duty not to recognize under S, Res. 277 
(1970) only came into being on 18th March, 1970 . Further the 
duty not to recognize under Article 2 (5) would certainly apply 
to the State of Rhodesia whereas, as we have seen, 76 ) it is not 
altogether beyond doubt whether the duty under s. Res. 277 (1970) 
applies to the State of Rhodesia, the Government of Rhodesia or 
both the State and the Government of Rhodesia though the sub-
mission was that it applied to both. 
In conclusion we must make one important observation . Both 
the duty not to recognize under S. Res. 277 (1970) and that 
under Article 2 (5) of the Charter can of course only bind 
member states of the United Nations. 
____________________ (3)/ .. . 
75) S . Res. 221 of 1966 . 
76) Supra, pp.308 et seqq. 
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(3) The obligation not to recognize a state which is constitutionally 
based on the denial of the right of self-determination. 
It has been argued that from the emerging acceptance of self-
determination, since at least 1948, as a basic principle of law 
and government, state practice has developed a common policy in the 
international comnrunity that new r~gimes constitutionally based on 
the denial of the right of self-determination shall not be recog-
nized.77) It is apparent that this duty not to recognize, if admitted , 
would be based entirely on the existence of a right of self-determin-
ation in international law . The question of the existence of such 
a right is examined later in this work and the writer's conclusion 
is that such a right has not emerged in contemporary international 
law . 78) That being so, the submission is that there is no duty not 
to recognize here.79) 
eo) 
Effects of recognition accorded in contravention of a duty not to recognize. 
As we have seen, the duty not to recognize exists only in relation to 
premature recognition and treaty obligations not to recognize. From our 
discussion it will also be apparent that only the latter category of duty 
is relevant in the case of Rhodesia in that there may be duties not to 
recognize Rhodesia under S. Res . 277 (1970) and Article 2(5) of the 
Charter of the United Nations. If a member state of the United Nations 
---------------------------w. ere/ . .. 
77) J .E S .F in (34) M.L R., 1971, p. 417. 
78) Infra, pp .472-520, in particular at p. 520. 
79) Chen, pp. 60, 61 further points out that the introduction of extran-
eous requirements for recognition (other than the traditional ones) 
such as degree of civilization, legitimacy of origin, religious 
creed or political system would shi~ the basis of recognition to 
nebulous intractable considerations. Not even violence of origin 
is a bar to recognition nor the unwillingness of a new state to 
observe international law. 
8o) This was previously discussed by the writer, note 11) supra, 
pp . 155-156, 166. 
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were to accord recognition to Rhodesia, two questions would arise as to 
the effect of such recognition. 81 ) In the first place, it would be asked 
whether the recognition was lawful and in the second place, whether it 
was valid . 
(1) Lawfulness of such recognition . 
In dealing with this question writers usually discuss the lawfulness 
of premature recognition but the argument they adduce is of course 
applicable mutatis mutandis to recognition prohibited by treaty. 
Some writers say that the grant of recognition in such cases is not 
illegal. Thus Anzilotti says that international law does not know 
legal or i llegal recognit i on , 82 ) whilst Liszt would appear to regard 
premature recognition as being merely an unfriendly act . 83)Le1Normand 
says in relation to premature recognition : 
"La reconnaissance pPematur~e est-elle bien une intervention? 
Il semble gue non, puisgue l'Etat qui la fait n'exige pas gue 
l' Etat ancien se comporte de telle ou telle fac~m". 
and this is so although: 
"L'Etat ancien verra done avec raison une l~sion de sa 
personalit~ dans tout reconnaissance accord~e en dehors de 
ces conditions." 84) 
However it is clear that with the exception of the above, writers 
generally have condemned premature recognition as being illega1. 85 ) 
--------------------------Chen/ . .. 
81) It is submitted that a non-member state of the United Nations could 
recogni ze Rhodesia with impunity. Such recognition would operate 
in the ordinary way to create an international personality in 
Rhodesia which would be relative in that it would exist only 
against the recognizer. See discussion supra, pp. 279, 281, 320. 
82) D. Anzilotti, Cours de Droit International, (Tr. Gidel) , Paris,1929, 
I. p. 169. 
83) See Chen , pp. 50-51. 
84) P. 250 
85) Chen, pp. 50-51; Lauterpacht, p. 8: Iavid A. Ijalaye, "Was Biafra 
at any Time a State in International Law?" (65) A.J I L . . , 1971, 
p. 551 at p. 559; A.J.G .M. Sanders, "Die Erkenning van State en 
Regerings" (33) T.H R-H .R. , 1970, p. 259 at p . 262. 
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Chen says that premature recognition is an act of intervention and 
an international delinquency and that this is common to both the 
constitutive and declaratory schools of recognition.
86 ) It is sub-
mitted that this is certainly correct. For if there is a duty not 
to recognize then breach of that duty must surely be an international 
tort . 87 ) The conclusion then is that recognition of Rhodesia by a 
member state of the United Nations would be an international tort. 
Whenever an international tort is committed, international responsib-
ility is incurred by the wrongdoer
88) and an obligation to make 
reparation to the states to whom the obligation was owed arises.8:J) 
In this case the duty not to recognize is a duty owed under the 
Charter of the United Nations and hence it is owing to all the 
other par~ies to the treaty - the member states of the United 
Nations both collectively and individually. 
The ideal form of reparation for a wrong is restitutio in integrum90) 
if this is possible . The essential principle is to wipe out all 
the consequences of the illegal act but if this is not possible 
reparation can take other forms which will shortly be discussed.9l ) 
In the case of recognition of Rhodesia it would be difficult for 
restitutio/ ... 
--------------
------------
86) P.54 . See too Lauterpacht, p. 8 and H. Kelsen, "Recognition in 
International Law - Theoretical Observations" (35) A.J .I.L . , 1941 , 
p 605 who says at p . 609 that such recognition is a violation of 
international law and an infringement of the rights of other states . 
87) Oppenheim, International Law, 8th Ed., London, 1955, I, p. 337. 
88) Ibid . 
8:J) Clyde Eagleton, "Measure of Damages in International Law" (29) Yale 
Law .Journal, 1929-1930, p. 52 ; Oppenheim, note 87) supra, p. 353; 
Chorzow Factory case, P.C .I.J . Ser. A. 17, no.13, p. 29. The wronged 
state has a right to request the performance of such acts as are 
necessary for the reparation of the wrong done . 
90) Schwarzenberger, I, p. 656 describes the content of what he calls 
restitut i o in pristinum . It necessarily excludes any form of 
reparation which either falls short of, or goes beyond, the purpose 
of re-establishing the harmony which existed before the tort . 
91) Eagleton, note 8:J) supra , p. 53 ; Schwarzenberger, I, pp.656, 657; 
Chorzow Factory case, note 8:J) supra, p.47 · Martini case , (Italy v 
Venezuela) (1930) (2) R. I.A.A . 975 at 1~. 
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restitutio in integrum to take place because in principle de iure 
recognition cannot be withdrawn . On the other hand if the type of 
recognition afforded was de facto recognition, withdrawal would be 
a possibility92 ) and so restitutio in integrum might be an appro-
priate remedy . 
Apart from the question of restitutio in integrum the question of 
making reparation for damage caused would also arise . Here we must 
draw a distinction between material and non-material damage and 
consider the appropriate forms of satisfaction for each and in 
favour of whom the forms of sat isfaction might exlst. 
(a) Material damage , 
This is actual economic loss suffered . Compensatory damages 
of a pecuniary nature93) should be paid to the victim which 
suffered loss .94 ) The calculation of the amount of the loss may 
be di fficult but it can be said that hypothetical and entirely 
conjectural losses should not be awarded . According to 
Eagleton it is only where a loss can be calculated with a 
reasonable degree of certainty that compensation in respect 
of it should be allowed. 95) A further requi rement is · that 
the loss should have been caused by the illegal act.96) 
Applying the above principles, it is submitted that if a 
________________________ member/ , . . 
92) Supra , p. 200 . 
93) Pecuniary damages are the rule but occasionally by way of exception 
compensation for material loss might take another form, e .g. cession 
of territory . J .B .Moore, A Digest of International Law, Washington, 
19o6 , VI, §lo61 et seqq. 
94) Oppenheim, note 87) supra , pp . 353-354; Eagleton, note 89) supra , 
p . 53 . 
95) Ibi d , p . 75. 
96 ) Ibid . p . 74. 
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member state of the United Nations suffered material loss as a 
result of the wrongful recogniti on of Rhodesia, it would be 
entitled in principle to claim pecuniary compensation from 
the recognizer 97 ) It is difficult however to see such a 
claim lying in the case of the wrongful recognition of 
Rhodesia because of the unlikelihood of this act causing 
material loss. 
(b) Non-material damage. 
The infringement of the treaty rights of member states of the 
United Nations by the unlawful recognition of Rhodesia would 
certainly give rise to claims for satisfaction in r espect of 
non-material damage . This claim might lie at the instance of 
any member state of the United Nations or in favour of the 
members collectively. We must now consider the possible forms 
of satisfaction which might be demanded here. 
(i) Apology, 
This is the very least that could be demanded.98) 
(ii) Damages . 
Pecuniary damages for breach of obligation might be 
demanded even though no material loss has been suffered. 
There is adequate authority for the award of such damages. 
Substantial/ . .. 
-------------------------
-
97) In this regard the Panamanian secession from Colombia in 1903 
provides an interesting example of the consequences of wrongful 
recognition, in casu premature recognition. The United States 
immediately recognized Panama and even went so far as to prevent 
Colombia from reasserting its authority over Panama. The controversy 
which ensued from this unjustified intervention was only settled 
finally by a treaty in 1922 under which a payment of $50 million 
compensatlon was made to Colombia. See Oppenheim, I p. 125 the 
writer, note 11) supra, p. 155. 
98) Oppenheim, note 87) supra, p. 354; Moore, note 93) supra, §lo61 
et segg. 
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Substantial satisfaction has in the past been awarded for 
serious derelictions of international duties.99) Thus 
awards have been made for denials of Justice,lOO) indignity 
suffered, grief sustained and other similar wrongs to 
aliens . lOl) In addition awards have been made for mere 
moral and political injury resulting from failure to 
observe the rules of international customary law and con-
102) 
ventions. Thus the United States was adjudged to pay 
Canada $25,000 as non-material damages for a breach of 
the freedom of the seas. 103 ) Sometimes the pecuniary 
compensation payable here is styled punitive, vindictive 
or exemplary damages. In essence , however, they are not 
such . but are merely compensatory for non-material damage. 
International courts and tribunals lack the power to 
award truly punitive damages, i.e. damages which have 
a penal element in that they amount to an expression of 
disapprobation of the tort.l04) 
(iii)Condemnation by an international tribunal. 
In certain cases the mere moral judgment implied in a 
purely declaratory judgment has been regarded as a 
commensurate form of reparation. In the Corfu Channel 
------------------------
(Merits)/ . .. 
99) 
100) 
101) 
102) 
103) 
104) 
Eagleton . note 89) supra, p. 55 ; James case (1926) (4) R.I .A.A. ~-
Eagleton. note 89) supra, p. 55. 
Stephens clai m (1927) (4 ) R. I .A. A. 265 at 266. 
The Carthage (France v . Italy) H.C R. (1916) 329 at 335; The 
Manouba (France v . Italy) H.C.R (1916) 341 at 349 . 
I'm Alone (1935) (3) R.I .A A. 1609 . 
Schwarzenberger, I, p . 673 . But in the past states have on 
occasions claimed punitive damages and some writers approve of them . 
See Eagleton, note 89) supra, pp. 62-63, 64-65. 
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(Merits) case , 105) the court regarded its own declaration 
as to the violation of Albanian sovereignty as appropriate 
satisfaction for the wrong inflicted on Albania. In the 
Carthage and Manouba caseslo6) similar views were expressed . 
In the former case the court said: 
"If a Power should fail to fulfill its obligations, 
whether general or special, to another Power, the 
establishment of this fact, especially in an 
arbitral award, constitutes in itself a serious 
sanction . " 107) 
In the event of such satisfaction as aforesaid being 
due and not forthcoming, the aggrieved state or states 
might bring proceedings before the International Court 
of Justice if all the states in question were parties 
to the Statute of World Court and the case was one 
which fell within the Jurisdiction of the latter. 10
8) 
Failing appropriate satisfaction the aggrieved state or 
states might also resort to reprisals by way of self-heli?9 ) 
In the event , therefore, of an unlawful recognition of 
Rhodesia the member states of the United Nations might, 
collectively or individually, make the aforesaid claims 
against/ . .. 
----------------------------
105) I .C J Rep . 1949, 35 at 35-36. 
lo6) Note 102) supra. 
107) The Carthage, note 102) supra, at 335. 
108) See Article 36 of the Statute of the World Court. 
the World Court might then conceivably constitute 
sanction . 
The judgment of 
a sufficient 
109) The reprisal is a measure which if taken in isolation, would be 
unlawful, but may be taken exceptionally when one state violates 
the rights of another state. It is taken for the sole purpose of 
forcing the delinquent state to abide by the law . It is subject 
to the rule of reasonable proportionality and it must not involve 
the threat or use of force contrary to Article 2 (4) of the United 
Nations Charter . See Sorensen, pp . 753-754. On the latter see 
however Derek Bowett, "Reprisals Involving Recourse to Armed Force" 
(66) A.J.I .L. , 1972, p .l . 
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against the recognizer and take the act ions indicated above 
aga i nst i t . In the case of reprisals being taken against 
the recognizer , these could be instituted by the individ-
ual member state acting unilaterally but there is no 
reason why they could not be taken collectively within 
the framework of the United Nations organization itself.llO ) 
(2) Validity of recognition granted in contravention of a duty not to 
recognize. 
Even if it is conceded that an act of recognition is undoubtedly 
unlawful , it still remains to be decided whether that act is valid 
or invalid If valid the act, though unlawful, will produce legal 
consequences and will create a personality in the entity recognizea~l ) 
112 ) 
If invalid, the act will naturally produce no such consequences . 
It is apparent that there is a real distinction between unlawfulness 
and invalidity and that an unlawful act is not necessarily also 
invalid . Jennings points out that the juridicial consequences of 
illegal acts are of much wider scope than the claim to reparation, 
involving also the quest i on of val i dity or invalidity. 113 ) 
E.Lauterpacht/ . . . 
----------------------------
110) Reprisals here would not include action taken by the Security Counci l 
of the United Nations against a recognizer under Chapter VII of the 
Charter . Such action would not be a true reprisal because it could 
be taken against a recognizer whether recognition was lawful or 
unlawful . The legality of Security Council action does not depend 
on the existence of prior unlawful conduct. See the writer, 
"Rhodesia and the United Nations , the Lawfulness of International 
Concern .: A Qualification" (2) C. I. L S . A , 1969, p. 454 at pp .454-
455 . But the legality of a reprisal is entirely dependent on prior 
conduct . 
111) See supra, ,p . 281 where the nature and effects of recognition 
are discussed. 
112) R.Y.Jennings , "Nullity and Effectiveness in International Law", 
Cambridge Essays in International Law, London, 1965, p. 64 at p.66 
points out that acts performed by an entity without capacity are 
null (invalid) in the sense of bei ng non-existent. 
113) Jennings, note 112) supra , pp . 64 , 73. 
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E . Lauterpacht states that there can be various classes of illegal 
acts,only some of which attract the penalty of nullity. 114 ) Honore 
poi nts out that it is a familiar feature of legal systems that 
unlawful acts create rights and that conduct is not merely permitted 
or prohibited but permitted or prohibited with greater or lesser 
insistence . Thus legality and validity cannot be identified.ll5) 
The problem of the validity or invalidity of an unlawful act of 
recognition is a difficult one and controversy exists on the 
particular topic . The following authorities can be quoted in 
support of the assertion that illegal recognition is also invalid. 
Kuntz states that no amount of recognition can supply the lack of 
requirements laid down by international law for independent state-
hood and that recognition (naturally premature) in such a case 
would be simply ineffective in law. 116 ) Similar views are expressed 
117) 118) llQ ) by Ijalaye , Redslob , the tribunal in the Cuculla Arbitration 
and/ ... 
------------------------------
114) E. Lauterpacht, "The Legal Effects of Illegal Acts of International 
Organizations", Cambridge Essays in International Law, London , 1965, 
p.88 at p. 117. The same writer points out (p.121) that even wh:?re 
an act is null, the nullity may be relative, i.e. it may be valid 
against some states, invalid against others. 
115) A.M.Honore, "Reflections on Revolutions" (2) Irish Jurist (n.s.) 
1967, p. 268 at pp. 268, 269. On the question of the relationship 
between validity and effectiveness see Marinus Wiechers, "South West 
Africa : The Background, Content and Significance of the Opinion of 
the World Court of 21 June 1971" (5) C.I.L.S.A , 1972, p.123 at 
pp . 167-168. 
116) J.L . Kuntz , "Critical Remarks on Lauterpacht ' s rRecognition in Inter-
national Law'" (44) A .J. I.L., 1950, p. 713 at p. 718. 
117) Note 85) supra , pp. 558-559 who says that the validity of any declar-
ation of recognition depends on whether or not the entity has ful-
filled the requirements of statehood. Premature recognition is a 
clear example of an illegal and thus invalid recognition. The 
results are then applied to the recognition of Biafra. For a con-
trary view in which recognition of Biafra was asserted to be valid 
(though unlawful as being premature) see the writer, note 11) supra , 
pp. 153, 155-156. 
118) Chen, pp. 50-51 quotes Redslob as saying that premature recognition 
has no legal effect. 
119) U.S v. Mexico (1876) Moore's International Arbitratinns, III, 
p . 2873 at pp. 2876-2877. 
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and the Kenny Arbitration. 120 ) Lauterpacht is ambivalent. He 
merely asser ts that premature recognition is probably also invalid~2l) 
There is one observat ion which we can make about all the above views. 
They all rel ate to the question of the duty not to recognize pre-
maturely and not to treaty duties not to recognize, such as are 
in question here. In addition, the reason given for the invalidity 
of premature recognition is , where relevant, the absence of the 
criteria of statehood in the recognized entity. Such considerations 
do not necessarily apply in the case of treaty duties not to recog-
ni ze. Here the criteria of statehood may well be present and in 
the case of Rhodesia it was indeed submitted that they were.
122 ) 
Thus the underlying basis for the alleged invalidity of recognition 
is not present in the case of the duty not to recognize Rhodesia . 
This means that the above views in relation to the invalidity of 
recognition are in all probability not apposite in considering the 
duty not to recognize Rhodesia. 
On the other hand there are views which maintain that unlawful 
recognition is valid - even if it is premature. J ennings says 
that i t is possible to find situations in which the idea of nullity 
is completely ousted and the legal effectiveness of the wrongful 
act is accepted without any subtraction . He then cites premature 
recognition of a new state, which he says is acknowledged to be 
a wrong even in classical law, and which is yet accepted as 
producing the totality of legal effects produced by a justified 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~r.ecognition/ ... 
120) Ibid ., p. 2883. Recognition is based on pre-existing fact and if 
this does not exist the recognition is falsified. See Chen, 
pp . 14 7-148. 
121 ) At p . 9 , 
122) Supra , p. 169. 
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recognition .123 ) Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice is of the same view 124 ) 
and Professor Nkambo Mugerwa even goes so far as to say that 
"if the r~gime recognized lacks the essentials of a state, to 
recognize it is to constitute it a subject of international 
law." 125) 
It is submitted that the views upholding the validity of premature 
recognit i on are preferable. Recognition accorded in breach of a 
treaty duty to recognize would a fortiori be valid as the arguments 
requiring a factual basis for recognition would, as we have seen, 
be inapplicable here because the factual basis (the objective 
criteria of statehood) would normally be present. This submission 
is bolstered by the following arguments. 
In the first place an analogy can be drawn with the position relating 
to conflicting treaties . State A concludes a treaty with State B. 
At a later stage State A concludes a conflicting treaty with State 
C. The conclusion of the latter treaty is unlawful in relation to 
State B, because State A may now be unable to discharge its obligat-
i.ons But the treaty is valid in relation to State C and is creative 
of rights and duties as between A and C. Sir John Fischer Williams 
states that the new treaty is a good and binding instrument as 
between the states parties to it, even if it violates pre-existing 
treaty/ ... 
-----------------------------
123) Note 112) supra, p. 73. 
124) "Ex Injuria non Oritur ius" (2) H.R . 1957, p. 117 at p. 124. 
Premature recognition of a seceding state though a wrong against 
the mother state produces full legal consequences between recognized 
and recognizer. 
125) Sorensen, p. 278. 
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treaty rights. The aggrieved party has no authority to make it 
void. 126 ) If then a state can conclude a valid bilateral consensual 
act , such as a treaty, even when in conflict with existing treaty 
obligat ions, then a fortiori a state may perform a valid unilateral 
consensual act such as recognition, though this may be in conflict 
with existing treaty obligations. 
In the second place if an act of recognition is invalid it is 
difficult to see how it could amount to a wrong. And yet the over-
whelming weight of authority supports the view that certain types 
of recognition are unlawful. For if recognition is invalid it 
cannot have any legal consequences. Thus it cannot create any 
situation the existence of which is adverse to the interests of 
the state entitled to insist on non-recognition. On this view an 
act of recognition would only be unlawful precisely for the reason 
that it was valid in that it created a situation whereby the 
interests of another state were affected~A 
We are now in a position to summarize the effects of recognition accorded 
to Rhodesia. They are as follows: 
----------------------------
(1 )/ .. . 
126) "The New Doctrine of Recognition" (18) Transactions of the Grotius 
Society , 1932 , p. 109 at p .121. Sir John however would make (and 
it is submitted correctly) a very limited exception with regard to 
treaties which transgress a general overriding rule of internat-
ional law, examples of which he finds not easy to discover but 
suggests a treaty to revive the slave trade as an example. Cf. 
Brownlie , p. 501 · Art. 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties, 1969 which provides that treaties shall not conflict 
with "peremptory norms of general international law". H. Lauterpacht , 
"The Covenant as 'Higher Law'" (17) B.Y.I.L., 1936, p. 54 at p.60 
suggests however that treaties which are inconsistent with previous 
treaties are invalidated . Lauterpacht argues that the third state 
has concluded a treaty with a state whose contractual capacity has 
been limited (by the first treaty). To the extent of the incapacity . 
the second treaty is inoperative. It is submitted that Sir Johns 
views are preferable. They would now appear to be inherent in the 
codi fication of the Law of Treaties - the Vienna Convention, 1969, 
Article 30 . For a discussion of such conflicts see O'Connell , I , 
PP. 272-277 . 
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(1) Member states of the United Nations which accorded recognition to 
Rhodesia would do so in violation of their obligation under Article 
25 of the Charter to obey binding resolutions passed by the Security 
Council. 127 ) They might possibly also violate Article 2 (5) of the 
Charter. Such violations would be international torts for which 
international responsibility would be incurred to the other member 
states of the United Nations collectively and individually. Non-
member states of the United Nations could lawfully recognize 
Rhodesia because such recognition would no longer be premature. 
(2) Even though the recognition accorded by a member state of the 
United Nations would be a breach of international obligation, the 
act of recognition would be valid and would have the effect of 
establishing an international personality in Rhodesia. The emerging 
personality would of course only be relative in that it would exist 
against the recognizing state only. 
Juristically we would here have a valid but unlawful act. The act 
of recognition would be a validly performed juristic act in that 
it would achieve the desired legal effect, namely the creation of 
an international personality in the recognized entity. But at the 
same time the creation of that personality would be a wrong against 
other member states of the United Nations to whom the recognizer 
would be internationally responsible. 128) 
-------------
----------·SECTION VI/ . .. 
127) The relevant resolution here being S. Res. 277 (1970). 
128) For the application of this argument to the Biafran situation, a 
jurisprudential analysis of the concepts of unlawfulness and 
invalidity in relation to the act of recognition and for some 
municipal law examples of acts whi ch are valid though unlawful, 
see the writer , note 11) supra, pp. 153, 155-156, 166. In general 
on the distinction between the concepts of unlawfulness and 
invalidity see Jennings , note 112) supra, and Lauterpacht , 
note 114) supra. 
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SECTION VI 
RECOGNITION OF RHODESIA. 
There are conflicting international la~, claims to complete sovereignty 
over the territory known as Rhodesia. On the one hand the State of 
Rhodesia claims to be independent and as such a full international person. 
As pointed out previously , this is the only possible interpretation to 
be drawn from the terms of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence1 ) 
and the attitude displayed by the Prime Minister of Rhodesia in statements 
to the effect that the United Kingdom had no powers over Rhodesia2 ) and 
that there was no other authority in Rhodesia except his government.3 ) 
In pursuance of this standpoint, Mr . Clifford Dupont was appointed as 
Officer Administering the Government in terms of the 1965 Constitution 
and in opposition to the Governor. 4 ) Further steps were progressively 
taken against the Governor, at this stage representing the British 
Government. 5 ) At no time in the ensuing years was the British Government 
allowed to exercise governmental power in Rhodesia either directly or 
through Sir Humphrey Gibbs. 6 ) 
_________________________ On/ ..• 
1) Supra, pp. 129-130. 
2) The Times , 13th November, 1965 , p. lO(a). 
3) The Times, 16th November, 1965, p. 12(a) (b). 
4) The Times, 18th November, 1965, p. 12(a). 
5) Sir Humphrey Gibbs ' telephone was cut off and he was asked to 
vacate Government House. The Times, 17th November, 1965, p . 12(a). 
Mr . Smith explained that the reason for cutting off the telephone 
was to prevent Sir Humphrey and the British Government communicating . 
The Times, 18th November, 1965 p. 12 (b). Later Sir Humphrey was 
informed that the Rhodesian Government would not meet his house-
hold expenses and as he had no official standing he would be charged 
a rent for the house and furniture. The Times, 31st December, 1965, 
p . 10 ( f) (g) . At no time however does it seem that the Rhodesian 
Government contemplated the physi cal eviction of Sir Humphrey from 
Government House. The Tj_mes, 16th November, 1965, p.12 (a). 
6) This was most dramatically demonstrated by the incident involving 
the exercise of the Royai Prerogative of Mercy by the British 
Government in Rhodesia . RH Christie , "Practical Jurisprudence 
in Rhodes i a" (2) C.I LS A. , 1969 , at p. 218. On this Beadle,C.J. 
held in Dhlamini v . Carter , N,O. , 1968 (2) S.A . 467 (R., A.D) at 
469 that it would be strange if the United Kingdom Government, 
exercising no internal power in Rhodesia, was accorded the right 
to exercise one of the most important powers of internal government , 
the prerogative of mercy. 
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On the other hand the United Kingdom claims sovereignty over the terri-
tory of Rhodesia. That this is so ls apparent from several factors 
which will now be described . The immediate reaction of Britain to U.D .I. 
was the dismissal of the Rhodesian Cabinet through the Governor?) who 
was therea~er deemed to be the local repository of executive power on 
behalf of the British Government. 8) The United Kingdom Parliament then 
passed the Southern Rhodesia Act, 1965, 9 ) the relevant provisions of 
which are as follows: 
11 1. It is hereby declared that Southern Rhodesia continues to be 
part of Her Majesty's dominions, and that the Government and 
Parliament of the United Kingdom have responsibility and jurisdiction as heretofore for and in respect of it. 
2 .( l)Her Majesty may by Order in Council make such provision in 
relation to Southern Rhodesia , or persons or things in any 
way belonging to or connected with Southern Rhodesia, as 
appears to Her to be necessary or expedient in consequence of 
any constitutional .action taken therein." 
This was fol lowed immediately by the promulgation of the Southern 
Rhodesia (Constitution) Order, 1965 (1965 S ,I. 1952) , the leading provis-
ions of which are : 
"2(1)It is hereby declared for the avoidance of doubt that any 
instrument made or other act done in purported promulgation 
of any constitution for Southern Rhodesia except as authorized 
by Act of Parliament is void and of no effect. 
('2)This section shall come into operation .forthwith and shall 
then be deemed to have had effect from November 11th, 1965. 
3(l)So long as this section is in operation -
----------------------------
(a)/ ... 
7) The Times, 12th November , 1965 , p. 12 (a). 
8) This is apparent from the messages of Sir Humphrey Gibbs to the 
people of Rhodesia in which he asserts that he remains their legal 
governor: see The Times, 15th November, 1965, p. 10 (a); 
24th December , 1965 , p. 6 (a) ; from the statement of Mr.Harold Wilson, 
the British Prime Minister , that Sir Humphrey could only be dis-
missed at the Queen's Plea~ure; The Times, 19th November , 1965, 
p . 12 (d); and from the content of the legislation passed by the 
United Kingdom which is now cited. 
9) Which received the Royal Assent at 1.32 a.m. on 16th November , 1965. 
See The Times, 16th November, 1965, p. 9 (f). 
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(a) no laws may be made by the legislature of Southern Rhodesia, 
no business may be transacted by the Legislative Assembly and 
no steps may be taken by any person or authority for the pur-
pose of or otherwise in relation to the constitution or re-
constitution of the Legislative Assembly or the election of 
any member thereof ... . ; and 
( c) Her Ma j esty in Council may make laws for the peace, order and 
good government of Southern Rhodesia, including laws having 
extra-territorial operation . . . 
4 (1) So long as this section is in operation -
(a) the executive authority of Southern Rhodesia may be exercised 
on Her Majesty's behalf by a Secretary of State ... 
6 It is hereby declared for the avoidance of doubt that any 
law made, business transacted, step taken or function exercised 
in contravention of any prohibition or restriction imposed by 
or under this Order is void and of no effect." 
The effect of this legislation was to annul all acts taken by the execut-
ive and legislature after the Unilateral Declaration of Independence. 
All executive and legislative authority was henceforth to be vested in 
the United Kingdom authorities who were to assume direct control.lo) 
The purpose of the assumption of such powers was to ensure that a govern-
ment of Rhodesia remained in existence even though the Governor was un-
able to function, to forestall the rebel government and the creation of 
governments in exile. 11 ) 
We have pointed out already that before U.D. I . Southern Rhodesia was a 
British col ony and , from the poi nt of view of international law, a 
dependency of the United Kingdom . Primary international personality was 
--------------------------vested/ .. . 
10) For a concise summary of the effects of the various actions taken 
thus far by the United Kingdom see Molteno, p. 265. The British 
attitude to its own assumption of complete power was not however 
entirely consistent . The Rhodesian Finance Minister is reported as 
commenting adversely on a statement by Mr. Arthur Bottomley thl.t t he 
British Government did not have the necessary authority in Rhodesian 
law to pay interest due on the Rhodesian public debt issued in 
London. The Times , 29th January, 1966 p. 7 (b). This attitude 
seems inconsistent with the plenary legislative powers of Her 
Majesty in Council, granted by the above legislation, which would 
enable the British Government to change the laws of Rhodesia to meet 
any possible eventuality! 
11 ) The Times ., 17th November , 1965, p. 9 (a) (b). 
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vested in the United Ki ngdom . t he mother state, but it had conceded a 
l i mited international personality, operative in certain spheres, to the 
dependency .12 ) From the point of view of international law, the actions 
taken by the United Kingdom after U.D .I. can be interpreted as a claim 
to wi thdraw any limited international personality which Rhodesia might 
have enjoyed prior to 11th November, 196513) and as a claim to vest sole 
and exclusive international personality in the United Kingdom itself, 
instead of primary personality as before. The British claim is a claim 
to complete sovereignty in international law over Rhodesia . 
Pursuant to the above the United Kingdom has taken several important 
steps which are consistent with such an assertion of complete sovereignty 
over Rhodesia. Among them we may mention the following. The United 
Kingdom made provision for the confiscation of passports issued by the 
Rhodesian authorities .14 ) Non-Commonwealth citizens wishing to visit 
1 C: ) Rhodesia were required to obtain visas from the British passport office. / 
Censorship in Rhodesia was revoked .16 ) The British Government advised 
the Queen to inform Mr . Smith through the Governor that she could not act 
on his request for the appointment of Mr . Clifford Dupont as Governor-
Generai.17) It also attempted to exercise the prerogative of mercy on 
a number of occasions. 18) Representat i ves from Salisbury had taken 
-------------------------------care/ . . . 
12) Supra , PP 89-90 . 
13) On the possibility of such withdrawal see discussion supra, p. 89. 
14 ) Southern Rhodesia (Property in Passports) Order, 1965 . 
15) The Ti mes , 20th November , 1965 , p . 7 (b). 
16 ) Southern Rhodesia (Revocation of Censorship) Order, 1965. This Order 
was considered by the Rhodesi an courts in Central African Examiner 
(Pvt) Ltd. v. Howman and Others, NN.O . , 1966 (2) S .A. 1 (R) but the 
court made no finding on the validity or otherwise of the Order in 
Rhodesian law 
17) The Times , 4th December, 1965, p.8 (c). 
18) In the case of one Lazarus, convicted of attempted arson ; The Times ., 
21st January, 1966 , p . 12 (g); in the case of one Simon Runyowa 
also convicted of attempted arson; The Times, 22nd January, 1966, 
p . 8 (b) ; See too Dhlamini ' s case, note 6) supra . 
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care of Rhodesian interests at the British Embassies in Bonn, Washington 
and Tokyo before U.D.I. The British Government terminated such posts 
and with them the relevant Rhodesian missions. 19) 
We have now seen the respective claims of the United Kingdom and Rhodesia 
to the territory known as Rhodesia. It is apparent that these claims 
are diametrically opposed and are mutually exclusive. These conflicting 
claims are the essence of the international dispute between Rhodesia and 
the United Kingdom. It follows that in order to ascertain the internat-
ional law status of Rhodesia it is necessary to ascertain which, if any, 
of the conflicting claims is valid . This reduces itself to ascertaining 
the attitude of third states to the position and here there are three 
possibilities : 
(1) the Rhodesian claim is recognized; 
(2) the British claim is recognized ; 
(3) something other than the British or Rhodesian claims is recog-
nized. 
Each of these possibilities will now be examined seriatim. 
(1) Recognition of Rhodesian claim to independence. 
Recognition can be express, i . e . formal, or implied from conduct. 
It is common knowledge that to date no state has formally recognized 
Rhodesia and so there is no express recognition of its claim to 
independence. On the contrary several states have explicitly 
declared that they do not recognize Rhodesia. Such statements 
amount to the use of the international law devices of protest and 
reservation of rights20 ) and they here rebut any possible suggestion 
_________________________ of/ ... 
19) The Times, 12th November, 1965, p. 8 (g); 17th November, 1965, p. 9 
(c); 10th December, 1965 , p. 18 (d) ; 1st March, 1966, p.11 (b). 
20) For discussion of the role of the devices see supra, pp. 131-133, 
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of implied recognition on the part of those states making them. 
Naturally the United Kingdom is foremost among such non-recognizing 
states. This appears clearly from the certificate produced to the 
court in Madzimbamuto v. Lardner-Burke, N.O. and Another, N.O. 
which reads: 
" . . . I, the Right Honourable Arthur Bottomley, 0 .B . E . , M. P. , 
Her Majesty ' s Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, 
hereby certify as follows: 
(a) Southern Rhodesia has since 1923 been and continues to be 
a colony within Her Majesty's dominions and the Government and 
Parliament of the United Kingdom have responsibility for and jurisdiction over it. 
(b) Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom does not 
recognize Southern Rhodesia or Rhodesia as a state either de 
facto or de iure. 
(c) Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom does not 
recognize any persons whomsoever as Ministers of the Government 
of Southern Rhodesia and does not recognize any persons purport-
ing to be such Ministers as constituting a government in 
Southern Rhodesia either de facto or de iure." 21) 
In addition recognition of Rhodesia by the United Kingdom would in 
any event be incompatible with the international law claims made 
by the United Kingdom which are described above. 
Other states too have stated in so many words 
ognize Rhodesian independence. These include 
Canada, 23 ) India ,24 ) Japan~5) Switzerland26 ) 
that they do not rec-
the United States, 22 ) 
and France. 27 ) 
---------------------------Other/ . .. 
21) 1968 (2) SA. 284 (R. , AD.) at 285-2e6 . See too statement that the 
agreement of November 1971 between Mr . Smith and Sir Alec Douglas-
Home was not to imply any change in the attitude of either party 
to the status of Rhodesia . Cape Times, 26th November, 1971; Cmd. 
R.R. 46 - 1971, p. 9. See too certificate submitted to the Court 
in Adams v. Adams, 3 W.L.R . 1970 at 946. 
22) The Times, 12th November, 1965, p. 8 (g); Die Burger, 10th March,197Q, 
The Judicial practice of the United States also supports non-recog-
nition of Rhodesia. See Shyu Jeng Shyong v. Esperdy, 294 F.Supp.355. 
23) The Times. 12th November, 1965, p. 8 (g). 
24) Ibid., p. 8 ( c). 
25) Ibid , p. 8 ( d) . 
26) The Times, 18th December, 1965, p. 5 (d). 
27) 20 UN S ,C.O.R. , 1258th Meeting , p. 3 (1965) . At a later stage 
Belgium, Singapore and Uganda refused to recognize the Republic of 
Rhodesia . s/9853 , Annex II, pp. 4, 46, 53. 
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Other states have declared that they do not recognize the Rhodesian 
Government, the Rhodesian regime or the "Smith regime" . Though on 
the face of it these states specifically only declare their non-
recognition of the Government of Rhodesia, it is submitted, that 
their intention in all the circumstances amounts to non-recognition 
of both State and Government of Rhodesia. The recognition of a new 
28) 
state often takes the form of recognition of government. It is 
thus possible that the form of non-recognition of a new state 
could also take the form of non-recognition of its government. 29 ) 
In this category we find New Zealand, 30 ) Denmark, 31 ) Sweden,32 ) 
Kenya :33 ) Norway, 34 ) Israei ,35) Czechoslovakia36 ) and the Soviet 
Union .37 ) 
Yet other states expressed their attitudes in a different manner 
but in such a way as to amount to an unequivocal statement of non-
recognition . Thus the Malaysian Foreign Office said that Malaya 
remained unalterably opposed to Rhodesia's seizure of independence.38) 
The/ . .. 
-------------------------------
28) Lauterpacht, p. 29 who gives the following instances. The United 
Kingdom and the United States recognized both the state and govern-
ment of Finland in 1919. The French recognition of Poland in 1919 
was similar but the United Kingdom recognition here was in the form 
of "recognition of the government of Poland" . 
29) See P. Kleist, Die Volkerrechtliche Anerkenning Sowletrusslands , 
Konigsberg & Berlin, 1934, p . 19 who maintains that there can be no 
recognition of state without recognition of government. Hence non-
recognition of government means non-recognition of state. This , it 
is submitted, goes too far. The implication of non-recognition of 
statehood can certainly be drawn from non-recognition of government 
but it is not the inevitable consequence of non-recognition of 
government. See discussion infra, pp. 405-4o6. 
30) The Times, 12th November, 1965, p. 8 (c). 
31) Ibid., p . 8 (e). 
32) Ibid. 
33) 
34) 
35) 
36) 
37) 
38) 
Ibid., p. 
Ibid. 
The Times , 
The Times, 
Ibid . 
The Times, 
8 (f). 
13th November, 
16th November, 
12th November , 
1965 , p. 8 ( C). 
1965, p . 7 ( e). 
1965, p. 8 ( C). 
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The Nigerian Federal Minister of State for Foreign Affairs expressed 
shock at U D.I 39) The Soviet Union's Izvestia described U.D.I . as 
a monstrous crime - within two hours: 4o) The Prime Minister of 
Jamaica also expressed shock. 41 ) The President of Pakistan said 
42) 
that Rhodesian action would have no validity whatsoever. The 
Prime Minister of Australia regretted the action. 43 ) Turkey did 
not approve of U D. I .44 ) while Israel later affirmed its opposition 
45) to U.D.I . The West German Government regretted U.D .I. Its 
future course would be determined by its friendly relations with 
Britain , possible United Nations decisions and by Germany's belief 
in the principle of self-determination. 46 ) 
The Portuguese attitude was originally ambivalent. The Foreign 
Minister stated that his government would consider whether or not 
to recognize Rhodesian independence only a~er studying the terms 
of the unilateral declaration. 47 ) Later however Portuguese policy 
crystallized into a definite policy of non-recognition. The Prime 
Minister is reported as saying 
"How could we be the only state to recognize the new Rhodesian 
Republic. Portugal recognizes the legal sovereignty of the 
British Crown." 48) 
Though/ . . . 
--------------------------
39) Ibid . 
40) Ibid. , p. 8 (d). 
41) Ibid., p . 8 (f). 
42) Ibid. 
43) Ibid. 
44) Ibid. Australia later refused to recognize the Proclamation of the 
Rhodesian Republic. s/9853 , Annex II, p.2. 
45) The Times, 16th November, 1965, p.7 (e). 
46) The Times, 12th November, 1965, p .8 (e). West Germany later refused 
to recognize the Republic of Rhodesia. s/9853, Annex II, p. 17. 
47) The Times , 12th November, 1965, p. 8 (d). 
48) Cape Times , 20th April , 1970. 
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Though Botswana only came into existence as an independent state 
after U.D.I., its attitude not to recognize Rhodesia is clear from 
the policy statement issued by its President Sir Seretse Kgama on 
2nd March, 1970 in which he urged inter alia that all states, 
especially those in Southern Africa , should refrain from according 
recognition .49 ) 
We have now seen that no state has expressly recognized Rhodesia 
and that many states have even gone further by expressly declaring 
their non-recognition. It is now necessary to examine whether recog-
nition of Rhodesian independence can be implied from the conduct of 
other states. There are two important principles to bear in mind 
in determining in any case whether recognition can be implied. 
(a) The intentions of the party whose conduct is subject to 
scrutiny is the paramount consideration in all types of implied 
recognition . 50) It is important to bear this principle in 
mind constantly because many rules of thumb have developed 
indicating that recognition can be implied in certain circum-
stances and not in others.5l) These rules of thumb must be 
seen to be subject to the principles under discussion . This 
means that an individual rule of thumb must always give way in 
the face of a contrary intention. B.R. Bot describes this by 
saying that an overriding importance is attached to intention 
__________________________ in/ ... 
49) D~e Burger, 3rd March, 1970. 
50) Starke, p. 147; Lauterpacht, p. 371 says recognition is primarily 
and essentially a matter of intention while A.J.G.M. Sanders, "Die 
Erkenning van State en Regerings" (33) T.H .R-H.R., 1970, p.259 at 
p. 264 describes intention as being "deurslaggewend". 
51) For example the rule that the conclusion of a bilateral treaty 
implies recognition whereas participation in multilateral treaties 
does not as a rule imply recognition. See B.R .Bot, Nonrecognition 
and Treaty Relations, Leiden, 1968, p. 30. We shall shortly see 
many of these rules of thumb where they are relevant in the RhodesiaC-
context. 
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in the matter of recognition.52 ) Lauterpacht says in relation 
to implied recognition , 
"There is , as a rule , no conduct, however conclusive in 
ordinary circumstances, the normal legal consequences 
of which cannot be averted or interpreted by a clear 
manifestation of a contrary intention." 53) 
(b) Recognition wi ll not be lightly implied.54 ) Indeed it has 
been stated that the implication is made solely when the cir-
cumstances unequivocally indicate an intention to establish 
formal relations with a new state or government as the case 
mi ght be . 55) We are only entitled to treat a particular act 
as amounting to recognition when there is no doubt as to the 
intention to recognize. 56 ) It is therefore asserted that an 
act from which recognition is implied should be formal and 
official . 57 ) It is possible however to have intensive and 
even official relations with a state without recognizing it.58 ) 
There are many acts which may safely be performed without any 
implicat i on of recognition being drawn . 59) 
We/ ... 
-------------------------------
52) Note 51) supra . p. 32 . 
53) P. 369 . 
54) Schwarzenberger , Manual , p. 71 . 
55) St arke , p. 147 ; Oppenheim, International Law, 8th Ed., I, pp.146-148 . 
Lauterpacht, pp. 395 , 396 points out that particularly exacting 
evidence of recognit i on is required in the case of states which 
have declared themselves to be pursuing a policy of non-recognition 
and even more so if such states ar e bound by an obligation of non-
recognition. As other states have expressly adopted such a policy 
in relation to Rhodesia and as members of the United Nations have an 
obl igation in this respect under s. Res. 277 (1970) it would requ i re 
very exacting evidence to imply recognition of Rhodesia. 
56) Lauterpacht , p. 370. 
57 ) Chen, p. 218. 
58) Bot , note 51) supra, p. 255. 
59) Examples are : giving relief to victims of disaster; informal calls 
on offi cials ; informal diplomatic approaches; informal communicat-
ions ; conduct of routine mat ters; postal agreements; maintaini ng 
an agency ; protesting because of an outrage and dealing with postal 
orders issued by the unrecognized entity. Whiteman, II, pp. 526, 
529, 531, 532, 567, 577 , 578, 595 ; Lauterpacht , pp . 388, 389, 393, 
For a description of other acts from which recognition is not normally 
implied see Oppenheim, International Law, 8th ed.,I, pp. 146-148. 
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We have now seen the overall principles which govern implied recog-
nition and we must now examine the more important categories of 
conduct of other states towards Rhodesia to see whether recognition 
can be implied from such conduct. Here it is proposed to deal with 
the following species of conduct : (a) maintenance of official 
relations with Rhodesia; (b) conduct of negotiations with Rhodesia ; 
(c) maintenance of trade relations with Rhodesia ; (d) maintenance 
of consular relations with Rhodesia; (e) maintenance of diplomatic 
relations with Rhodesia ; (f) conclusion of bilateral treaties 
with Rhodesia; (g) United Nations action against Rhodesia under 
Chapter VI of the Charter; (h) United Nations action against 
Rhodesia under Chapter VII of the Charter; (i) United Kingdom 
submission of the Rhodesian question to the United Nations. 
(a) Maintenance of official relations with Rhodesia. 
It is possible to have intensive and even official relations 
with an entity without recognizing it. Relations officieuses 
i.e. official but informal relations do not carry the implicat-
ion of recognition .60 ) Though these are usually restricted to 
matters of immediate concern, such as temporary security of 
property or persons, it is not uncommon for important commerc-
ial and even political matters to be dealt with in this 
61) 
informal manner. Informal but official intercourse may be 
maintained through the appointment of agents in the territ-
ory in question.62 ) 
There/ ... 
--------------------------
60 ) Bot, note 51) supra, p. 255 ; Chen, p.136. 
61) Chen, pp. 216-217. 
62) Chen, p . 217; Lauterpacht, p. 388. Thus for instance, the mainten-
ance of a British "link" man in Salisbury for the purpose of keep-
ing contacts between Britain and Rhodesia does not imply recognit-
ion. See Cape Argus, 26th May, 1972. 
There are many other forms of official contact which may be 
maintained without implying recognition. For instance it would 
appear to be South African practice to endorse subpoenas 
issued in Rhodesia for service in South Africa.63) It would 
also appear to be South African practice to surrender criminals 
64) 65) 
to Rhodesia. This does not imply recognition. It is 
common knowledge that South African and Portugal recognize 
passports issued by the Rhodesian government as valid travel 
documents. It is possible to imply recognition from this66 ) 
but it is submitted that such implication is rebutted by the 
cl ear policy statements issued by both South Africa and 
Portugal on the question of recognition of Rhodesia.67 ) It 
is also clear that no implication of recognition should be 
made from visits by officials in the absence of an intention 
________
________
________
__ to/. ... 
63) S. v. Charalambous, 1970 (1) SA. 599 (T). 
64) S. v. Eliasov, 1967 (2) S.A. 423 (T). 
65) Chen, p. 218; Lauterpacht, p. 394. 
66) Chen, p. 218 says that there is in fact a conflict on the question of 
whether or not recognition should be implied from the issue of travel 
visas by unrecognized authorities. A fortiori recognition would be 
implied from the issue of a pP.ssport and its recognition. 
67) Even if the normal rule of thumb would imply recognition in such 
circumstances, this rule would, as pointed out, have to give way 
before the overriding principle that intention is paramount. In 
these cases intentions appear to be clear from the policy state-
ments in question, as to which see supra, p. 341 and infra, pp.367-368. 
It is true that the Advisory Committee of the League of Nations 
Assembly was of the view that non-recognizing governments could 
not regard a document issued by authorities dependent on the 
Manchuko Government as a p~ssport and could not therefore allow 
their consuls to visa such documents. The Committee considered 
that the consuls in question should issue identity documents to 
such persons. Lauterpacht, pp. 396-397 considers this to be an ex-
cessively ingenious precaution which does not take into account the 
situation where there is a proclaimed attitude or obligation of 
non-recognition which would make the implication of recognition 
impossible in any event in such a case. See too note 55) supra, 
and Daniel C. Turack, "Passports issued by some non-state entities" 
(43) B.Y.I.L., 1968-1969,p. 209 at p. 215 who says that though the 
United States does not recognize the Order of Malta it muld accept 
passports issued by the latter as valid travel documents in terms 
of United States m,unicipal law. 
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to recognize.68) Thus no implications should be drawn from 
the fact that the South African Prime Minister, Mr. Vorster, 
has visited Rhodesia69) or that the Rhodesian Prime Minister, 
Mr. Smith, has visited South Africa on several occasions. 70 ) 
If the maintenance of official relations does not normally imply 
recognition, then a fortiori the mere fact that a former offic-
ial happens to be still in a state, will not imply recognition. 
Thus Mr. Thomas Mann, the United States Under Secretary of 
State for Economic Affairs sent a letter to Mr. Henry Hooper, 
"the registered agent for the so-called Rhodesia Information 
Office in Washington", that the United States was not prepared 
to allow him to <i!ontinue to live there "on the basis of a 
purported official capacity". The decision was communicated 
to the President of the United Nations Security Council be-
cause of a protest by the Nigerian representative that 
Mr. Hooper's continued activities in Washington was a breach 
of Security Council resolutions on non-recognition of .Rhodesia . 
Mr. Mann stated that Mr. Hooper had come to the United States 
as a diplomatic agent attached to the British Embassy. Since 
U.D.I. he had ceased to be a member of the Embassy staff. 71 ) 
It is submitted that the Nigerian contention was incorrect 
here. No United States recognition could be implied in the 
circumstances, even if Mr. Hooper continued to live in the 
office and continued to carry out activities there. 72 ) 
________
________
____ (b)/ ... 
68) Whiteman, II, pp. 529, 531. 
69) Die Burger, 29th May, 1970 . 
70) Cape Argus, 11th July, 1970 ; Die Burger, 28th September, 1970; 
Cape Times, 1st March, 1972. 
71) The Times ., 1st March, 1966, p. 11 (b). 
72) As far as the allegation that recognition would be a breach of 
Security Council resolutions (assuming such recognition to exist 
of course), we may here refer to the fact that at the time there 
were no binding Security Council resolutions on this matter. See 
the writer (33) T,H.R-H.t., 1970, p . 152 at pp. 159-163. 
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(b) Conduct of negotiations with Rhodesia. 
At different stages since U.D.I. the United Kingdom has conduct-
ed negotiations with the representatives of the Government of 
Rhodesia. The main examples of these negotiations are the 
"Tiger" and "Fearless" talks and the Smith-Douglas-Home 
negotiations in 1971 destined to be successful initially but 
to be rejected later by the Pearce Commission which found 
them to be unacceptable to the Rhodesian Africans. 73) It is 
a generally established rule of thumb in international law 
that the initiation and conduct of negotiations with an un-
recognized entity does not necessarily imply recognition. 74 ) 
If, of course, an intention to recognize can be implied from 
the cnnduct of negotiations, there may be recognition but other-
wise not and of course it must be borne in mind that recognition 
will not lightly be implied. Obviously there has not been at 
any time an intention on the part of the United Kingdom to 
recognize Rhodesia. In the first place, recognition of 
Rhodesia would be incompatible with the claim to complete 
sovereignty over Rhodesia which the United Kingdom makes. 75) 
-------------------------....;In/ . .. 
73) The records of these negotiations will be found in Cmnd. 3171, 
Cmnd. 3793, Cmnd. 4o65 and Cmrl. R.R. 46- 1971. The report of the 
Pearce Commission is contained in Cmnd. 4964. 
74) Schwarzenberger, Manual, p. 71; Starke, p. 147; Whiteman, I, pp.524 , 
58(), 58.3, 584. Relations and meetings can take place without implic-
ations of recognition. See M. Lachs, "Recognition and Modern Methods 
of International Co-operation" (35) B.Y.I.L.,1959, p. 252 at p.253. 
75) Supra, pp.335-338. The following instances may be noted. When 
Rhodesia proclaimed itself a Republic, the Foreign Secretary of the 
United Kingdom, Mr. Michael Stewart, urged the United States to 
close its Consulate in Salisbury. Die Burger, 6th March, 1970. The 
United States acceded to the request and withdrew its mission. 
Die Burger, 10th March, 1970 . So too when the South African Prime 
Minister, Mr. John Vorster, announced his intention of visiting 
Rhodesia the British Embassy in Pretoria communicated with the 
South African government and expressed concern over the visit to 
British territory without communicating with the London Government. 
Die Burger, 23rd May, 1970. 
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In the second place, the United Kingdom has always specifically 
asserted its non-recognition of Rhodesia. 76 ) 
(c) Maintenance of trade relations. 
Certain nations, principally South Africa and Portugal, allowed 
normal trade relations with Rhodesia to continue after U.D.I. 77 ) 
Indeed South Africa openly admits the maintenance of such 
trade relations with Rhodesia. 78) This continues to be the 
position79) despite the imposition of United Nations mandatory 
economic sanctions against Rhodesia.Bo) The general rule of 
thumb here is that the conduct of business, the sending of trade 
missions and the conclusions of business agreements do not imply 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------recognition/ . .. 
76) See text of the certificate submitted to the court in Madzimbamuto's 
case, note 21) supra. See too statement by the British Foreign 
Secretary that the reason why Britain was prepared to recognize the 
regimes in Czechoslovakia and Communist China but was not prepared 
to recognize Rhodesia was that the former entities were not in re-
bellion against the Crown. Die Burger, 16th May, 1970. See too 
A.J.G. Lang, "Madzimbamuto's and Baron's Case at First Instance" 
(5) Rhodesia L.J., 1965, p. ·65 at pp. 72-73. 
77) The Times, 21st December, 1965, p. 4 (a). The report contains a list 
of the countries who imported more than~ million per annum from 
Rhodesia and points out that with the exceptions of South Africa, 
Portugal, Zambia and Malawi (the latter two being exceptional cases) , 
these countries had banned sugar and tobacco imports and certain 
countries among them had also banned other imports. 
78) The South African Prime Minister Dr. Verwoerd stated on 11th November , 
1965 that South Africa would continue to maintain normal friendly 
relations with Rhodesia. The Cape Times, 12th November, 1965. On 
28th February, 1966 he clarified his policy of maintaining "normal" 
trade relations with Rhodesia. The policy extended beyond trading 
in the usual commodities at the usual levels. In particular before 
the oil embargo only a limited amount of lubricant oils had been 
imported from South Africa. The Times, 2nd March, 1966, p. 11 (b). 
79) See for instance the statement of Dr. Hilgard Muller, the South 
African Minister for Foreign Affairs, on 10th March, 1970 that 
South Africa's relations with Rhodesia would remain unchanged despite 
the decisions of other lands to close their consulates in Salisbury . 
He said: "Ons beleid is nog altyd goed verstaan en gewaardeer deur 
alle betrokkenes". Die Burger, 11th March, 1970 . The South African 
Prime Minister, Mr. Vorster, stated that relations with Rhodesia 
would continue as in the past. Die Burger, 21st May, 1970, 
8o) S . Res. 232 (1966) and S. Res. 253(1968). The legal implications of 
contravention of these are not r elevant to the question under dis-
cussion viz. whether recognition can be implied from trading 
(whether or not i n contravention of United Nations sanctions). 
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81) 
recognition. Thus it would appear as if recognition of 
Rhodesia cannot be implied from the maintenance of normal 
trading relations. Moreover the trade relations comprise 
trading by private individuals and companies from South Africa. 
Such private acts cannot prejudice the attitude of the govern-
ment on the question of recognition. It is for the government 
to recognize. But not even trading by the government itself 
with the Rhodesian government would necessarily imply recognit-
ion.82) The same arguments are applicable mutatis mutandis 
to Portuguese trading with Rhodesia or for that matter to 
the conduct of trade relations between Rhodesia and any other 
states.83) No implication of recognition can be drawn merely 
from the conduct of such trade relations. In any event the 
intentions of South Africa and Portugal not to recognize are 
quite clear84 ) and Rhodesia does not draw any inference of 
recognition from the maintenance of trade relations. 85) 
(d) Maintenance of consular relations. 
Since U.D.I. several states have maintained consular offices 
in Salisbury. 86 ) These countries closed their missions in 
1970 on the Proclamation of the Republic of Rhodesia. 87 ) 
The/ ... 
---------------------------------
81) Chen, p. 218; Bot, note 51) supra, pp. 30, 31, 
82) Chen, p. 218. 
83) Thus the resumption of importation of chrome from Rhodesia into the 
United States does not imply recognition of Rhodesia. See Cape 
Argus, 5th April, 1972. 
84) Supra, p. 341 infra, pp , 367-368. 
85) Mr. Smith, the Rhodesian Prime Minister, stated that the pressure 
being exercised by the British Government was such that several 
countries who had afforded practical recognition and who were contin-
uing to trade with Rhodesia, were not for the present able to give 
de iure recognition. See The Times, 19th February, 1966, p. 7 (a). 
86) For the list of countries which maintained consular missions in 
Salisbury after U.D.I. see supra, p. 164. 
87) For the history and order of such closures see supra, p. 164. 
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The general rule of thumb is that the maintenance of consular 
relations does not imply recognition in the absence of the 
issue of a consular exeguatur~8 ) It is submitted that the 
maintenance of the consular relations in question does not 
imply recognition of Rhodesia for two reasons. 
(i) All the consular missions in question operated under the 
Queen's exeguatur. It was by virtue of British permission 
that such missions were established and maintained in 
Rhodesia. They were not therefore accredited to the 
government of an independent Rhodesia and thus did not 
imply recognition of the latter. The missions in question 
were closed (on the Proclamation of the Rhodesian Republic) 
as a result of British pressure. Thus when the United 
Kingdom pointed out to the United States that its mission 
had been established with the approval of the British 
Government, the United States withdrew the mission.89) 
The Portuguese Consulate, the last mission to close in 
Salisbury, also operated under the Queen's exeguatur. 
When the British Government threatened to withdraw the 
exeguatur, the Portuguese decided to close the Consulate 
rather than clash directly with the United Kingdom on 
___________________
___ __._the)/ ... 
88) Starke, p. 147; Briggs, pp.107, ll6; Whiteman, II, pp. 569-570, 570 -· 
571, 584, 588; Oppenheim, :!international Law, 8th ed. ,I, p ·. J,48; Bot, 
note 51) supra, p.31. But Bot (p.102) criticizes the exception 
which would imply recognition from the issue of a consular exeguatur. 
He says it seems exaggerated to attribute so much significance to an 
act which only permits a foreign official to fulfill non-political 
functions and in addition it is no longer a necessary requirement for 
the full and unhampered exercise of consular functions. Further, it 
is difficult to conceive why the issue of an exeguatur should have 
a greater impact than the visit of a Cabinet Minister of the unrecog-
nized regime, Cf. the discussion supra,pp.345-346 on the respective 
visits of the South African and Rhodesian Prime Ministers to each 
other's countries. For a discussion of the implications of the issue 
of ex~guaturs and the making of requests for same see Lauterpacht,pp . 
383-38·r. 
89) Die Burger, 6th March, 1970; 10th March, 1970, 
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the legal point.90) 
(ii) The consular relations in question were merely the contin-
uance of relations which existed before 1965 and as such 
they do not imply recognition of the new claim of Rhodesia 
to sovereign independence made in U.D.I.9l) 
(e) Maintenance of diplomatic relations. 
South Africa has at all times since U.D.I. maintained a mission 
in Salisbury under the direction of an accredited diplomatic 
representative.92 ) Further the head of this mission is 
accredited to the Foreign Ministry of the Rhodesian Government~) ) 
There is also a Rhodesian mission in South Africa under an 
accredited diplomatic representative.94 ) The general rule of 
thumb in international law is that the maintenance of diplo-
matic relations does imply recognition.95) It is submitted 
that the maintenance of such relations between South Africa 
and Rhodesia does not however imply recognition f or the follow-
ing reasons. 
(i) The missions in question could possibly fall short of 
diplomatic/ ... 
---------------
-------------
90) Cape Times, 20th April, 1970 ; Sunday Times, (Johannesburg), 
26th April, 1970; Die Burger, 27th April, 1970. 
91) Informal intercourse may be maintained through the retention of con-
sular offices of the non-recognizing state in the territory of the 
new entity. Chen, p. 217, 
92) Die Burger, 11th March, 1970; Die Burger, 22nd May, 1970. 
93) Cape Times, 2nd May, 1970. 
94) Palley, p. 725. 
95) Starke, p. 147; Oppenheim, International Lawi 8th ed., I, p . .148. 
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diplomatic relations in the full sense.96) Chen points 
out that the mere fact that an agent is styled 'diplomatic' 
does not affect the question of recognition if the inter-
course remains at an unofficial or informal levei.97) 
(11) The diplomatic relations in question existed before U.D.I. 
When Southern Rhodesia and South Africa were both members 
of the Commonwealth, they exchanged High Commissioners.98) 
When South Africa le~ the Commonwealth an accredited 
diplomatic representative was appointed. 99) The mainten-
ance of such relations at the relevant time could not 
possibly have amounted to recognition of Southern Rhodesia 
as an independent state for the obvious reason that 
Southern Rhodesia did not then claim to be an independent 
state. Since the maintenance of such relations did not 
imply recognitlon in the pre-U.D.I. era, it is submitted 
that the maintenance of the same relations in the post-
U .D.I./ ... 
------------------------------
96) See for instance the British attitude to the missions stated by the 
Foreign Secretary on 4th May, 1970. He stated that it was incorrect 
to regard the contact between South Africa and Rhodesia as diplomatic 
relations and that the South African representative in Rhodesia was 
described in a manner which stressed that he was not really a diplo-
matic representative. Die Burger, 6th May, 1970. On the Rhodesian 
Mission the attitude was that it had no legal status and H.M. rep-
resentatives abroad had been instructed not to have dealings or social 
contacts with it. The Times, 10th December, 1965, p. 18 (d). It i s 
conceded of course that the mere attitude of H.M. Government that 
relations with Rhodesia were "illegal" or "non-existent" does not 
necessarily mean that such relations do not exist as a matter of 
international law. 
97) P. 217. 
98) J.E.S. Fawcett, "Security Council Ref>0lutions o;.1 Rhodesia" (41) 
B.Y.I.L., 1965-1966, p. 103 at p. lo6. 
99) Palley, p. 725 quotes Mr. Bottomley, the Commonwealth Secretary, as 
saying that the appointment of such a representative to South Africa 
was no precedent. It had historical reasons in that Southern 
Rhodesia was represented in South Africa when the latter was a 
member of the Commonwealth. When South Africa le~. Britain felt 
it was unnecessary to make any change in the situation. 
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U.D.I. era does not imply recognition of Rhodesia as an 
independent state. The mere continuance of an existing 
relationship does not imply recognition of a new claim by 
one of the parties.loo) 
(iii)The South African intention in relation to non-recognition 
101) 
of Rhodesian independence is in any event abundantly clear 
so there is simply no room le~ for an implication of 
recognition from the maintenance of such diplomatic 
relations. 102 ) 
Finally it may be mentioned that the Rhodesians maintain a 
mission in Lisbon. This is however, not a diplomatic mission 
and this fact is quite clear from the attempt made in July, 
1965 to appoint a Rhodesian representative having independent 
diplomatic status. The attempt failed, Portugal being un-
willing to go beyond entitling the mission a "Rhodesian 
Mission". 103 ) It is submitted that the mission in question 
amounts merely to the appointment of a Rhodesian agent in 
Lisbon on an informal basis and such an appointment does not 
imply recognition.lo4) 
______
______
______
____ (f)/ ... 
100) Chen, p. 217 says that the retention of the diplomatic officers of 
the non-recognizing state in the territory of the new entity does not 
imply recognition. He would also regard such continuing relations as 
being of an informal nature. 
101) Infra, pp. 367-368. 
102) Sanders, note 50) supra, p. 264. 
103) Fawcett, note 98) supra, p. lo6; Palley, pp.725-726. The latter 
aptly comments that Portugal received the representative but not in 
the capacity claimed. See too statement of Mr. George Thompson that 
the Rhodesian mission in Lisbon had no official status whatsoever 
and that H.M. representatives abroad had been instructed not to have 
dealings or social contacts with it. The Times, 10th December,1965, 
p.18 (d). The United Kingdom attitude however would not prevent the 
mission being a diplomatic one. But the Portuguese attitude, as 
host to the mission, would be decisive. 
lo4) Chen, p. 217. 
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(f) Possible conclusion of bilateral treaties with Rhodesia. 
Prof. C.J R. Dugard drew attention to the fact that South 
African police are present in Rhodesia and that presumably 
their presence arises from a bi-lateral agreement between the 
governments of South Africa and Rhodesia. He then posed the 
question whether recognition of Rhodesia by South Africa could 
be implied from such an agreement.l05) 
Whenever a state concludes an agreement with an unrecognized 
entity there are, it is submitted, four possibilities. 
(i) The state intends to conclude a treaty and to recognize 
the other party fully. Here there will be an intention on 
both sides to create international obligations, so that 
there is a treaty, and in addition there will be a unilater-
al intention to recognize on the part of the "old" state. 
In principle full de iure recognition will normally be 
implied from the conclusion of a bilateral treaty unless 
there appears to be a contrary intention.lo6) The writer 
previously submitted that such recognition could be implied 
at the conclusion of the treaty. 107 ) It could however be 
that such recognition might in some circumstances pre-
cede the conclusion of the treaty, e.g. the offer of 
treaty relations to an unrecognized entity might imply 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-'recognition/ . .. 
105) (&5) S.A.L.J, 1969, p. 112 at pp. 113-114 . 
lo6) Oppenheim, International Law, 8th ed. ! , pp .146-148; Starke, p.147; 
Lachs, note 74) supra, p. 253; Bot, note 51) supra, p. 30. However, 
participation in a multilateral treaty does not normally carry the 
implication of recognition. Ibid. For the possible implications of 
participation in a multilateral treaty with a non-recognized entity 
see Lach.s, note 74) supra, pp. 256-257. See supra, pp. 183-185 . 
107) "Does South Africa Recognize Rhodesian Independence?" (&5) S.A.L.J., 
1969, p. 438. 
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recognition though the treaty itself only comes into 
operation at a later stage when the offer is acceptedlOB) 
and an unratified treaty might also imply recognition.l09) 
The requirement of intention would, as always, be necessary 
in such cases. In all cases where recognition is implied 
from a treaty with an unrecognized entity, the recognition 
afforded is essentially unilateralllO) though it is in-
separably interwoven with a bilateral treaty. Here the 
treaty fulfils a dual function. 111 ) Its two distinct 
roles rest upon two distinct bases - the intention to 
recognize and the intention to create international law 
obligations. 
The above rule of thumb relating to implied recognition from 
the conclusion of a bilateral treaty is subject to the 
general principle requiring an intention to recognize. 
Very often there will be no intention t o recognize in non-
political treaties which are of a temporary or technical 
------------------
------------nature/ ... 
108) s~.ders, note 50) supra, p.264. 
109) Lachs, note 74) supra, p. 253. 
110) On the unilateral nature of recognition see supra, p. 281. 
111) Lauterpacht, pp. 56-57 points out that it is not difficult to regard 
a given treaty as fulfilling two purposes at the same time, viz. 
recording the unilateral act of recognition of the new state which 
thereupon takes part in a contractual relationship and cites as 
examples the 18th century Treaty of Peace between Britain and the 
United States and the 19th century Treaty in terms of which Portugal 
recognized the Brazilian Empire. In all cases recognition is inde-
pendent of the content of the treaty and should the treaty lapse 
recognition would remain. A. Raestad, "La Reconnaissance internat-
ionale des nouveaux etats et des nouveaux gouvernements" (17) 
Revue de Droit International et de Legislation Comparee,1936 p.257 
at pp. 273-274 says that when a mother country concludes a treaty 
giving independence to a colony it fulfils a dual function: 
"Il ya, d'une part, la reconnaissance et d'autre part, le 
reglement plus general auguel la declaration de reconnaissance 
est incorporee Quelle gue soit la forme employee ... la 
reconnaissance se presente, guand au fond comme un acte uni-
lateral." 
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nature such as trade agreements or those for limited 
112) purposes. But even the conclusion of a political 
treaty is not necessarily prejudicial to recognition 
where there is no intention to recognize.113 ) O'Connell 
says: 
"One might even say that agreements could be entered 
into with Eastern Germany without involving recognit-
ion, at least provided they were not intended as a 
general and permanent settlement of the political 
situation taken account of in western non-recognit-
ion policy." 114) 
Lacks points out that in the course of time starting from 
the nineteen twenties an ever-growing number of bilateral 
treaties have been concluded between states which do not 
recognize one another. 115) 
When an agreement is concluded from which it is impossible 
to imply full de iure recognition because the intention 
not to recognize is clear, the agreement in question may 
fall within any one of the three remaining categories. 
Which of these it is will depend on the relevant intentions 
in the case under scrutiny. 
--------------------------------
(ii)/ ... 
112) Bot, note 51) supra, p. 30; Starke, p. 147. 
113) Bot, note 51) supra, p. 30. 
114) I, p. 155. Thus Belgium, the ·United States and the West Berlin City 
Council (supervised by West Germany) all concluded agreements with 
East Germany without implication of recognition of the latter. See 
Bot, note 51) supra, pp. 96-98. 
115) Lachs, note 74) supra, p. 253. An instance is the Exchange of Notes 
between the United States and Albania at Tirana on June 23rd and 
25th, 1922 prior to, and as a condition of United States recognition 
of Albania on July 28th, 1922. See Herbert w. Briggs, "Recognition 
of States: Some Reflections on Doctrine and Practice" (63) A.J .I.L., 
1949, p. 113 at p. 118. Some earlier examples from the 16th and 
17th centuries are cited by Jochen A. Frowein, "Transfer or Recognit-
ion of Sovereignty - Some early Problems in connection with Dependent 
Territories" (65) A.J.I.L., 1971, p. 568 at pp. 568-570. 
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(ii) The state intends to conclude a treaty with the entity 
hitherto unrecognized and in addition to afford a limited 
116) degree of recognition to the latter. Here there will 
be an intention on both sides to create international law 
obligations and so there is a treaty. There will also be 
an intention to recognize for some of the purposes of 
international law but not for all purposes. The obvious 
example would be recognition for the purposes of bearing 
rights and duties under the treaty in question and no 
more.
117) Here to rebut the implication of full de iure 
recognition, which would normally flow from the conclusion 
of such a treaty, the state in qu~stion should clarify 
its intention not to afford full recognition. In practice 
such limited recognition under a bilateral treaty is un-
likely.118) 
(iii)The entities in question may intend to conclude a municipal 
law agreement only. Here there is no intention to create 
internatinnal law obligations. There is a municipal law 
contract but no treaty. Hence there cannot be any implicat-
ion of recognition. 
(iv) The entities in question may not intend to create any 
obligations at all - either in international or in 
-------------
-------------
-'municipal/ ... 
116) On limited recognition see supra, pp.197-201. 
117) Lach;s, note 74) supra, p. 258 says that the conclusion of a treaty 
with an unrecognized entity amounts only to an admission of the 
treaty-making capacity of the other party or recognition for the 
purposes of the treaty. 
118) It is much more likely to occur in the case of multilateral treaties. 
See supra,pp.183-185.The Albanian example in note 115) supra, is 
probably an instance of limited recognition in a bilateral treaty. 
municipal law. Here we merely have a "gentleman's agree-
ment". There is no contract and no treaty. Hence there 
cannot be any implication of recognition here.
119) 
We have now seen the various categories of agreement which may 
exist and it remains to assess the possible bilateral agreement 
with Rhodesia in the light of these categories. 
The overall question which arises is whether the agreement in 
question is a treaty. For if it is not, no recognition (either 
full or limited) can be implied from it. 
The present writer examined this question at some length in a 
120) 
previous paper. The question of course depends primarily 
on the intentions of the parties to the agreement. If they 
intended to create international law relations by means of the 
agreement, it is a treaty and there is recognition.
121 ) The 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ writer/ ... 
119) Inter-departmental agreements for instance are normally not treaties 
and do not bind the state because they are usually concluded by organs 
which are not regarded as being competent to bind the state in inter-
national law. It is only if there is an international practice recog-
nizing an administrative competence to bind the state, that inter-
departmental agreemen"tswill become legally binding. In a restricted 
class of international business including river drainage, canals, 
telegraphs, posts and railways there is a tendency to regard such 
practice as established. See J. MeryYn Jones, "International agree-
ments - other than 'Inter-State Treaties' - Modern Developments" (21) 
B.Y.I.L., 1944, p. 111 at pp. 117, 119. Cf. Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties, 1969, Article 7 (1) (b). 
120) Note 107) supra, pp. 438-443. 
121) Either full or limited. For discussion of the 'intent' requirement 
see ibid., pp.439-440. J.E.S. Fawcett,"The Legal Character of Inter-
national Agreements" (30) B.Y.I.L., 1953, p. 381 at pp.387-390,400 
says that the contractual character of international agreements de-
pends upon the intention of the parties to create legal relations 
between them. There are a number of factors which indicate the 
presence of such intentions. Two of these factors are decisive and 
the remainder, while indicative of such intentions, are not conclusive. 
The decisive factors are: (1) whether the parties have declared, or 
it is deduced from the agreement as a whole, that it is to be govern-
ed by one of the three bodies of law to which the parties are capable 
of referring the agreement (these are international law and the re-
spective municipal law systems of the parties); (ii) whether the 
parties have provided for the settlement of disputes arising from the 
agreement by compulsory judicial process. The inconclusive but 
relevant factors are : 
(i) registration of the agreement under Ar ticle 10~ of th~ Charter 
of the United Nations; 
(ii) the subject matter of an agreement may lead to the inference of 
such an intention, e.g. when the agreement is the constituent 
instrument of an international organisation. 
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writer came to the conclusion on such evidence as was available 
that the parties in concluding this agreement did not intend to 
internationalize their relations.122 ) His principal reasons 
were as follows: 123 ) 
{i) Non-registration of the agreement by South Africa in 
accordance with Article 102 of the Charter of the United 
Nations would indicate that South Africa probably did not 
intend to conclude a treaty with Rhodesia. 124 ) 
{ii) Recognition need not inevitably be implied from the con-
clusion of bilateral agreements. There is nothing to 
prevent even recognized states from concluding 'gentleman' s 
agreements' which are not treaties and from which no rights 
and duties in international law flow. 125) 
{iii)The agreement was concluded in 1967 and yet Rhodesia does 
not claim recognition. In this respect reference was made 
to the declaration against self interest made by the 
Rhodesian Prime Minister on 25th June, 1969.126 ) 
{iv) Reference was made to the clear-cut policy statement made 
by the South African Prime Minister that South Africa was 
------------
------------
---...;not/ ... 
122) The writer, note 107) supra, p.443. 
123) For amplification of these arguments see~., pp. 441-443. 
124) Ibid., p.441. Failure to register a treaty would be a breach of 
obligation under Article 102 of the Charter. R.B.Lillich, "The 
Obligation to Register Treaties and International Agreements with the 
United Nations" (65) A.J.I.L., 1971, p. 771 at p. 772. It would not 
be presumed that South Africa intended to commit a breach of obligat -
ion in view of the presumption in favour of the law-abidingness of 
states. Schwarzenberger, I, p. 647. However the test of registrat -
ion is not conclusive on intention. Fawcett, note 121) supra, p.389 
(who gives the reasons for this at pp. 389-390). 
125) The writer, note 107) supra, p. 443. 
126) Ibid., pp. 441-442. 
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not according recognition to Rhodesia's claim to independ-
ence. This statement amounted to the employment of the 
specific device of reservation of rights and its purpose 
was to refute any suggestion of implied recognition. Taken 
in conjunction with the rule that recognition is not 
lightly to be implied, this statement must be taken to 
mean that South Africa's intention was not to recognize 
Rhodesia. 127 ) 
To the above arguments the following may now be added as 
further evidence that no implied recognition of Rhodesia by 
South Africa has taken place. 
(i) Further declarations against self-interest have been made 
by the Rhodesian Prime Minister. 128) 
(ii) South Africa has since made it quite clear that it does 
not intend to recognize Rhodesia. 129) 
In the light of all that has been said it would appear to be 
quite clear that no recognition of Rhodesia either full or 
limited, can be implied from the conclusion of the aforesaid 
bilateral agreement between that state and South Africa. 
________
________
____ (g)/ ... 
127) I.!21sl,, p. 442. See infra, p. 367. 
128) On 13th April, 1970, Mr. Smith described the achievement of recognit-
ion as one of Rhodesia's important aims and that Rhodesia should 
work in that direction. See Die Burger, 14th April, 1970. In the 
Cape Times, 20th April, 1970, he is reported as saying "Why all this 
fuss about recognition? What is more important is to continue 
winning the economic war. Recognition will come later". 
129) On 3rd March, 1970 the South African Prime Minister, Mr. Vorster, 
confirmed that relations with Rhodesia would be as in the past. 
On 20th May, 1970, the British Foreign Secretary stated that South 
Africa had given the assurance that the impending visit of Mr.Vorster 
to Rhodesia did not indicate a move towards recognition of the 
independence of the territory. See Die Burger, 21st May, 1970; 
23rd May, 1970. 
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fg) United Nations action against Rhodesia under Chapter VI of the 
Charter 
Reference has been made to the resolution of the Security 
Council of the United Nations imposing selective mandatory 
sanctions on Rhodesia in December 1966. 130 ) The resolution was 
said to be taken under Chapter VII of the Charter 131 ) but it 
has been hypothetically argued that if it had been taken under 
Chapter VI of the Charter , viz that dealing with "Pacific 
Settlement of Disputes" it would be tantamount to recognition 
of Rhodesia because you cannot have a non-existe.nt party to a 
132\ dispute ' 
With respect, it is submitted that this contention is not 
correct for the following reasons: 
fi ) It is true that one cannot have a dispute with a non-
existent entity It is also probable that the disputes 
referred to in Chapter VI of the Charter are disputes be-
tween states 133 ) But there is no reason to assume that 
a dispute between a recognized state and an unrecognized 
one cannot be a dispute within the meaning of Chapter VI . 
In this case, as the unrecognized state is not an inter-
national person, the dispute cannot be an international 
law dispute The submission then is that "disputes" with-
in the meaning of Chapter VI are not necessarily confined ·. 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~to/ 
130) S Res 232 (1966) 
131) It undoubtedly was taken under Chapter VII See discussion in John 
Hopkins "International Law - Southern Rhodesia - United Nations -
Security Council", Cambridge Law Journal , 1967 . p . l at p 3 
132) Editorial . r 5) Rhodesia L ,J 1965 p 51 
133) H Kelsen , The Law of the United Nations. London, 1951, p . 388 
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to international law disputes. "Disputes" under Chapter VI would 
of course include all international law disputes between states 
but would be wider in scope than this. This submission receives 
some support from the provision of Article 36(3) of the Charter 
which provides: 
"In making recommendations ... the Security Council should 
als~ take into consideration that legal disputes ... should ... 
be referred ... to the International Court of Justice .... " 
The fact that legal (i.e. international law) disputes are 
singled out for special treatment in this article means it is 
submitted that the Chapter envisages that disputes may be either 
legal or non-legal. 
The net effect of Security Council recommendations in relation to 
a dispute with a non-recognized state would be that the Security 
Council recognizes the state as such in the "acknowledging" sense 
134 ) 
of the term but there would be no implication of legal recognition . 
(ii) There need not even be a dispute (either legal or otherwise) for 
the Security Council to act under Chapter VI. Article 34 provides: 
"The Security Council may investigate ... any situation which 
might lead to international friction or give rise to a 
dispute .... " 
Article 36(1) provides: 
"The Security Council may, at any stage of .•. a situation •.. 
recommend appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment". 
It is clear that a dispute is not necessary. The existence of a 
"situation" enables the Council to aot under Article 36(1 )135) 
Here there could not even be recognition in the "acknowledging'1 
sense and a fortiori no legal recognition of an unrecognized 
state involved in such a 11 situation". 
----------------------------The/ ... 
134) On these two types of recognition see discussion supra, pp. 269-270. 
As we have seen recognition in the "acknowledging" sense has no 
legal implications though it is probably evidence in favour of the 
existence of the objective criteria of statehood in the "acknowledged" 
(but legally unrecognized) entity. 
135) See Kelsen, note 135) supra, pp. 388-389. 
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The conclusion then is that recommendations made by the Security 
Council under Chapter VI of the Charter in relation to Rhodesia 
cannot amount to recognition of the latter.
136 ) 
(h) United Nations action against Rhodesia under Chapter VII of the 
Charter . 
The security Council has instituted mandatory sanctions of 
various kinds aga i nst Rhodesia. 137 ) It has been suggested that 
the imposition of sanctions against an entity amounts to impl ied 
recognition that it is de facto in power. 138) This can at most 
amount to recognition i n the "acknowledging" sense and cannot 
amount to legal recognition (either de iure or de facto). 139) 
(i) Uni ted Kingdom submission of the question to the United Nations 
and invocation of United Nations assistance. 140 ) 
I t has been alleged by Mr. Smith, the Rhodesian Prime Minister, 
that thi s is tantamount t o recognition of Rhodesian independence 
by the United Kingdom. 141 ) It is submitted that this contention 
______
______
______
______
___ is/ ... 
135) See Kelsen, note 133) supra, pp. 388-389. 
136) Even were it to amount to recognition, it is submitted that it would 
only do so in the case of those states which vot ed for it in the 
Security Council. These would of course not exceed fi~een in 
number and might be as few as nine. See Articl es 23, 27 of the 
Charter. 
137) The principal resolutions are S. Res. 221 (1966); 232 (1966) ; 253 
(1968) ; 277 (1970). 
138) H.R.Hahlo , "The Privy Council and the 'Gentle Revolution'" (e6) 
S.A .L.J. , 1969, p. 419 at p. 432, 
139) On the distinction between legal recognition and "acknowledging" 
recognition, de iure recogni tion and de facto recognition (both i n 
fact species of legal recognition) see supra , pp. 269-270, 279-28o. 
See· t oo , f ootnote 134) supra , and i42) infra. 
140) For descriptions of the debate in the British House of Commons whi ch 
preceded such introduct i on and the speech of the Foreign Secretary , 
Mr . Mi chael Stewart when i ntroducing t he matter to the Security 
Council see Chayes, II , pp. 1338-1342. 
141) Rosalyn Higgins , "Internat i onal Law, Rhodesia and the United Nations" 
(23) The World Today, 1967, p . 94 at p. 105. It is interesting to 
note that France seemed to take the same view of the matter at the 
t i me. See speech of the French Delegate to the Security Council at 
20 U.N S C. O,R. , 1258th meeting 3 (1965) . 
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is not correct for the following reasons: 
(i) Article 39 of the Charter provides: 
"The Security Council shall determine the existence 
of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or 
act of aggression and shall make recommendations, 
or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance 
with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore 
international peace and security". 
Articles 41 and 42 describe the various sanctions which 
might be imposed by the Council . 
Higgins points out, and with respect correctly, that 
Article 39 can be invoked in respect of. non-sovereign 
entities. One carmot therefore assume that an entity is a 
sovereign state because sanctions are imposed under 
Article 39. 142 ) 
(ii) Implied recognition does not arise lightly and is essential-
ly a matter of intention. 143) As we have seen the United 
Kingdom intention not to recognize Rhodesian independence 
is, in any event, quite clear. 144 ) 
(iii)There is nothing to prevent a state from bringing one of 
its domestic problems before the United Nations for solut-
ion.145) There is therefore nothing to prevent the 
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
___ United/ ... 
142) Note 141) supra, p. 105. The extensiveness of the operation of 
Article 39 can be better appreciated by saying that it can be 
invoked against any entity including not only states (both sovereign 
and non-sovereign, both recognized and non-recognized) but also 
entities which are not states , e.g. organizations, companies, 
individuals. 
143) Higgins, note 141) supra, p. 105. 
144) Supra, p·. 139. 
145) Higgins, note 141) supra, p. 96 aptly says in relation to Rhodesia ; 
" . .. if the const1.tutional authority wishes to put matters before 
the international community, matters which are otherwise within its 
jurisdiction, nothing prevents it from doing so." 
United Kingdom from requesting United Nations assistance · 
in helping it to quell the rebellion in Rhodesia. Such 
request and assitance does not imply recognition of the 
secessionary entity. 146 ) 
In view of all that we have said, it is now submitted that no other 
state recognizes Rhodesian independence either expressly or impliedly . 
(2) Recognition of the British claim to complete sovereignty over 
Rhodesia . 
As we have seen the British claim is an international law claim to 
exercise complete sovereignty over Rhodesia. It would appear as if 
this claim is recognized by practically every other state. That 
this is so is apparent from the conduct of the overwhelming majority 
of states both within the framework of the United Nations organizat-
ion and outside that organization. 
Various resolutions on Rhodesia have been passed by overwhelming 
majorities in the General Assembly of the United Nations and these 
resolutions constantly refer to the United Kingdom as the "admin-
istering power". 147 ) The conduct of those states which voted for 
------------------------- such/ ... 
146) Though the request for assistance from the United Nations and the 
rendering of such assistance by the latter in the form of sanctions 
do not prejudice the United Kingdom in implying recognition of 
Rhodesia, they do weaken its position in relation to recognition of 
Rhodesia by other states. This matter was previously discussed by 
the writer in "Status of Rhodesia in International Law", Acta Jurid-
ica, 1967, p. 39 at p. 46 and "Rhodesia; a Duty not to Recognize?" 
(33) T .H.R-H.R., 1970, p. 152 at pp . 154-155. The internationaliz-
ation of the situation by the invocation of United Nations aid shows 
an inability to control a domestic issue which other subjects of 
international law might take into consideration in deciding whether 
or not to grant recognition to Rhodesia. The fact that the United 
Kingdom needed the co-operation of other states to help restore its 
rule in Rhodesia would indicate that recognition of the latter would 
not be premature 
147) A. Res. 2024 (XX) : A. Res. _2151 (XXI) ; A.Res. 2383 (XXIII). Further 
S. Res. 216 (1965) and S. Res. 217 (1965) recognize the authority of 
the Government and Parliament of the United Kingdom alone. See 
Fawcett , note 98) supra, p. 114. When occasion demands, the law can 
recognize an abstract title presently divorced from a material display 
of sovereignty. See R. Y. Jenni~ss, The Acquisition of Territory in 
International Law, Manchester, 1903, p. 5. 
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such resolutions is only consistent with a complete refusal to recog-
nize Rhodesia and a complete recognition of the claims of the United 
Kingdom. There is also conduct performed outside the United Nations 
which indicates such an attitude on the part of several states. 
Thus in the case of the United States, Ambassador William B. Buffum 
acknowledged the sovereign authority of the United Kingdom to re-
prieve conderrned prisoners and generally to enter into consultations 
with Rhodesia for a settlement. The acknowledgement was made to the 
Security Council of the United Natians.
148) When Rhodesia became a 
republic, the United States stated that it acknowledged the legal 
sovereignty of Britain and it acceded to a British request to with-
draw its mission in Salisbury. 149) The attitude of the Judiciary in 
Shyu Jeng Shyong v. Esperdy reflects this position too. Judge Ryan 
said: 
" . . . the United States recognizes the United Kingdom as the 
legitimate government for Rhodesia ; that the United States 
consular office in Rhodesia is accredited to the United Kingdom; 
and that the United States recognizes only United Kingdom pass-
ports and visas for travel to Rhodesia." 150) 
The Portuguese Prime Minister is also reported as saying: 
"How could we be the only state to recognize the new Rhodes i an 
Republic. Portugal recognizes the legal sovereignty of the 
British Crown". 151) 
The Zambian President Dr . Kaunda is also reported as saying that 
Zambia is entitled to call on Britain to restore the peace in 
152) 
Rhodesia since Zambia still regarded Rhodesia as a British colony. ' 
____
____
____
____
____
 (3)/ ... 
148) See "Contemporary Practice of the United States" (62) A.J .I.L . , 
1968, p . 754 at pp. 757-758. 
149) Die Burger, 10th March, 1970. 
150) 294. F. Supp. 355 at 356. See (63) A.J.I .L ., 1969, pp. 828-829. 
151) Cape Times, 20th April , 1970. 
152) Die Burger, 24th June , 1970 . 
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(3) Other attitudes to recognition. 
We have just seen how states in general recognize the international 
claims of the United Kingdom to Rhodesia and refuse to recognize 
the Rhodesian claim to independence. We must now examine a few 
exceptional cases, and the first and main attitude which arises for 
discussion is that of South Africa. It is helpful here to examine 
the terms of various policy statements made by members of the South 
African Government on the South African attitude to recognition. 
Immediately a~er the Unilateral Declaration of Independence 
Dr. Verwoerd, then Prime Minister, stated 
"The Republic will continue its policy of non-intervention. 
In accordance w1.th this attitude which it has adopted in 
the course of the dispute both prior to and subsequent to 
Rhodesia · s declaration of independence, it will express no 
views on the arguments put forward by either Britain or 
Rhodesia in this matter. The Republic will however continue 153 ) to maintain the normal friendly relations with both countries. 
On 25th January, 1966, Dr. Verwoerd, reacting to a suggestion by 
the leader of the Opposition, Sir de Villiers Graaff that South 
Africa should recognize Rhodesia de facto, stated that South Africa 
would continue its policy of non-intervention and the maintenance 
of correct relations with both Britain and Rhodesia. 154 ) 
At a meeting at Muizenberg on 3rd March, 1970, the South African 
Prime Minister, Mr. Vorster, confirmed that South African relations 
with Rhodesia would be as in the past. 155) When he announced his 
intention of visiting Rhodesia, the British Embassy in Pretoria 
----------------------------~made/ . . . 
153) Cape Times, 12th November, 1965. 
154) The Times, 26th January, 1966, p. lO(b). 
155) Die Burger, 21st May, 1970. 
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made enquiries and as a result was informed by the Department of 
External Affairs that his visit did not in any way imply recognition 
of Rhodesian independence and that South Africa ' s policy remained 
unchanged. 156 ) When leaving Malawi on 21st May, 1970, Mr. Vorster 
stated at a Press Conference at Chilaka airport that the South 
African Government was not considering recognizing Rhodesia ' s 
independence.157) When the findings of the Pearce Commission were 
published on 23rd May, 1972,
158) Mr . Vorster stated: 
"The Pearce Commission ' s Report does not in any way change 
South Africa ' s relatjons with and attitude towards Rhodesia 
and its Government." 159) 
There is one certain thread which runs through all the above policy 
statements and that is that the South African attitude has remained 
unchanged since U D. I . It is therefore appropriate to take 
Dr. Verwoerd's initial statement of 12th November , 1965 , as repre-
senting South African policy and to ascertain the South African 
attitude to the Rhodesian question from its terms. 
It is submitted with some confidence, that the statement shows it 
was not the South African intention to recognize either British or 
Rhodesian claims in the matter . The conclusion therefore is that 
just as South Africa does not recognize Rhodesian independence so 
too it refuses to recognize British claims to exercise complete 
and exclusive sovereignty over Rhodesia. Another factor which 
supports this conclusion is South Africa's consistent policy of 
voting/ .. . 
---------
---------
---------
--
156) I!1!s!· See too Sanders, Note 50 supra, p. 263. 
157) Ibid. 
158) Cmnd. 4964. 
159) Cape Times, 24th May, 1972. 
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voting against various resolutions on Rhodesia introduced into the 
General Assembly of the United Nations which refer to the United 
Kingdom as the administering power and which emphasise its respon-
.bilit· 160) s· s th f si ies. ince ou Arica does not recognize any of the 
claims made we must now ascertain what its precise attitude is. 
There appears to be two possibilities. 
(a) South Africa does not recognize any international law claims 
to the territory known as Rhodesia. This would appear to be 
an entirely unsatisfactory solution. Such an attitude would 
be unlikely for the following reasons. 
(i) There are competing claims to international law sover-
eignty over the territory. The international law claim 
of the United Kingdom is a very strong one being recog-
nized by practically every other state, while that of 
Rhodesia is weak since Rhodesian independence has not 
been recognized by any state, including South Africa. 
A denial of all recognition in the face of such complete 
claims would therefore appear to be very unlikely. 
(ii) It is desirable that there should be an authority which 
is responsible for each piece of territory in internat-
ional law.161 ) 
(iii)A complete absence of recognition could be tantamount to 
regarding the territory as a res nullius. But there are 
grave difficulties in the way of such a status because 
___________
___________
___ of/ ... 
160) A. Res. 2024 (XX) ; A. Res. 2379 (XXIII); A. Res. 2383 (~II), 
161) Schwarzenberger, Manual, p. 56 says: "What matters to other subjects 
o~ .-international law is the existence of a body politic which can 
be held directly responsible under international law in respect of 
a given territory, whether under a treaty or in tort." 
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of the fact that there are claims to exercise international 
law sovereignty over it.162 ) A total denial of conflict-
ing claims to the territory would only be likely where a 
state with such an attitude asserts a relative title of 
its own or of some third state in opposition to the 
relative titles which it refuses to recognize.
163 ) This 
is certainly not the position relating to Rhodesia. 
South Africa makes no claim to Rhodesia and does not 
purport to recognize the claim of any third state to the 
territory. 
It is therefore unlikely that South Africa denies all recog-
nition in respect of Rhodesia. 
(b) The second possibility is that South Africa continues to rec-
ognize the international law position as it was prior to 
11th November, 1965 i.e. the status quo ante independence. 
In principle it would appear from the above mentioned state-
ments of policy that South Africa is not prepared to recognize 
any claims made on or a~er 11th November, 1965.
164 ) But 
South Africa has not stated that it was withdrawing any recog-
nition previously accorded in respect of Rhodesia. In order 
then to escape from a complete personality vacuum in respect 
of the territory, it is submitted that the only possible 
~-----------------------
------------------------
---·interpretation/ ... 
162) Brownlie , p. 485 says that territory inhabited by peoples not 
organized as a state cannot be regarded as terra nullius. A fortior i 
it is submitted that territory occupied by people organized as a 
state, as in the case of Rhodesia, cannot be regarded as terra 
nullius. Further difficulties would present themselves in relation 
to the question of dereliction of sovereignty and the presumption 
against reversion to the status of a res nullius as to which see 
O'Connell, I, p. 444. 
163) Schwarzenberger, I, p. 294. 
164) Dr. Verwoerd's statement of 12th November, 1965 says that South 
Africa will express no views on the arguments put forward by either 
Britain or Rhodesia. 
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interpretation of the South African attitude is that it con-
tinues to regard the international law position of Rhodesia 
immediately before the Unilateral Declaration of Independence 
as being the presently effective position.165) We previously 
examined the pre-independence international law personality 
of Rhodesia166 ) and we found that a number of factors were 
indicative of a limited international personality conceded 
by the mother-state, the United Kingdom, to Rhodesia, e.g. 
Rhodesia was a member of several international organizations 
and was allowed to conclude treaties with third states. 
Limited personality therefore undoubtedly existed in several 
167) 
respects, with primary personality in the United Kingdom. 
This pre-1965 international law status now becomes very import-
ant if we accept the argument that South Africa still continues 
to recognize the status quo ante independence for it means 
that South Africa still continues to .recognize a limited 
-------------
-------------
-J'ersonality/ ... 
165) This may be deduced from the statement of Dr. Verwoerd in which he 
refers to the maintenance of the South African attitude adopted in 
the course of the dispute both prior to and subsequent to Rhodesia's 
declaration of independence and the continuance of normal friendly 
relations with both Rhodesia and Britain. The practice of main-
taining the same diplomatic and consular relations with Rhodesia 
which existed before U.D.I. and the continued application of pre-
U.D.I. treaties (S. v. Eliasov, 1967 (2) S.A. 423 (T)) support 
this contention as does the attitude of the court in S. v. Charalam-
bous. 1970 (1) S.A. 599 (T). The latter case revolved around 
section 7 (3) of the Foreign Courts Evidence Act, No. Bo of 1962 
which requires a person subpoenaed by a foreign court of a territory 
mentioned in the Second Schedule to the Act to attend such foreign 
court under pain of committing an offence. The court did not con-
sider the point that the Rhodesian subpoena in this case emanated 
from the courts of an unrecognized state. It would appear that~ 
omission the courts (and the authorities) simply treated Rhodesia 
as being the same as the "Southern Rhodesia" mentioned in the 
Second Schedule to the Act, which, at the time of the passing of the 
Act, was professedly a British colony. The implication is that 
there is no change in the South African attitude to Rhcrl.esia. 
166) Supra, pp.89-90. 
167) That personality can be so divided - a division by function - is 
apparent from our discussion ibid. See too Le Normand, pp.71-72, 74. 
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personality in Rhodesia as a dependency and that personality 
would be co-extensive with the pre-1965 personality of Rhodesia. 
South Africa therefore recognizes the claims of both Rhodesia 
and Britain but only as they were prior to 11th November,1965. 
It refuses to pass Judgement or to give validity to, claims 
made by either entity after that date. This is in fact the 
way in which South Africa endeavours to maintain what it calls 
an attitude of neutrality in the dispute between Rhodesia and 
the United Kingdom. 
It may now be asked whether the South Africen exercise of 
recognition is here a proper one. On the one hand the United 
Kingdom claims full sovereignty, on the other hand, Rhodesia 
claims full independence. The question which arises is 
whether South Africa has the option of recognizing something 
else - a midway course between the two claims - a continued 
recognition of the status quo as it was before the conflicting 
claims were made - a policy of recognition which is incompatible 
with both of the claims. It is submitted that South Africa 
can pursue such a via media in relation to recognition. The 
granting of recognition is a completely discretionary matter. 
There is therefore no duty to recognize any claim made. 168) 
As a matter of policy therefore South Africa is entitled to 
refuse to recognize Rhodesian and British claims. If South 
Africa is entitled to refuse all recognition then surely it 
is entitled to stop short of this and to grant a partial 
recognition to each claimant. And what better way of according 
----------------------------·such/ ... 
168) See supra, pp. 285-295 where the "duty to recognize" is discussed 
and rejected'. 
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such partial recognition than by recognizing the status quo 
before the dispute arose? A continuing recognition of the 
status quo is the most practical way to avoid a legal vacuum 
while at the same time refusing to pass Judgment on the merits 
of the British-Rhodesian dispute. Support for the view that 
a state may continue to recognize the status quo ante despite 
the fact that the parties involved no long~r make claims con-
sistent with that position can even be found in recent British 
practice itself. In Carl-Zeisstiftung v. Rayner & Keeler Lta~9) 
The Foreign Secretary presented a certificate to the court 
which certified inter alia: 
"From the zone allocated to the u.s.s.R., Allied Forces 
... withdrew at or about the end of June, 1945. Since 
that time and up to the present date Her Majesty's Govern-
ment have recognized the State and government of the 
U.S.S.R. as de iure entitled to exercise governing author-
ity in respect of that zone ... and ... have not recognized 
either de iure or de facto any other authority purporting 
to exercise governing authority in or in respect of th,., 
zone." 
And yet as Harman, L.J. pointed out in the Cou. t of Appeal: 
"It is, in fact, notorious, that the U.S.S.R. has re"og-
nized the German Democratic Republic as a sovereign 
state and treats its law-making capacity accordingly." 170) 
The position therefore is that the United Kingdom continues to 
recognize the status quo ante Soviet recognition of East 
Germany despite the fact that the status guo ante is at variance 
with the international law claims of the entities involved, 
the Soviet Union and East Germany, The Soviet Union no longer 
claims de iure sovereignty over FBst Germany and the latter 
claims to be an independent state. It is submitted 
------------------------- that / ... 
169) [1965] Ch. 565: [1965]Ch. 576: [1966] 3 W.L.R. 125, 
1 70.) [1965] Ch. at 651. 
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that this is strong authority for the proposition that continued 
recognition of a status quo ante is lawful and it is especially 
so in a relationship which involves the United Kingdom itself 
since this appears to be United Kingdom practice.171 ) In fact 
this precedent from United Kingdom practice goes even further 
than the South African practice relating to Rhodesia for in 
the case of East Germany there is no conflict between the 
claims of East Germany and those of the Soviet Union. The 
United Kingdom therefore does not have to contend with disputed 
claims and yet it recognizes the status quo ante Soviet recog-
nition of East Germany. 172 ) 
The overall submission is that South Africa recognizes the 
international status quo ante U.D.I., that such recognition 
is not improper and is not affected by the Security Council 
Resolution of 18th March, 1970,l73) imposing a duty not to 
recognize Rhodesia on member states of the United Nations 
because, as we have argued, this resolution is not retrospective 
in effect .174 ) 
One further question arises in relation to the South African 
attitude and that is whether South Africa recognizes Rhodesia 
in the acknowledging sense. We have seen before that Kelsen 
------------
------------
----drew/ ... 
171) Akehurst, p. 47 says that a state will be estopped from denying the 
existence of a "rule" if it has acted as if that "rule" were already 
law. Schwarzenberger, Manual, pp. 300-301 says that when a state 
relies upon a practice it weakens its position in relation to the 
practice in t hat it will not be able to assert the illegality of 
the practice when resorted to by other states. See further the 
discussion on estoppel in the context of Southern Rhodesia being 
a self-governing territory between 1946 and 1965. Supra , pp. 102-
103. 
172) East Germany claims to be a party to several conventions but the 
United Kingdom refuses to recognize this. For a list of the relevant 
conventions see O'Connell, I, p. 287. 
173) S. Res. 277 (1970 ). 
174) Supra, pp. 315-317. 
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drew a distinction between recognition in the political 
sense and recognition in the legal. sense of the word .
1 75) 
A.J.G.M. Sanders has examined this question in relation to 
Rhodesia and has concluded, and with respect correctly, that 
South Africa recognizes Rhodesia in the acknowledging sense 
176) 
but not in the declaratory sense. He says: 
"Die Suid-Afriltacµise stellingname dat dit Rhodesie se 
onafhanklikheid nie erken nie, ls 'n aanduid:1.ng dat 
dit nie sy bedoeling is om deur die uitruil van diplomat-
ieke verteenwoordigers Rhodesie gok inderdaad as 'n 
volkeregtelike · subJek te behandel nie. · nat,Syid-Afrika 
deur die aangaan van die genoemde ooreenkomf en oie 
uitruil van diplomatieke verteenwoordigersn feite 
Rho,desie se onafhanklikheid en ook die effektiwiteit 
van die Rhodesiese staat en regering wel erken (be~estig-
ende erkenning), kan beswaarlik ontken word; •.. Om QP 
te som: Suid Afrika erken Rhodesie in die bevestigende 
sin, egter nie in die verklarende sin nie." 177) 
The fact however that South Africa recognizes Rhodesia in the 
acknowledging sense has no legal consequences for as we have 
seen this is not recognition in the legal sense.
178) 
There are two other hypothetical points which concern Zambia 
and New Zealand respectively in relation to recognition of 
Rhodesia. 
President Kaunda/ ... 
----------------
---------
175) 
176) 
177) 
178) 
Supra, pp.269-270. See too Lauterpacht, p. 23 who says that there 
is a distinction between the acknowledgment of independence and 
recognition and that this is especially reflected in United States 
practice. 
Note 50 supra, pp. 264, 267. 
Ibid., p. 264. Sanders says here too that" ... Suid Afrika se 
standpunt dat hy nie Rhodesie se onafhanklikheid en effektiwiteit 
as 'n staat erken nie, moet dan ook met 'n korrelt,jie politieke 
sout geneem word." The writer is in agreement that indeed South 
Africa recognizes Rhodesia in the acknowledging sense but his 
interpretation of the policy statement in question, in so far as 
it relates to recognition (in the legal sense), is different from 
that of Sanders who interprets the policy statement that South 
Africa does not recognize Rhodesia's independence to mean that the 
South African Government does not consider Rhodesia to have one of 
the characteristics of statehood, viz. independent government 
(p. 263). The writer, with respect, interprets the policy statement 
in question to mean that South Africa is not prepared to accord the 
legal status of independence (i.e. full international personality) 
to the State of Rhodesia . He does not interpret it as a denial of 
the fact of the existence of independent statehood in Rhodesia. 
Supra, p·. 270 • 
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President Kaunda of Zambia when announcing the rapid expansion 
of Zambia's army and air force on 9th December, 1965 is reported 
to have informed the National Assembly that any Rhodesian 
interference with the Common Services "will be a declaration 
of war on Zambia and I shall not hesitate to order my country 
into action11 • 179) In the event of a state of war occurring 
between Rhodesia and Zambia as a result of such interference, 
there would probably be a limited recognition of Rhodesia by 
Zambia under which the former would enjoy the rights, and be 
subject to the duties, of a belligerent power in time of war. 
It is submitted however that President Kaunda's statement 
could not, in itself, amount to recognition. Any recognition 
flowing from it would be conditional on the outbreak of 
hostilities amounting to war and would probably also be 
limited to the creation of a belligerent capacity in Rhodesia 
in respect of the hostilities in question. 
In January, 1972 a former Southern Rhodesian Prime Minister, 
New Zealand-born Mr. Garfield Todd and his daughter Judith 
were detained in Rhodesia. They were later released but 
18o) 
restricted to their farm. On 10th February, 1972 New 
Zealand's most powerful Journalists organization at Auckland 
demanded that the New Zealand Government should investigate 
what it described as the illegal imprisonment of Mr. Todd 
181) 
and his daughter. If the New Zealand Government were to 
-------
-------
-------
-------
act/ ... 
179) The Times, 10th December, 1965, p. 10 (a). 
18o) Cape Times, 3rd March, 1972. 
181) Cape Times, 11th February, 1972. 
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act on this suggestion and were to call on the Rhodesian 
Government to observe the minimum standard of treatment for 
182) 
aliens prescribed by international law and release the Todds, 
this would be tantamount to a limited recognition of Rhodesia 
for the purpose of the reciprocal observance of the rules 
in question. 183) However, an attempt to exercise protection 
in respect of the Todds could possibly meet with the answer 
that protection would be incompetent on the ground that they 
were also Rhodesian nationals - if that indeed is the case!l
84 ) 
SECTION VII 
CONCLUSIONS ON RHODESIAN INTERNATIONAL PERSONALITY. 
In Section III of this chapter it was submitted that the Constitutive 
theory was the preferable theory relating to recognition. In the last 
section it was submitted that no state recognizes Rhodesian independence. 
The writer's conclusion from these two propositions is that Rhodesia is 
not a full international person in its relationship with any other subject 
of international law. 1 ) 
-------
-------
-------
-------
E_ven/ ... 
182) On the minimum standard see Sorensen, pp. 483-48c). Akehurst, 
PP. 111-123, 
183) See discussion supra, pp.19:;-201 on the phenomenon of limited 
recognition by calling upon an entity to observe some specific rule 
or rules of international law. 
184) On the exclusion of protection where the individual claimant enjoys 
the nationality of the defendant state see R.Y. Jennings, "The 
Commonwealth and International Law" (30) B.Y.I.L., 1953, p.320 at 
p. 347, 
1) If the Declaratory theory is correct, the inevitable conclusion is 
of course that Rhodesia is a full subject of international law 
since, as we submitted in section II of this chapter, Rhodesia is 
an independent state. This viewpoint has in fact been expressed 
by C. A. Crause, 11 .Enkle Opmerkings oor Besluite van die Veiligheids-
raad ten opsigte van RhodesiM (29) T.H.R -H.R., 1966, p. 320 at 
pp. 330-332; J.A.Coetzee, The Sovereignty of Rhodesia and the Law 
of Nations, Pretoria, 1970; A.J.G.M. Sanders, "Die Erkenning van 
State en Regerings" (33) T,H.R -H.R., 1970, p. 259 at p. 263. 
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Even though Rhodesia does not have full personality it does enjoy limited 
international personality in the following respects. 
(1) Rhodesia has a limited international personality in relation to 
the member states of the Organization of American States. Here by 
virtue of Articles 6 and 9 of the Charter of the Organization, 
which in this respect may be regarded as a stipulation pour autrui, 
it enjoys certain basic rights against the members. 2 ) This person-
ality exists independently of the fact that none of the member 
states in question recognize Rhodesia because Article 9 specific-
ally so provides and creates an exception to the general constit-
utive role of recognition . Alternatively Articles 6 and 9 can be 
construed as a form of limited recognition subject to a suspensive 
condition in favour of such entities as shall in the future fulfil 
the requirements of statehood. On this construction the provisions 
of the Articles in question would harmonize with constitutive 
3) 
doctrine, basic rights flowing from the limited recognition accorded . 
The personality enjoyed against member states of the O.A.S. cannot 
however be a full international personality because Article 10 of 
the Charter would appear to require full recognition for the enjoy-
ment of full rights in international law by a state.4) The limited 
international personality which exists here however is important 
when one considers that it exists against the United States of 
America which is a member state of the O.A.S. 
----------
----------
----T. he/ ... 
2) 
3) 
4) 
Supra, pp. 261-262. 
Supra, pp. 262-265, 
Supra, pp. 260, 261 . 
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The content of the personality consists of the rights which 
Rhodesia enjoys in accordanc~ with Article 9. These are 
"the right to defend its integrity and independence, to 
provide for its preservation and prosperity, and consequently 
to organize itself as it sees fit, to legislate concerning 
its interests, to administer its services, and to determine 
the jurisdiction and competence of its courts. The exercise 
of these rights is limited only by the exercise of the rights 
of other states in accordance with international law." 
In my view the limitation on the states' rights in the last 
sentence mentioned assumes important proportions in the case of 
Rhodesia. For it would enable member states of the O.A.S. to take 
lawful action against Rhodesia in accordance with valid United 
Nations Resolutions. Without such a limitation it could conceivably 
be argued that member states of the O.A.S. could not rely upon the 
authorization of the United Nations by way of justification for 
infringing these basic rights of Rhodesia because Rhodesia is not 
a member of the United Nations. But it is clear that in terms of 
Article 9, the enjoyment of the basic rights in question is subject 
to the exercise of international law rights by other states. 
(2) Rhodesia also has a limited international personality in its 
relationship with South Africa. This follows from the earlier 
submission that South Africa continues to recognize Rhodesia as it 
was prior to the 11th November, 1965. 5 ) The content of this per-
sonality has already been described6 ) and it need not be repeated 
here. This personality does not exist against any other state 
because other states, as pointed out, recognize the complete 
sovereignty of the United Kingdom over Rhodesia, 7) a recognition 
which South Africa alone refuses to accord. 8) 
------------------------
-----
5) 
6) 
7) 
8) 
SuEra, 
SuEra, 
Su12ra, 
SuEra, 
p. 374. 
pp. l.05-119. 
pp. 365-366. 
pp. 368-369. 
(3)/ ... 
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(3) Rhodesia still possesses a lirni ted international personal! ty as a 
member state of various international organizations.9) Personal-
ity is here relative in that it only exists against other member 
states of the organization in question . Personality is further 
limited in content in that it only embraces the rights and duties 
incidental to membership of the organization. As we previously 
pointed out there is here an implied but limited recognition for 
the purposes of the organizationlO) and this recognition gives 
rise to the limited rights in question. 
On the 18th March, 1970 the Security Council of the United 
Nations passed a resolution11 ) in paragraph 12 of which it 
"Calls Upon Member States to take appropriate action to sus-
pend any membership or associate membership that the illegal 
regime of Southern Rhodesia has in the specialized agencies 
of the United Nations." 
In paragraph 13 the Security Council 
"Urges Member States of any international or regional organis-
ation to suspend the membership of the illegal regime from 
their respective organizations and to refuse any request for 
membership from that regime . " 
If Rhodesia were to be expelled from any organization, naturally 
i~ would cease to have the rights and duties incidental to such 
membership. If it were merely suspended its rights and obligations 
might be in abeyance during the currency of such suspension. W·;th 
one/ • • • 
9) Supra, pp. 105-lo6. 
10) Supra., pp. 185-188 . Naturally there cannot be any question of such 
membership implying full recognition of Rhodesia as an independent 
state because at the time Southern Rhodesia first attained such 
memberships it was not, nor did it claim to be, an independent 
state . Strictly speaking therefore., the memberships in question 
are possessed by "Southern Rhodesia" and not by "Rhodesia". 
11) S. Res. 277 (1970). 
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one doubtful exception, it would appear that Rhodesian membership 
of international organizations has been neither terminated nor 
suspended. 12 ) The possible exception is W.H.O. in which Rhodesia's 
associate membership may be suspended. After 1966 no budgetary . 
contributions were received in respect of Rhodesian membership. In 
response to a letter of 19th March, 1969 referring to Southern 
Rhodesian's arrears of contributions, the United Kingdom Ministry 
of Health, in a letter dated the 22nd May, 1969 stated that while 
Southern Rhodesia remained an associate Member of W.H.O., the 
Declaration of Independence in 1965 had the consequence that the 
associate membership was in suspense so far as Southern Rhodesia's 
enjoyment of it was concerned. Financial transactions between the 
Organization and the regime (including the payment of contributions) 
had been suspended until the return of legality in Southern Rhodesil~ -
The United Kingdom delegate to the Committee on Administration, 
Finance and Legal Matters of the Organization made a statement con-
firming the view that Southern Rhodesian membership was in suspense. 
-----------
-----------
-------There/ ... 
12) For action taken by I.T.U., of which Rhodesia was a member, see 
s/9853, Annex III, pp. 7-9; for W.M.O., of which it was also a 
member, see 1bid., p. 19; for G.A.T.T., of which it was also a 
full member, see ibid., p. 3; for F.A.O., of which it was an assoc-
iate member, see ibid., p. 2; for I.B.R.D., in which it formed part 
of United Kingdom membership, see.!!?.!.£., p. 4; for U.P.U., in 
which it formed part of the British overseas group, see.!!?.!.£,, 
pp. 12-13, The acceptance of the credentials of the Rhodesian Govern-
ment in organizations of which Rhodesia still is a member is of 
course a different question, which will later be discussed. See 
infra, pp.427-429,In addition we might mention that several inter-
national organizations and agencies of the United Nations, in whose 
membership Rhodesia did not participate, took action in the Rhodesian 
situation but these actions are naturally irrelevant to the question 
of the existence of Rhodesian personality. These include I,C,A.O., 
U.N.C.T.A.D., U.N.E.s.c.o., U.N.I.D.O., see s/9853, Annex III, 
pp. 5, 6, 10, 11; Economic Commission for Latin America, Internat-
ional Committee of the Red Cross, S/9853, Annex IV, pp. 2,3; United 
Nations' High Commissioner for Refugees, s/9853, Add. 1, Annex III ., 
pp. 2-3. 
13) s/9853, Annex III, p. 14. 
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There was no comment on this statement, 14 ) but on 26th May, 1970, 
the Executive Board of the Organization adopted a resolution in 
which it decided to recommend to the Health Assembly that in 1972 
and future years the contribution of Southern Rhodesia to the 
Organization should be placed in the Appropriate Section for Undis-
tributed Reserve of the annual appropriation resolution. 15) 
From the above it would appear that Southern Rhodesian associate 
membership of W.H.O. is in suspense but this probably means that 
only its rights are in abeyance while its obligations continue, e.g. 
the obligation to contribute. The United Kingdom attitude however, 
is that both rights and obligations are in abeyance. · 
We may now conclude that Rhodesia has personality, and thus rights 
and duties, incidental to its membership of certain international 
organizations but that in the case of W.H.Q. its rights as an 
associate member are, in all probability, in suspense. 
SECTION VIII 
IMPLICATIONS OF LIMITED RHODESIAN PERSONALITY. 
Rhodesia has international law rights and duties only in the spheres in 
which its limited international personality is operative.1 ) Beyond these 
spheres it has no personality and hence no rights and duties in internat-
ional law. The implicationsof this will now be examined in relation to 
two types of conduct of Rhodesia and the conduct of other entities against 
Rhodesia. The basic inquiry in each case is into the lawfulness or other-
wise of the conduct in question, and the degree of Rhodesian personality 
plays a substantial role in such determinations. 
_________
_________
____ (1)/ ... 
14) Ibid., p. 15, 
15) Resolutions EB46. R20. For text see s/9853, Annex III, p. 16. 
1) Supra, pp, 378-382. 
-38.3-
(1) Rhodesian conduct. 
Rhodesia's conduct will only be an international tort or a breach 
of duty to other subjects of international law, if it has two 
characteristics. 
(a) It must be an infringement of an obJective norm or rule of 
international law. 
It goes without saying that if the conduct in question does 
not infringe international law rules, it cannot be a tort in 
any case.2 ) Thus, none of the following acts on the part of 
Rhodesia can amount to an internati.onal tort or breach of 
obligation to the power against which the conduct is directed: 
refusing to allow British aircra~ to refuel at Salisbury;
3 ) 
curbing of payments for gi~s and maintenance to residents 
of Britain; 4 ) the severance of the connection between the 
Rhodesian currency and sterling;5) the prohibition of the 
transfer of funds from Rhodesia to United Kingdom insurance 
companies;6 ) the stoppage of coal supplies to Zambia (which 
did not in fact materialize though threatened) and the rais-
ing of the price of coal (in the form of the imposition of a 
Royalty) to Zambia (which did materialize but which the 
~--------------------------
----------------------------
----------------------------
-Rhodesian/ ... 
2) This requirement will always be present regardless of the identity 
of the potential tortfeasor. For the elements of an international 
tort see Schwarzenberger, I, pp. 571-576. 
3) The Times, 24th December, 1965, p. 6 (f). 
4) The Times, 4th December, 1965, p. 8 (b). 
5) The Times, 29th January, 1966, p. 7 (f). 
6) The Times, 17th December, 1965, p. 10 (e). This was done in retali-
ation for the British prohibition on the transfer of funds by 
British Insurance Companies to meet claims in Rhodesia inter alia. 
The Times, 17th December, 1965, p. 16 (c). This led to cancellat-
ion of Lloyd's registration and in fact favoured Rhodesia's balance 
of payments because in the past Rhodesian insurance had resulted 
in a net inflow of funds to Britain. Premiums were now retained in 
Rhodesia against claims. The Times, 30th December, 1965, p. 12(c) (d ). 
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Rhodesian government was later willing to forego; 7 ) the 
insistence on payments by Zambia in currencies other than 
sterling;S) the banning of Zambian currency;g) the suspension 
of oil supplies to Zambia;lO) the threat to repatriate aliens 
to Zambia and Malawi if their Jobs were required by redundant 
Rhodesians;ll) dismissal of non-Rhodesians only from R.r.s.c.o. 
as a result of diminished manpower needs be cruse of the closure 
of furnaces on losses of steel sales;
12 ) the declaration of the 
Rov. Donald Abbott and his wife, both Americans, as prohibited 
immigrants followed by an order to leave; the refusal to allow 
the Rt. Rev. Games Pike, Episcopalian Bishop of California 
entry as a prohibited irnliligrant.13 ) None of the above acts 
on the part of the Rhodesian authorities are illegal in inter-
national law because, in the absence of a treaty, there is 
no obligation on a state not to do these acts. They are un-
friendly but quite legal acts. 14 ) 
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
_ (b)/ ... 
7) 
8) 
9) 
10) 
11) 
12) 
13) 
14) 
The Times, 26th November , 1965, p. 13 (b); 30th December, 1965, 
p. 6 (a); 3rd January, 1966, p. 8 (f ). 
The Times, 30th December, 1965, p. 8 (d). 
The Times, 22nd November, 1965, p. 8 (f). 
This action was stated to be taken because of the diversion by 
Britain of a Norwegian tanker carrying oil for both Rhodesia and 
Zambia. The Times, 21st December, 1965, p. 8 (a). 
The Times, 9th December, 1965, p. 10 (b)(c). See t oo J.E.S.Fawcett , 
"Security Council Resolutions on Rhodesia" (41) B. Y .I.L,, 1965-1966 , 
p. 103 at p. 117. 
The Times, 3rd February, 1966, p. 12 (g). 
The Times, 30th December, 1965, p. 8 (d)(e). 
Obviously the possible number of such acts is infinite. The 
instances listed serve merely as examples, many of which, on analysis 
may amount to the employment of the device of Retortion,as to which 
see Sorensen, p. 753. Retortion is in essence an extra-legal con-
cept employed to denote unfriendly acts which keep within the bounds 
of the law. In the absence of a treaty obligation to the contrary, 
Rhodesia's action in closing the border with Zambia is quite legal 
though it is, of course, an unfriendly act. Cape Times, 10th 
January, 1973. 
(b) The conduct in question must be committed in a sphere in which 
Rhodesia enJoys international personality. 
Naturally where Rhodesian personality is relative the conduct 
must be in relation to a state against whom Rhodesian personal-
ity exists.15) 
Thus, for example, Rhodesia is included in the membership of 
the British Overseas Territories in U.P.U !6 ) and as such has 
the rights and obligations stipulated in the Universal Postal 
Convention, 1964. As such it has an obligation to forward 
mail originating in other member countries. 17 ) Thus the 
suspension of all mail services from Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania 
18) 
on 6th February, 1966 was prima facie a breach of the convent -
ion unless it could be justified as a reprisall9) for similar 
action later by the East African countries on 15th December, 
1965.20 > 
So too Rhodesia was comprised in United Kingdom membership of 
I .B.R.D .21 ) The World Bank loaned money for the construction 
22 ) 
of Kariba. Rhodesia and Zambia had obligations to pay for this 
and Britain was guarantor of the Kariba "mortgage 11 •
23 ) In 
December/ .•. 
-------------
-------------
15) Half-sovereign states can commit international delinquencies in so 
far as they have an international status and corresponding internat-
ional duties of their own. See Oppenheim, International Law, 8th ed., 
London, 1955, p. 339. 
16) G.A.Codding, The Universal Postal Union, Coordinator of the Internat-
ional Mails, New York, 1964, pp. So-85; p. 265; Supra, p. 105 . 
17) Sorensen, p. 639. 
18) The Times, 7th February, 1966, p. 8 (f). 
19) On reprisals see Sorensen, pp. 753-755, 
20) The Times, 16th Deoember, 1965, p. 8 (g). The legality or otherwise 
of the refusal to handle Rhodesian mail by certain other members of 
U.P.U. will be discussed infra, pp. 398, 427-428. 
21) Supra, p. 105. 
22) The Times, 14th December, 1965, p. 8 (g). 
23) The Times, 6th December, 1965, p. 10 (f)(g). 
December, 1965 Rhodesia refused to meet its obligations to the 
24) 
World Bank, then totalling one hundred and eight million pounds. 
This would be a prima facie breech of Rhodesia's obligations in 
a sphere where it possessed international personality unless it 
could justify its action on some other ground such as necessity 
or impossibility.25) The World Bank attitude was that if 
Rhodesia did not meet her obligations, the United Kingdom 
26) 
would be held responsible as guarantor. In the same way as 
refusal to meet commitments due in respect of Kariba to the 
World Bank was a prima facie breach of international law by 
Rhodesia, so too, it is submitted that interruption of power 
facilities to Zambia from Kariba would involve a breach of 
obligations, 27 ) unless again this could be justified on some 
other basis such as reprisal. In relation to Kariba, Rhodesia 
has treaty obligations and thus this is a sphere in which its 
personality is operative. 
On. the other hand unless Rhodesian conduct can be brought with-
in the narrow confines of the spheres in which its personality 
exists, it cannot be categorized as unlawful and as such 
Rhodesia/ ... 
---------------------
------
24) Ibid.; The Times, 9th December, 1965, p. 10 (b)(c) 
25) See Schwarzenberger, I, pp. 538-543. These doctrines are discussed 
infra, pp. 714et seqq. in relation to United Kingdom Jbligations 
relating to Rhodesia. It may possibly be inferred that Rhodesia is 
relying on these doctrines to escape its commitments to the World 
Bank. See Statement of Mr. Ian Smith on 4th December, 1965 that 
"as Britain has now seized Rhodesia's London reserves and imposed 
trade and financial sanctions of the greatest severity upon Rhodesia, 
I must make it clear to the people of Britain and to the World at 
large that it is quite obviously impossible for Rhodesia, much as she 
desires, to meet her debt obligations ..• to the World Bank .... " 
The Times, 6th December, 1965 p. 10 (f)(g). 
26) The Times, 10th December, 1965, p. 19 (b). 
27) The Times, 26th November, 1965, p. 13 (b); Fawcett, note 11 supra, 
p. 117. 
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Rhodesia incurrs no international responsibility for it - even 
if it is objectively an infringement of international law. We 
might say that Rhodesia has no imputability or toerekenings-
vatbaarheid for such conduct. Thus, for instance, Rhodesia 
would bear no responsibility for the arrest of Ramotse and 
others carried out in Botswana by the Rhodesian police.28 ) 
So too Rhodesia need not accord sovereign immunity to non-
recognizing states before its courts; it would not be respon-
sible for refusing to pay interest, rents, profits and dividends 
to persons and firms resident in Britain;for placing such sums 
in blocked accounts29 ) and for failing to meet its obligations 
to pay interest on Rhodesian loan funds. 30 ) If Rhodesia were 
a fully recognized state, failure to meet such obligations 
to non-Rhodesians would in all probability be a breach of the 
minimum standard of treatment owing to aliens and as such a 
breach of international law.3l) 
Finally, to take an extreme example, a non-recognizing state 
could not complain of a breach of international law even if 
it were the victim of Rhodesian aggression. All such relations 
are extra-legal and will remain so as long as recognition is 
withheld from Rhodesia. Non-recognizing states cannot be 
heard to complain of hardship in these cases for the remedy 
lies in their own hands. If they wish Rhodesia to have full 
international/ ... 
------~-------------------28) S. v. Ramotse (unreported Judgment of the T.P.D. of 14th September, 
1970 - discussed in (83) S.A.L.J., 1971, pp. 13-14.) 
29) Th~ Times, 4th December, 1965, p. 8 (b). 
30) The Times, 6th December, 1965, p. 10 (f)(g). The possibility of 
United Kingdom responsibility for Rhodesian loans is discussed 
infra, pp. 615-617, 652-657. 
31) Serbian and Brazilian Loans case (1929) P.C.I.J. A 20/21, p. 18. 
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international law duties towards them, they can simply impose 
such duties by recognizing Rhodesia. If they wish to impose 
limited duties in specific fields (or even single duties), 
they can accord a recognition which is limited to the imposit-
ion of such duties only.32 ) Thus an international law duty 
not to commit aggression could be imposed by another state 
simply calling on Rhodesia to observe international law in 
this respect.33 ) This would constitute an implied rocognition 
of Rhodesia limited to the field in which international law 
norms relating to aggression applied. In all these cases, 
as we previously submitted, the imposition of duties would be 
purchased at a price which is the undertaking of reciprocal 
duties vis-a-vis Rhodesia by the state affor.ding implied recog-
nition.34) 
Despite the fact that Rhodesian personality exists in an 
extremely limited field, it has been asserted that various 
Rhodesian activities contravene international law though they 
clearly fall outside that field as described by us. These 
assertions have previously been examined and it was submitted 
that/ ... 
---------------------------
32) Supra, pp.lSt)-197,203-205 . Limited r ecognition for particular purposes 
would not, it is submitted, contravene S. Res. 277 (1970) because 
in so far as recognition of the state of Rhodesia is concerned this 
resolution prohibits only recognition of the Republic of Rhodesia. 
Supra, pp .312-313. This would certainly extend to full de iure 
recognition of the Republic, and probably also to de facto recognit-
ion of the same entity but would probably not extend to other forms 
of limited recognition. The resolution also contains prohibitions 
on the recognition of the Government of Rhodesia. This does not 
arise here and is discussed infra, pp.423-424. 
33) Supra, pp. 156-197. 
34) Supra, p. 197. 
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that there was one obvious argument which must apply to each of 
these allegations of unlawfulness.35) An unlawful act in 
international law can only be committed by an entity which 
enjoys personality in that system. To talk of unlawful acts 
without conceding a personality to the actor is a contradict-
ion in terms. The lack of personality in Rhodesia in relation 
to the acts in question seems to be a conclusive answer to 
allegations of infringements of international law.3
6 ) 
Apart altogether from lack of personality in the actor, the 
question whether the alleged conduct objectively conflicts 
with international law is extremely debatable. Let us t~re-
fore see what the particular assertions of unlawfulness on 
Rhodesia's part are.McDougal and Reisman assert as follows: 37 ) 
" the list of indictments of Rhodesian transgressions 
against international law is alarmingly long. As far as 
conventional international law is concerned, the Rhodesian 
authorities have repudiated a number of Security Council 
decisions .... They have also repudiated the human 
rights provisions of the Charter ... and the prescript-
ions of the increasingly authoritative Universal Declarat-
ion. As far as international customary law is concerned, 
they have violated the more traditional human rights 
policies in a degree which ... would have in the past 
served to Justify 'humanitarian intervention' by 
individual nation states . . . . As far as !' 'general 
principles' are concerned, the Rhodesian elites have 
violated the principle of good faith by failing to 
make effective assurances which they gave the United 
Kingdom at various times for Just treatment of the 
African population. The act of unilateral declaration 
of independence and the subsequent internal legislation 
violated ... the principle of self-determination ... as 
well as British Sovereignty ... the assertion of inde-
pendence was an act of irresponsibility in violation of 
the most basic policies of the Charter for the maintenance 
of international order." 
----------------
----------------
----------------
--Repudiation/ ... 
35) 
36) 
37) 
"Rhodesia and the United Nations; the '.uawfulness of International 
Concern: a Qualification" (2) C.I.L.S.A., 1969, p. 454 at pp. 
456-457. 
It is assumed for the purposes of argument that the allegations made 
are factually correct. The question whether there can be internat-
ional responsibility on the part of the individual human beings who 
allegedly perpetrated the acts under consideration is discussed 
infra, pp. 465-468. 
"'rilioaesia and the United Nations: The Lawfulness of International 
Concern" (62) A.J.I.L., 1968, p. 1 at pp. 11-12. 
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Repudiation of Security Council resolutions by Rhodesia is no 
infringment of international law. In the first place, Rhodesia 
is not a member of the United Nations and so is not subject to 
the provisions of Article 25 of the Charter. In the second 
place, the provisions of Article 2 (6) applying to non-members 
are probably juristically ineffective because they attempt to 
bind a non-party to the Charter without its consent.38) Thirdly, 
if we examine the provisions of Article 2 (6) of the Charter, 
they do not in terms impose obligations on non-members of the 
United Nations. Instead they attempt to give the United 
Nations competence to act against non-members .39) Kelsen, 
discussing Article 2 (6), says that the legal competence of a 
special organ is not the mere reflection of a duty on the part 
of the individuals who are subjected to the authority of the 
special organ. Thus even though Rhodesia might conceivably be 
subjected to action by the Security Council that does not mean 
that it has a duty to observe the decisions of the Counci1.40 ) 
Repudiation of the human rights provisions contained in the 
Charter of the United Nations is not necessarily a breach of 
international law. In the first place Rhodesia is not a member 
of the United Nations and in the second place it is doubtful if 
________
________
________
 the/ ... 
38) C.A.Crause, "Enkele Opmerkings oor Besluite van die Veiligheidsraad 
ten opsigte van Rhodesie 11 (29) T.H.R -H.R., 1966, p. 320 at pp . 
332, 333, 334, 
39) Crause, note 38 supra, p. 335 considers such action to be illegal. 
"Dwangaksie van die v.v. teen 'n nie-lid van die organisasie en teen 
die wil van daardie nie-lid, is niks anders as 'n verbreking van die 
algemene volkereg nie. 11 This, wi.th reepect, goes too far. ~or if 
action by the United Nations against a non-member is justified in 
terms of international customary law, the non-member cannc:t complain 
of a breach. See the writer, note 35 supra, pp. 460-461. 
40) H. Kelsen, "The Draft Declaration on Rights and Duties of States" 
(44} A.J.I.L., 1950, p . 259 at p. 264. For further discussion of 
this see the writer, note 35 supra, pp. 460-461. 
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the provisions in question impose legal duties in the matter of 
41) 
human rights even on member states. 
Repudiation of the human rights provisions in the Universal 
Declaration is not necessarily a breach of international law. 
Rhodesia is not a party to the Declaration, the Declaration, 
in any event, was a merely moral instrument at its inception 
and it has not subsequently been transformed by custom into an 
42) 
instrument embodying legal obligatio~s. 
The allegation of violation of traditional human rights such 
as would have Justified humanitarian intervention is also in-
correct. There were no human rights in the traditional system 
of international law. Where humanitarian intervention took 
place this did not necessarily presuppose a breach of inter-
national law by the power against which intervention took 
place. In any event the right of humanitarian intervention was 
not established beyond doubt in the traditional system. Finally, 
the right is now certainly obsolete in the light of the provis-
ions of Article 2 (4) of the Charter of the United Nations 
which prohibits the use of force against the territorial integ-
43) 
ri ty of a state. 
The allegation of violation of good faith is not legally 
relevant. For mere violation of good faith does not amount 
to a violation of international law. The assurances referred 
to operate only on the municipal law or constitutional level. 
44 ) 
The/ •.. 
----------
----------
---------
4 i) See discussion~., pp. 462-463; see too discussion on human right s 
infra, pp.521-527. 
42) See the writer, note 35 supra, pp. 463-464; infra, PP,527-542. 
43) For further discussion see the writer, note 35 supra, pp. 464-465. 
44) See discussion ibid., p. 465. 
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The allegation of violation of the principle of self-determin-
ation is not necessarily an allegation of a violation of inter-
national law. Self-determination has, in all probability, not 
established itself as a legal right in international law. Thus 
it cannot be used by the Rhodesians as a shield or by anyone 
else as a sword against them.45) 
Infringement of British Sovereignty is not a breach of inter-
national law either. For international law does not proclaim 
British sovereignty over palm and pine as far as the inhabit-
ants of British territory are concerned. These have liberty 
to revolt and secede, if they can do so, just as the mother 
country has liberty to crush the revolt or secession, if it can 
do so. International law prohibits neither species of conduct~
6 ) 
Infringement of British Sovereignty may be, and, in the Rhodes-
ian case, undoubtedly was, a breach of municipal law,
47 ) but 
not of international law. 
The allegation of irresponsibility in violation of Charter 
policy for the maintenance of order is probably legally irrel-
evant. An act contrary to United Nations "policy" is not 
necessarily an infringement of international law - especially 
48) 
in the case of a non-member. If, on the other hand., the 
allegation means that the conduct of Rhodesia was a "threat 
to the peace" within the meaning of Article 39, then the 
allegation has legal relevance, for the Security Council may 
take/ ... 
--------------
--------------
-
45) See ibid., pp. 458-460; infra, pp. 519-521. 
46) Supra, pp. 137-138. 
4 7) Supra, pp. 133-135. 
48) See the writer, note 35 supra, p. 465. 
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49) 
take action in such a case. But even though the Security 
Council may take action to remedy the "threat to the peace" 
that is not to say that the conduct of the state deemed to a 
"threat to the peace" is illegal. Illegality on the part of 
the state involved is no prerequisite for the legality of 
Security Council action to remedy the "threat to the peace" 
arising from such conduct.50) 
Our conclusion must be that even if we assume the factual 
accuracy of the various allegations made, that the allegations 
have no substance as allegations of infringement of international 
law. 
(2) Conduct of other entities which may be said to be preJudicial to 
Ehoges1~. 
The conduct of other states against Rhodesia can only be an inter-
national tort or an infringement of rights if it has the following 
two characteristics. 
(a) It must be obJectively a breach of international law. 
If the conduct does not infringe a norm of international law 
it cannot be a wrong against Rhodesia. At most, it is an un-
friendly but quite legal act. Various states have taken various 
actions against Rhodesia which are of an unfriendly character. 
It would be impossible to enumerate all such actions. A few 
salient examples will be given for the purposes of illustrati3!~ 
______
______
______
______
__ Thus/ ... 
49) On the legality of: such aation against .. a· non-member of the United 
Nations, see note 39) supra. 
50) See the writer, note 35 supra, pp. 454-456. 
51) No British action against Rhodesia will be given by way of example. 
The various actions which the United Kingdom has taken against 
Rhodesia will be described later when the position of the United 
Kingdom itself is discussed. See infra, pp. 620-63l. 
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Thus Australia ceased trading, imposed restrictions on the 
entry of Rhodesians into Australia as well as travel and 
currency restrictions.52 ) Austria severed trade relations 
with Rhodesia.53) Belgium promulgated ministerial orders on 
the importation of Rhodesian goods, the export of Belgian goods 
to Rhodesia and the transit of Rhodesian products through 
Belgium.54 ) Botswana refused to allow the transit of petroleum, 
arms and ammunition on the South African-Rhodesian railway, 
terminated flights between Francistown and Bulawayo and 
eliminated the importation of Rhodesian tobacco and beer. 55 ) 
Canada introduced a complete ban on trade with certain humanit-
arian exceptions. 56 ) The Congo (now Zaire) cut all economic 
and commercial ties with Rhodesia.5?) Cyprus imposed compre-
hensive mandatory trade sanctions against Rhodesia.5
8 ) Denmark 
announced a complete embargo on trade with Rhodesia and closed 
its consulate. 59 ) The Federal Republic of Germany terminated 
commodity trade.60 ) France suspended the services of its 
airline U.T.A. t o Salisbury,
61 )and prohibited the transportat i on 
of commodities or products to or from Rhodesia.
62 ) Greece 
prohibited the transportation of certain cargoes from Rhodesia 
64) 
on its merchant ships63 ) and brought all trade to a standstill. 
Hong Kong/ ... 
--------------
-------------
52) s/9853, Annex II, p. 2. 
53) Ibid. , p . 3. 
54) Ibid., p. 4. 
55) Ibid., p. 5, 
56) Ibid., p. 9. 
57) The Times, 2nd February, 1966, p. 11 (b). 
58) s/9853, Annex II, p. 11. 
59) .l!2.i.£·, p. 14. 
60) J.!214. , p . 1 7 . 
61) The Times, 24th February, 1966, p. 10 (g) 
62) s/9853, Annex II, p. 20 . 
63) The Times, 15th March, 1966, p. 8 (g). 
64) s/9853, Annex II, p. 21. 
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Hong Kong banned imports of tobacco.
65) India imposed a total 
ban on trade, implemented United Nations decisions on immigrat-
ion and carriage of goods, banned remittances to Rhodesia and 
excluded the latter from the list of Commonwealth countries 
for the purposes of exchange controi.
66 ) Iran instructed the 
oil companies operating in the Iranian consortium not to sell 
crude oil to Rhodesia.67 ) Iraq broke off economic relations.68 ) 
Italy interrupted economic and commercial relations.
69 )Jama1ca 
ceased trade, communications and social relations.
70 ) Japan 
revised its position relating to trade, remittance of funds, 
transportation, entry of Rhodesians and emigration to Rhodesia.
71 ) 
Kenya prohibited trade, trans-shipment of goods, financial trans-
actions including remittances to Rhodesia and all f orms of 
communication. Residents of Rhodesia were prohibited from 
entering Kenya. 72 ) Jordan would not recognize Rhodesian pass-
ports and cut telephone and telegraph communications with 
Rhodesi~. 73 ) Luxembourg subjected all trade and the transit 
of goods t o licence and refrained from issuing such licences.
74 ) 
The Malagasy Republic prohibited all trade and access to 
Rhodesian ships and aircraft. 75) Malawi abrogated a trade 
agreement with Rhodesia and suspended financial dealings with 
Rhodesia/ ... 
-------------
-------------
---
65) The Times, 15th December, 1965, p. 8 (f). 
66) s/9853, Annex II, t>· 23. 
67) The Times, 23rd November, 1965, p. 11 (f). 
68) Ibid., 13th December, 1965, p. 7 (e). 
69) s/9853, Annex II, p. 25. 
70) Ibid., p. 26. 
71) Ibid. , p. 27. 
72) Ibid., p. 28. 
73) The Times, 17th December, 1965, p. 10 (e); 30th December,1965,p.6 {b ) . 
74) s/9853, Annex II, p . 31. 
75) Ibid., p. 32. 
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Rhodesia. 76 ) Libya and Malaysia announced a complete trade 
embargo with Rhodesia. 77 ) The Netherlands implemented the 
sanctions decreed by the Security Counci1. 78) New Zealand 
prohibited all relations, trade and otherwise with Rhodesia. 79 ) 
Niger prohibited trade and air communications with Rhodesia.Bo) 
Nigeria placed an embargo on all trade with Rhodesia.
81 ) Norway 
ceased all trade and other reJations.8'2) Singapore placed a 
complete ban on exports and imports.83) Sudan instituted a 
boycott against Rhodesia. 84 ) Sweden implemented Security 
Council resolutions. 85) Switzerland banned the ·export of arms 
and ammunition to Rhodesia, temporarily blocked the Rhodesian 
Reserve Bank's account in the Swiss National Bank and took steps 
to prevent Rhodesia using Switzerland as a funnel for exports 
to West Europe. For the latter purpose all Rhodesian goods 
entering Switzerland required import licences and these would 
not be granted above the normal volume of imports in recent 
years.&5) Trinidad and Tanzania announced complete Trade 
87) 88) 
embargoes. Uganda prohibited all dealings. The Soviet 
Union/ ... 
-------------
-------------
--
76) The Times, 19th November, 1965, p. 10 (d); 9th December, 1965, p.9(b ) . 
The latter measure was taken pending discussions on ways in which 
Malawi could pay for imports from Rhodesia since Rhodesia refused to 
accept payment in sterling. 
77) The Times, 8th December, 1965, p. 8 (f). 
78) s/9853, Annex II, p. 37-
79) Ibid., p. 38. 
8o) Ibid., p. 40. 
81) ~Times, 8th Decembe~, 1965, p. 8 (f). 
82) s/9&53, Annex II, p. 42 . 
83) Ibid., p. 46. 
84) .Il?,ig_., pp. 4 7-51. 
85) Ibid. , p. 52 . 
&5) The Times, 18th December, 1965, p. 5 (d). 
87) .I£ig_., 8th December, 1965, p. 8 (f). 
88) s/9853, Annex II, p . 53 . 
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Union prohibited all trade and other relations.89) The United 
Arab Republic broke off economic relations. 90 ) The United 
States prohibited trade.91 ) So too did the Republic of Viet-
Nam.92) Zambia refused to recognize Rhodesian passports and 
travel certificates,93 ) removed Commonwealth preference on 
many commodities imported from Rhodesia, prohibited Zambian 
dealings on the Salisbury stock exchange, banned Rhodesian 
currency, 94 ) required visas on the part of Rhodesian citizens 
entering Zambia and the signing of a declaration on entry re-
nouncing the Smith regime,95) restricted various payments to 
Rhodesia, imposed general import and export control requiring 
licences for all but essential commodities, and introduced 
surveillance of the border.96 ) Further, it continued to reduce 
its trade with Rhodesia. 
None of the above described conduct is objectively an infringe-
ment of international law and so, in the absence of a treaty 
duty to the contrary, cannot be illegal, even if it were 
committed against a fully recognized subject of international 
law. 97 ) 
(b) The conduct must be committed in a sphere in which Rhodesian 
personality exists and it must be committed by an entity against 
which Rhodesian personality exists. 
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
 .Rhodesia/ ... 
89) Ibid .. , p. 55. 
90) The Times, 13th December, 1965, p. 7 (e). 
91) s/9853 Annex II, p. 56. 
92) s/9853/Add. 1, Annex I, p.4. 
93) The Times, 19th November, 1965, p. 10 (d). 
94) Ibid., 22nd November, 1965, p. 8(f). 
95) Ibid., 3rd December, 1965, p. 11 (a). 
96) Ibid., 7th December, 1965, p. 10 (d). 
97) s/9853/Add. I, Annex I, p. 5. 
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Rhodesia as we have seen possesses a limited personality against 
South Africa.98 ) Thus, for instance, it might be argued that 
tho freezing of Rhodesian assets in South Africa by the Reserve 
Bank (reluctantly and under pressure from the Bank of England) 
was a breach of international law.99) So t oo Rhodesia continues 
to enjoy the membership of certain international organizations 
and as such is entitled to the rights incidental to such member-
ship.loo) Denial of these rights would be a prima facie breach 
of international law. Thus, for instance, refusal to handle 
Rhodesian mail by India,lOl) Kenya, 102 ) Mali,l03) the Soviet 
Union,lo4) Jordanl05) and seven other countrieslo6) was prima 
107) 
facie a breach of the Universal Postal Convention. We have 
also seen how Rhodesia enjoys a limited personality embodying 
certain basic rights against member states of the O.A.s.
108) 
Thus, for instance, hypothetically, aggression by any one of 
these states against Rhodesia would be an infringement of the 
basic rights of the latter and thus an international tort. 
On the other hand where the conduct, though objectively i t 
would be a tort against a fully recognized subject of inter-
national law, is committed in a sphere in which Rhodesian 
__________
__________
_______ ... -
98) Supra, p. 379. 
99) The Times, 22nd December, 1965, p. 8 (g). 
100) Supra, pp. 380-382. 
101) s/9853, Annex, p. 23. 
102) Ibid., p .28. 
103) Ibid., p. 34. 
lo4) Ibid., p. 55. 
105) S/9853 Add I, p. 4. 
1o6) s/9853, Annex III, p. 12. 
ersonality/ .. . 
107) The breuch is only a prima facie one and there are further factors 
to consider which are connected with the recognition of the Govern-
ment of Rhodesia and the capacity of the latter to issue postage 
stamps which must be recognized for the purpose of pi.'epayment of 
postage in other countri es. The matter is discussed infra,pp.427-428 
where the recognition of the Government of Rhodesia is considered. 
108) Supra, pp. 378-379. 
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personality does not exist, it is not an international tort 
against Rhodesia. Thus Kenya removed and impounded cargoes 
bound for Rhodesia at Nairobi f09) The United States annulled 
the sale of thirty six heavy diesel locomotives to RhodesiallO) 
and refused to allow the importation of 9,500 tons of Rhodesian 
111) 
sugar already sold and on the seas in transit. The United 
Kingdom blocked the payment of income from sterling securities 
to Rhodesian residents. 112 ) It also seized the assets of the 
Reserve Bank of Rhodesia held abroact. 113 ) Hypothetically other 
states need not accord the right to sue and sovereign immunity 
to Rhodesia before their courts nor admit th~ validity of the 
internal acts of the Rhodesian Government. 114 ) Hypothetically, 
not even aggression would be an international tort against 
Rhodesia. 115) Thus the alleged conduct of subversive broad-
casts by Zambia containing incitement to murder and sabotage 
in Rhodesia, even if true, 116 ) the affording of facilitiBs to 
para-military forces in Zambia for the purpose of armed in-
cursions into Rhodesia, the conditional declaration of war 
made by President Kaunda in the event of Rhodesian interfer-
ence with the common services, the threat to use force in the 
form of military operations by President Kaunda, 117)the threat 
by/ ... 
--------------------
----------
109) The Times, 14th December, 1965, p. 8 (g). 
110) Ibid., 13th November, 1965, p. 10 (c). 
111) Ibid., 22nd November, 1965, p. 10 (g). 
112) Ibid., 12th November, 1965, p. 12 (e). 
113) Ibid., 4th December, 1965, p. 8 (a). 
114) Gelston v. Hoyt, 3 Wheat. 246; Rose v. Hime ly (18o8) 4 Cranch 241; 
The Nereide (1815) 9 Cranch 388; The Annette; The Dora (1919] 
P.105; City of Berne v. Bank of England (18o4) 9 Ves. Jun. 347. 
115) Thus Quincy Wright "The Chinese Recognition Problem" (49) A.J.I.L., 
1955 ., p. 320 at p. 333 says that if Chiang Kai Shek and the communists 
attacked each other, neither could be accused of aggress~on. 
116) The Times, 5th March, 1966, p. 7 (d)(e); 9th March, 1966, p. 13 (a). 
117) The Times, 10th December, 1965, p. lO(a); 31st December, 1965, 
p. 9(a). 
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by Ghana to use military force, 118 ) would not be international 
torts against Rhodesia. Aggression against Rhodes i a would 
however have the following implications: 
(i) It would constitute a tort against the United Kingdom 
whose sovereignty over the territory is recognized by 
all states except South Africa.119 ) Schwarzenberger says: 
"So long as Rhodesia is not recognized as a 
subject of international law, the only country 
against which any breach of the rule of territor-
ial inviolability has been committed is the 
United Kingdom, and the United Kingdom may be 
thought to haye waived its right of international 
complaint on this score." 120) 
, (i i) If the aggressor ls a member state of the United Nations, 
aggression would be a breach of its obligation under 
Article 2 (4) to refrain from the threat or use of force, 
but no wrong would be committed against Rhodesia as such. 
(iii) The individual human beings responsible for such aggression 
would in all probability, commit an international crime 
121) 
against peace. 
Finally, we must consider action taken by the United Nations 
against Rhodesia. 122 ) Crause has asserted that such action is 
illegal. 
"Dwangaksie van die V.V. teen 'n nie-lid van die 
organisasie en teen die wil van daardie nie-lid, is niks 
anders as 'n verbreking van die algemene volkereg nie." 
He goes on to say that the action of the Security Council 
118) The Times, 13th November, 1965, p.10 (c)(d). 
i19) Supra, pp; 365~,66. 
II -1 
•••• ma&" •••• 
120) "Ter rorists, Hijackers, Guerrilleros and Mercenaries" (24) C.L. P., 
1971, p. 257 at p. 278 . 
121) See discussion of the international responsibility of the individual 
in the context of responsibility of the individual members of the 
Rhodesian Government. Infra, pp.465-468 . The same principles are 
applicable here mutatis mutandis. 
122) Action such as that taken under S. Res.2~1 (1956); S. Res. 232 
(1966); S. Res. 253 (1968); S. Res. 277 (1970 ). 
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" mag 'n uitdrukking van magspolitiek wees, maar dit 
het beslis nie sy grondslag in die algemene volkereg 
nie ... 11 123) 
It is submitted however that the actions taken by the United 
Nations against Rhodesia were lawful if only for the reason 
that if they were to be unlawful, they would have to infringe 
the rights of an international person. A wrong in any legal 
system can only be committed against a legal person. Rhodesia's 
personality does not operate in the spheres in which this 
conduct has taken place. Hence other states and international 
persons (such as the United Nations) cannot owe it duties and 
commit wrongs against it in these spheres. 124 ) 
The above acts on the part of states and international organiz-
ations against Rhodesia are lawful because of lack of Rhodesian 
personality. 
In practice, however, such lack of personality does not have 
such drastic consequences as might at first sight be thought. 
Retaliation by the state in question is always a possibility 
and will serve to check at least some kinds of activity by 
other states against it.125) Many kinds of relations falling 
short of international law relations may be maintained with 
such an entity.126 ) But there are certainly inconveniences 
which usually result from :ack of personality attributable 
_______
_______
_______
____ to/ ... 
123) Crause, note 38),supra, p. 335. 
124) See the writer, note 35) supra, pp. 465-466. 
125) Lauterpacht, pp. 52-53. 
126) Ibid., p. 53. 
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to non-recognition. Amongst these the principal inconveniences 
are the following: the inability to sue in the courts of other 
states and claim sovereign immunity before such courts; non-
recognition of the acts of its government as having the custom-
ary legal effect in other states; no diplomatic immunity for 
its representatives; 127) the experiencing of difficulty in 
changing its money; getting official quotations from other 
states for the same; getting financial assistance; the 
uncertainty surrounding its concessions (which is not enco~r-
aging for foreign capital for development) and non-recognition 
128) 
of its passports. 
Chapter IV/ ... 
--------------------------
127) See the writer, "Status of Rhodesia in International Law", 
Acta Juridica, 1967, p. 44. 
128) Sir John Fisher Williams, "I.a doctrine de la reconnaissance en 
droit international et ses d~veloppements r~foents" (44) H.R., 
1933, II, p. 203 at p. 243. 
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